

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR.

Abteilung Ic (Chief of Intelligence).

1. The present report is the first of a series of three dealing with some aspects of G.A.F. Intelligence during the War and in the series of European incidents which preceded it. Whilst this report covers the vicissitudes of the two Chiefs of Intelligence during the major part of the War, Generalleutnant Josef ("Beppo") SCHMID and Oberst WODARG, the second and third reports will deal respectively with details of sources of intelligence and their value to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, and with the working of Intelligence during the main incidents preceding the War and in the main campaigns of the War Itself.

2. The information has been supplied by Generalleutnant SCHMID, the Chef Ic from 1938 to 1942, Oberst WODARG, the Chef Ic from 1942 until February 1945 and Oberstleutnant KIEMITZ, who worked under both SCHMID and WODARG and finally took over the latter's post. Some additional information was supplied by Hauptmann ZETZSCHE, chief of one of the Groups in the Ic department of Foreign Air Forces West and from Oberstleutnant OHLETZ who, from January 1941 until March 1943, was Ic of Luftflotte 6 on the Russian front.

3. The main impression gained from these interrogations is one of two distinct phases in the fortunes of G.A.F. Intelligence, each the direct result of the War situation at the time. These two phases fall roughly into the periods of office of "Beppo" SCHMID and Oberst WODARG.

4. The handling of Ic by SCHMID for the furtherance of personal ends and as an obliging and gratulatory adjunct to the G.A.F. General Staff could find no impediment in the rising tide of German success. With the reversal of fortunes and the ever-widening gap between the wishful thinking of the General Staff and insistent reality at the fronts, however, the broad and easy path of SCHMID became a tightrope from which he inevitably fell.

5. It is noteworthy that SCHMID, the close friend of GOERING, departed to the command of Jagdkorps I with undiminished prestige, whilst WODARG, eclipsed by the glow of a former spurious glory, was left to struggle in evil times to obtain recognition of an unpleasant war situation. At times he was forced to the employment of amazing expedients in order to achieve this end. Since the acceptance of defeat could find no place in Nazi philosophy it was never possible for the German Intelligence, which had foreseen defeat as early as 1943, to achieve the prestige, facilities and effectiveness enjoyed by its Allied counterpart.

## THE FIRST CHEF IC - 1938 to 1942.

6. The 5th Abteilung was established as part of the G.A.F. General Staff on first January 1938 and was to collect information on foreign air forces and to build up target data for appreciation in air warfare. The new department was to combine and systematise functions previously the responsibility of a target data unit and of R.L.M. departments of foreign air forces.

7. Those two organisations were already known respectively as Gruppe II of the first Abteilung and the 5th Abteilung, and were manned by civilians and reserve officers who had large quantities of information from the foreign press and literature at their disposal, but worked with no clearly defined aims; their main policy seemed to be deliberate exaggeration of the strength of foreign countries in order to justify German armament.

8. An appreciation by Generalleutnant SCHMID of the achievements of these two organisations up to January 1938 will be found in Appendix I to this report.

9. The new 5th Abteilung was to be under the command of Generalleutnant, - then Major, - SCHMID, who since 1935 had been employed in a ministerial capacity and had no knowledge of foreign languages. He had, however, been recommended to GOERING by Oberstleutnant JESCHONNEK, at that time Chief of the 1st Abteilung of the General Staff.

10. The first task which SCHMID set himself was to replace his staff by younger and more suitably qualified officers, although these were difficult to obtain. The organisation of the 5th Abteilung, or department Ic of the Ops. Staff as it now became, is shown in Appendix II to this report. After the dismissal of SCHMID in 1944 the department was reorganised by Oberst WODARG to the form in which it remained until the closing stages of the war. This aspect is discussed later in this report and the new organisation appears in Appendix IV.

11. The main departments of SCHMID's new organisation were set up as a first echelon at the Wildpark headquarters, and other departments as a second echelon at the R.L.M. in Berlin. For 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> years SCHMID and his staff lived and worked in the command train which was the "Robinson" headquarters.

12. By the outbreak of war intelligence departments had also been set up in the subordinate commands of the G.A.F., but choice and training of staffs were far from satisfactory, and it was not until 1942 that Ic (Intelligence) officers were appointed down to Geschwader and Gruppe levels. Even then the type of officers chosen reflected a lack of appreciation of the needs of Intelligence.

