

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W. AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR - III.

The Working of Intelligence.

1. The first two of this series of three reports on G.A.F. Intelligence in the War have described in some detail the organisation of Abteilung Ic and the difficulties encountered by successive Chiefs of Ic in their relations with the G.A.F. High Command, as well as the methods employed in collection and dissemination of intelligence.

2. In the light of those accounts, the present report shows that Ic operated efficiently from the time of its formation onwards, but was not appreciated by the High Command until the last months of the war and then only after the employment of unorthodox methods. This lack of appreciation was not apparent as long as Germany was successful in the series of short campaigns from the occupation of Austria to the conquest of France. In the flush of early victories Ic's warnings were ignored, and when Germany began to face reverses it had already fallen into discredit.

PRE-WAR ACTIVITY.

3. After the formation of the 5th Abteilung (Chef Ic) on 1st January 1938, the department spent the first months in reorganisation as a preliminary to intensified work. During this period potential targets were classified, photographed and filed, whilst requests for information were passed to the Abwehr department and attachés, and press officers were lectured on their functions.

4. The intention to occupy Austria was made known to Ic on March 6th 1938, and by the 9th a mass of documents covering the Austrian air force, A.A. defences and ground organisation had been delivered to the forces which were to undertake the occupation. The 5th Abteilung was also responsible for the distribution of O.K.W. leaflets to be dropped over Austrian towns. After the occupation SCHMID himself accompanied GOERING to Vienna on March 10th and that on a triumphal tour of the country.

5. The plan of work for the 5th Abteilung thereafter had Czechoslovakia as its main target, with July 15th as the date for completion of work. Soon after the occupation of Austria the German intention to absorb the Czech state became clear to SCHMID, and from April to June weekly conferences were held in which detailed preparations were made for air attack on the Czech defences.

6. From May onwards a flood of agents' reports came in from Czechoslovakia, and by the middle of August all intelligence preparations for a campaign were completed, with the necessary data in the hands of the German forces.

7. The Munich agreement and HITLER's declaration of October 1938 that his territorial demands in Europe were satisfied brought a welcome breathing-space to the 5th Abteilung. His speeches of November, however, showed that new tasks were to be prepared, and the plan of work for the half-year 1938-1939 had its main emphasis on the study of Poland, with a date-line of 1st July 1939 for completion of the work. Russia was also to be included, whilst in the West the emphasis was on Great Britain, with the additional question of American aid.

8. The Polish studies proceeded according to plan, with extensive contributions from Abwehr and the Attachés, so that the disposition of the Polish Air force and its ground organisation was established in detail and target data was practically complete by the spring of 1939.

ATTENTION TURNED TO GREAT BRITAIN

9. In November or December 1938 GOERING ordered an extensive examination of the air and industrial armament capacity of Great Britain. MILCH, UDET and JESCHONNEK were appointed as permanent members of a study commission which met once or twice weekly from January to June 1939. The meetings were under the chairmanship of the Chef Ic and were attended by representatives from all branches concerned with the study of British affairs; results were published by the 5th Abteilung in July 1939 under the title "Studie Blau".

10. One of the Red Books issued by Ic, and dated 2nd May 1939, has come into the possession of the Air Documents Section and its conclusions throw some light on the intelligence advice given at that time to the High Command of the Luftwaffe. A translation of the conclusions appears in Appendix I to the present report, and shows the emphasis laid on Germany's absolute air superiority in 1939, with a warning that this superiority could not be expected to be held.

11. In July of that year SCHMID emphasised some of his conclusions in the presence of GOERING, MILCH, FELMY and KAMMHUBER. He pointed out that Great Britain was strong in its people and its industry. The British Navy was by far superior to Germany's; the R.A.F. and the small army were fast being modernised and it would be possible for the former to reach parity with the G.A.F. in 1940.

12. The weakest part of British industry was seen to be its dependence on imports and sea-routes, so that it was obvious that a very strong German air force would be needed to destroy both the R.A.F. and the Royal Navy. Up to that time very little emphasis had been placed on the use of the G.A.F. in an anti-shipping role, and GOERING himself was little interested in airborne torpedoes or mining.

13. At about the same time there was divided opinion in Germany as to whether Britain would or would not go to war in the event of a German-English dispute. The London Air Attaché, WEMNIGER and all those who knew England said yes; SCHMID himself was doubtful after the Munich concessions, but JESCHONNEK, the Chief of Air Staff, was positive that the western powers would not go to war.

14. According to SCHMID the 5th Abteilung produced a report towards the end of that year pointing out that unless Germany increased her air strength the combined Air resources of France and Great Britain would outstrip those of Germany by the end of 1939 or the beginning of 1940. The immediate effect of this report which was signed by MILCH and presented to GOERING, was that GOERING summoned JESCHONNEK and SCHMID to his presence, ordered the report to be destroyed, and strongly criticised such a defeatist judgment.

INTELLIGENCE IN WAR.

Poland to the Fall of France.

