

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR - II.

Sources and Dissemination of Intelligence.

1. This, the second report of the series dealing with G.A.F. Intelligence during the War, is based mainly on the interrogation of Hauptmann ZETZSCHE who, during the Period of Major WODARG's office, was in control of Gruppe A of the department "Foreign Air Forces West" under Chef Ic.
2. The infuriation set out in this report falls into two main headings of "Sources" and "Publications". The paragraphs dealing with the German "Y" Service as a source of intelligence have been purposely reduced to a minimum, since a series of eight reports covering that subject alone is to be issued shortly by A.D.I.(K).

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN AIR FORCES WEST.

3. The department of Foreign Air Forces West, under Major OWE (see A.D.I.(K) 393/1945, Appendix IV) and with a staff of about 100, was responsible for covering Great Britain, the Empire, the U.S.A., France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and the Middle East.
4. The two Gruppen of the department "A" and "B", dealt respectively with military aspects and political and economic questions. In spite of the far greater commitments of Gruppe A, departmental strength was equally distributed between the two Gruppen.
5. The following are the sources upon which Foreign Air Forces West depended for collation of intelligence.

German "Y" Service.

6. The German Y-Service - Abteilung 3 of General MARTINI's staff - supplied collated data to Chef Ic. In spite of Generalleutnant SCHMID's complaints of that department's methods of working (see Part I para. 31), Hauptmann ZETZSCHE stated that this source provided extensive data for Allied Order of Battle, subordinations and chains of command, operations, radar developments and ferryings of aircraft from the U.S.A.
7. Four sub-sections of Abteilung 3 covered all aspects of Allied activities, and issued daily intelligence summaries which were

telephoned or teleprinted to Chef Ic. Ten-day and monthly appreciations of Allied activity were also issued, the latter containing valuable Statistics of Allied incursions.

8. One section, Chi-Stelle (codes and cyphers) Referat B covered all radio and radar intelligence on the western front such as details of current air operations, including Gee-H and Oboe attacks. The southern front was similarly covered by Chi-Stelle Referat C, and a sub-section, Referat C-1, dealt with Allied transport and ferrying traffic, this latter was of special value to Ic in assessing Allied production and losses.

9. Radar intelligence from both Western and Southern fronts was collated by a section known as Funkleitstand. A monthly report was issued which was of great help to Ic in assessing Allied radar and the effects of German jamming. A liaison officer was maintained by Funkleitstand with the P/W Interrogation Centre at Oberursel for the purpose of clearing up obscure points by interrogation of Allied aircrew.

10. Another section, the Zentrale Funkaufklärung (ZAF) was set up at Treuenbrietzen for tactical evaluation of radio and radar data received in the area of Jagdkorps I. As this section was solely concerned with tactical considerations, its relations with Chef Ic were not close.

Prisoner of War Interrogation.

11. Excellent results were obtained from the close co-operation with Auswertestelle West - formerly Dulag Luft; collated reports resulting from detailed interrogation of Allied aircrew provided valuable matter for Ic publications as well as for filling in gaps in Order of Battle, etc., left by the "Y" service, and supplying the Y-Service itself with working data.

12. The actual methods employed by the Germans in the interrogation of their prisoners has been set out in detail in A.D.I.(K) 388/1945. It is perhaps worth recording that Oberst WODARG was frequently caused no little embarrassment as a result of Generalleutnant SCHMID of Jagdkorps I being on the distribution list for P/W interrogation reports; SCHMID usually had his copy first, and WODARG found it disconcerting to have to tell GOERING things he already knew.

Air Reconnaissance.

13. The G.A.F. strategic reconnaissance effort was limited by lack of fast aircraft types. During the period leading up to the invasion, reconnaissance of England by day had been practically nil; at the end of May 1944 two Me.109's succeeded in carrying out a probing reconnaissance of the Isle of Wight under cover of cloud and an American four-engined sortie. The invasion fleet in Southampton was covered only once - whereupon a night attack by Fliegerkorps IX followed. Beyond a few isolated daylight efforts, reconnaissance results consisted entirely of night flash bomb cover - mainly valueless - and visual reconnaissance by Me.410's.

