

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

A GERMAN RADAR STATION AT DOUVRES.

1. The information contained in this report was obtained from selected P/W of the 8th Kompanie of Ln. Regiment 53, who were captured on 17th June 1944 at a Radar station which they were manning 2 km. to the East of Douvres. The site consisted of two Würzburg Riese and two Freyas without the A.N. attachment; one of these Freyas was of the mobile type, and was not operational pending its being changed for one of the fixed type.

2. The operators as a whole were not particularly knowledgeable, but were able to give some interesting information on the way in which Allied air attacks affected operational efficiency of the station. One member of the station, an officer, was more knowledgeable than the others and added some odd scraps of information on other Radar equipment, which are summarised in this report.

DAMAGE BY ALLIED AIR ATTACK.

3. The beginning of May saw the opening of almost daily air attacks on the Radar station at Douvres; from this time until D-Day the site was subjected to bombing, machine-gun and rocket projectile attack from Thunderbolts, Typhoons and Spitfires.

4. Surprisingly little resulted from those attacks; eight men had been killed and one barrack building had been burnt out, but the Radar installations themselves, protected as they were by heavy brick work, were practically undamaged. Apart from short intervals of a few hours for repairing cables and aerials severed by M.G. fire, the installations were, according to P/W, continuously in operation.

5. It was stated R.P. attack was particularly ineffective, but that machine gun fire into the cabins of Radar installations was both feared and effective. During air attacks, therefore most of the personnel of the station,

including crews from the Würzburg and Freya cabins, went to the "Bunker" shelters.

6. On the night of 6th/7th June, the Kompanie had been busily employed in plotting Allied shipping and at 0100 hours on that night the Würzburg had plotted some 100 ships, which information was passed through to Jafü 5. At 0300 hours a large number of bombs fell in the neighbourhood and all the personnel left their posts to take to the shelters, leaving the apparatus unattended.

7. From D-Day onwards the Würzburgs and Freyas were kept operating even with the added weight of artillery and tank attack and the equipment was, in fact, operational until a few hours before the site fell to the Invasion Forces. It is, therefore, clear that in an operational sense the site survived nearly five weeks of constant attack.

8. When capture became imminent, however, all technical apparatus on the site was destroyed by explosive charges. The personnel put up a good defence, and it was not until the Allied tanks broke through the protective minefield that the station finally surrendered.

#### **PLOTTING ROOM.**

9. The plotting room on this site, which correlated data received from the Freya and Würzburg, was housed on the top floor of a two-storey "Bunker" - a box like building partly sunk in the ground and constructed of concrete two metres thick. It had originally been intended that, in addition to handling normal Würzburg and Freya searches, the plotting room should also be employed for control of night fighters, but since there were no night fighters operating in this area, this latter function had never emerged; in any case the Seeburg Tisch had not been installed, although provision for it had already been made.

10. At the time of the Invasion, the plotting equipment consisted of a ground-glass screen, measuring some 8 x 12 ft. let into a wall, the glass bearing a map on which the plots were drawn. In addition to this a small-scale map of Northern France, overlaid with tracing paper, was laid flat on a table but this latter had never been put into use, having been forestalled by the Invasion.

11. In operation, plots from the Würzburgs and Freya were made in pencil, no distinction being made on the ground-glass screen between friendly and enemy plots.

12. The plotters, who wore earphones, received their information direct from the operators of the Freya or Würzburg, and transferred their plots to the ground-glass screen. A man called an "Ableser" then read off the plot from the ground-glass screen and telephoned it to Jafü 5 at Bernay, and latterly in the Western suburbs of Paris.

13. At one end of the room there was a platform on which sat a supervisor, who was responsible for the accuracy of the plotted information. He kept his eye on all plotting whilst listening to information as it came from the Radar equipment. He had a small telephone at his side through which he could plug in to any line from Würzburg or Freya.

### SOME NOTES ON RADAR EQUIPMENT.

#### General Remarks.

14. The only knowledgeable P/W, an officer, gave as his opinion that British and American Radar technique are slightly ahead of their German counterpart. In German Signals circles, he said, it is openly admitted that any piece of Allied radar equipment is seized upon and studiously copied.

15. One major difference, he believed, was that Allied Radar equipment was always smaller and more compact in construction than similar German apparatus.