15. SCHMID records the strange detail that GOERING tried to delay the opening of the Polish campaign by one day to avoid the bad luck of a Friday. From the intelligence point of view the campaign was without particular interest apart from the provision of target data for night attacks by K.G.100, using the "X" beam, on Warsaw and a munitions factory, (cf A.D.I. (K) 394 para.23).

16. The entry of Great Britain and France into the war was as much of a surprise to most members of the German High Command as was the subsequent passive role of the Allied bomber forces. Plans to attack France followed when it became obvious in October 1939 that there was no possibility of the hoped-for

agreement with the West. The intention to march through Belgium and Holland was made known in January 1940, but the plans to occupy Denmark and Norway not before March.

17. The forced-landing in Belgium in January 1940 of two German officers carrying most secret operational intentions caused great alarm in Germany and occasioned a most far-reaching secrecy order by HITLER, in consequence of which Ic worked against time without knowing the intended date for the opening of hostilities against France.

18. For the Norwegian campaign, intelligence sources were almost exclusively the Attaché Service and photo reconnaissance, the latter flown by F.W.200's between East Prussia and Narvik or Kirkenes.

19. After the opening of the Western campaign on May 10th 1940 the main activity of Ic was the sifting of reconnaissance reports for strategic Army purposes and the establishing of the bases of the enemy air force. These reconnaissance reports often overlapped, being provided for the same areas by both the tactical forces serving the Army and by the long-range reconnaissance units of the Luftflotten, as well as by Ob.d.L. The prevailing fine weather helped to give a complete reconnaissance picture which greatly contributed to the success of the airborne operations in Holland.

20. After the western campaign, the Germans concluded that they had correctly gauged the strength, equipment and striking power of the French tactical air force; the organisation and capacity of the French armament industry, however, were even worse than they had assumed. They had greatly over-estimated the part that would be played by the French and British bomber forces. It had been thought that a larger number of R.A.F. units were based in Northern France, and that raids would have been carried out on the German ground organisation and supply routes.

21. The speedy victories in Poland, Norway and France were to prove to be military and national misfortune. HITLER and GOERING saw themselves as victorious warlords of their own invention, the Blitzkrieg, and regarded the Generals and members of the General Staff as lay helpers in a war that was already won. This naturally led to a disregard of the work of Chef Ic, which, however, only made itself felt later, when things began to go against Germany.

22. Nothing further was done to expand the G.A.F. or to improve its aircraft, but there was a widespread inclination to relax and enjoy the fruits of victory. At that time SCHMID was commissioned by GOERING to make contact with PLESSMANN,

Director of the Dutch Air Lines, who was on the point of attempting armistice negotiations between CHURCHILL and HITLER, when RIPPENTROP intervened.

The Battle of Britain.

23. SCHMID claims that the reorganisation of the British fighter force was recognised by Ic and its dispositions known exactly in July 1940 and throughout the following months. The estimate for the total of front line fighters was 1,000 Spitfires and Hurricanes. The total of A.A. guns was not known, but there was obviously a shortage. The weak bomber force had not been modernised and was estimated at 600 to 700 serviceable aircraft.

24. British fighter losses in the Battle of Britain were considered to be very heavy, especially in aircraft, so that there were days at the end of August or beginning of September when serviceability was taken to be as low as 100 fighters, even though reinforcements were brought to the South coast from the Midlands and the North. It was understood of course that in the rest interval imposed by bad weather the fighter units recovered considerably and that this figure rose fairly quickly to 300 or 400.

25. The British fighters fought extremely stubbornly and were very skilfully employed in attempts to conceal their strength and intentions. Bad R/T discipline, however, enabled the German signals intelligence to check strength and operations and the calling in to the battle of Gladiators and of bomber pilots from the O.T.U's. Claims of victories made by the G.A.F. operational units were greatly exaggerated, perhaps unconsciously, and in compiling statistics Ic always deducted 30% from the claims sent in, although he realised that even this left a large margin of error.

26. Early in September a conference at the Hague revealed great differences of opinion amongst the heads of the Luftflotten and Fliegerkorps as to R.A.F. strength. KESSELRING, for example, considered the British fighter force to be finished, but SPERRLE thought it still had 1,000 aircraft at its disposal.

27. Tending towards the more optimistic viewpoint, the G.A.F. launched its daylight bombing attacks against the London docks and the harbours on the South coast. Losses were not great at first, but when later they became heavy a great deal of friction arose over the alleged bad tactical training of the mixed bomber and fighter formations; it was GOERING himself who called off the day attacks.

28. The impossibility of hitting individual targets by night led to the deliberate extension of bombing to the city of London itself and later to other towns and it was hoped that by this means to wear down the resistance of the capital to the point where Britain could capitulate. The Chief of Air Staff found it impossible to draw up a plan of campaign amidst the many conflicting opinions and policies thrust upon GOERING from all sides.

29. HITLER spoke of the eradication of cities, the Navy demanded G.A.F. support in minelaying and attacks on shipping; other suggestions were put forward by the England committee of the Foreign Office. The German aircraft industry wanted their competitors to be bombed whilst other industrial experts suggested the bombing of British railways, blast furnaces and the Sheffield steel industry; Professor STEINMANN of R.L.M. advocated the destruction of electric power cables by means his Seilbombe.

