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Initials

REPORT FROM CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL BRANCH ISSUED BY THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT, BY COMBINED PERSONNEL OF U.S. AND BRITISH SERVICES FOR USE OF ALLIED FORCES.

Information on various GAF war methods and experience obtained from the former chief of "Air Command West" (Luftwaffen Kommando West). Major General Schmid British source. Received in Britain 14 July 1945.

Whenever individual aircraft flew over the NORTH SEA to lay mines the same number of blips appeared as for a stream of bombers. This happened regularly from November 1943 on. I had no faith in those blip indications, but General MARTINI thought them very important. I don't know what caused it whether it was due to bad organisation of our DF installations or because the enemy only used their instruments occasionally. They were no good to me for tactical purposes. If I had received the reports on batches of them like the 'Rotterdam' reports, for instance: "a lot of blips here", and five minutes later "a corresponding number of blips now further East", then I could have used it. However, if you merely get one blip here and another there, covering the entire area, it's no use. As it was the DFing was very inaccurate.

The fact that we could DF the 'Rotterdam' instrument was decisive for recognition of bomber streams from October 1943 until the large-scale night attacks on NUREMBERG which cost such heavy losses to the Allies. That must have been on the 7th or 9th April 1944. Then attacks ceased until they produced those long tin-foil strips. Until then I only went by reports on 'Rotterdam'. All other reports were only a confirmation of the correctness of the DFing of 'Rotterdam'. The DFing of 'Rotterdam' even gave me the take-off of the first aircraft. In November 1943, when a large-scale raid on Berlin took place, and the first bombe dropped at 7:30 in the evening, I already knew at 5:15 by 'Rotterdam' report that planes were assembling over the English mainland.

We could establish quite accurately: "They are taking off now". We could establish the assembling quite accurately. Then we kept track constantly, every three minutes. I demanded that this be done as I had Hauptmann RUECKHEIM (?), who was in charge of the interception (Kompanie) which did the DFing, at my battle HQ. They first brought me single 'Rotterdam' reports, which were no good to me as I needed batches of them. Where is the main concentration of 'Rotterdam' I could see it on my maps. I kept on getting a circle which moved every 2 min. (sic). If it made a sudden bend you could tell exactly: now they are over OSNABRUECK, now they are passing to the North of HANOVER, with three minutes' difference in time and five minutes' delay. Therefore, whenever I entered the 'Rotterdam' report in my chart - it was called report on 'Rotterdam circle' (Kreismeldungen) a better name for it would have been concentration report (Buendelmeldung) I had to take into account an extra five minutes' flying time. I got reports every three minutes.

We knew very early that the Allies were using the 'Boomerang' Method, even before I took over the 'Korps'. However we were only able to profit by it at the end of 1943 and beginning of 1944. We could make use of it to such an extent that we were able to warn our airfields in HOLLAND beforehand.

When Mosquitos appeared to interfere with our take-off we could say at once "Attention, 'Boomerang' operating in direction of LEEUWARDEN, DEELEN, GILZERIEN, VENLO !". Thereupon lights were extinguished and we quickly took-off before, or else waited until the bombs had fallen and then took-off. Afterwards, in the summer, after the invasion had started and it was possible to advance the 'Boomerang' stations further on the Continent, we got our information even up to the RUHR district. We could tell exactly in summer, when an attack was about to take place: "It is a 'Boomerang' directed attack on ESSEN or DUISBURG." Accordingly one could tell which town was to be attacked. However, we sometimes were led astray: the 'Boomerang' directed attack was a diversionary attack by Mosquitos and the main attack was elsewhere; then our night-fighters were somewhere in the RUHR district and had to rush after them, I don't know whether it was done on purpose or just by chance. On the other hand we were able to notice when the 'Boomerang' directed Mosquito attack, which also served a path-finding purpose, didn't coincide with the following bomber formation as regard time. Then we had plenty of time to bring our night-fighters up, because the bomber formations kept on shouting: "Where are you?" They called for the pathfinders on several occasions.