*Hand written comment: but the German Rotterdam weighs about half H2S - its British original!*

16. Some few details on current German Radar Geräte were given by the above source. These are summarised below.

#### Würzburg.

17. The Würzburg Riese on the station at Douvres were of the usual type, and had a search range of 30/40 kilometres. The frequency of both Würzburg Riese was stated by P/W to be 600 mc/s.

#### "Window".

18. Some operators of the Würzburg and Freyas, although agreeing that they experienced interference from "window", interference which showed itself in a series of specks and lines on the presentation screen, maintain that because "window" travels more slowly than an aircraft, an experienced operator can distinguish the flight of the aircraft against the tracks of the "window".

19. The officer P/W, however, is sceptical about all anti-window devices, and believes that the German Radar authorities are seriously perturbed by it.

20. Some few weeks ago Goering, it is alleged, offered a cash prize of 300,000 Reichmarks to any Signals personnel who could invent an apparatus to outwit "window".

#### Nürnberg Gerät.

21. According to P/W, the Nürnberg Gerät is fitted to Würzburg in order to eliminate the effects of "window". This apparatus has not been entirely successful, although it makes the operator's job slightly easier.

#### "Würzburg Laus".

22. The "Würzburg Laus" is said to be an apparatus replacing the Nürnberg Gerät as a counter measure for "window". The apparatus is contained in a box 18 x 9 x 9 inches, which is attached to the Würzburg.

23. The "Laus" is a much more recent development, and is said to be somewhat more successful than the Nürnberg Gerät.

#### Flanderzaun.

24. This is the colloquial name given to highly characteristic interference pattern on the screen of the Würzburg and Freya. The word is apparently associated with the barbed wire entanglements of Flanders in the last war, and this gives some indication of the picture which the interference makes.

25. P/W believed that this interference is a transmission apparently on the frequency on which Würzburg and Freya are operating, and some P/W have the idea that it emanates from the Isle of Wight vicinity.

#### Köthen Gerät.

26. The "Köthen Gerät" is, according to P/W, not an apparatus but a frequency of the Freya. For example, particular frequencies on Freya are designated A, B, C and D, and Köthen is merely another frequency deriving its name from an experimental station at Köthen.

27. The A, B, C and D frequencies, P/W thinks, were produced by civil firms, and the Köthen name implies that this frequency is a development of the Luftwaffe's own experimental station at Köthen.

### "Limbach".

28. Amongst documents found at the Radar station at Douvres was a paper headed "Limbach"; this piece of apparatus was stated to be attached to the V.H.F. transmitter/receiver in the aircraft and to operate in conjunction with the Freya on the ground.

29. The paper stated that the procedure employed with this apparatus was similar to that of the Gemse - Erstlings procedure, but strangely enough was used in conjunction with the FuGe 7.

30. According to this P/W, the Limbach was superseded by the Gemse - Erstling (FuGe.25).

31. The document in question has been forwarded to A.D.I.(Sc).

### Rammstoss Gerät.

32. This is stated to be an instrument carried in German bombers, its purpose being to show the position of other aircraft and prevent collisions in tight formation.

### Rotterdam Gerät and Panorama Gerät.

33. It is stated that both these instruments, Allied in origin, are now being used by G.A.F. aircraft, but all P/W had heard was that the Panorama Gerät had a wide focus, whilst the Rotterdam Gerät was designed to show a small area.

### Diana.

34. At long last, after a lapse of 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> years, confirmation of "Diana" has come to light through documents. The first mention was from a notebook of a P/W of I/K.G.30 in August 1941 (A.D.I.(K) 420/1941), which stated that Diana was to be similar in principle to Elektra, but working on a short-wave band and within a frequency range of 3,000/6,000 kc/s.

35. The present document notes that "Diana" is similar to Elektra but operates on short waves. This P/W stated that "Diana" had not been operational.

### ORDER OF BATTLE - LN. REGIMENT 53.

36. The 53rd Ln. Regiment, to which the 8th Kompanie at Douvres belonged, consists of a number of Kompanien ranging from 1 to 26; The Kompanien are not necessarily numbered consecutively, so that the total in the 53rd Ln. Regiment may therefore be less than 26. All the Kompanien had code names.