30. The head of Ic meanwhile referred constantly to his "Studie Blau" and tried, together with General von WALDAU, head of the Operations department, to guide the choice towards R.A.F. targets and bottlenecks in the aircraft industry as well as shipping and harbours.

31. GOERING overestimated the strength of his own forces and their training in bomb-aiming and navigation once the British had mastered the German bombing beams, and he then tried to attack all possible targets and so split up his resources that no task was carried through to its conclusion. Commanders at the higher and medium operational levels were forbidden to fly over Britain themselves and thus had no personal experiences on which to base their judgments. They were dependent on crew reports, foreign radio and press and photo-reconnaissance. This last revealed on one occasion, that three successive night attacks on Liverpool, which had been considered very successful, had actually been directed against dummy targets South-West of the city.

32. The effects of the bombing during the course of the battle were closely followed by photographic reconnaissance and agents' reports. Ic had great difficulty, however, in persuading the High Command that the damage inflicted on certain chosen targets needed to be followed up to maintain the disruption which would otherwise be neutralised by repairs, dispersals and improvisations. The moral effect on the population was greatly over-estimated, especially at the beginning but it was considered that a primary achievement had been the interference with the aircraft industry and with imports and secondly the serious limitations imposed upon the armament capacity of the country as a whole.

33. SCHMID referred to the charge later made in G.A.F. circles that German lack of success in the Battle of Britain was due to a faulty judgment of the enemy by Ic. He refuted this by emphasising the magnitude of the crisis which the British managed to overcome, the accurate picture of the situation afforded by his "Studie Blau", and the extensive intelligence information issued to every German air base. He suggested that had the Higher Command taken into account his findings and the state of their own forces they would have conducted the battle differently or refrained from it completely.

The U.S. Potential.

34. An appreciation of American armament was begun in the autumn of 1940 and a clear picture was obtained from the air Attachés in Washington of the progress of air armament, in men and material, and the plans for modern fighters and four-engined bombers. The extent of immediate aid in short supply materials for the R.A.F. was closely followed, as well as the setting up of the two Atlantic flying routes.

35. Ic repeatedly warned the G.A.F. leaders that by the summer of 1943 a large and powerful air force would be in existence. Although the possibility of U.S. intervention in the European War was considered, it was not at that time thought probable.

Russia.

36. Knowledge of the intention to attack the Soviet Union reached Ic about 10th January 1941, and was unexpected inasmuch as the air attack on the British Isles was still at its height and it thus marked a departure from HITLER's declared policy of avoiding war at two fronts. These obvious disadvantages aroused a certain amount of adverse criticism in the Ic department and elsewhere in the Operation Staff, whose head expressed his misgivings to the Chief of Air Staff.

37. At the end of the Polish campaign the Ic section for Eastern studies had come almost to a standstill owing to a lack of working data, and the new plan involved a reorganization of Ic staff so that Russian data could be build up anew. There was, however, scarcely time for information to be obtained through agents before the start of operations,

intended for the beginning or the middle of May, and winter weather limited photo-reconnaissance considerably.

38. By May 1st, Ic had completed its target data up to the line of Archangel to Leningrad and lake Ilmen to the Dnieper basin. Dispositions of the Russian Air force were followed closely up to the opening of the campaign, and the majority of the airfields in European Russia, especially in former Polish territory, were known, together with plans for their extension.

39. Ic's estimate of the Army Air force at that period gave the total strength of forces in European Russia as 2500 to 3000 old aircraft types and about 300 modern fighters. The bomber fleet was considered unimportant, whilst the strength of the Air force in Asiatic Russia was guessed at about 2000 aircraft of old types. The widely developed training of the Russian army in combatting aircraft with all possible weapons and its skill in camouflage were known.

40. Chief Ic was aware of the industrial centres of Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, the Donetz basin and the middle Volga, but he had little or no knowledge of the Ural area and therefore greatly underestimated Russian productive capacity. It was shown later that the system and state of production, especially of modern engines for fighter aircraft, were much more progressive and extensive than had been supposed.

41. This underestimate arose from the complete isolation of the Soviet Russian state for the previous twenty years, from deliberate German propaganda and perhaps also from the jaundiced opinions of Russian emigrants. SCHMID confessed to having shown insufficient belief in the favourable reports of a German industrial commission which had visited aircraft factories in Moscow, the Urals and on the Volga in spring 1941, as it had been suspected that the Russians were bluffing. The Air Attaché in Russia had been ill-informed, had little opportunity to see anything of value, and only concurred in the Higher Command's judgement of the Russian situation.

42. After the opening of the campaign in the summer of 1941, Russian airfields in the Luftflotte 6 area were covered daily by photographic reconnaissance which, together with evidence from signals Intelligence and P/W interrogation went to build up a local picture of Russian Order of Battle.

43. The results of the signals intelligence service against Russia had been peacetime; in war it provided the only sure and embracing picture of equipment of the Russian Air force. Since the Russian encoding systems were relatively easily broken, the figures of operational strengths and replacements, reported daily by W/T, gave continuous help to Intelligence.

