

Reference abstracts Part II

of

KV 2/400 - KV 2/402

This document contains materials derived from the latter files

Its purpose: to be used as a kind of reference document, containing my personal selection of report sections; considered being of relevance.

Please do not multiply this document

Remember: that the section-copies still do obey to Crown Copyright

By Arthur O. Bauer

Part II

Kurt Wieland

KV 400 – KV 402

KV 2/400-2, page 17

7. In July or August 1942, W. was sent ahead with a skeleton staff of the Sonderstab F. to prepare a camp near STALINO for the larger unit. The camp was to be for between 350 and 500 people, though W. could not state the approximate numbers of the unit since there were always sections away on detachment. The Sonderstab F was not to be used in the ordinary fighting but was to await an opportunity to shoot down into Iraq. When the German advance was held at ODESSA, the Sonderstab F was put into the front lines, W. was wounded and finally returned to the depot staff in BERLIN. Here he was told that he was to be sent away on an officers' training course.

7 In July or August 1942, Wieland was sent ahead with a skeleton staff of the Sonderstab F. (AOB, [Sonderstab Felmy](#)), for operations in the Caucasus?) to prepare a camp near Stalino for the larger unit. The camp was to be for between 350 and 500 people, though Wieland could not state the approximate numbers of the unit since there were always sections away on detachment. The Sonderstab F was not to be used in the ordinary fighting but was to await an opportunity to shoot down to Iraq.. When the German advance was held at Odessa, the Sonderstab F was put into the front lines, Wieland was wounded and finally returned to the depot staff in Berlin. Here he was told that he was to be sent away on an officer's training course.

KV 2/400-2, page 17

8. In December 1942, W. reported back as 2/Lieut. to the Sonderstab F. offices in BERLIN where he became quartermaster. The object of this unit had now vanished so that it was partially dissolved, some of the members being transferred to N. Africa for the purpose of training arabs, others being combined into an infantry unit Sonderverband 801 (or 802), later known as Panzergranadierregiment 92 and used in the Balkans. Hptm. MICHELS of P.G.R. 92 and formerly of Kap SUNION asked for W. who joined the unit in the Balkans, where it was used against the guerrilla bands. It was here that W. met Hptm. LANGE of the Abw. who suggested that W. might find interesting work in the Abw. and gave him the telephone number of Lt.-Col. KLEINSTÜBER of Abw. I - Luft.

8 In December 1942, Wieland reported back as 2/Lieut. To the Sonderstab F. offices in Berlin where he became quartermaster. The object of this unit had now vanished so that it was partially dissolved, some of the members being transferred to N. Africa for the purpose of training Arabs, others being combined into an infantry unit Sonderverband 801 (or 802), later known as Panzergranadierregiment 92 and used in the Balkans. Hptm. Michels of P.G.R. (AOB, [likely: Panzergranadierregiment](#)) 92 and formerly Kap Sunion asked for Wieland who joined the unit in the Balkans, where it was used against the guerrilla bands. It was here that W. met Hptm. Lange of the Abw, who suggested that Wieland might find interesting work in Abw. I – Luft.

KV 2/400-2, page 17 +18

9. W. was on leave in BERLIN in December 1943 and telephoned to [KLEINSTÜBER](#) who told him to call at BERKAERSTR. 32-37, but when W. called there, he was interviewed by [BEISSNER](#) who asked him which Arab countries he knew, mentioning Transjordan, Syria and Palestine. W. replied that he only knew Palestine. BEISSNER noted his particulars and said he would hear later. At the end of May or beginning of June, W. was transferred to the Officers' Depot, BERLIN, from where he should have gone to the Eastern Front but was suddenly told one day to report to a certain room in BERKAERSTR. 37. KLEINSTÜBER was not

Continuing at next page

present but W. was told to report to him at ZOSEN Camp. Here KLEINSTÜBER PF 601, 5 asked W. how he thought an expedition to Palestine could be carried out and if he thought it would be worth while to attack specific objectives. W. replied that he would need a W/T operator and a reliable Arab but that the attack on specific objectives would have only a temporary success whereas the inciting of Arabs against the Jews would bring more permanent results. The first essential was to get a W/T operator and W. suggested Uffz. BEILHARZ of the Lehrregiment BRANDENBURG, who was thought to be W/T instructor to Arabs in the German Army. W. also said that they would have to have large stocks of arms and ammunition. KLEINSTÜBER then dismissed him by telling him to report in future to BERKAERSTR. 37 because the ZOSEN Camp was being taken over by another unit. W. was then given a room in BERKAERSTR. 37, in the offices of Abw. I - Luft which had come under S.D. Amt VI C 13 (or Amt Military). Here W. drew up a list of what would be necessary for the expedition and for personal property but would not touch the W/T side of their requirements until an operator had arrived. PF 600 756

Wieland was on leave in Berlin in December 1943 and telephoned to Kleyenstüber who told him to call at Berkaerstrasse 32-37, but when Wieland called there, he was interviewed by Beissner, who asked him which Arabic countries he knew, mentioning Transjordan, Syria and Palestine. Wieland replied that he only knew Palestine (AOB, [he was born there and grew up](#)). Beissner noted his particulars and said he would hear later. At the end of May or beginning of June, Wieland was transferred to the Officer's Depot, Berlin, from where he should have gone to the Eastern Front but was suddenly told one day to report to a certain room Berkaerstrasse 37. Kleyenstüber was not present (AOB, [like preparing for taking over the leadership of KO Spain, replacing Leissner; he arrived there about July/August and kept this post up to the end of the war. Was expelled in early 1946](#)) but Wieland was told to report to Zossen Camp (AOB, [Zeppelin?](#)) Here Kleyenstüber asked Wieland how he thought an expedition to Palestine could be carried out and if he thought it would be worth while to attack specific objectives. Wieland replied that he would need a W/T operator and a reliable Arab but that the attack on specific objectives would have only temporary success whereas the inciting of Arabs against the Jews would bring more permanent results. The first essential was to get a W/T and Wieland suggested Uffz. Beilharz of Lehrregiment Brandenburg, who was thought to be W/T instructor to Arabs in the German Army. Wieland also said that they would have to have large stocks of arms and ammunition. Kleyenstüber then dismissed him by telling him to report in future to Berkaerstrasse 37 because the Zossen camp was being taken over by another unit. Wieland was then given a room in Berkaerstrasse 37, in the offices of Abwehr I - Luft (AOB, [by the way, Kleyenstüber himself came from I L](#)) which had come under S.D. Amt VI C 13 (or Amt Mil). Here Wieland drew up a list of what would be necessary for the expedition and for personal property but would not touch the W/T side of their requirements until an operator had arrived.

↓

COPY
Original in P.F.600,274 DELHAYE Vol.2. 44a p.6

SECRET
16 ab

SUMMARY OF TRACES.

Date: 8.11.44. Name: DELHAYE, Rene Gustave
Ferdinand Joseph.