14. With the introduction of the Ar.234 subsequent to the invasion, the situation improved steadily. Airfields, harbours, London etc. could then be effectively covered. Nevertheless there were still too few aircraft (three names of pilots only were to be read on aerial photographs), and the enemy picture obtained continued to be only a partial one. This state of affairs was partly due to the emphasis placed on tactical reconnaissance, the results of which were of interest only to the Army and G.A.F. operation commands.

15. Scientific evaluation and appreciation of aerial photographs by Ic was made difficult through bad organisation, the G.A.F. Hauptbildabteilung being subordinated to the General der Aufklärungsflieger.

Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) and 3 S.K.L.

16. Ic placed great value on the information on Order of Battle, subordinations and directions of thrust of Allied ground forces supplied by Fremde Heere West, which for its own part found the Ic enemy air situation report extremely useful, in that the Order of Battle of air ground support units showed a clearer cut and timelier picture of enemy intentions than the movement of military ground forces.

17. Fr.H.W. issued extremely good appreciations. Alone with Ic/West it pointed continually to the probability of one sole landing on the Normandy coast, in opposition to the firm Wehrmachtsführungsstab belief in the likelihood of a second landing in the Straits of Dover.

18. Intelligence received from 3.S.K.L. the Naval liaison unit, was for the most part scrappy, owing to the dearth of information regarding the occupation of Allied harbours and the distribution of the Allied navies, landing craft and merchant fleets.

Reports from Operational Commands.

19. Ic officers at the front complied only partially with Chef Ic's requirements, owing to a variety of reasons, such as Chef Ic's lack of personal influence, the sometimes poor quality of the Ic officers themselves, and the emphasis placed at the front on the reporting of the enemy's actions rather than on knowledge about him, such knowledge being merely designated as enemy propaganda.

20. The main teak of Operational Command Ic's was to teleprint to Ops. Staff In a current enemy situation report, comprising Order of Battle, operations, tactics and any special considerations such as possibilities of air landings, invasion eta. These reports were, however, only forthcoming at irregular intervals and even then seemingly with an ill grace. Thus, with the exception of the Luftflotte 3 Ic appreciation prior to the invasion, Front Ic reports could not be considered as a regular source of intelligence comparable with Auswertestelle West or the W/T Listening Service.

21. A further duty was also neglected by Ic's at the front, that of passing up Staffel reports to Chef Ic and passing down Chef Ic reports to the Staffeln. Instead, every month each Operational Command painstakingly produced its own comprehensive report of the air situation

carefully printed and edited and covering enemy incursions, operation., Order of Battle strength, subordination., etc., the figures naturally differing between one Command and another, and from those of Chef Ic who had other sources at his disposal.

22. As for the sources available to Operational Commands, on which the reports were based, Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, one-time Chief Intelligence Officer of Luftflotte 6, gave the following as sources available between January 1941 and March 1943:-

- i) The Luftflotte tactical and strategical reconnaissance units. These were at the disposal of the Ic as and when required.
- ii) A signals intercept unit for the Luftflotte 6 area.
- iii) The interrogation centre for Russian flying and Flak personnel.
- iv) A photographic unit.
- v) Evaluation of battle experience of Luftflotte 6 units.
- vi) A captured equipment evaluation centre.
- vii) Current data from adjacent Luftflotten.
- viii) Reports from Ic-Heer, supplied by the Army Group Centre.
- ix) Reports from the Military Intelligence Service affecting Luftflotte 6 area.

23. OHLETZ states that results of a tactical nature were distributed by him to Luftflotte 6 units. Full details were sent to O.K.L. Ic and Army Group Centre, and brought to the daily conferences of the Flottenchef with his Chief of General Staff and officers in charge of operations.