44. After the wide territorial losses by Russia early in 1942, the rapid construction of auxiliary airfields and their outstandingly good camouflage, combined with the effective dispersal of Russian units near the front, proved deceptive for a time. The Moscow area was, however, covered continually by special high altitude photo-reconnaissance aircraft. The Russian aircraft strength thus ascertained was considerable, especially in fighters and fighter bombers.

45. In July 1942 Luftflotte 6 estimated that there were from 2,000 to 4,000 S.E., 1,000 to 2,000 T.E. and 500 to 1,000 multi-engined aircraft. These figures, confirmed by the most exact observation and amounting to between 4,000 to 7,000 aircraft in an area up to approximately 1,000 km behind the Russian front, and of which the majority were available for operations in the Moscow area, were to be compared with a simultaneous appreciation by Chef Ic giving the total strength of the Soviet air force as 300 to 1,200 aircraft on the entire Eastern front.

46. This official figure could not be allowed to pass by Luftflotte 6 without contradiction, since it did not do justice to the really difficult operations of the G.A.F. and, furthermore, could lead to dire consequences should operational commanders be led to base conclusions on it, such as for instance might bring about the transfer of fighter units to the Western area to combat the strongly increasing Allied bomber offensive.

47. Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, the Ic of Luftflotte 6, therefore placed the full facts before JESCHONNEK. The next development was that SCHMID visited OHLETZ at Smolensk "to talk the matter over". He endeavoured to convince OHLETZ of the errors in his appreciation. Photographic cover produced by OHLETZ was countered with the argument: "The Russians have used dummies here". Reference to the number of Russian sorties was counterbid with the supposition that the fighter pilots had

exaggerated, or that the Army was in a panic. Von GREIM later expressed it as his own opinion that SCHMID was afraid his position might be endangered by OHLETZ's conflicting appreciations.

48. Similar differences arose between the Front Ic and the Higher Command in the appreciation of Russian industrial capacity. Finally, in order to clear the matter up, OHLETZ put one of the best units of the reconnaissance Gruppe of Ob.d.L. to covering all known Russian industrial installations from Moscow to the Urals. The results were staggering and the photographs were immediately forwarded to O.K.L. When later OHLETZ had occasion to visit Robinson and Kurfürst, however, to his surprise not one of the specialists concerned with the matter had the slightest inkling of their existence.

49. The Ic department itself was accused of defeatism when it pointed out the increasing strength of the Russian air force. The G.A.F. leadership could not be convinced of the great productive capacity of the Soviet Union, and doubted the increasing importance of the imports via Archangel, the Far East and the Persian Gulf.

DECLINE OF Ic's INFLUENCE.

50. It was pointed out in the first report of this series that the influence of Chef Ic on the Luftwaffe Operation Staff began to decline at about the same time as the dismissal of SCHMID. Actually, it was rather the fact that things began to go badly for Germany from the Autumn of 1941 onwards than SCHMID's methods of intelligence appreciation that was responsible for this decline.

51. From the time of the entry of the United States into the war and the increasing bombing attacks on German towns - beginning with the R.A.F. 1,000-bomber raid on Cologne - tension and bad feeling increased between GOERING and JESCHONNEK on one side and Chef Ic on the other. Unfavourable reports put out by Chef Ic, which often had the unpleasant task of correcting exaggerations by the individual Fliegerkorps, were disbelieved. Reports on the expansion of the British aircraft industry and the setting up of an R.A.F. four-engined bomber fleet were therefore not appreciated, and Ic publications on U.S. armament were in vain.

52. GOERING not only doubted, but laughed with scorn when he was warned of the creation of a huge U.S. day bomber fleet,

the mass-production of modern fighters and the construction of a large number of new airfields in England. The latter could not be fully proved by photographs since the increasing efficiency of the British fighter defences prohibited anything more than occasional reconnaissance of coastal areas.

53. Again, in February 1943, when WOGARD had only recently taken over the task of Chef Ic, KIENITZ, without having previously advised his Chief, issued a report that Russian air bases were about to be used by American fighters and heavy bombers, founded on knowledge through signals intelligence of the setting-up of American Met. Stations in Russia, and of instructions issued to the Russians that they were not to fire on B.17's and other U.S. Aircraft.

54. KIENITZ was immediately indicated by KORTEN as a defeatist and all issues of the report were withdrawn. The reason for this withdrawal was that the Foreign Office, influenced by the eternal theme of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, had maintained that such a move was impossible.

55. The place of the Allied invasion of the continent was foretold by Ic as between the Seine and the Cherbourg peninsular, a conclusion which was drawn from signals intelligence on U.S. IXth Air Force and British T.A.F. movements, the activity of radio stations on the isle of Wight and photographic reconnaissance of several South coast harbours. The latter revealed parts of the Mulberry harbours and a type of monitor which had only been previously seen in the Salerno landings.