Reference: File No.:

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	PP.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
<u>APPENDIX II a) Suspected enemy agents operating or in training.</u>		
53. <u>ABU ALI.</u>		Known from MSS to be W/T operator belonging to "T" Group at The Hague SD school in June 44. Described as "adequate" from W/T aspect. Also there is rather a vague trace for a MOHAMMED MUSTAFA KHATIB using the @s ABU ALI and HUSNI. He is holder of Syrian Passport 13720 issued Aleppo 22.9.41. and left for Europe on 10.8.42. (SF.52/Syria/1).

Delhaye (René Gustav Ferdinand Joseph) was a Belgian agent working for the Germans (KV 2/228 on the name of De Letay PF 600276, accordingly the PF number notice on top of this card is apparently incorrect)

MSS stood for: Most Secret Source, hence Enigma message. This was of the most ultimate secrecy! The Hague SD school, was code-named: Seehof and situated in a park like surrounding.

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No.: FF 600,528 Name: WIELAND/FRANK/LATIF.

Original in File No.: SF 75/Germany/10A. Serial: 85ab(1) Dated: 21.11.42.

Original from: Extract from MI19 report SIR3 Under Ref.: 21.11.42.

Extracted on: 5.11.44. by: EHF Section: RB

LEHRREGIMENT PERSONALITIES. (Brandenburg)

.....

WIELAND Uffz. An old Palestian friend of P/W WEBER. Told P/W WEBER about the BERLIN-STRAUSBERG course. Was in the 3 Kp.Brandenburg Regiment.
1.75m, slim, clean shaven, dark brown hair parted on the side, left. Short full face, fresh complexion.

...Extract from MI 19 report SIR3 under Ref. 21.11.42 Wieland/Frank/Latif.
Lehrregiment Personalities (Brandenburg)

..
Wieland Uffz. An old Palestinian friend of P/W Weber (AOB, Operator, together with Aberle the special Abwehr W/T car-station named: Schildkröte, which was captured by New Zealanders, and this event "blew up" the entire Operation Salaam and Condor the latter should operate from Kairo). Told P/W Weber about the Berlin-Strausberg course. Was in the 3. Kp. Brandenburg Regiment. 1.75m, clean shaven, dark brown hair parted on the side left, Short full face, fresh complexion.



Extract from Security Summary Middle East No. 205
dated - 25th October, 1944. 162
Recd. 5.11.44.

PALESTINE

(a)(1) In the course of their preliminary interrogation, the results of which should be taken with some reserve pending further investigation, the three parachutists who were captured near Jericho on 16 Oct. state that their mission to Palestine was to organise and maintain an Arab 'resistance movement' against the Jews, and that the Mufti was the prime mover of the expedition. The German officer Wieland (on his own statement) was not given full control of the party, but was only in charge of the technical side of the mission and general administration. He was to supervise the activities of the Arab officer Dhu'l Kifl Abdul Latif in the organising, arming and payment of Arabs, but the mission as such was the charge of Abdul Latif. The Mufti was stated to have provided the money and weapons for the expedition and it was at his suggestion that the extra medical stores were carried. He also wishes to have control of the communications between the party and Berlin, but this was refused, and an arrangement was made for the passing of messages to be divided equally between the Arab and the Germans. For his part, Wieland was to send military and political information to Berlin by W/T. The group claim that they were given no names of possible contacts in Palestine being told merely to go to earth until Abdul Latif had made contact with local Arabs and then to make their own arrangements after they had surveyed the position. Wieland states that he was given an introductory note signed by the Mufti, but this has not been found. The Danish passports and identity cards were to be used only 'in case of flight.'

Extract from Security Summary Middle East No. 205
Dated - 25th October 1944.
Recd. 5.11.44.

Palestine.

(a)(1) In the course of their preliminary interrogation, the results of which should be taken with some reserve pending further investigation, the three parachutists who were captured near Jericho on 16 Oct. state that their mission to Palestine was to organise and maintain an Arab 'resistance movement' against the Jews, and the Mufti was the prime mover of the expedition. The German officer Wieland (on his own statement) was not given full control of the party, but was in charge of the technical side of the mission and general administration. He was to supervise the activities of the Arab officer Dhu'l Kif Abdul Latif in the organising, arming and payment of Arabs, but the mission as such was the charge of Abdul Latif. The Mufti was stated to have provided the money and weapons for the extra medical stores were carried. He also wishes to have control of the communications between the party and Berlin, but this was refused, and an arrangement was made for the passing of messages, to be divided equally between the Arab and the Germans. For this part, Wieland was to send military and political information to Berlin by W/T. The group claim that they were given no names of possible contacts in Palestine being told merely to go to earth until Abdul Latif had made contact with local Arabs and then to make their own arrangements after they had surveyed the position. Wieland states that he was given an introductory note signed by the Mufti, but this has not been found. The Danish passports and identity cards were to be used only 'in case of flight.'

Sunday Express

PRESS CUTTING.

Date . . . 29 . . . 10 . . . 14

THREE NAZI SABOTEURS PARACHUTE ON JERICHO

Sunday Express Correspondent

JERUSALEM, Saturday.

THREE Luftwaffe officers landed by parachute in the wilderness near Jericho. They came to sabotage, but achieved nothing, and from the time they landed until they were caught ten days later they were on the run, hunted through the desolate, shadeless hills.

They brought 14 German printed maps of Palestine. What they hoped to sabotage no one knows.

The three men—one is believed to be a Palestine Arab—landed on October 7. This is what followed:

First Day.—Five Arab shepherd boys outside Jericho pick up a bag of gold coins worth £400, dropped by a low-flying plane into a deserted ravine. Three men seize the bag and warn the boys to clear off.

Gold coins clue

Second Day.—An Arab police inspector in Jericho hears that gold coins are in circulation there. He investigates, learns about the plane and the landings.

Searchers find German-Arabic dictionaries, machine guns, explosives, near the landing site.

Third Day.—Police, still searching, are told by a watchman at a convent on a hilltop overlooking Jericho, that he has seen three men dressed like Arab peasants walking up the dry river bed towards Jerusalem.

Fourth Day.—No developments.

Fifth Day.—A wireless transmitter and arms are found buried in an orange grove.

Cavalry join in

The trail is lost until the seventh day, when police find a German parachute, more arms and sabotage equipment.

The search continues until the morning of the tenth day, when a Transjordan Frontier Force sergeant sees a man clad in Arab clothes standing near a cave in an area where hermit priests lived in the Middle Ages.

The man holds an automatic pistol with silencer, but he surrenders quietly.

Two more men are found in the cave. They wear Luftwaffe insignia; one is a major, the other a captain.

Inside the cave a British officer finds another wireless transmitter, money, arms, ammunition and tinned food.

'Daft,' said officer

The British officer who told me part of this story commented: "So far as I can see they were completely daft. They did not seem to know what they wanted to do. I should say they were told to go to Jericho—and they went."

PRESS CUTTING 29.10.44 Sunday Express

Three Nazi Saboteurs parachute on Jericho
Jerusalem, Saturday

Three Luftwaffe officers landed by parachute in the wilderness near Jericho. They came to sabotage, but achieved nothing, and from the time they landed until they were caught ten days later they were on the run, hunted through the desolate, shadeless hills.

They brought 14 German printed maps of Palestine. What they hoped to sabotage no one knows.