The 'J-beams' were those which were sent out to mark the area which was to be attacked, directional beams. We knew 'J-beams' had been switched on, sometimes half an hour before they left - and until March and April 1944 we were able to conclude by that whether the attack was directed towards Northern or Southern GERMANY. It was very useful to us. Its usefulness ceased in April 1944, because all (?) J-beams' were switched on. At that stage I couldn't tell whether the attack was to be on BERLIN or the RUHR district. I could only say it would be to the North of the THURINGIAN FOREST on Northern GERMANY. It was invariable accurate, but one day that ceased to work. After April of last year we could no longer rely on 'Rotterdam' DFing because there were too few apparatus.

Until the attack on NUREMBERG, in April 44, indications with the 'Rotterdam' were very clear. Then the question arose: "Do the Mosquitos carry 'Rotterdam' instruments or not?" The minute Mosquitos carried 'Rotterdam' our night fighters would start following the Mosquito which they could not catch, and would follow every feint attack. I assume Mosquitos carried 'Rotterdam' in the Spring of last year. I used to have a speed-chart drawn up on purpose showing the speed at which the 'Rotterdam' moved on, taking wind strength etc. into account according to this there must have been Mosquitos among the aircraft. After the NUREMBERG attack we ceased receiving batches of 'Rotterdam' reports and only got single-ones. It was the same everywhere. Our long-range locating apparatus 'Wuerzburg-Riese' etc. as far as they were not jammed on the Dutch coast gave us DF signals up in the NORTH SEA - DF streaks; we didn't know where they (enemy aircraft) were and how far away, all we knew was: there is something out there. Thus I got the 'Rotterdam' reports at the same moment as the aircraft reporting service (Flugmeldedienst) reported aircraft noises somewhere near the islands. Therefore the Allies must have switched on their 'Rotterdam' only shortly before crossing the coast and then only a few. This was too late for me.

On an average the 'Flak' only accounted for 3% of hostile planes shot down at night. I don't want you to misunderstand me. I still maintain that 'Flak' is absolutely necessary because of the repellent effect it undoubtedly has, but it isn't capable of bringing down much more than I mentioned. Above all one must take into account the number of aircraft which returned home damaged. In the raid on NUREMBERG in which 96 Allied planes were shot down the 'Flak' accounted for none of them. The first aircraft were shot down near MEPPEN. When opposing a stream of bombers it is important to shoot down aircraft at an early stage. None of them was shot down over NUREMBERG itself. I don't

want to exaggerate - perhaps the NUREMBERG 'Flak' brought down two or three, I don't know for certain.

There is one thing one must take into consideration. 'Flak' can only obtain considerable results, when it has many opportunities for firing. Until then NUREMBERG had hardly been attacked at all. The 'Flak' there had no experience in firing. Captured pilots all said the most dangerous 'Flak' was around HAMBURG, BERLIN and in the RUHR, and that all the others weren't bad. We have to thank Churchill that we got so much 'Flak'. In one of his speeches in the House of Commons between the end of 1940 and Spring 1941 he stated, after he too had been attacked on account of unsatisfactory AA results - : "I need AA if only for reasons of morale for the population." He was right. After this speech our 'Flak' people rushed off to the FUEHRER and said: "There you see CHURCHILL also said more 'Flak'."

The poor results of 'Flak' were also caused by attacks taking place over a relatively short period. The longer an attack lasts - like the ones which were made on us at the beginning of the war, when an attack lasted up to an hour and a half and aircraft kept on appearing in ones, twos, and threes - the better one will be able to take aim and bring them down. But if six or eight-hundred bombers thunder overhead within the space of ten minutes your chances of success are far less. They used to fire for another ten minutes at the clouds of 'window' - those fools - then our night fighters arrived and had to land at the airports around BERLIN; all the gun crews were so flustered by large-scale attack. They had become quite mad through the constant abuse they got and fired for all they were worth as soon as they heard a buzzing sound. At that time the crews consisted merely of children and Russians. Unfortunately I was not myself in charge of Flak. I used to order through the Flak Liaison officer that fire should not be directed above a certain height; but they said "No"! I couldn't order them about.