24. It is therefore not difficult to understand why Operational Command Ic's with such resources at their disposal and in view of their special operational commitments, should feel themselves independent and to some extent intolerant of control by Chef Ic, and why Chef Ic on his side, with responsibility for the accurate assessment of the full enemy situation, and viewing the situation solely from this standpoint, should maintain that Ic's at the front were overstuffed and negligent of their true functions.

Evaluation of the Press.

25. Each Intelligence organisation in Germany made its own arrangements for the procuring and evaluating of foreign newspapers and periodicals. Chef Ic obtained its papers either through the R.S.H.A. or the G.A.F. Air Attachés in Bern, Stockholm and, up to 1944, Madrid, Lisbon and Ankara; Papers were at least four weeks out of date when received owing to poor R.S.H.A. organisation. American newspapers and periodicals were received only occasionally and in small numbers. Luftwesen was responsible for supply within Ic, and thus provided a further cause of delay.

26. Intelligence was extracted from press reports concerning personalities (e.g. from "Aeroplane, "Tatler" and "Sphere"), production figures, photographic material, tactics and economics matters.

Technical Intelligence.

27. Enemy aircraft armament was covered mainly by Chef Technische Luftrüstung section A/Rü, and Ic could neither guide nor co-ordinate its work. Generally speaking, A/Rü took upon itself to keep industry and Operation Commands informed, Ic serving to pass its reports down to unit level.

28. These reports were very good and complete, but came much too late to be really valuable, since TLR-Rü invariably waited until the last details were known on any subject before issuing a report upon it. For the same reason Ic only received at long and irregular intervals reports on Allied aircraft shot down.

Broadcast Monitoring.

29. Of special interest and value were the broadcast links between the news agencies and their correspondents in the various capitals of the world. Of broadcasting stations, the B.B.C. and Swiss stations were considered the most reliable, Daventry in particular being appreciated for its figures concerning Allied sorties and losses. Indeed, during the period between the invasion and collapse, BBC reports were often the only source of reliable information on the war situation.

30. Radio monitoring was done by O.K.W.-Chi, its Naval counterpart the Seehausdienst, and the Forschungsamt, the results being sorted out and distributed by Ic/Luftwesen.

Agents.

31. The complete failure of the German Agent Organisation as a source of reliable information was attributed by ZETZSCHE to the following causes:-

- i) The unsuitability of personnel both at home and abroad.
- ii) Lack of agents in high positions.
- iii) Many agents inspired by British Intelligence, e.g. Hector, Josephine probably, and Ostra for certain.
- iv) No agents in America.
- v) Agents' reports evaluated and issued without reference to Ic, final judgment on them being passed by Abwehr I/Luft (later R.S.H.A. Mil.Amt).
- vi) The splitting of the Agent organisation between Haupt Amt IV and Haupt Amt VI of the Mil.Amt, thus giving rise to two separate organisations abroad.

vii) The final assumption of control by the S.D. causing the whole organisation to fall to pieces, and the flow of useful reports to cease altogether.

32. Liaison was maintained with the Militärisches Amt through Oberstleutnant von DEWITZ. From the middle of 1944, however, agents' reports were not passed out to Commands owing to their proved unreliability.

Attaché Reports.

33. Attaché reports came from Amtsgruppe Ausland (Admiral BÖRKNER) of O.K.W. which passed to Ic important reports from military, Naval and G.A.F. attachés, as well as direct from Air Attachés in neutral countries, organised by the Ic Attaché Gruppe.

34. For the most part attaché reports consisted of descriptions of economic conditions and morale abroad, sometimes amounting to no more than translations of newspaper reports. Little of any value was ever received concerning England, France or U.S.A. On the other hand attachés often swallowed whole rumours issued by the Allies for German consumption, e.g. rumours concerning the imminent invasion of Norway, the Balkans, etc.

35. Air attaches were not held in very high esteem partly owing to their being considered poorly chosen for the task and partly owing to lack of firm direction by Ic (Luftwesen).

