

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

GERMAN INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS.

1. Amongst documents recently captured in Normandy was an interrogation report giving information obtained from British and American P/W; the copy captured was one circulated by Flakkorps III to its Abteilungen on 4th May 1944.

2. A full translation of the document is given below.

- - - - - 0 - - - - -

For Service Use only.

Generalkommando III. Flakkorps
lc (Intelligence).

H.Q., 4th May 1944.

Summary N° 2 of Statements made by P/W
and the Evaluation of Captured Documents.

A. Nuisance Raid.

1) Statements made by the W/T operator of a Fortress crew:

The U.S.A. airborne jamming transmitter BC-1017-A was built in to the navigation compartment of P/W's aircraft, but it can also be housed in the radio compartment.

The W/T operator had completed 23 war-flights and since the middle of December 1943 had flown five times in aircraft containing the above jamming apparatus. He mentioned that at the briefing W/T operators were told if their aircraft was fitted with the jamming apparatus. He did not know how the apparatus worked, but knew that its function was to jam German Flak-Radar apparatus (FMG-Flak). His orders were to switch on the apparatus after taking off and to switch off shortly before landing.

2) Statements made by the W/T operator (14 war-flights) from the crew of another Fortress:

P/W spoke of a jamming transmitter T-26, and after being shown photographs said that it was very much like the BC-1017-A. The T-26 is fixed beside the W/T operator's seat. P/W stated that he had always switched on the apparatus after taking off and only switched it off

after landing. At first, while the apparatus still a novelty, the navigator had told him not to switch it on until shortly before reaching the enemy coast. P/W believed that all the aircraft in his Squadron were fitted with apparatus for jamming German Flak-Radar. In one case the transmitter had been placed in the rear of the fuselage. (He was presumably referring to the BC-1017-A). Actually P/W did not think that the jammer was much help, for over the Ruhr his crew had encountered well-directed Flak, despite cloud cover.

In the case of the Americans, technical instruction regarding the function and working of special apparatus is confined to the barest outlines of manipulation. When P/W was interrogated on the subject of the "Gee Box" (Hyperbelnavigationsanlage), he said that in had never seen this piece of equipment. He added that navigators were very secretive about it, and that anyone who asked questions was liable to be suspected as a spy.

P/W did not in the least realise that by switching on his jamming apparatus so soon after the take-off he was badly overloading the aircraft batteries and generators, and that the apparatus was caused to run uselessly for anything up to three hours during rendezvous and the approach to the German coast. This attitude is often found among Americans, in contrast to the English, who are much more thoroughly trained.

B. Sabotage Raids.

Statements made by Members of Crews of three Liberators from two Squadrons which fly exclusively on Sabotage Operations.

Both Squadrons have been engaged on this type of operation since December 1943. They drop nothing except containers, and Crews are never told what is inside the latter. P/W state with every appearance of truth that as far as they known no agent have ever been dropped by their Squadrons. The number of warflights is very small for individual crews - one pilot had been on only four during the four months since he had joined the unit - so that crews have plenty of spare time and are given London-leave very freely.

As is known, these operations are carried out at a low altitude - 1000 m. during approach, and 100 - 150 m. while bombs are dropped. Moon-light nights with good weather conditions are preferred.

Bombs are usually dropped according to ground markers consisting of three red or white lights in a row, the middle one of which denotes the actual target and is used for sighting by the bomb-aimers.

Recently however, a good many bombs have been dropped without visual markers. This suggests that bombs may have been dropped in accordance with wireless signals. None of the P/W could make any statement on the point, since only navigators would understand such matters. The whole subject is treated very much as a secret and no member of the crew is told more than is absolutely necessary for carrying out his own particular job. At the Briefing only the navigator is given detailed target instructions; the whole flight is carried out under his orders. The captured pilot described himself as being really

nothing but a "chauffeur". A W/T operator stated that strict W/T silence must be observed during the flight. A time signal was transmitted from base every half hour; beyond that he had never received any messages.

When engaged on sabotage operations the Liberator flies with only eight men in the crew. Both waist gunners are left out, as air combat is not anticipated owing to the low altitude of flight.

At an officers' briefing it was said to have been stated that losses up to 10% were reckoned on in sabotage operations, though this figure had not actually been reached; but that in view of the importance of such missions, losses up to 25% would be worth while.

One of the officers, interrogated on the scale of effort of sabotage operations, said that in one night 120 aircraft had been sent over from England to drop sabotage materiel on the Continent.

One bomb aimer had flown on 16 sabotage raids January and February, over France, Belgium, Poland (once), and Southern Germany (once, in the region of Lake Constance). He had carried out this unusually large number of flights because he used to volunteer to go and was always gladly accepted as an experienced man.

The following facts which emerge from interrogation are worth noting:

- 1) Certain turning points are frequently used, namely Mer sur Loire, Sancerre, and Bourg en Bresse.
- 2) Recognised Flak zones are always carefully circumnavigated. These were very accurately marked on captured maps.

.

Distributed down
to Flakabt.

For the Generalkommando,
(Signed) BAER,

- - - - - 0 - - - - -

A.D.I.(K)
14 July 1944.

S.D. Felkin,
Wing Commander.