37. The 53rd Ln. Regiment was responsible for an area bounded on one side by the coast, and on the other sides by a line running from the tip of the Cherbourg peninsula to the South of Paris and northwards to Dieppe. Its Kompanien lie all along the coast and towards the interior at a distance of 30/40 km. apart; each Kompanie's area overlaps so that the entire territory is completely covered.

38. The H.Q. of the 53rd Regiment is in Paris and is under the command of Oberstleutnant FLECH, with Major HOFFMANN as Deputy.

#### 25th Kompanie.

39. The 25th Kompanie is the H.Q. Kompanie and has a strength of 20/25 men, who were engaged in visiting Freya and Würzburg sites of the Regiment and doing minor repairs. It was stated that these men were by no means skilled engineers, and knew nothing of the internal workings of the Freyas and Würzburgs.

#### 8th Kompanie.

40. The 8th Kompanie at Douvres had a total strength of 160 men, who were divided as follows:-

Kompanie Stab.....	Administrative Staff.
Zug 1 )	
Zug 2 ) .....	Personnel manning the Freya and Würzburg on six-hour shifts day and night.
Flak Zug.....	Personnel manning and guarding Flak position round the Kompanie's site.

41. Another Kompanie of this Regiment, the number of which was unknown to these present P/W, was said to be manning a site at St. Valery-en-Caux.

#### MORALE.

42. Generally speaking, the morale of the 8th Kompanie during the pre-Invasion raids was high, and their resistance during the final attack on the station was certainly not suggestive of low morale. It is noteworthy, however, that since capture and the absence of the excitement of action, these P/W are heartily glad to be out of the war. The majority are convinced that Germany has already lost the war.

SEE APPENDIX OVERLEAF.

A.D.I.(K).  
30 June 1944

S.D. Felkin,  
Wing Commander

1. The Deputy Commander of the 8th Kompanie at Douvres an Oberleutnant - was good enough to bring his paybook with him, and his career is therefore set out below as a matter of interest.

Oct. 1937 - March 1938... Was with Ln. Abteilung R.L.M., 2nd. Komp. at Potsdam (This was, supposed to be one of the very elite schools for Signals in Germany before the war).

March 1938 - April 1938.. Was with Ln. Abt. R.L.M. 2nd. Komp. in Vienna, and took part in the Anschluss.

April 1938 - Aug. 1938... Back to the R.L.M. 2nd. Komp. at Potsdam.

Aug. 1938 - Sept. 1939... Acted as Funker to Ln. Regt. 4, 7th Komp. in Vienna.

Sept. 1939 - Feb. 1940... Became a Horchfunker with Ln. Regt. 4, 7th Komp. At Cracow.

Feb. 1940 - March 1940... Was posted to the Ln. Officers' Training School at Halle.

April 1940 - Aug. 1940... Joined Ln. Regt. 4, Abt. III as Staff Officer. Here he was in command of a Hörstelle.

Aug. 1940 - April 1941... Became O.C. of Horchstelle (W.24) at Breslau. (P/W explained that all these Hörstellen are described in passon and paybook as Wetter Funkempfangstelle which is in fact only a cover name for Horchdienst).

April 1941 - March 1942.. Was at the depot of Horchstelle (W.3) which is at Athens. Here his job was to listen in to English ground telegraphic messages which were coded and decoded.

March 1942 - April 1942.. Posted to Nikolaiew in Russia as Staff Officer to III Abteilung Ln. Regt. 4.

April 1942 - May 1943.... Served in Ln. Regt. 130, who were there in the South Russian sector in support of a Flak division.

May 1943 - May 1944..... Became O.C. of the 11th Komp. Of Ln. Regt. 57 and later O.C. of the 7th Komp. Of the same Regiment then near Orleans.

2. In May 1944 he was posted to his present unit (Ln.53, 8th Komp.) as Second-in-Command to Hauptman EGLE. He says that it was intended that he should take over this Company in a very few weeks' time.

**Decorations:**

Erinnerungsmedaille for Austria.

Erinnerungsmedaille for Sudetenland.

K.V.K. Second Class with Swords.

Rumanian Cross given to those who fought against  
Communism.

Krimm Shield, which commemorates the battles of  
the Crimea, including Sebastopol and Kersch and  
last:-

E.K.II.