The three men-one is believed to be a Palestine Arab-landed on 7 October This is what followed:

First day: Five Arab shepherd boys outside Jericho pick up a bag of gold coins worth £400, dropped by a low-flying plane into a deserted ravine. Three men seize the bag and warn the boys to clear off.

Gold coins clue

Second Day. An Arab police inspector in Jericho hears that gold coins are in circulation there. He investigates, learns about the plane and the landings.

Searchers find German-Arabic dictionaries, machine guns, explosives, near the landing site. (AOB, [the dictionaries are strange, because the two Germans were born in Palestine, why should they need a dictionary, as they also spoke Arab language? Or have the British told \(briefed\) them this?](#))

Third day-Police, still searching are told by a watchman at a convent on a hilltop overlooking Jericho, that he has seen the men dressed like Arab peasants walking up the dry river bed towards Jerusalem.

Forth Day.- No developments

Fifth Day.- A wireless transmitter and arms are found buried in an orange grove.

Cavalry join in

The trail is lost until the seventh day when police find a German parachute more arms and sabotage equipment.

The search continues until the morning of the tenth day when a Transjordan Frontier Force sergeant sees a man clad in Arab clothes standing near the cave in an area where hermit priests lived in the Middle Ages.

The man holds an automatic pistol with a silencer, but he surrenders quietly.

Two more men are found in the cave. They wear Luftwaffe insignia one is a major the other a captain.

Inside the cave a British officer finds another wireless transmitter, money, arms, ammunition and tinned food.

'Draft,' said officer

The British officer who told me part of this story commented: "So far as I can see they were completely draft. They did not seem to know what they wanted to do. I should say they were told to go to Jericho- and they went."

↓

↓

C O P Y

S.C.U.4 (M.E.R.S.),
M.E.F.
TEL. MIDEAST 278.

42B

23/RS/27.

21 October 1944.

S. I. M. E.
G.H.Q., M.E.F.

REPORT ON W/T EQUIPMENT DROPPED BY PARACHUTE IN PALESTINE

OCTOBER 1944.

I have examined the above equipment and the transmitter, receiver and power pack are similar to that supplied to "BLACKGUARD", a report on which was forwarded to you under our 23/RS/14 of 15th October 1943.

The whole apparatus is so badly damaged (probably by landing on a rock or other hard object from a considerable height) that it is only just recognisable and quite irreparable.

The transmitter, receiver and power pack are all numbered 520 in ink. The similar set referred to above was numbered 300. No other identification marks are visible.

The power supply is a pedal generator similar in external appearance to those supplied to MULLER's party in Iraq in 1943. (See your SIME/500/14/5 of 22 July 1943) except that instead of the voltmeter being mounted on the generator itself, a small metal box measuring 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ " X 4" X 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ " with lid with perspex panel in it, is supplied separately. This contains a voltmeter and ammeter and a cut out and variable resistance. A flexible lead connects the generator to this box and another connects the box to the power pack. The cut-out in the box is presumably to put power on to the set only when a given voltage is reached, that voltage being determined by the variable resistor. The components in the box are very second rate. The generator itself gives 350 volts direct current and the power pack has had some amateur alteration made to it, presumably so that it can be worked off AC mains or the DC generator using the smoothing circuit of the power pack only. It is interesting to note that the instructions on the generator are written in Greek, though the generator is made in Germany.

The generator is undamaged and in working order.

There are no accessories such as phones, key, aerial wire, spare parts, etc. with the set and these were presumably lost when the suitcase containing the set was broken on impact. There is, however, with it a pamphlet in German which gives instructions on how to use a bug key for sending. These keys are difficult to operate and need much experience and it may be presumed that a bug key was supplied with the set and the operator is very proficient. The pamphlet itself was issued by the German Amateur Radio Institution.

There is no indication as to what frequency was to be used or what ciphers. The W/T plan may be with the W/T operator or may have been lost with the other loose parts.

(sgd)

Captain R. Signals.

S,C,U.4 (M.E.R.S.)
M.E.F.
Tel. Mideast 278.
23/RS/27.

21 October 1944.

S.I.M.E. (AOB, [Secret Intelligence Middle East](#))

G.H.Q. (AOB, [General Headquarters](#)) M.E.F. (AOB, [Middle East Forces?](#))

Report on W/T Equipment Dropped by Parachute in Palestine.
October 1944.

I have examined the above equipment and the transmitter, receiver and a power pack are similar to the supplied to "Blackguard", a report on which was forwarded to you under our 23/RS/14 of 15th October 1943. (AOB, [the equipment once found on the Operation Mammut guided by Gottfried Mueller \(Müller\) after their capture in Iraq](#))

The whole apparatus is so badly damaged (probably by landing on a rock or other hard object from a considerable height) that it is only just recognisable and quite irreparable.

The transmitter, receiver and power pack are all numbered 520 in ink. The similar set referred to above was numbered 300 (AOB, [Operation Mammut](#)). No other identification marks are visible.

The power supply is a paddle generator similar in external appearance to those supplied to Mueller's party in Iraq in 1943. (See your SIME/500/14/5 of 22 July 1943) except that instead of voltmeter being mounted on the generator itself, a small metal measuring 7¼" x 4" x 4¾" with lid with Perspex panel in it, is supplied separately. This contains a voltmeter and ammeter and a cut out and variable resistance. A flexible lead connects the generator to this box and another connects the box to the power pack. The cut-out in the box is presumably to put power on to the set only when a given voltage is reached, that voltage being determined by the variable resistor. The components in the box are very second rate. The generator itself gives 350 volts direct current and the power pack has had some amateur alternation made to it, presumably so that it can work off AC mains or the DC generator using the smoothing circuit of the power pack only. It is interesting to note that the instructions on the generator are written in Greek, though the generator is made in Germany.

The generator is undamaged and in working order.

There are no accessories such as phones, key, aerial wire, spare parts, etc. with the set and these were presumably lost when the suitcase containing the set was broken on impact. There is, however, with it a pamphlet in German which gives instructions on how to use a bug key for sending. These keys are difficult to operate and need much experience and may it may be presumed that a [bug key](#) was supplied with the set and that its operator is very proficient. The pamphlet itself was issued by the German Amateur Radio Institution. (AOB, = [DASD](#))

There is no indication as to what frequency was to be used or what ciphers. The W/T plan may be with the W/T operator or may have been lost with the other loose parts.

(sgd)

Captain R. Signals.

↓

The set has no earphones, battery, battery leads or spares. The key is present, being kept in a socket inside the set when not required. There are two crystals of 5660 kcs and 8568 kcs incorporated in the set, and a socket where a third crystal can be plugged in. A switch determines which crystal is in use.

The set no earphones, battery leads or spares. The key is present, being kept in a socket inside the set when not required. There are two crystals of 5660 kHz and 8568 kHz incorporated in the set, and a socket where a third crystal can be plugged in. A switch determines which crystal is in use. (AOB, = type SE 109/3, see: <http://www.cdvandt.org/Staritz-Abwehrfunk-Funkabwehr-neu2.pdf>)
KV 2/401-1, page 18 + 19

SECRET. File No. SIME/004/111/284/1 ^{39a}
Copy No. 3
*Copies 6 & 7 sent
O'Brien 27/12.*

S. I. M. E. REPORT NO. 4.

Name : Thulkifl ABDUL LATIF.
Nationality : Palestinian.
Interrogation: 5/12/44 and 6/12/44.