13. According to Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, the entire Ic service suffered from lack of experience when the war broke out, since the apparatus to meet the demands of war was not brought into being, until that time; from the technical point of view, however, Intelligence had played its part well up to that time, as, for instance, in that the target indices

available at the outset were good, as were the political and geographical studies produced.

14. In spite of SCHMID's efforts to introduce younger men into Intelligence at the time when he took office, his specialist staff was still mainly composed of older reserve officers, the majority of whom were lacking in both physical and mental agility. His officers were blindly devoted to him and appeared uncritical of the course he gave them to pursue.

15. Actually there was much disagreement in the G.A.F. concerning the personality of SCHMID. His self-confidence was enormous and his enmity was feared. By virtue of his double office as Chef Ic and GOERING's personal General Staff Officer, he exerted an influence over GOERING outweighing even that of JESCHONNEK when the latter was Chief of Staff. The strong tension later existing between SCHMID and JESCHONNEK was openly discussed. It was also accepted that SCHMID would not tolerate any officer about him who could become potentially dangerous to his position.

16. The composition of his staff certainly appeared to bear out this conviction. By dint of bribery, a persuasive tongue and his proverbial conviviality - was a heavy drinker - he had created about himself a circle of officers who were completely under his thumb.

17. It is only in the light of this state of affairs that the discrepancies between the information from intelligence formations at the front and its dissemination by the Chef Ic to be discussed later in this series of reports can, to some extent, be understood.

#### **SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCES.**

18. It was impossible for the 5th Abteilung to achieve the ideal solution for the collection of intelligence, namely, the subordination to it of all agencies concerned with the procuring of information. SCHMID's suggestion to set up an inter-service department of O.K.W, which would build up a complete picture of the military, naval, and industrial potentialities of the enemy met with no more success. The result was that each service produced a partial appreciation from available sources, whilst the S.S. maintained a separate agent and foreign service.

19. The 5th Abteilung sought to administer its own press and attaché service, the technical study of foreign aircraft and the interrogation of prisoners. It also claimed that it should be the channel for liaison with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda, should have the right to control sales of German aircraft abroad, and finally that it should have the sole responsibility for a day-to-day appreciation of the situation in war. From SCHMID's point of view, however, few of these matters were arranged satisfactorily.

20. In the spring of 1939 he was able to obtain control of the R.L.M. press department following upon certain blunders in the censorship, and in the few months remaining before the War introduced a tighter discipline.

21. The aims of the press department were to glean information from the foreign press as well as to conduct propaganda for the G.A.F. in press articles, pictures and films whilst maintaining a control of the security aspect and, after outbreak of War, to organise the G.A.F. press publicity units. The wartime organisation was never clearly defined, however, being complicated by the rival intervention of the Propaganda Ministry.

22. Liaison with the Propaganda Ministry produced good results only in the form of films and other comforts for the troops, but in the favourable periods of the War the difficulties of propaganda and censorship were not important. Later, however, WODARG found himself blamed by GOERING or the Chief of Staff for errors in publication over which it was impossible to keep a control - a situation which led to much personal friction.

23. The provision of foreign newspapers was in the hands of the Sicherheitsdienst and the supply of daily papers for intelligence purposes was therefore irregular, although periodicals could be obtained without much difficulty. Liaison with foreign scientific institutes was forbidden and could only be conducted through the Abwehr.

24. The G.A.F. Attaché Service abroad was subordinate to the Chef Ic, and was also responsible for securing the confidence of German-allied and neutral air attachés in Germany. Although the Attaché Service was regarded as a valuable potential source of information, its subordination to the 5th Abteilung was not brought about until the spring of 1939.

25. Its contribution to the information on foreign air forces was very small both in peace and war. Before 1939, when the Attaché Service had been subordinated to the central office at the R.L.M., its chief, Major CRAMON, had refused to regard the obtaining of information as part of his task, added to which GOERING's attitude had always been to send ill-qualified officers abroad as air attachés.

26. The importance attached by the head of Ic to the Attaché Service did not meet with official approval and the Attaché conferences held at Berlin at which was expressed the dissatisfaction of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Turkey with the lack of German support, were finally forbidden on account of their political character.

27. The Foreign Office declined to pass on military or air information via its officials, and only after outbreak of war was closer liaison effected by setting up a representative (Ic/Pol) who, however, only covered the rather restricted questions of violations of the frontier, exchange of prisoners, free passage of ships and listening to enemy radio.

28. Intelligence officers of all departments had at first been allowed to listen to the enemy radio, but this was restricted in summer 1942 to Ob.d.L. and the heads of the Luftflotten and a list had to be sent to the Propaganda Ministry of all persons to whom this authority was delegated.