55. By this time WODARG had found that his intelligence counsels were continually ignored. According to KIENITZ, Chef Ic was certainly welcome at conferences in that he could always provide something for the curious out of his knowledge, but otherwise he was not called upon for actual planning. He was rather regarded as politically dangerous on account of his comprehensive knowledge of the enemy. He could make proposals, but he did not know if his proposals would be heeded; rarely if ever did he receive any directions for his work. If he expressed his views too clearly to the High Command he was invariably accused of defeatism.

AN ATTEMPT TO RE-ESTABLISH Ic's REPUTATION.

56. Early in 1945, with Germany's position worsening to a catastrophic degree and the German High Command's continued ignoring of Ic's advice, WODARG decided upon a method of bringing the conclusions of his department to the High Command's notice in a forcible way. He fabricated a document which he passed on to HIGH COMMAND as an Allied memorandum captured at the front.

57. KIENITZ was the author of this document, and its effect exceeded all WODARG's expectations. A few weeks later he decided to repeat the process by "capturing" another document purporting to be a Directive from the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander. This was also written by KIENITZ and was designed to make the High Command realise the hopelessness of the German position in the West after the Ardennes offensive and to influence them to seek an understanding with the western Allies at the expense of Russia.

58. Copies of the two documents were brought to England by KIENITZ and are reproduced as Appendices II and III to the present report.

CONCLUSIONS.

59. In the survey of G.A.F. Intelligence in the war concluded with this report, it has been shown that German Intelligence itself cannot be said to have failed, but rather that it was victim, like other branches of the Luftwaffe, of personal intrigue and preconceived notions. As an epitaph to the departure of Chef Ic, Oberstleutnant KIENITZ has written the following:

"History will show that the German Intelligence Service in the past war did not break down. In Germany, as in England in 1939, its High Command only gave credence to information that was in harmony with its own wishes. In Germany, however, there was nobody to rouse the High Command to awareness of the inherent danger.

Thus the German Intelligence Service was not appreciated as a means of warfare. The logical consequence was a neglect to incorporate it into the organisation as a whole. A glance at the plan of organisation of the German Military Intelligence Service will immediately reveal to the expert a failure to coordinate all sources of intelligence under one Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces. Therefore no control

of the Intelligence Service by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht existed for the purpose of evaluation and the issue of instructions.

This underestimation of the Intelligence Service runs through the Wehrmacht like a red thread, from the most subordinate unit to the highest command, and from the beginning of the war to the present day.

Every responsible command will in future draw the proper moral from this experience."

A.D.I.(K) and
U.S. Air Interrogation.
16th October 1945

S.D. Felkin
Group Captain.

SECRET

APPENDIX I

To:

Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt	Berlin, 2nd May 1939.
und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe	100 copies.
Chef des Generalstabes	20th copy.

No.700/39 g.Kdos. (5.Abt.I)

Top secret !

THE AIR SITUATION IN EUROPE

As in: Spring 1939

C o n c l u s i o n s

- 1) The German Air Force is at the present time superior to any single Air Force in Europe, This is true both with respect to the quantity and quality of aircraft and equipment as well as to organisation, training and tactical and operational preparedness for aerial warfare.
- 2) Even in the event of hostilities with the combined British and French Air Forces the German Air Force is still to be regarded as superior for the year of 1939.
- 3) Neither Poland nor Russia are in the position to conduct an effective offensive air war against Germany.

On the whole, even the use of the Polish ground organisation by Russian air units will not result in a deterioration of the air situation in the East until an extensive program of airfield development, repair and supply arrangements has been carried out. The period of time required for this purpose would in peacetime be at least 1-2 years from the start of the work. Up to now there are no reports in this connection to hand.

The danger of an equally strong threat to Germany in the air from the West and from the East is not, therefore, to be reckoned with for the time being.

- 4) Although the existing tension makes an outbreak of military conflict in the East seem possible, the decision in the air will be contested in Western Europe if the Western Powers should join in.

- 5) Germany's advantage, over the Western Powers for the year 1939 (above all because of the obsolescence of their aircraft) lies in the following:
 - (a) The German offensive air forces are much stronger than the British or the French air defences, which can only be used singly at any given time, but cannot be concentrated.
 - (b) The German air defence are so strong that even the concentrated operations of the British and French offensive air forces have only slight chances of success.
- 6) It will not be possible until some later date, about the end of 1939, to judge whether the present advantage held by Germany in the field of Air armament can also be maintained (in the purely technical sphere) during the coming years in view of the recently intensified armament of the British and French air forces.
- 7) But in this age of technical development it must be taken into consideration that highly-industrialised countries will be able to develop technically perfect defensive, weapons to ward off dangerous offensive weapons after they have had the opportunity to start up the necessary industries. It remains to be seen, however, whether such weapons can be produced in the necessary quantities at the proper time. With the air forces approaching technical parity the advantage of tactical and operational preparedness for war assumes special importance.
- 8) On the basis of all available reports, Germany stands out as the only country with a totalitarian concept of the preparation and conduct of an offensive and defensive air war with regard to equipment, organisation, tactics and command. This fact means a general advantage in Germany's readiness for a war and thereby a strengthening of the overall military situation.

"Top Secret."

C. S P A A T Z, Lt.General.

C.i.C. of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in
Europe.

H.Q., January 5th, 1945.