In addition to S. I. M. E. Report No. 3. LATIF was submitted to a further interrogation and revealed the following particulars:-

Training at the Hague.

L. On LATIF's insistence and according to the [Hafti's] instructions LATIF was sent in circa September 1943 to a training school at the Hague. At this school he attended courses of instruction in methods of defence against sudden attack. These were with pistols and tommy-guns. He was also given instruction in methods of street warfare. A German sergeant (name unknown) was instructor for the above two courses. Corporal DICK trained them in the use of British hand-grenades. Another instructor (name unknown) gave them lectures on incendiary material and various methods of starting fire i. e. with packets containing incendiary material which exploded under pressure. They used to be put in the seats of chairs and other prominent parts of the household. A German captain (name unknown) was in charge of the course in the Hague. The students and personnel on this course were housed

39a

in a house, and a bungalow which was surrounded by a wood. The bungalow housed the students.

2. The undermentioned personalities attended this fourteen day course with LATIF at the Hague. They, like LATIF, were sent on this course by the Arabic Bureau which was then situated at Goethe Str. Zehlendorf West, BERLIN. (In circa June 1944 this Bureau was transferred to OYBIN.) The Mufti was head of this bureau.

× (a) Dr. ADEL MISKI.

Syrian Mohamedan Arab. 29 years old. 1.67m in height. Thick set. Round, clean-shaven face. Brown eyes. Black hair. A doctor of medicine having (?) graduated in DAMASCUS where he was born and later in PARIS. He arrived in GERMANY in circa early 1943 and practised medicine in SUHL, THURINGEN. A nationalist Arab with strong convictions. Is now working in KREIS Hospital, SUHL, THURINGEN. Speaks fluent French and a little German.

× (b) IBRAHIM MISKAWI.

Syrian Mohamedan Arab. Born in ALEPPO. 22 years old. 1.75m in height. Thin build. Long elongated white clean-shaven face. Brown eyes. Dark hair. Long straight nose. Big ears. A German officer. 2nd Lieutenant in the Free Arabic Legion. Was in SONION Camp, GREECE, in 1942. Was then transferred to STALINO in RUSSIA. Mutinied with the other Arabs in early 1943 and returned to BERLIN when he resigned from the German Army. Was still residing in BERLIN when LATIF left on 25th October 1944. Receives an allowance from the Arabic Bureau. Speaks German and a ~~few~~ French.

× (c) ABU SHAMAAT.

Syrian Mohamedan Arab. Born in ALEPPO. About 25 years old. 1.80m in height. Well-built. Brown, oval, clean-shaven face. Brown eyes. Black hair. Has all the qualities and appearance of an athlete. A 2nd Lieut. in the Free Arabic Legion. Was in SONION, GREECE, in 1942, then transferred to STALINO, RUSSIA. Mutinied with the other Arabs while in STALINO where he was imprisoned and later brought to BERLIN, where he remained in prison for a long time. Was released after the Mufti's pressure. Now resides in BERLIN. Is kept by the Arabic Bureau. Spends most of his time at the REICH SPORT FELD, BERLIN. Speaks a little German and understands French.

S.I.M.E. Report No. 4.

Name : Thulkifl Abdul Latif
Nationality : Palestinian
Interrogation : 5/12/44 and 6/12/44

In addition to S.I.M.E. Report No. 3 Latif was submitted to further interrogation and revealed the following particulars:-

Training at the Hague. (AOB, there existed an SD saboteur school in Scheveningen (The Hague); which was dissolved after about September 1944, named "Seehof". They lived on the premises in separate houses)

On Latif's insistence and according to the [Mufti's] instructions Latif was sent in circa September 1943 to a training school at the Hague. At this school he attended courses of instruction in methods of defence against sudden attack. These were with pistols and tommy-guns. He was also given instruction in method of street warfare. A German sergeant (name unknown) was instructor for the above two courses. Corporal Dick trained them in the use of British hand-grenades. Another instructor (name unknown)(AOB, they all used aliases) gave them lectures on incendiary material and various methods of starting fire i.e. with packets containing incendiary material which exploded under pressure. They used to be put in the seats of chairs and other prominent parts of the household. A German Captain (Hptm) (name unknown) was in charge of the course in the Hague. The students and personnel on this course were housed in a house, and a bungalow which was surrounded by a wood. The bungalow housed the students.

2 The under mentioned personalities attended this fourteen day course with Latif at the Hague. The like Latif, were sent on this course by the Arabic Bureau which was the situated at Goethe Str. Zehlendorf West, Berlin.. (In circa June 1944 this Bureau was transferred to Oybin.) The Mufti was head of the bureau.

(a) Dr. Adel Miski.

Serian Mohamedan Arab. 29 years old. 1.67m in height. Thick set. Round, clean shaven face. Brown eyes. Black hair. A doctor of medicine having (?) graduated in Damascus where he was born and later in Paris. He arrived in Germany in circa early 1943 and practised medicine in Suhl, Thuringen. A nationalist Arab with strong convictions. Is now working in Kreis Hospital, Suhl, Thuringen. Speaks fluent French and a little German.

(b) Ibrahim Miskawi.

Syrian Mohamedan Arab. Born in Aleppo. 22 years old. 1.75m in height. Thin build. Long elongated white clean-shaven face. Brown eyes. Dark hair. Long straight nose. Big ears. A German officer. 2nd Lieutenant in the Free Arabic Legion. Was in Sonion Camp, Greece, in 1942. Was then transferred to Stalino in Russia. Mutinied with the other Arabs in early 1943 and returned to Berlin when they resigned from the German Army. Was still residing in Berlin when Latif left on 25th October 1944. (AOB, I suppose, that September being meant, as the party arrived in Palestine 5/6 October 1944) Receives an allowance from the Arabic Bureau. Speaks German and a little French.

(c) Abu Shamaat.

Syrian Mohamedan Arab. Born in Aleppo. About 23 years old. 1.80m in height. Well built. Brown oval, clean shaven face. Brown eyes. Black hair. Has alle the qualities and appearance of an athlete. A 2nd Liet. In the Free Arabic Legion. Was in Sonion, Greece, in 1942, then transferred to Stalino, Russia. Mutinied with the other Arabs while in Stalino where he was imprisoned and later brought to Berlin, where he remained in prison for a long time. Was released after the Mufti's pressure. Now resides in Berlin. Is kept by the Arabic

Bureau. Spends most of his time at the Reichssportfeld, Berlin. Speaks little German and understands French.

KV 2/401-1, page 28 + 29 + 30 + 31 + 32 + 33

TOP SECRET Copy for further SIME Distribution 30a

OSDIO (Air) C.M.F. SIME Copy No. 3....

X SPECIAL REPORT ON OPERATION "ATLAS". X

CRIBB
S.I.
23.12.44

PREAMBLE.