29. SCHMID considered the Abwehr department to be the worst functioning institution of O.K.W. and stated that whatever material was supplied by it could not be appreciated at its true value because there was no way of judging the reliability of the agents. The Abwehr was a huge and expensive organization but, according to SCHMID, it was manned by the worst and most unsuitable officers in the services. It achieved very little in peace and only occasional chance results in war. At the beginning of the war it had undeserved **larols** thrust upon it by the attention paid in enemy countries to the fifth column. SCHMID did not find it surprising that the S.S. took over the whole organisation with apparent ease.

30. At the outbreak of war the special photo-reconnaissance Staffel formerly subordinated to the office of O.K.W. was put under the control of the 5th Abteilung and became the Ob.d.L. Gruppe. SCHMID praised the outstanding reconnaissance work of this unit in all theatres of war, as well as pioneer technical achievements in high altitude flying. The main sources of intelligence were, however, the wireless interception service and the interrogation of prisoners of war although the latter did not produce any outstanding results until towards the closing stages of SCHMID's period of office.

31. The wireless interception service was developed in peace-time by General MARTINI and was still controlled by him during the whole of the war. SCHMID recognised the valuable nature of the work done by this department, but depreciated the tendency of the Signals Staff to issue independent appreciations which were necessarily incomplete and unbalanced. In his opinion much more could have been achieved by its subordination to an organisation with a wider horizon and more penetrating aims. This deficiency became even more apparent to SCHMID when later in the war he became the Chief of Jagdkorps I and was concerned with defence of the Reich.

32. An appreciation by Generalleutnant SCHMID from memory, and unaided by documents, of Intelligence covered by the organisations mentioned above appears in Appendices III A to C of the present report.

#### DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

33. In the early stages of the war the 5th Abteilung was responsible for drawing up situation reports under the headings of air attacks, air defence and the sea and land situation. These reports were based upon those received twice daily from the fronts by the Ic Report Centre and often had to correct hasty and exaggerated reports which had reached GOERING through In (Operational channels). When Germany began to suffer reverses in the War the distribution of these Intelligence reports was restricted and in the spring of 1942 GOERING forbade their publication altogether.

34. Chef Ic had other tasks which were not purely concerned with the G.A.F. direction in that he passed Intelligence to interested specialist ministers and general staffs of German-allied countries whenever it seemed necessary or opportune, being thereby drawn into conferences outside the G.A.F.

35. At certain intervals reports were issued by Chef Ic containing a survey of the position on individual fronts. There were, however, other bodies which trespassed upon the functions of the 5th Abteilung or overlapped in the issue of intelligence appreciations. UDET's technical office under Oberst Ing. TSCHERSICH (GL/Rü) appeared to consider that its task was to prove that all foreign equipment was inferior to German. His reports on the excellence of German Intelligence, bombs, and weapons were preferred by GOERING, and enjoyed great popularity in the period after the French campaign. This organisation was finally linked up with the Chef Ic in 1940 and was reorganised with good effect under Oberst Ing. SCHWEPKE.

36. The head of the O.K.W. Wirtschaftsstab had announced at a conference in the summer of 1939 that his task in War would include the conduct of strategic air war-fare. This body did in fact issue reports on the sensitivity of foreign countries to air attack. A Ic Wirtschaftsstab was later formed under WODARG, but according to the staff of Oberstleutnant KILLINGER of Dulag Luft the opportunity of interrogation of Allied prisoners on industrial subjects was almost completely neglected; the interrogators could never obtain the necessary briefing or outside interest for such work.

37. An example of the worth of the Ic Wirtschaftsstab in January 1943 in the form of appreciation of British synthetic oil production and Russian oil production has recently come to light in a captured document now in the hands of A.D.I.(K) Document Section (List No.93).

38. In the opinions of KIENITZ, OHLETZ and ZETZSCHE the Ic Service itself suffered from the fact that its Chief did not present with sufficient obduracy a plain unvarnished picture of the situation which was to be concluded from practical experience at the front, and from indubitable facts photographic reconnaissance and captured material, underlined by P/Ws' statements, outside intelligence and above all by evidence from the wireless interception service.