In GERMANY we only had static 'Flak'. We only had two or three railway 'Abteilungen' (Bns) which travelled in the wake of the raids. If MUNICH was attacked twice running, they went down to MUNICH. The following day BERLIN was the target and they dashed up there again. Each enemy air-crew which was brought down was asked by what they were shot down and then the 'Flak' people came and said: "Look here, they were brought down by 'Flak'." They were often found and had bailed out at places where there was no 'Flak' at all. But as they had been brought down by upward-slanting aircraft armament (Schraege Musik) from below, they didn't realise that this had been done by night fighters and were taken completely by surprise. We never used photographic apparatus in fighter-aircraft at night, but we used 'Robot' cameras during the day. At one time we used them a lot, but in the end they dropped them. One couldn't make certain of the destruction of a plane by following it with a 'Jagdschloss' device, as this was still in its infancy. Only very limited use could be made of it. If there was a 'Jagdschloss' 40 km away from BERLIN, the blips from the big BERLIN buildings showed in it too, not counting the ones caused by the surrounding woods. They hindered us a great deal. If some aircraft had been dropping 'window' at random during the day, then the tube was full of blips. You couldn't distinguish enemy aircraft from your own. You had to switch over. It took several minutes before the blips made by the 'window' in the tube had disappeared. That was a great disadvantage. The 'Jagdschloss' only had one advantage - by day it enabled you to establish where the American streams were flying. You saw their vanguards but not what followed. It was similar at night. It was quite impossible to fly on an isolated operation based on information through the 'Jagdschloss'. With great experience you could establish the approximate direction of their approach but that was all. As it was it was in its infancy. We had between forty and fifty of these apparatus. The first ones came out exactly a year ago. The first was at the BAER position near BERLIN and another in HOLLAND at the

HAASE position, then there was one at DARMSTADT. When you left at the end of 44 I believe there were round about forty.

GOERING paid no heed to the views of his 'Kommandeure' on the ineffectiveness of the 'Jagdschloss' but listened to the outbursts of irresponsible people. They arrived too late moreover, and weren't of any practical use because they needed an incredible amount of current and, on account of the constant interruptions and shortage of current, part of them were never brought into action. The main source of interference was the use of 'window'. Of course I should add that it might have been a different story had we had sufficient current and better personnel. Our old experienced personnel was continuously being withdrawn from our locating positions and transferred to the paratroop army and were replaced by women or other impossible people. When dealing with high-frequency apparatus you can't just put anyone in the job and say: "You'll act as technician." As a result one never developed them any further.

On the whole we accomplished more in our interception service than in our Radar organisation; we were forced to. I wanted to get a move on by instituting a flying interception service which would act as jamming organisation at the same time. We never got that far. I wanted to do the same thing as the English did with their 100th Bomber Group, not over Britain, but in GERMANY. I wanted to intercept and jam from the air, not from the ground, using our excellent interception WT. They were our best men and I pinned great faith in it. Whilst flying to DELLE (?) from BERLIN on 16 September 1943 the idea of what we later called 'observer' aircraft struck me. It was like this: at the time the predominant night-fighting tactics were the 'Wilde Sau' (wild boar), developed from KAMMHUBER's inflexible night-fighting system which went to such lengths that if an officer, like, for instance, HERGET, was hunting enemy aircraft in a neighbouring area, next to the one allocated to him, because there were none in his own area, he had to obey the 'Reise, Reise' order, that is, was obliged to land as he wasn't authorised to fly in that area. From this Inflexible method sprang suddenly the free lance 'Wilde Sau', in which everyone can do as he pleases. At that time the enemy still made a lot of use of flares in their attacks; that is to say they used flares for the assembly and during the approach flight whenever a change of course was indicated, and again shortly before the target, before the point of assembly and eventually for the attack. The first "Christmas trees" were dropped then. That was quite an innovation. We had our own observer aircraft, called 'Beppos', and as soon as the first 'Rotterdam' reports of the outward flight arrived that is if the outward flight headed in the direction of the ZUIDER ZEE - I placed observers, two over the RUHR area, two at BREMEN, two at HAMBURG and two at HANOVER. These men were particularly efficient officers who had made a study of flares based on the Intelligence Officer's data and who knew enemy methods of attack; they informed us about what they saw from the air by WT and on many occasions we had to thank them that we arrived in time. During the large-scale attack on HANOVER, in which I believe forty five hostile aircraft were downed, one of these observers made an excellent job of it; he gave us the changes of course and the markers in a most efficient manner. Of course this ceased as soon as the attackers no longer depended on flares and used other methods.