1. The information contained in this report is confined to matters relating to the GAF and its main source is 27 year-old Lt. der Infanterie Kurt WIELAND who, in the uniform of a GAF Major, was captured by the Allied authorities ten days after his descent by parachute near JERICHO in the early morning of 6 Oct. 44.
2. Additional details have been supplied by a second agent, Lt der Heeresnachrichtenbruppe Werner FRANK, who arrived in the same fashion dressed as a GAF Hauptmann.
3. The above named persons together with a third German Ofw, Friedrich DEININGER in the uniform of a GAF Lt and two Arabs flew as passengers in a B 17 piloted by Ofw, KNAPPENSCHEIDER with co-pilot Fw. JOLCHM.
4. The leader of the mission was Lt WIELAND. He states that it had been originally intended to transmit intelligence information to BERLIN from Palestine but he had succeeded in enlarging the scope of the expedition to include sabotage and the organisation of an Arab Freikorps.
5. Except that DEININGER and one Arab are still at large the mission was a failure and the interrogator gained the impression that insufficient thought and preparation had been given to the project.

DETAILS OF A/C

6. Unit: I/KG200 Base FINSTERWALDE Place of Start KILIMAKI

Type: B.17. As far as could be ascertained the machine was used unchanged after capture except for the markings and removal of some armament.

Markings: German Cross in white on both sides of the fuselage surrounded by a yellow ring. One letter "C" The machine was also referred to by the crew as the Gustav.

Camouflage: Grey-green except under the wings where the portions outboard the engines were coloured yellow. Just before take-off the yellow parts were dappled with green.

Armament: The two waist guns and tail guns were in position. The one gunner on board manned the tail turret.

Crew: Apart from the 2 members named above the crew consisted of an Observer, a W/T Op, Flight Engineer, a Gunner and a Cargo-dispatcher. None of these men was known to sources by name.

LAST FLIGHT

7. The a/c took off from KILIMAKI at 1830 hrs on 6 Oct and as far as can be discovered flew SOUTH for about 20 minutes. WIELAND says that he slept most of the time and only on 3 occasions did he try to orientate himself.
8. Looking through the astro-hatch he saw that after 20 minutes' flying the bearing of the stars had changed and the a/c seemed to have swung round to the Eastward.

9. After about 3 hrs' flying he again looked out and saw below and on the port quarter a brightly illuminated town, directly astern high mountains which however were not high enough to be covered with snow and to starboard and below - the sea.
10. He had told the pilot that when the a/c was within 15 minutes' flying time of the dropping place he should be wakened so that he could verify the actual spot. He was duly wakened a few minutes before midnight (German time) and looking out through the rear gunner's perspex he could see that they were flying Northwards away from the Dead Sea which lay astern of them.
11. He realised that they had quite a distance to fly yet and made no immediate move to leave when, to his consternation, FRANK disappeared through the side door, followed by DEININGER and the Arabs. As he was the leader of the party he had no option but to follow. The failure of the party to arrive at the correct spot seems to rest with the crew since :-
- 1). The observer had not taken any drift sights and consequently failed to allow for a very strong NORTH wind.
 - 2). They were dropped from much too great a height. Both sources estimate it as 800 m instead of the 300 which had been agreed upon.
 - 3). They were dropped much too early. On instructions from the 2nd pilot the cargo-dispatcher gave the order to leave and let go the stores from the bomb bay without consulting WIELAND.
12. This irresistible combination of misfortunes resulted in the party landing about 2 kms EAST of JERICHO instead of near the mountains 20 kms NORTH of the town. They came down widely separated and FRANK did not make contact with WIELAND until the 3rd day.

PREPARATIONS.

13. WIELAND, as leader of the expedition is the main source of the following information.
14. He first came in touch with the GAF for the purposes of operation of operation ATLAS in Mar. 44. Through Sturmbannfuhrer BEISSNER of Amt Vic he met Oblt FIGULLA, Adjutant of the Geschwaderstab K.G. 200 and arranged with him to meet Major STORNER, the KOMMODORE of K.G. 200 at GATOW the base of the Geschwader. ~~STORNER'S~~ meeting took place at the beginning of April.
- 3 - MAY 1955
15. The plan was discussed in outline from the standpoint of the GAF. It seems to have been laid down from the start that the approach should not be made over Turkey but as is indicated in the last flight it is doubtful whether the instructions were obeyed.
16. At first the outward flight was planned thus :-
- KALAMAKI - a point on the coast of LYBIA near SOLLUM - SOUTH of CAIRO - Gulf of AQABA - the Dead Sea - Jordan Valley to the dropping place.
17. The advantage of this approach was that the Allied Radar cover of the Lybian coast was supposed to be defective at SOLLUM.
18. 5-6 men were to take part and 500 kgs of stores were to be taken with the party. Either a JU-290 or a captured plane was to be used for the job.

19. At the beginning of May a third meeting took place at FINSTERWALDE the base of I/K.G.200 when the plan was discussed in greater detail. The meeting was attended by Oblt FIGULLA, Major KOCH, Kommandeur of I/K.G.200, Oblt METTER, Intelligence Officer of I/K.G.200, Hpt, St. Fuehrer BACHHAUS of Amt VI and Lt PAULUS, a parachute expert. PAULUS carried out a demonstration jump with full equipment on the a/f.

20. The same subjects which had been discussed at GATOW were again reviewed and it was now decided that the a/c should be a B 17 piloted by Fw POHL and with Oblt KUSSMAUL as Observer.

21. After the meeting Fw POHL told WIELAND that it was by no means certain that he could do the trip since he was about to be sent to OCTU.

22. At a further meeting held in WIELAND's office at Amt VI when Major KOCH and Oblt FIGULLA were present the start was fixed for the beginning of August. This arrangement did not last very long however and shortly afterwards the start was postponed until the end of August or the beginning of September.

FIRST FLIGHT.

23. On 4 Sep. the B 17 took off from RANGSDORF after the German members of the party had received GAF Frontausweise. The party was the same as in all subsequent flights. An intermediary landing was made at BECKEREK about 3 kms NORTH of BELGRADE.

24. Next day the journey was continued to KILAMAKI and the following evening the B 17 taxied out to take-off. A burst tyre delayed the start for 24 hours and it was not until the evening of the 7th that the B 17 was air-borne for the last lap.

25. After 20 minutes' flying the B 17 was back again at KILAMAKI with mechanical trouble. From sources' description it seems that the port inner propeller developed an oil leak in the transmission.

26. A further delay of 3 days resulted before a new propeller was fetched from FINSTERWALDE. During this delay Allied bombers visited the a/f and the a/c was damaged slightly by splinters and blast.

27. The new propeller was eventually fitted but in the meantime the weather in the Eastern Mediterranean had closed down and the operation was temporarily abandoned. On the 14 the a/c returned to FINSTERWALDE.

PREPARATIONS for the LAST FLIGHT.

28. It was eventually decided that the flight should take place from RANGSDORF on the 30 Sep. On the 26th FRANK informed WIELAND that the flight had been advanced to the 26th and was to start from DRESDEN/GROSSENHAIN so that the take-off from KILAMAKI should not be later than the 30th. It is thought that this advancement was made to allow the same a/c to make two sorties during the full-moon period.