39. One result of this was that the total numbers of British bombers engaged in night attacks on Germany was not believed, and when the Chief of Ic confirmed the accuracy of CHURCHIL's figure for the 1000-bomber raid on Cologne in May 1942, he laid himself open to charges of defeatism and theorising. His reports acquired the reputation of "Lügenmeldungen" (lies) among members of the Operations Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff finally ordered that the Ic staff should be cut down to lessen the output of unpleasant nonsense.

40. In another instance of this kind, which is described more fully in the final report of this series, disagreement of Luftflotte 6's figures of Russian strength became so acute that JESCHONNEK ordered an enquiry into the methods of appreciation by Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Luftflotte.

41. The strength postulated by Chief Ic for the Russian Air Force was but a fraction of the enemy strength actually encountered at the front and so increasingly worthless did the appreciations become that at the instance of von GREIM, OHLETZ refrained from handing them down to the operational units in order that their faith in the Higher Command should not be further shaken. There were days on which over 100 aircraft were

shot down in the area of Luftflotte 6 alone, whilst Chef Ic was estimating the total Russian effort as 150 to 200 aircraft on the entire Eastern front.

42. In order to cover his intelligence officers, von GREIM himself flew immediately to headquarters to put the case personally. On his return he informed OHLEZ that JESCHONNEK had recognised the accuracy of the Luftflotte reports and wished the fact to be conveyed to him; he added that Oberst SCHMID would not remain in office much longer.

#### DISMISSAL OF SCHMID

43. Matters were brought to a hold as far as SCHMID was concerned when in August 1942 an Ic officer of the Attaché Gruppe, Oberstleutnant SCHULZT-BOYSEF, was arrested by the Gestapo, in agreement with GOERING, on a charge of espionage for Russia. A number of other members of Ic were questioned and altogether at least 100 persons were arrested in Berlin in what became known as the "Rote Kapelle affair".

44. It was established that SCHULZT-BOYSEF, had had sources of information in the G.A.F. Technical Office, in the Foreign Office and the O.K.W. although he had not received secret information of any kind from Ic. Nevertheless, SCHMID was reproached by GOERING and the Chief of Staff for having protected SCHULZE-BOYSEF in 1938 and at the beginning of the war against the suspicions of the Gestapo.

45. In October 1942 SCHMID was relieved of his post, officially because of the Rote Kapelle affair; in the G.A.F., however, it was considered that his departure was due to events at the front not having conformed with his predictions.

46. After SCHMID, the task of taking up the reins of Ic was allotted to Oberstleutnant KOEGL who, however, was not suited to his duties and handed them over shortly afterwards to Major WODARG. KOEGL's short tenure had one good effect in that it brought Oberstleutnant KIENITZ more into the picture. According to OHLUTZ that officer was a very accurate worker, but unfortunately, although undeniably the most valuable of the officers in responsible positions, did not possess the particular gifts necessary to make a successful Chef Ic.

#### WODARG's TENURE OF OFFICE - 1942 to 1945

47. Major WODARG had been deputy head of Ic under Oberst SCHMID and he was also involved in the Rote Kapelle affair and was dismissed at the same time on a charge of failing to maintain adequate supervision. He was saved from further punishment only because it was maintained that meticulous secrecy had been carried so far in the Gruppe Ost and the Operations Staff that supervision by WODARG had been impossible. However, 5 months after the dismissal of SCHMID, WODARG succeeded KOEGL as Head of Ic.

48. He took up his duties with remarkable energy and he soon rid himself completely of the superannuated personal staff of Ic, apart from a small number of experts, and introduced young and highly ambitious General Staff officers. By this means he diffused considerably more energy into the department. Oberstleutnant KIENITZ was available to

facilitate the smooth change-over from the SCHMID regime, and with his complete mastery of the methods of the past provided a good liaison with the new generation.

49. A table showing the Ic staff after its reorganisation by WODARG appears in Appendix IV and may be compared with the organisation under SCHMID given in Appendix II.

50. According to KIENITZ, WODARG undoubtedly brought the required ideas and breadth of vision to Intelligence. His methods of evaluating the War situation were completely revolutionary and his appreciations were built up on the basis of front Intelligence, being given out unvarnished and untainted by the methods which had played such a big part with his predecessor. For protection against attempts to oust him from the saddle he relied on a very close relationship with the ministry of Dr. GOEBBELS and the Reichssicherheits Hauptamt (security police headquarter).

51. His work was much hampered by his one outstanding peculiarity, which stamped his department with a certain character. His mind was imbued with a morbid distrust of the whole world and he suffered from a form of spy mania which could almost be described as pathological. This made life very unpleasant both for himself and for those about him. He had his officers watched continually and he checked every possible method and procedure with Amt IV of the Sicherheitsdienst in order to be in a position to cope immediately with any possible threat to himself or his department.