Our reconnaissance planes were directed by Y-procedure. We continued using it for DFing on 'Rotterdam'; aircraft were sent up equipped with 'Naxos', they were used again afterwards. All my old recce pilots were killed. They were good and were thrown in on daylight operation, in which they were all killed. Afterwards we called the people who used 'Naxos', 'Aufklaerer' (recce). However, the 'Naxos' was no good for the general picture of the situation, as we followed up each individual 'Rotterdam' and not the batches of 'Rotterdam' and this was no good. I personally never understood why 'Rotterdam' was switched on. In my opinion that was the greatest mistake.

It was a much greater mistake than the other Allied practice of following the same approach route every night. I must prepare myself for what is coming, and the more time I have for that the better, for the whole show only took three to four hours anyhow, sometimes less than that. The fact

that I received the first 'Rotterdam' report from the time I had coffee at half-past five in the evening, was an enormous advantage. In the winter I could tell my people half an hour before the take-off saying: "Look out, they're coming to-day! 'Rotterdam' are in the north, that's to say for attacks on NORTERN GERMANY." So everyone was already mentally prepared for it. The worst thing is if you are sitting there from 6 o'clock in the evening onwards, under orders: "Pilots in aircraft, telephone connected". Then you hear: "The first DF contacts up there!" All people at 'Gruppe' headquarters start wondering: "What will it be? An attack on the RUHR? Or - ? "New DF contacts here." Another DF contact. Everything in complete confusion. Finally no clear picture of the situation at all. That makes the command nervous. It makes the men nervous. For that reason I maintain that the 'Rotterdam' DFing was the greatest mistake, because it gave us an absolute certainty of the time and angle of approach of enemy flight.

The considerable decline in losses inflicted on the allied Air Forces following the invasion I attribute, firstly to the fact that our whole preliminary warning system, interception, DF services and aircraft reporting service, was knocked out and that, for reasons which are now completely incomprehensible to me, we did not succeed in setting up this system further to the rear in time. That was the main reason. The second reason was that just at that time they introduced new methods, that's to say the long 'window', with the many diversionary attacks by Mosquitos, all new things which could have been soon countered by an experienced organisation on our side. But it was no longer possible to achieve that. Then finally as the third thing, came the shortage of gasoline combined with - what I have already described exhaustively - the lack of flying experience among the crews, the falling-off of the 'SN 2' readiness. The aircraft were no longer kept in the hangars. All these innumerable small details had the accumulated effect of decreasing the efficiency of the night-fighters to a fearful extent. Then in addition, as perhaps the final blow, came the fact that the High Command had become extremely nervous through these set-backs; it had been in a complete muddle altogether since the invasion, and was open to all sorts of ideas. One of them said: "Oh, I don't need any long range night fighters." "I don't need any apparatus. I'll take off when I feel like it." etc. So there was no longer any strict control of night-fighters. SOUTHERN GERMANY, particularly, suffered most from it because the gap was greatest there.