29. Another B 17 awaited them at GROSSENHAIN and another delay - this time one of the fuselage tanks was u/s. The flight was begun on the 29th and a landing made at PARNDORF near VIENNA. They maintained a height of 100 m when crossing Reich territory.

30. Exceedingly bad weather in the Balkans kept them grounded at PARNDORF until the 4th Oct and whilst they were waiting there a JU 290 of I/K.G.200 arrived from FINSTERWALDE with a similar load and purpose to theirs. Its destination, however was rumoured to be Tunisia.

31. On the 4th they took off at 1500 hrs and landed at SEMLIN near BELGRADE where they spent the night.

32. At 0300 hrs on the 5th they took off for KILMARI and arrived there about 0500 hrs. Here the fuel tanks were topped up and a last minute alteration of plan carried out. WIELAND had always tried to arrange that the kit and stores should be dropped all together so that it would be immediately available for the party's use. Up to the time of the last take-off he had been unable to have his way and the arrangement was that the cargo-dispatcher should throw out the various packages as quickly as he could.

33. After the pilot and the Observer had discussed the petrol situation the port fuselage tank was removed from the bomb bay and the cargo stowed afresh in its place. This meant that the petrol tankage was now 12,000 litres instead of 14,000 and it seems fairly certain (although WIELAND claims not to know) that the route as originally planned was never even attempted.

34. When the B 17 left KILMARI on the 6 Oct. the JU 290 which was said to be on similar business to theirs was still on the a/f.

W/T APPARATUS.

35. FRANK had been the Signals Officer of Regimentstab SAJDENBURG before he was seconded to the Wehr for this special mission. He was to act as W/T Op and brought with him 3 sets for this purpose. They were never used operationally.

1. 40 Watt 90/40 which was separately dropped from the a/c and provided with pedal current generator.
2. Z.N. Geract. FRANK carried this set during the drop. This was manually supplied with current.
3. S.E.109/3 battery set. WIELAND carried this strapped to his chest when he dropped.

Frequencies.

36. The operational frequencies lay between 6₂-12 mc/s tuned manually on the S.E. 90/40 and crystal-controlled in the two other sets.

37. For the Z.N. Geract and the S.E. 109/3 FRANK had 10 crystals between 6₂-12 mc/s. For two of the frequencies, thought to be around 6₂-8 mc/s, a pair of matched crystals was provided so that the two sets could be used as mutual standby.

38. If necessary transmission and reception could be carried out up to a frequency of 16 mc/s on the S.E.90/40.

40. K.G.200 (4 Oct 44.)

Personalities.

Kommodore	Hpt. STORMER
Stabsadjutant	Oblt FIGULL
Kommandeur I/K.G.200	Hpt. KOCH (No one seems to know what happened to HARTENFELDT)
Operations Officer I/K.G. 200	Hpt. BRAUN
Intelligence Officer	Oblt METTER
Adjutant	Lt. SCHIESSL
Pilots	Hpt KOHLMANN
	Ofw POHL
	Ofw KNIPPENSCHNEIDER
	Fw JOACHIM
Observer	Oblt KUSMUL

DISCARDED

5-MAY-44

41. Bases

Sta/Sta K.G. 200
I/K.G.200

G.TOV
FINSTERWALDE

42. Strength in a/c

On 4 Oct the following machines of I/K.G.200 were parked in hangars II and III on FINSTERWALDE a/f:

2 JU 290's, 1 B 17, 1 JU 252, and 1 Fieseler Storch

43. Detachment

In Jul 44 a Kommando of K.G.200 i.e. a detachment at a forward base, is known to have been at JILISTEA in Rumania. Under the command of Oblt FITTIG or FITTING its function was to maintain a reserve supply of stores and fuel for a/c coming out from Germany and returning from missions. Except for a HE III there were no a/c of K.G.200 stations on the a/f and this machine was used exclusively for the transport of urgent stores and personnel between the rear and forward bases.

Some Operations.

44. Summer 1943.

WIELAND had previously made preparations for a mission to IRAN known as Einsatz WERWOLF. In Aug. 43, after months of indecision on the part of Amt VI a party of Arabs and Palestinian Germans assembled at S.RABUZ in the Crimea, ready to take off and be dropped over IRAN in an a/c to be provided by Gruppe Gartenfeldt, as I/K.G.200 was then known.

45. Oblt, later Hpt, BRAUN was to be the pilot and the expedition was led by Lt. KURSCHNER with WIELAND (as 2nd in command) Quartermaster

46. The W/T station which was to maintain contact with the agents after they were dropped had already been set up and was in working order.

47. A JU 290, just returned from an agent dropping mission in IRAN was being checked and serviced on the a/f when an over-enthusiastic mechanic pulled up the under carriage. History does not record what happened to him but the expedition was abandoned and the party dispersed.

48. Summer 1944.

In Jul 44 PW went on leave to MEDLS in Rumania where he has a wife among the Siebenburger Sachsen. He hitched a ride in a JU 290 of K.G. 200 which starting from RANGSDORF, called at GROSENELIN near DRESDEN to pick up 30 Russians and then flew on to BRASOW where it proceeded to get itself bogged on the a/f. WIELAND left the same day and is unable to say whether the a/c became operational again.

49. On 2 Aug another JU 290 of I/K.G.200, piloted by Hpt. KOHLMANN arrived at JILISTEA with a similar load and this is definitely known to have taken off with passengers and returned without them. Although WIELAND thought that they were to be dropped in the Caucasus this is by no means certain since he was told that often an interval of 2 or 3 days occurred between the departure and return of the a/c and it was therefore assumed that landing was made inside Russian territory

50. Petrol Shortage.

In Sep this year I/K.G.200 were rationed to 80,000 litres of petrol a month which would limit operations to 2 long-range and 6-8 short-range sorties.

GENERAL.

51. Prohibited Area for Flying.

When the B. 17 made the intermediary landing at WIEN/P. RNDORF on 29 Sep they were informed that they could not take off until 1500 hrs on any afternoon for flights over Hungary. All flying was prohibited over that country between the hours of 0600 and 1400 each day

52. Night Fighters.

Whilst at P. RNDORF WIELAND saw about a dozen JU 88's which from the description (rod aerials mounted on the nose of the a/c) may have been night fighters. An unspecified number of FW 190's were also parked on this airfield.

(SGD) J.B. NEWTON, S/Ldr.

for R.M.C. DAY, W/Cdr.
Commanding A.I.K. Med.

CSDIC (Air) C.M.F.
Special Report on Operation "Atlas".

Preamble

1 The information contained in this report is confined to matters relating to the GAF and its main source is 27-year-old Lt. der Infanterie Kurt Wieland who, in the uniform of a GAF Major, was captured by the Allied authorities ten days after his descent by parachute near Jericho in the early morning of 6 Oct. 44.

2 Additional details have been supplied by a second agent, Lt. der Heeresnachrichtentruppe Werner Frank, who arrived in the same fashion dressed as a GAF Hauptmann.