To: Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee.

M E M O R A N D U M.

When launching their offensive on the Western Front in the middle of December the Supreme Command of the German Wehrmacht for the first time tried to regain the initiative in the field with a view to adapting the German strategy to the new idea of an "offensive defence".

Irrespective of whether, or not, the German offensive reached its operational aims, it has in the end compelled the Allied Supreme Command:

- 1) to stop their offensives which were in progress at that time, by which a timely co-ordination with the Russian offensive plans was rendered impossible,
- 2) to withdraw parts of the Allied forces concentrated at vital points in the region of Aix-la-Chapelle and on the Saar front,
- 3) to reinforce the salients which up to that date were of minor importance,
- 4) to take preventive measures against future German offensives. (Retention of reserves, building-up defence-lines),
- 5) to send out the Strategic Air Forces to repulse the German attack,
- 6) to support the ground-forces by air-borne divisions and to abstain from air-borne operations of a larger scale,
- 7) to bring up fresh troops to the weakened units implying a great loss of time,

- 8) to make up for the high casualties and loss of equipment, ammunition, food, and to replenish equipment and stocks in an already strained transport situation.

In consequence thereof, and in view of the great reliance, of our T.A.F. on weather conditions, it has been possible for the German Supreme Command to interfere with our plans which had to be altered and eventually postponed for several months.

It is not out of the question that the Luftwaffe, having realised the immediate effects of Rundstedt's offensive in the Ardennes to the full, will likewise more and more be guided by the idea of an "offensive defence" in the air, thus taking to from us the law of action in aerial warfare.

Up to the present time the leading principle for the German day and night-fighters has been strictly confined to the defence of the Reich. This principle was dropped only once, namely on January 1st, 1945, when our grounded planes suffered severe losses. The carelessness of our own squadrons, the local superiority of the Luftwaffe and the paralysing of our radar instruments by flying at low level, are the main reasons for our great losses. Nevertheless the Germans suffered great losses too.

As the German planes flew far into the rear area to reach the British airdromes located in the V 1 Flak-zones, they met with heavy AA-opposition, not only over their targets but also over heavily AA-protected roads and railway lines.

As far as the War in the air is concerned apart from the afore-mentioned points, the following facts may induce the Germans to send out their fighters by day and night within the scope of an offensive defence:

- 1) the numerical strong forces of our own bombers especially the strength of our escort-fighters, the difficulty the Germans have to encounter in assembling their fighters in bad weather conditions which never enables them to bring more than 250 fighters against 70 of our own escort-planes. (1:3)
- 2) the great German losses during the last quarter of 1944 (with approx. 9,000 German sorties, 1,000 planes were lost, 500 Allied planes were lost),
- 3) a more economic use of petrol which, so far, has been waste without any appreciable success,
- 4) the steady deterioration of the flying abilities of the German fighter crews, as a result of their losses,

- 5) the fact that the German fighter-defence can only attack part of our units and will in no case represent a menace to the Allied Air Forces as a whole,
- 6) the fact that the initiative in aerial warfare is still with the Allies and that, therefore, they are still in a position to place all man-power no longer used with the home defence, at the disposal of the Army on the front,
- 7) the fact that the Allied Command, with the aid of their highly developed navigation instruments, will more and more adopt the practice of sending out their planes in bad weather conditions which will make it almost impossible for the German fighters-squadrons to take off to intercept our bombers,
- 8) the poor results of the German defence-forces in bringing down Allied aircraft at night.

Considering the above mentioned points, I feel it my duty to draw the attention of the Supreme Headquarters to the fact that the following weak points of the Anglo-American Air Forces may be known to the German Supreme Command, and may, accordingly, constitute targets within the German operational plans.

- 1) The concentration of flying units on airdromes located in the front area at the southern and western theatre of war, being without adequate protection (assembling of more than 200 planes on several airdromes in the front area),
- 2) the difficulties to American four-engined bombers in taking off, concentrating (1-3 hours) and landing, if disturbed by German fighters,
- 3) the withdrawal of substantial forces of fighters and radio-ranging units from the Mediterranean theatre of war,
- 4) the concentration of the entire fighter and radio-defence forces in southern England, the North being left with inexperienced weaker forces,
- 5) difficulties on their dispersal, to returning bomber streams in the face of Intruder activity by German long-range night fighters.

Since the German aircraft industry has been shifted to places which are less susceptible to Allied bombing, it has been possible to keep the production on such a level as to enable the Luftwaffe to appear with a superior number of

planes over certain salients of the front. Moreover, there must be taken into account the steadily growing number of jet-planes which, by reason of their superiority, form a considerable menace to the American assembly, which is notified by the German signal-corps always in time.

In conclusion I have to point out that it is not impossible that the recent change in the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, which was already reflected in the attack on the Allied ground organisation, may mean a turning point in the German aerial defence. It may be said that a versatile and constructive German operational planning might well have the effect of seriously interfering with the Allied tactics, at least with regard to daylight raids, pinning down considerable defence forces both in Great Britain and France.