MARTINI is the man I should blame for not withdrawing our organisation quickly enough. I told the signals officer in PARIS, whose name was I think HENTSCHE (?) - an absolute tyro who had never seen a cathode-ray tube in his life, much less an 'SN2' or sound detector - as well as MARTINI, all my troubles, and made suggestions for improvement. I told both of them they were sabotaging the defence (?) of the REICH. In spite of that nothing happened. And GOERING didn't understand such matters. Their only answer was: "All right, that's being done. That's not so bad." They didn't believe that FRANCE was lost either. In PARIS hundreds of DF sets fell into American hands, and I didn't have a single one where I was. The sets I mean were the kind with which, for instance, one DFs 'Rotterdam'!. Carefully stored in the signals ordnance store, well greased, and with little labels and everything. The signals officer's name, as I have mentioned, was, I think, HENTSCHE (?), a General. But I ought to qualify my original remark a little. It was not really MARTINI's fault; the fault lay rather in the organisation itself. He had too much to do. He was supposed to put the telephone line in EAST PRUSSIA in order; was to bring his junk home from BUCAREST in time. Then trouble flared up in ITALY. Then he was to bring his stuff home from the BALKANS, and was to do things up here. I mean there's a limit to what one man can do. If this matter had been made one person's concern for the West, let's say, the defence of the REICH, or night defence, then we would have done the thing ourselves. In so far, MARTINI's guilt was, so to speak, a tragic one.

In 1943 the unit responsible for DFing on Rotterdam was, as I well remember, an interception 'Kompanie' which was stationed in HOLLAND and which came under Paris because HOLLAND was a foreign country. It was under RUCKHEIM (?) who received Dutch Schnaps from me, and for that reason came to see me in secret, because he was forbidden to have anything to do with me. I gave him the signals people and the apparatus. This officer could vouch for what I say. An extraordinarily capable lad, completely un-military. I had a great pool of signals people. So I asked: "Who knows any English? Who has studied high frequencies? Who is a precision mechanic? Who has a university degree etc." Then I sent for about 200 of them and picked out suitable ones. We left them to work locked up, and said: "Now let's see what will come out of that." Then DFing started in HOLLAND. That's to say not actually DFing, but that was the centre where the DF plots were collated covering the area to the line BREMEN-STUTT GART. They couldn't DF further than that. But on MARTINI's orders these DFings were to go through PARIS to me. He gave it only to me direct, in secret. Then the second 'Rotterdam' or interception 'Kompanie' was set up in BERLIN, and stationed in BERLIN. They DF'd from BREMEN across to STETTIN, and then later also down to SOUTHERN GERMANY. But they didn't know how to do it properly. This 'Kompanie' came under WEISE. He had the DFings sent to his house, and then we got them. Then later we set up an interception reporting centre at TREUEN-BRIETZEN, under RUCKHEIM (?), at which all the DFing from the whole REICH were collected. The WT interception 'Regiment' West was originally in PARIS and RUCKHEIM (?) as interception 'Kompanie' belonged to this WT Interception 'Regiment' West. But the WT Interception Regiment was only concerned with the tactical WT communications of the TAF of the Americans and English. I wasn't interested in that, and in aircraft numbers etc. What they did was no good except for a history of the war.

A fourth man was added to night-fighter crew for observation purposes, he was supposed to watch out to the rear. I made it optional that a fourth man could be taken; it wasn't ordered. This additional man, as I have said was to watch for enemy aircraft behind. It is a fact that the number of aircraft shot down by Mosquitos was comparatively small expressed as a percentage, but its unsettling effect was great because of the fact that the people were disturbed when taking-off, and got nervous, and no longer listened to their orders. They got a certain fear of night-fighters. Whoever recognised a Mosquito in time and was able to bank sharply, got away. The long-range night-fighters were the ones which spoiled our picture of the situation most of all, because of the fact that they flew on either side and ahead of the bomber force, that they had a higher speed and were sent into operation in waves, so they completely upset the aircraft reporting service. I don't know how the Japanese are equipped for aircraft recognition. If their equipment is the same as ours, then it would be only sensible for the Allies to employ against this the same methods by which they dealt with us. I know that the Japanese were shown everything we had and that they copy everything faithfully; but not a single one of my night-fighter' crews went to Japan as long as I was responsible. I had command until January 1945. After that HUTH executed the orders, but PELZ had control. My own last post was GAF command WEST (Luftwaffenkommando West).