3 The above named persons together with a third German Ofw. (AOB, [Oberfeldwebel](#)) Friedrich Deininger in the uniform of a GAF Lt. and two Arabs flew as passengers in a B17 piloted by Ofw. Knappenscheider with co-pilot Fw. (AOB, [Feldwebel](#)) Joachim.

4 The leader of the mission was Lt. Wieland. He states that he had been originally intended to transmit intelligence information to Berlin from Palestine but he had succeeded in enlarging the scope of the expedition to include sabotage and the organisation of an Arab Freikorps.

5 Except that Deininger and one Arab are still at large the mission was a failure and the interrogator gained the impression that insufficient thought and preparation had been given to the project.

Details of A/C (AOB, [abridgement of the word aircraft](#))

6 Unit : I/KG 200 Base Finsterwalde Place of Start Kalamiki (AOB, [I stood for 1st Staffel](#))

Type : B.17. As far as could be ascertained the machine was used unchanged after capture except for the markings and removal of some armament.

Markings : German Cross in white on both sides of the fuselage surrounded by a yellow ring. One letter "G" (AOB, ["G" might had stood for Gartenfeld the KG 200 leader](#))

Camouflage : Grey-green except under the wings where the portions outboard the engines were coloured yellow. Just before take-off the yellow parts were dappled with green.

Armament : The two waist guns and tail guns were in position. The one gunner on

board manned the tail turret.
Crew : Apart from the 2 members named above the crew consisted of of an observer, a W/T Op, Flight Engineer, a Gunner and a Cargo-dispatcher. None of the men was known to sources by name.

Last flight.

7 The a/c took off from Kalamaki at 1830 hrs on 6 October and as far as can be discovered flew South for 20 minutes. Wieland says that he slept most of the time and only on 3 occasions did he try to orientate himself.

8 Looking through the astro-hatch he saw that after 20 minutes' flying the bearing of the stars had changed and the a/c seemed to have swung round Eastwards.

9 After about 3 hrs' flying he again looked out and saw below and on the port quarter a brightly illuminated town, directly astern high mountains which however were not high enough to be covered with snow and to starboard and below – the sea.

10 He had told the pilot that when the a/c was within 15 minutes' flying time of the dropping place he should be wakened a few minutes before midnight (German time) (AOB, [known as DGZ which stood for: Deutsche gesetzliche Zeit](#)) and looking out through the rear gunner's Perspex he could see that they were flying Northwards away from the Dead Sea which lay astern of them.

11 He realised that they still had quite a distance to fly yet and made no immediate move to leave when, to his consternation, Frank disappeared through the side door, followed by Deininger and the Arabs. As he was the leader of the party he had no option but to follow. The failure of the party to arrive at the correct spot seems to rest with the crew since:-

1) The observer had not taken any drift sights and consequently failed to allow for a very strong North wind.

2) They were dropped from much to great height. Both sources estimate it was 800 m instead of 300 which had been agreed upon.

3) They were dropped much too early. On instructions from the 2nd pilot the cargo-dispatcher gave the order to leave and let go the stores from the bomb bay without consulting Wieland.

12 This irresistible combination of misfortunes resulted in the party landing about 2 km East of Jericho instead of near the mountains 20 kms North of the town. They came down widely separated and Frank did not make contact with Wieland until the 3rd day.

Preparations.

13 Wieland, as leader of the expedition is the main source of the following information.

14 He first came in touch with the GAF for the purpose of operation of operation Atlas in March 44. Through Sturmbannführer Beissner of Amt VI C he met Oblt. Figulla, Adjutant of the Geschwaderstab K.G. 200 and arranged with him to meet Major Stormer, the Kommodore of K.G. 200 at Gatow the base of the Geschwaders ?? meeting took place at the beginning of April.

15 The plan was discussed in outline from ?? the standpoint of the GAF. It seems to have been laid down from the start that the approach should not be made over Turkey but as is indicated in the last flight it is doubtful whether the instruction were obeyed.

16 At first the outward flight was planned thus: -

Kalamiki – a point on the coast of Libya near Sollum – South of Cairo – Gulf of Aquaba – Dead Sea – Jordan Valley to the dropping place.

17 The advantage of this approach was that the Allied Radar cover of the Libyan coast was supposed to be defective at Sollum.

18 5-6 men were to take part and 500 kgs of storage were to be taken with the party. Either a JU 290 or a captured plane was to be used for the job.

19 At the beginning of May a third meeting took place at Finsterwalde the base of I/K.G.200 when the plan was discussed in greater detail. The meeting was attended by Oblt. Figulla, Major Koch, Kommandeur of I/K.G. 200, Oblt Metter, Intelligence Officer of I/K.G. 200,

Hptm. St. Führer Backhaus (AOB, [St. Fuehrer = Standartenführer](#)) of Amt VI and Lt. Paulus, a parachute expert. Paulus carried out a demonstration jump with full equipment on the a/f. 20 The same subject which had been discussed at Gatow were again reviewed and it was now decided the a/c should be a B 17 piloted by Fw. Pohl and with Oblt. Kussmaul as Observer. 21 After the meeting Fw. Pohl told Wieland that it was by no means certain that he could do the trip since he was about to be sent to Octu (AOB, = [according Google: Officer Cadet Trainings Unit](#)).

22 At a further meeting held in Wieland's office at Amt VI when Major Koch and Oblt. Figulla were present the start was fixed for the beginning of August. This arrangement did not last very long however and shortly afterwards the start was postponed until the end of August or the beginning of September.

First Flight.

23 On 4 Sep. the B 17 took off from Rangsdorf after the German members of the party had received GAF Frontausweise. The party was the same as in all subsequent flights. An intermediary landing was made at Beckerek about 3 kms North of Belgrade. 24 Next day the journey was made continued to Kalamaki and the following evening the B17 taxied out to take off. A burst tyre delayed the start for 24 hours and it was not until the evening of the 7th that the B 17 was air-borne for the last lap. 25 After 20 minutes flying the B 17 was back again at Kalamiki with mechanical trouble. From sources' description it seems that the port inner propeller developed an oil leak in the transmission. 26 A further delay 3 days resulted before a new propeller was fetched from Finsterwalde. During this delay Allied bombers visited the a/f/ (AOB, = [air field](#)) and the a/c was damaged slightly by splinters and the blast. 27 The new propeller was eventually fitted but in the meantime the weather in the Eastern Mediterranean had closed down and the operation was temporarily abandoned. On the 14th the a/c returned to Finsterwalde.

Preparations for the last flight.