52. In his relations with GOERING Oberst WODARG was made to feel that he was an imperfect substitute for Oberst SCHMID the founder and architect of the Ic Service. WODARG never attended a Führer's conference, nor was he allowed in HITLER's presence because of his Jewish appearance - he had Jewish connections in both his own and his wife's family. In the O.K.L. he was the least important personality of the staff and he himself did not consider that he was the right man, especially in view of his ill health, to have played an active part in the shaping of policy and the raising of Ic from its subordinate role in the councils of O.K.L.

53. In spite of the drive which WODARG brought to Ic and in spite of his many ideas the work of Ic was doomed to failure in that it had to be performed at a time when the G.A.F. was at its lowest ebb, when through lack of air reconnaissance and liaison with Military Intelligence services, the enemy dispositions were becoming increasingly difficult to arrive at. Ideas might burst from WODARG in an unflinching flow, but no sooner did some new factor crop up than the situation grew out of hand again. That the department functioned with any regularity at all WODARG felt was due to Oberstleutnant KIENITZ, who as WODARG's permanent deputy provided the one stable focal point in the entire organisation.

#### **INTERNAL INTRIGUE.**

54. From the time of his own implication in the Russian spy affair, WODARG maintained more or less friendly relations with officials of the S.D. in the Reichssicherheitsdienst Hauptamt, relations which were fostered by the judicious distribution of delicacies from G.A.F. stores. Apart from the confession that these occasional visits provided him with

an excuse vis-à-vis the O.K.L. Staff for leisure hours in Berlin or otherwise unauthorised journeys, WODARG gave three examples of his exploitation of these contacts.

55. He passed on as a precaution any reports on officers who seemed to him to arouse suspicion, but often without any further action to be taken as the investigating authorities were too overburdened. In return the S.D. sometimes passed to Ic reports of corruption inside the G.A.F. which were dealt with internally by the O.K.L. without BORMANN being drawn into the matter.

56. After the bomb explosion in HITLER's headquarter WODARG short-circuited the S.D.'s investigations into the General Staffs by himself undertaking to watch over O.K.L. by means of GOERING's Forschungsamt. This telephone eavesdropping was reduced to a farce since there was only one possibility of listening-in on six exchanges with a daily average of 12-18,000 telephone conversations. Discreet personal warnings were passed by WODARG to the Air Staff, and a few weeks later the control was dropped after WODARG had reported to GOERING and so to HIMMLER that the task had been carried out with negative result.

57. In autumn 1944 the Sicherheitsdienst office at Frankfurt charged Oberstleutnant KILLINGER and his interrogation officers with anglophile tendencies, defeatism and transgression of service rules. The S.S. demanded punishment of the offenders and subordination to the S.S. of the prisoner of war interrogation centre, which WODARG interpreted as a move by Amt IV of the R.S.H.A. to steal a march on Amt VI. WODARG claims the credit for having taken successful steps to get the matter settled by G.A.F. court martial instead of in the People's Court.

58. Through his former activity as G.A.F. censor, he was on good relations with Dr. GOEBBELS, about whom he records the admittedly quite new point of view that he was personally in favour of coming to terms with the Allies long before the catastrophic effects of Allied air supremacy. He had a wholesome respect for Allied statesmen, and warned against the error of underestimating the enemy. WODARG used his contacts in the Propaganda Ministry, the personnel of which was mainly G.A.F. officers, to play off one government clique against another and to secure private information which he claims to have used to protect O.K.L. against the S.S. - until the latter took over all the key positions in the Propaganda Ministry.

#### **OBERSTLEUTNANT KIENITZ**

59. In February 1945 Oberstleutnant KIENITZ was put in charge of Ic, although he was never appointed Chef Ic. After service as a Gruppenkommandeur with J.G.3 in the early part of the war he held office successively under SCHMID, KOEGL and WODARG, being responsible for Order of Battle first on the eastern front and later in the West. From November 1944 onwards he was WODARG's deputy and right hand man.

60. After taking over from WODARG, KIENITZ very soon came to the conclusion that the G.A.F. had become a purely ground support air force, and he therefore directed all his efforts towards the determination of Allied intentions first in the East, later in the West - as indicated by the position of new airfields, ammunition and fuel dumps, unit

movements, etc. For this information he relied mainly on the W/T listening service; the results of his findings he embodied in as air situation report.