Diplomatic Reports.

36. Reports from the Foreign Office and agencies abroad came to Ic both through Amtsgruppe Ausland of O.K.H. and through the Ic Liaison Officer with the Foreign Office, Hauptmann EHRENHAUS (Ic/Luftwesen/Pol). They were of little military value.

37. Intelligence concerning foreign diplomatic exchanges was received from the Forschungsamt (subordinated directly to GOERING) through Ic/Luftwesen/Abwehr, and was given a restricted distribution. It consisted of intercepted Allied radio-telegrams (e.g. London-Stockholm), ordinary radio reports (e.g. Atlantic Radio) and intercepted traffic between diplomats and ministers on certain links, Ankara-Moscow (Turks), Bern-Washington (Americans), London Washington (Poles).

36. The last-mentioned source was of great value before and during the invasion and after the breaking-off of Turkish-German relations. In general the Forschungsamt reports contained a great deal of significant information concerning economic and political matters.

Reports from Repatriated Germans.

39. The Army, Navy, G.A.F. and Gestapo interrogated at will both military and civilian repatriates. A general lack of direction and co-ordination resulted. Auswertestelle West, Oberursel, was responsible for the G.A.F. interrogations and obtained many interesting details on enemy morale and supply.

FREMDE LUFTWAFFE OST (FOREIGN AIR FORCES EAST).

40. This section, the eastern front counterpart of Fremde Luftwaffe West, covered the Soviet Union, China, Sweden, Finland and the Balkans. It was organised into the following subsections:-

i) Aufmarsch.

In this section the Russian Order of Battle was worked out in the greatest detail. Since the bulk of the Soviet Air Forces was employed tactically in support of the Armies at the front, this work was of the utmost scope and importance. Appreciations of the air situation were issued whenever necessary, on average every three to five days. Maps showing the locations of Soviet flying units were issued on the 1st and 15th of each month.

ii) Training and Organisation.

This section covered Soviet subordinations and chains of command, the organisation of Soviet flying schools and the training of pilots.

iii) Archives.

This section was responsible for provision of target data. It covered Soviet Industry, power plants, oil installations, ball bearing factories, etc. It issued industrial reports, based mainly on P/W statements and W/T intercept material supplied by the Forschungsamt.

iv) Auswertestelle Ost (Evaluation Centre East).

This organisation differed from Auswertestelle West in that it dealt only with the most important and knowledgeable prisoners, as for instance the Russian Inspector of Fighters who landed with his staff by mistake on a German airfield in 1943. Thirty to forty P/W at the most were at Auswertestelle Ost at any one time. The remainder were dealt with by the interrogation centres of the individual Luftflotten, which reported anything of interest daily. Since the Listening Service provided the complete Soviet Order of Battle, and knowledge of Soviet tactics was deemed unimportant, P/W were only kept for what information they might provide concerning Soviet organisation.

Auswertestelle Ost was located near Karlsbad and was under the command of Oberstleutnant MOLTERS.

MELDEWESEN.

41. As the receiving and distributing centre for all data concerning German and Allied operations, Meldewesen constituted an information bureau highly appreciated by its users, i.e. O.K.W., O.K.L., GOERING, Operational sub-areas, etc. The limited communications and staff of Ic were however, insufficient to cope with the stream of enquiries from HITLER, GOERING, Chief of General Staff and the rest, so that the flying

units were perforce neglected and the very success of this section tended to have a detrimental effect on the work of Ic as a whole.

LUFTWESEN.

42. This department was an unhappy attempt to co-ordinate a number of widely differing functions. It comprised the following sub-sections, some of which have been already referred to:-

L/Abwehr, which was responsible for the maintenance of security within the G.A.F. and for the security training of the flying units. For the first task it did not dispose of sufficient personnel, and as already indicated, Fremde Luftwaffen West and Ost were the only departments competent to carry out the second. However, from the middle of 1944 an Oberleutnant ROLFES was appointed liaison officer with German P/W camps with the object of exploiting the intelligence possibilities of this source.