Actually, in my opinion the upward-slanting armament, as introduced in our planes, was a confession of cowardice. But my serious view is that it had a great advantage over the armament pointing straight ahead. If I use a weapon pointing straight ahead, then I have to fire, whether from behind or ahead or from somewhere else, from a position at the same altitude as my target. On clear nights without moon or mist, good crews can see 800 m, and exceptional individuals up to 1000 m. If someone whose eyes are used to night flying is in a Lancaster he can see anyone approaching to fire weapons pointing straight ahead. You will have had it confirmed a thousand times by our night-fighters that their crews were particular good at that, and that any of our aircraft which were not able to shoot theirs down with upward-slanting armament, that is to surprise them really caught it hot. But if one of our pilots had upward-slanting armament then as soon as he saw a bomber he would turn away; then he would quite slowly creep in underneath and shoot it from down below. We always had to tell

inexperienced crews to clear off as soon as they saw the enemy aircraft had been hit, because we had several cases of enemy bombers falling on to our own aircraft.

Whether the omission from the British Lancasters of the rear gunner's position, and turrets, with a view to augmenting speed, would have proved worth while is hard for me to judge, especially as I don't know what increase of speed it would have given if they had left them out. It would have been more unpleasant from my stand point if the Lancasters had flown 1000 m higher, than if they had flown any faster. The '110', equipped as she was with armour, WT apparatus and the third man, was so heavy that she could not be made to fly any higher. Something would have had to be discarded, and the '88' - people who treated her very well and who kept on flying higher and higher with her, said that they should have been able to reach a ceiling 2000 m. higher, but in fact it had also more or less reached a limit of its engines. Whereas, as regards speed - I am no expert to be able to say how much speed would have been gained by leaving out the gun turret - but, if we assume, say, 80 kmph, we could just about have managed that. A greater height would have been considerably more awkward.

There were '219' mainly in the RUHR district. When I left there were two 'Gruppen' there but they were reduced to one afterwards. Up to the time the Americans demolished WIENER-NEUSTADT, our highest figure of '219's' in the GAF was over one hundred. Only 1/NJG 1 had '219's' - and 'Gruppe' II. However, the rest of the 'Gruppe' were not only supposed to get these machines; they actually had them for about four or five weeks; they had one set of '219' and a 'Gruppe' of '110's'. When that large-scale raid on WIENER-NEUSTADT took place, I said: "All right, the '219' is finished with; you will keep the '110' as a supplement to the '219' for the time being - the rest of them will go to 'Gruppe' I as replacements. Had WIENER-NEUSTADT not been destroyed we planned to equip the whole of NJG 1 with '219's'.

The manoeuvre by which Allied four engined bombers often descended to very low level after releasing their loads was an excellent thing, above all because flying at different altitudes decreases a night-fighter's chance of bringing them down. Nothing is simpler than when one is able to notify a night-fighter: "The whole bomber stream is flying at 5600 m". But if they all fly at different altitudes and especially if they go down to low level after dropping their bombs - that was frequently most awkward for us. As to flying I am a firm believer in the frequent altering of one's tactics. Inflexible adherence to one single tactic is always a disadvantage and in night attacks the tactics should be changed as often as possible. As far as the British are concerned, they were true to type, and used the same tactics for a very long time, attaining, however, an incredible perfection in those tactics. The discipline of their bomber formation above all as regards WT, but also in actual flying, was exemplary. This would have been harder to maintain had English tactics been continually altered. Things of that sort must be practised every detail must be pre-arranged. I believe that night-attacks and any alteration of night tactics in particular, need thorough briefing - time calculations, navigational preparations etc. One needs picked personnel. A year ago British night-flying had by frequent practice reached a zenith of excellence.

I understand the British were in a position to employ 'Window' (antiradar tinfoil) a year before they actually did so in July 1943; and I believe they could have used it the moment our bombing raids on ENGLAND ceased to strike them as dangerous without risking any disadvantage thereby. In my opinion the earliest date would have been the time we embarked on our Russian campaign, and the latest date after STALINGRAD. They started using it too late.