#### **GERMAN INTELLIGENCE - CONCLUSIONS.**

61. The mentality of the German rulers, who had risen to power in internal political strife and were fanatical to the point of despising the intelligence of the so-called "Intellektuellen", was such that they were incapable of appreciating an intelligence service of their own fashioning or of respecting the intelligence service of the enemy. Otherwise according to WODARG, they would have avoided the War in the first place, or having recognised the absolute superiority of the enemy, would have concluded peace earlier - about the beginning of 1942.

62. The General Staff of the G.A.F., in common with the other branches of the armed forces, was in WODARG's opinion too small and untrained to assume effective leadership even if the Chief of Staff had recognised the value of the intelligence service in general or appreciated its work in detail. Since this recognition was lacking, Ic was inadequately staffed in comparison with Ia, the operations department. Moreover, the lack of co-ordination between the sources of information and Ic limited considerably the latter's ability to draw up a complete intelligence picture.

63. The activity of the General Staff and particularly the Ic department was further crippled by HIMMLER's assumption of power over the State and armed forces, and from spring 1944 onwards the General Staff had to struggle for existence against the encroachments of the S.S.

64. Hauptmann ZETZSCHE has summed up the main weaknesses of German Intelligence during the War in the following main points:-

##### **A) Within the State.**

- i) There was no hard and fast Ic organisation within the Wehrmacht with boundaries clearly demarcated from those of similar civil bodies.
- ii) Wehrmachtführungsstab Ic did not co-ordinate the work of the Heeres-, Marine- and Luftwaffenführungsstäbe Ic, but was merely a distributing agency for the Ic reports of the individual Wehrmacht components, exercising practically no authority over them.
- iii) The large number of intelligence organisations in Germany without clearly defined tasks, including O.K.W./Amtsgr.Ausland, R.S.H.A. (Mil.Amt), R.S.H.A. (Hauptamt IV) and Reichsministerium Speer (1. Abtlg). (The Propaganda Ministry and the Foreign Office also partly covered the same territory).
- iv) The lack of a Ministry of Economic Warfare. Military Commands were obliged to cope with the problems without expert knowledge or guidance, (e.g. in the Battle of

Britain). With so many independent intelligence organisations and no centrally co-ordinated hand the Germans consequently never saw the enemy picture as a whole.

#### **B) Within the G.A.F.**

- i) Again innumerable bodies working over the same ground as G.A.F. Ops. Staff Ic, TLR Rü, Gen. Nafü, Waffengeneräle, Forschungsamt, etc. These departments were not responsible to Ic and on grounds of personal ambition worked by and far for themselves. All this was due to the lack of a "man of stature" as chef Ic (GOERING's phrase).
- ii) The not altogether happy organisation of G.A.F. Ops. Staff Ic (Luftwesen, Ic/See, Ic/Bild).
- iii) The subordination of Ic to Chief of G.A.F., whose decisions were too often swayed by In considerations.
- iv) Ic was kept as ill-informed on the subject of German weapons, apparatus, etc. that it was incapable of offering suggestions which would otherwise undoubtedly have arisen from Ic knowledge of Allied material.
- v) Ic's tactical suggestions were mainly ignored owing to the jealousy of the Training Abteilung which again was in no position to evaluate enemy information since in the sphere of training too, there were many figures in the pie (principally those of the Waffengeneräle and Forward Commands).
- vi) Ic was unable to have its wishes carried out by Forward Commands. It could not order but only request.
- vii) The poor quality of Ic personnel. Many officers who were not wanted by other branches of the service found their way into the various departments of Ic.
- viii) Ic was considerably understaffed. Moreover, such staff as it had was unevenly distributed in relation to the tasks.
- ix) There were no Ic officers with the flying units, so that valuable lessons which might have been drawn from battle experience were lost.
- x) The lack of intelligence courses for officers
- xi) The insufficient support of Ic in every sphere, e.g. no aircraft, no cars, no money or additional comforts and drinks (the latter for P/W interrogation centre, Oberursel), insufficient communications with Oberursel.

65. Ironically, the sole organisation to recognise the worth of Ic was the S.S. (since most personnel had connections with foreign countries and were therefor already under suspicion). Hence the efforts of the S.S. (by means of agents) to keep a watch on the entire Ic organisation in Germany and finally even to take it over.

A.D.I.(K) and  
U.S. Air Interrogation.

Walter A. Frank  
for:- S.D. Felkin  
Group Captain.