L/Pol. Maintained Ic liaison with the Foreign Office. His main effort was to produce his "Aussenpolitischen Wochenbericht", a weekly report on the political situation, reflecting Foreign Office views and mainly emphasising the reasons for an Anglo-American-Soviet Russian conflict of views.

L/Informationsdienst sorted and distributed radio reports sent in by O.K.W./Chi.

L/Presse received reports from the Army, Field Propaganda companies etc. as well as foreign publications.

Liaison with the S.D. was provided by Major MERKWITZ and Hauptmann BULA.

Attaché Gruppe. Owing to the total lack of accommodation in Berlin, the close direction of Attachés by Luftwesen was made impossible and their control virtually ineffective.

INDEPENDENT SPECIALISTS.

43.

Ic Wirtschaft. In this section Oberstleutnant SEIDL, with the assistance of one officer, issued a monthly report on Anglo-American bombing attacks, comprising details of damage, falling-off of production etc. and predicting probable future Allied tactics.

Ic/See. This department covered purely Naval matters.

Ic/Bild. Theoretically for the purpose of Ic-liaison with the Main Photographic Section, this department was rendered superfluous owing to the practice of subordinate units by-passing Ic and dealing direct with the Hauptbildabteilung.

PUBLICATIONS ISSUED BY Ic.

44. The succeeding paragraphs in this report are in the form of a catalogue of publications issued by Chef Ic. Hauptmann ZETZSCHE's

assessment of the scale of contribution to the subject matter of these reports by the various sources of intelligence already mentioned will be found in Appendix I to this report. A diagram prepared by Hauptmann ZETZSCHE summarising the sources which went to make up Ic's publications appears in Appendix II.

(a) **Maps showing Order of Battle.**

Maps of the Western Front (Great Britain and France), Southern Front (Italy), Mediterranean area and the world as a whole were issued monthly down to Divisional level and to O.K.W., O.K.L., O.K.H. and O.K.M. Printing difficulties were responsible for this limiting of distribution.

(b) **Rechenzettel (Allied Strength Estimate).**

Issued monthly down to Divisional level and to the Flugmeldedienst.

(c) **Truppenfeststellungen.**

Covered unit transfers, rearmament and changes of subordination and command, quoting the source of each item, e.g. Presse, Grönbild (covername for Listening Service). (Issued every two to three days to Luftflotte Ic's and the Flugmeldedienst).

(d) **Appreciations of the Air Situation.**

Teleprinted at three to five-daily intervals to specialist departments of O.K.W., O.K.H., O.K.M., Luftflotte Ic's and Air Observation Units, these appreciations covered tactics employed against special targets, new operational procedures, estimates of Allied production and losses, ferrying figures, invasion potentialities.

(e) **Red Books.**

Issued by Gruppe B of Fremde Luftwaffen West, the so-called Red Books contained data concerning Allied targets and airfields and those of neutral countries.

(f) **Target Data and Photographs.**

Also issued by Gruppe B.

(g) **Notes on Allied Air Armament.**

Figures of Allied production and losses, derived mainly from press and radio reports were prepared for O.K.L. headquarters units. German and agent reports of aircraft shot down were disregarded owing to unreliability. These figures, as well as Ic predictions, proved more accurate than those issued by TLR/Rü.

(h) **Reports on Allied Morale.**

Contained notes on morale, supplies, political questions, economy, etc. derived from P/W statements and extracts from captured letters.

(i) Foreign Comment on the Air War.

Press and radio opinion concerning the German and Allied air forces, presented in tendencious form to illustrate various themes, such as, for instance, that the G.A.F. was handmaiden of the German Army.

(j) Ic Kurzmeldungen.