Nevertheless, 'Window' proved extremely profitable to you by blinding us for a time and by upsetting KAMMHUBER's whole 'Himmelbett' system. KAMMHUBER would have been finished six months sooner in that case. I mentioned STALINGRAD, and the start of our Russian war as appropriate dates because all our bomber forces were transferred from the West to the East, except for two 'Gruppen'. Afterwards, I believe, only KG 2 remained in the West. On the other hand I do not think that

the (jamming) Group 100, which did its most effective work for the allies after the invasion, could have achieved comparable success before we had lost our outer defence.

Under order we sometimes sent up our night-fighters by day to attack American four engined planes. This I considered lunacy. I can't say for certain when it was first done, but I assume it was during the American large-scale attack on SCHWEINFURT-RATISBON-ITALY in August 1943, when that through flight took place. Then I was ordered to send them up as soon as the American bombers were beyond the reach of their escorting fighters; at that time American fighters escorted them up to about a line from EMDEN to the RHINE. On 10th November 1943, early, at 8 o'clock, we suddenly heard to our surprise: "Thunderbolt. - o.k. ". That was the first time; I went along as far as WILHELMSHAFEN. I then reported: "This fact makes it impossible to use night-fighters any more." I was told that I was wrong in saying the American escort fighters accompanied the bomber as far as that. Then GALLAND took off himself and reported to GOERING that he had come into combat with American fighters over HANOVER and later on in the BERLIN area, because GOERING hadn't believed it. A long-range-fighter 'Geschwader' (wing) was then formed, originally consisting of '110's' and afterwards of '410's'. It was sheer suicide. At that time the FUEHRER's crazy orders were carried out to the effect that 5 cm. cannon were to be put in the '410'. I said: "If you really intend throwing in a twin-engined fighter with its own fighter protection, then take one with as many cannon as possible. You use a shotgun for hunting game, not a rifle." You want to be able to fire a lot of ammunition in a little time, and a 5 cm. cannon which fires very slowly is no use; you can't fire at aircraft in that way. We already had models with eight '2 cm.' - we called them '2 cm.' 'shower baths' - suspended below, in order to be able to have a great firepower in a short time in the '410'. It was a success too. I only used this 'Geschwader' to attack damaged aircraft or such as had engine-trouble and were taking evasive action towards SWEDEN or else those which had been hit in the Southern area, around VIENNA, were trying to escape to the East. That was during the summer of 1944.

Generally speaking, our use of night-fighters in daylight continued on in as long as enemy fighter escort could not accompany the bombers all the way. But we also used them afterwards, up in SCHLESWIG, against isolated aircraft which were trying to escape. However, after the American fighter protection had become incredibly strong and isolated aircraft called on their fighters to protect them - we intercepted those messages - and within a few minutes ten or twenty fighters appeared - then we couldn't use our night-fighters any more. LENT was practically in tears when five of his best night-fighter crews were shot down. The great number of losses among night-fighters was probably due to the fact that from night operations they were used to approaching within a short distance and only then opening fire. The Flying Fortresses defensive weapons come into their own then.

In my opinion the weakest links in night-attacks as well as American day-light raids were the period of assembly after the take-off, and the landing at their base. I held that a surprise massed operation of long-range-night-fighters would have led to a considerable success, and that, though a constant long-range night-fighter activity would have been a great nuisance, the enemy would not have discovered counter measures with which to stop our activity more or less. In other words we ought to have undertaken long-range night-fighting activity over England, but only as a surprise, as separate blows at great intervals, not continuously, because we had not sufficient strength to do that, and because defensive measures would quickly have been adopted against us. The fact remains that the FUEHRER forbade it. He wanted the German people to see the wrecks of enemy aircraft shot down; it was no use to him if bombers were shot down over ENGLAND. I intended this long-range night-fighting to be like this, that our interception WT operators should be sent over simultaneously to send out false reports on the British flight security wavelength, and that a great many small bombs should simultaneously be dropped on the airfields to cause a commotion, and that, apart from that, those iron triangles should be dropped which puncture one's tyres if one runs over them. In fact, to use a great many annoying tricks. None of those things are any use once they are known, but only if they are done

once on a large scale. Methods of attack should constantly be changed, and not always the same method employed.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

P. E. PEABODY
Brigadier General, GSC
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