I therefore, beg you to take the following measures:

- 1) issue of strict regulations for the dispersal of planes on airdromes in the front area,
- 2) to prevent the withdrawal of further fighter-forces from Great Britain designed for the protection of the American assembly,
- 3) increased action by British night-fighters to neutralise the German night-fighter defences,
- 4) strict orders are to be given to the Allied press not to publish any articles dealing with the weak points as mentioned before. (article enclosed).

G. SPAATZ.
Lt. General.
C.i.C. of the U.S.Strategic Air Forces
in Europe.

OFFICIAL:

H.M. TAILOR.
Colonel, AGD.
Adjutant General.

APPENDIX III.

Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff,
Dept.I, No.374510/45 - Top Secret.

H.Q. 24 January 1945.

DIRECTIVE NO.77.

- I. The Soviet Union has achieved successes in the East, to an extent not expected by the Anglo-American Command. In the case of any further rapid advance toward the West, a situation may thus develop which would be extremely unwelcome to the Anglo-American Governments and Commands.

Experience has shown that the Soviet Union does not release - except under strongest military pressure - any territory it has occupied. It is therefore of great importance that the line of demarcation of the German territory to be occupied by the Red Army be reached approximately simultaneously with the Russians. Under no circumstances may a situation be allowed to develop, in which - on the collapse of German resistance - the Soviet Armies would be West of the ELBE or, worse, between the WESER and the RHINE, and the Allied forces still West of the RHINE.

Our military measures must therefore be such as to permit the Germans to reinforce their Eastern Front, reinforcement they can, mainly, achieve by weakening their Western Front.

Dispositions to this end must, however, be taken in such a way that our Russian ally may in no circumstances be in a position to accuse us of an attitude contrary to our alliance commitments. The Allied Command has committed itself to close military and political co-operation, and will adhere to this.

The important point is that, at the end of the War, the allies stand militarily strong in Europe and as deep as possible in Germany. To a certain extent, a prolongation of the War may still be accepted at present, from the points of view of both domestic and foreign policy.

- II. With the capture of the Northern part of the German Eastern Front and with the advance of our Russian ally up to and beyond the frontiers of the old Reich, a change becomes necessary in the assessment of the economic and armament production situation of the Reich and, therefore, also a change in the conduct of the War in the air. German economic and armament industries have been so badly hit by the penetration of the Soviet Union into the German East, particularly into Upper Silesia, that the gravest consequence

must shortly be expected in the supply of Industry and coal and, therefore, of the Front with arms and equipment.

The fuel production plants in the East have hitherto been targets of American four-engined bomber units in the Southern area. The steel industry in the East has lately been included in the plan of attack. An understanding must now be reached with our Russian ally regarding the attention to be given to these objectives, which are still partly in German hands but which are in the immediate vicinity of the Battle Zone. The War policy of our Russian ally has, so far, been to spare the industrial area in the East of Germany.

Because of the fact that Upper Silesia ceases to play a part in the German supply system, as far as coal, iron and steel are concerned, the need has now disappeared to continue bombing the Western coal and steel industry - particularly that of the RUHR - until total destruction of these industries has been achieved. Our own Air fleets may now confine themselves to continue police action over targets damaged and destroyed. Forces becoming available because of this may be used for the increased bombing of German supply traffic in the West.

For the conduct of the war against Germany, the following continue to be determining factors:-

- (1) Maximum bombing effort (over 100,000 tons per month).
- (2) Maximum "Terror" effort to shake the war morale of the German people.
- (3) Destructive offensive against the communications system under the following headings:
 - (a) The hindering of all personnel reinforcements and supply transport to the battle front in the West.
 - (b) Moral support to the Soviet Union by attacks on the Eastern German communications system.
 - (c) The hindering, to the greatest possible extent of the German coal supply, by destruction of RUHR traffic at the points of exit of the RUHR area and within the area itself, in conjunction with the paralysing of the Central German waterways.
- (4) The bombing of the Armament Industry with particular emphasis on the Chemical Industry (liquid fuels, nitrogen, explosives, buna). Bombing of the basic industry for the production of iron and steel in the

RUHR area should be confined to keeping down installations already damaged or destroyed.

- (5) Attacks upon the overseas communications (between the NORWEGIAN area, the NORTH SEA area and the BALTIC.)

The bombing of the communications system should receive first priority.

III. Within the framework of the foregoing appreciation, the following directives are issued for the future conduct of operations of the Allied forces:

A. Directives for the Spring Operations on the Western Front in Europe.

The general offensive of the 16th December 1944 and the Russian offensive of the 12th January 1945, acquire the, following modifications of the plans drawn up in 1944 for the European Western Front:

- (1) Strong attacks directed towards the attrition of the German Forces in the West, in order to gain favourable departure positions for the Spring operations:
 - (a) In the rearward zone of the industrial area on the Western bank of the RHINE.
 - (b) In the SAAR area.
 - (c) On the upper RHINE in order to renew the threat to the flank of the Seventh American Army. For this purpose and, in the absence of other fresh troops, air landing divisions may be used.
- (2) It is to be ensured that Units on the Western Front, which have suffered be fully operational once more by 1st May 1945 at the latest.
- (3) In order to ensure the replacement of personnel and material to make good losses suffered and those to be expected in the Spring, and also in order to develop increased personnel and material superiority.
 - (a) The 600,000 American and 250,000 British recruits, whose training for the Armed Forces has recently been ordered as a matter of the highest priority, are to be used for setting up and reinforcing the replacement and training units.