Immediate reports on new aircraft types, new operational procedures, new commanders and their characteristics, new weapons and apparatus, etc. Distribution was extremely varied to include all possible interest parties. Up to the middle of 1944 advance warnings of Allied attacks, derived from P/W interrogations, captured maps and target data, were also promulgated in this form. After that date, to avoid unnecessary delay, they were issued independently at source by Auswertestelle West.

(k) Stichworte zum Feindeinsatz (Notes on Enemy Operations).

Contained extracts from P/W interrogation reports of special interest, evaluations of captured documents, press and radio reports etc. Cartoons from the foreign press added immensely to its popularity. It was issued every three to five days and distributed to some 60 departments (O.K.L., Commands, Flugmeldedienst Units, Research, Industry, etc.).

(l) P/W Interrogation Reports.

Demand for these was great largely owing to the political observations they contained, and until about August 1944 they were allowed a wide distribution. After this data the original reports were limited to Commands and Air Observation Units, the remainder receiving "Stichworte zum Feindeinsatz" instead.

(m) Blue Books.

Instituted by KIENITZ at the end of 1943, the Blue Books dealt with subjects of a confidential nature, e.g. American day operations, Allied ground support, British navigation, etc. However, in spite of a wealth of illustration and good printing they proved a failure, being too bulky to be easily read, apart from the contention in certain high quarters that they only amounted to Allied propaganda.

(n) Einzelnachrichten des Ic Dienstes (Special Ic Studies).

The first of this series was brought out in the middle of 1943, nothing of the kind having been attempted before. At first they appeared weekly on such subjects as "American day and British night operations", "Experiences of Fliegerkorps IX in the bombing of London", etc. With the dropping of the Blue Book series round about June 1944, E-N began to include such restricted subjects as "Allied twin-engined operations", "American fighter navigation", etc. Difficulties were encountered in its distribution, which were countered by the printing of 3,000 copies. It was highly valued by such as managed to get hold of it, and was in constant demand by the Wehrmacht, industry and research.

(o) Schnellbildsendungen (Rapid Photo Delivery).

This was a system, inaugurated by Ic/See, of delivering negatives to Commands in order that the latter might run off as many prints as were required by subordinate units. The system was originally utilised by Ic/See for distributing Ship types, but Ic applied the idea generally to the swift distribution of new aircraft types, captured H2X negatives, and apparatus, aerial photographs of airfields, etc.

The system did not work effectively; for instance, it took longer to procure both positives and negatives from the Main Photographic Section than to obtain the required number of prints. Moreover, the shortage of photographic material at Commands made it difficult for them to do the necessary printing from the negatives which they received. Finally, the previous system of delivering normal prints had to be reverted to.

A.D.I.(K) and
U.S. Air Interrogation.
2nd October 1945

Walter A. Frank
for:- S.D. Felkin
Group Captain.

AN ASSESSEMENT BY HAUPTMANN ZETSCHKE
OF THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF IC SOURCES
TOWARDS FINAL APPRECIATIONS BY CHEF IC.

A. ORDER OF BATTLE.

W/T Listening Service..... 70%
P/W Statements)
Captured Material)..... 20%
Press 1%
Air Photos 9%

B. SUBORDINATIONS AND CHAINS OF COMMAND.

W/T Listening Service..... 50%
P/W Statements)
Captured Material)..... 5%
Press 45%

C. PERSONALITIES.

Press 90%
P/W Statements)
Captured Material)..... 10%

D. OPS. APPRECIATIONS.

P/W Statements 55%
Captured Material 20%
W/T Listening Service 20%
Press 5%

E. TECHNICAL APPRECIATIONS.

P/W Statements 30%
Captured Equipment 50%
Press 20%

F. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY PRODUCTION.

Ferrying and O.B. Data (Mainly W/T
Listening Service) 35%
Enemy Losses 30%
Radio and Press 30%
P/W Statements 4%
Agents' Reports 1%

G. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY LOSSES.

P/W Statements 20%
Press and Radio 40%
W/T Listening Service 30%
Neutral Reports 9%

Agents' Reports 1%