- (b) The re-equipping and assembling of supplies in Western Europe to be completed by 15 March; increase of ammunition supplies by 33 per cent.
- (c) The equipment of 8 French Divisions to be completed by 1st May.
- (4) The supply of material to the Russians to continue on same scale as hitherto.
- (5) Apart from the

81 large formations (51 American, 22 British and 8 French Divisions) at present in FRANCE, and by deferring other plans, a further

34 large formations (25 American, 3 British and 6 French Divisions) will be sent to the Western Front, and will have arrived there by 1st May 1945.

- (6) The measures listed under 1-6 (sic. 1-5 is meant) represent the basis for the carrying out of the interrupted offensives against Germany, with the RUHR and SAAR areas as objectives in order to hinder the enemy in the continuance of the war.
- (7) In order to ensure the exploitation of any possibilities arising out of the operations planned the Fourth British Army (at present 11 and one-half divisions), which is now in ENGLAND, is to be reinforced and to remain in GREAT BRITAIN as a strategic reserve.

B. Directives for the conduct of operations by the Anglo-American Air Forces in EUROPE.

- (1) Full strategic reconnaissance of areas controlled by Germany for the detection of movements of German Forces by land and by sea.
- (2) Attacks against railway centres immediately behind the Western and the Eastern Front, (West of the RHINE and immediately West of the ODER), to hinder German transport movements; to be carried out with a medium effort by four-engined Bomber Units of the VIIIth and XVth U.S. Army Air Forces.
- (3) Night harassing attacks by No. 205 British Bomber Group at FOGGIA against towns in Southern SILESIA and the Protectorate.

- (4) Attacks against BALTIC Ports, (STETTIN and GDYNIA being of especial importance), concurrently with the mining of areas concerned, by Bomber Command with a small effort (200 - 300 four-engined aircraft).
- (5) The continuance of the present attacks by day and by night against the German Hydrogenation Plants.
- (6) The preparation of a strong "Terror" Mission against BERLIN with some 1,200 four-engined bombers, in several streams. The night for the attack will be ordered later at short notice.
- (7) Increased sea reconnaissance and Anti-U boat activity in the ATLANTIC and, when weather is favourable, attacks by small forces of Bomber Command (100 - 200) against U-boat pens in NORWAY.
- (8) Operations by the Allied Tactical Air Forces according to the requirements of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Invasion Forces (Eisenhower).

All attacks planned require prior approval by the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff.

B. Propaganda Directive.

- (1) Directives for general Broadcasting.
 - (a) All British, and also neutral Broadcasting Stations so far as they are supplied with material by us, are to feature with priority the successes by the Russians in the Eastern campaign, and care should be taken that such successes are in no way written down whilst confining the report to the true facts and consulting the communiques of the German OKW where necessary.
 - (b) Successes of Anglo-American Command, especially those of the Air Forces, are to be represented without reference to the real results obtained. The Russians allies must gain the impression that the Anglo-American Command is doing everything to support his action in the East. Care should be taken, however, that successes are not exaggerated to such an extent that they might be contradicted by German counter-statements and cause the Russian ally to suspect Anglo-American communiques.
 - (c) Broadcasts should continually contain reference to one or more great offensives which the Anglo-

Americans are preparing in the West. The impression is thereby to be created in the minds of the Russians that the enemy is being forced to desist from moving troops to the East. The relief to the Russians in the East caused thereby is to be effectively stressed.

(d) Successes by Anglo-American Ground troops are to be similarly treated and exploited.

(2) Directives for Broadcasts specifically destined for Germany.

(a) The Germans must also be given the impression that the Anglo-Americans are starting a large scale offensive, the date of which will be determined by the withdrawal of German troops to the East.

(b) At the same time, the German public is to be increasingly convinced that unconditional surrender does not represent the death of the German people. Churchill's last speech in the House of Commons provides guidance for the explanation of the term "unconditional surrender".

(c) By exaggerating reports regarding Soviet successes on the Eastern Front (particularly by emphasizing unduly the importance of advanced Russian patrols and armoured spearheads) the German public is to be brought to a state of nervousness which will lead to chaos in the areas more closely affected.

(3) Directives to the Press.

The directives issued for broadcasting apply in principle to the Press, but the Ministry of Information will ensure that occasionally a voice should, again and again, rise against Russia in the Press. The Russian ally will thus be given the impression that on the Anglo-American side there exists the right to a free expression of opinion, which will lend added weight to the value of pro-Russian publications.

SIGNED (Illegible)

Distribution:

Chief of the Great General Staff, Washington.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London.
European Branch of the Anglo-American Sub-Committee of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, London.
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Great Britain

(General Eisenhower).

"Certified correctly translated." (SIGNED:)

MEYER
Leutnant.