28 It was eventually decided that the flight should take place from Rangsdorf on the 30 Sep. On the 26th Frank informed Wieland that the flight had been advanced to the 26th and was to start from Dresden/Grossenhain so that the take-off from Kalamiki should not be later than the 30th. It was thought that this advancement was to allow the same a/c to make two sorties during the full-moon period. 29 Another B 17 awaited them at Grossenhain and another delay – this time one of the fuselage tanks was u/s. The flight was begun on the 29th and a landing made at Parndorf near Vienna (Wien). They maintained a height of 100 m when crossing Reich territory. 30 Exceedingly bad weather in the Balkans kept them grounded at Parndorf until the 4th Oct. and whilst they were waiting there a JU 290 of K.G. 200 arrived from Finsterwalde with a similar load and purpose to theirs. Its destination, however, was rumoured to be Tunisia. (AOB, [Wimmer-Lamquer, KV 2/3663? This party landed in Spain, apparently with aircraft problems and stayed there for the rest of the war](#)) 31 On the 4th (Oct.) they took off at 1500 hrs and landed at Semlin near Belgrade where they spent the night. 32 At 0300 hrs on the 5th they took off for Kalamiki and arrived there about 0500 hrs. Here the fuel tanks were topped up and the last minute alterations of plan carried out. Wieland had always tried to arrange that the kit and stores should be dropped all together so that it would be immediately available for the party's use. Up to the time of the last take off he had been unable to have his way and the arrangement was that the cargo-dispatcher should throw out the various packages as quickly as he could. 33 After the pilot and Observer had discussed the petrol situation the port fuselage tank was removed from the bomb bay as the cargo stowed afresh in its place. This meant that the

petrol tankage was now 12,000 litres instead of 14,000 and this seems fairly certain (although Wieland claims not to know) that the route as originally planned was never even attempted.

34 When the B 17 left Kalamiki on the 6th the Ju 290 which was said to be on similar business to theirs was still on the a/f/

W/T Apparatus.

35 Frank had been the Signals Officer of the Regiment Brandenburg before he was seconded to the Abwehr for this special mission. He was to act as W/T Op and brought with him 3 sets for this purpose. They were never used operationally.

1 40 Watt 90/40 which was separately dropped from the a/c and provided with pedal current generator.

2 Z.N. Gerät. Frank carried this set during the drop. This was manually supplied with current.

3 S.E. 109/3 battery set. Wieland carried this strapped to his chest when he dropped.

Frequencies.

36 The operational frequencies lay between 6 – 12 MHz tuned manually on the S.E. 90/40 (AOB, see <http://www.edvandt.org/Staritz-Abwehrfunk-Funkabwehr-neu2.pdf>) and crystal controlled in the two other sets.

37 For the Z.N. Gerät the S.E. 109/3 Frank had 10 crystals between 6 – 12 MHz. For the two of the frequencies, though to be around 6½ - 8 MHz, a pair of matched crystals was provided so that the two sets could be used as mutual standby.

38 If necessary transmissions and reception could be carried out up to a frequency of 16 MHz on the S.E. 90/40.

40 K.G. 200 (4 Oct. 44)

Personalities.

Kommodore	Major Stormer (AOB, decarded means he was now a member of the Allies, friendly, or, maybe, dead)
Stabsadjutant	Oblt. Figulla
Kommandeur I/K.G. 200	Major Koch (no one seems to know what happened to Gartenfeld)(AOB, it is known that he was after the war in Russian hands and later sentenced to death)
Operations Officer I/KG 200	Hptm. Braun
Intelligence Officer “	Oblt. Metter
Adjutant “	Lt. Schiessl
Pilots “	Hptm. Kohmann
“	Ofw. Pohl
“	Ofw. Knappenschneider
Observer “	Oblt. Kussmaul

41 Bases.

Sta/Sta K.G. 200	Gatow
I/K.G. 200	Finsterwalde

42 Strength in a/c.

On 4 Oct. the following machines of I/K.G. were parked in hangars II and III on Finsterwalde a/f:

2 Ju 290's, 1 B 17, 1 Ju 252, and 1 Fiessler Storch (AOB, [Churchill appreciated this latter aircraft type in North Africa, as well as did General Patton](#))

43 Detachment.

In July 1944 Kommando of K.G. 200 i.c. a detachment at the forward base, is known to have been at Jilester in Rumania. Under the command of Oblt. Fittig or Fitting its functions was to maintain a reserve supply of stores and fuel for a/c/ coming out from Germany and returning from missions. Except for a He 111 there were no a/c of K.G. 200 stations on the a/f and this machine was used exclusively for the transport of urgent stores and personnel between the rear and forward bases.

Some Operations.

44 Summer 1943.

Wieland had previously made preparations for a mission to Iran known as Einsatz Werwolf. In August 43 after months of indecision on the part of Amt VI a party of Arabs and Palestinian Germans assembled at Sarabuz in the Crimea, ready to take off and be dropped over Iran in an a/c to be provided by Gruppe Gartenfeld, as I/K.G. 200 was then known. (AOB, [he is mixing up matters, as the Dora group mostly men sent by Amt VI landed in South Iran \(Gashgai country\)](#)). See Schulze case: <http://www.cdvandt.org/schulze-case.htm>)
45 Oblt., later Hptm, Braun was to be the pilot and the expedition was led by Lt. Kurschener with Wieland(as 2nd in command) Quartermaster.

46 The W/T station which was to maintain contact with the agents after they were dropped had already been set up and was in working order.

47 A Ju 290, just returned from an agent dropping in Iran was being checked and serviced on the a/f when an over-enthusiastic mechanic pulled up the under carriage. History does not record what happened to him but the expedition was abandoned and the party dispersed.

48 Summer 1944.

In July 44 PW went on leave to Medias in Rumania where he has a wife among the Siebenburger Sachsen. He hitched a ride in a Ju 290 of K.G. 200 which starting from Rangsdorf, called at Grossenhain near Dresden to pick up 30 Russians and then flew on to Brasow where it proceeded to get itself bogged on the a.f. Wieland left the same day and is unable to say wheather the a/c became operational again. (AOB, [there must have been much hesitation, because the Russians were due to enter Rumanian territories!](#))

49 On 2 Aug. another Ju 290 of I/K.G. 200, piloted by Hptm. Kohmann arrived at Jilester with a similar load and this is definitely known to have taken off with passenger and returned without them. Although Wieland thought that they were to be dropped in the Caucasus this is by no means certain since he was told that often an interval of 2 or 3 days occurred between the departure and return of the a/c and it was therefore assumed that landing was made inside Russian territory.

50 Petrol Shortage.

In Sep this year I/K.G. 200were rationed to 80,000 litres of petrol a month which would limit operation to 2 long-range and 6-8 short-range sorties.

51 Prohibited area of Flying.

When the B 17 made the intermediary landing at Wien/Parndorf on 29 Sep they were informed that they could not take off until 1500 hrs on any afternoon for flights over Hungary. All flying was prohibited over that country between the hours of 0000 and 1400 each day.

52 Night Fighters.

Whilst at Parndorf Wieland was about a dozen Ju 88s which from the description (red aerials mounted on the nose of the a/c and may have been night fighters, An unspecified number of FW 190s were also parked on this airfield.

(Sgd) J.B. Newton S/Ldr.
for R.M.C. Day, W/Cdr.
Commanding ? I. K. Med.

↓

S. Form 100.

SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

30B

From : C.I.C.I. Office File No. GEN Originator's No. BD/220
 BACHADAD Passed for Date of Origin 13.12.44
 Action to B.1.B 18/12 Date of Receipt 15.12.44
 Copies to Deciphered by NCM

SECRET.

Addressed MIDEAST for S.I.M.E. repeated Snuffbox London.

WELAND.

Snuffbox signal DS/3645/44 of December 4th. PF 600,528/B.1.B not repeat not received this office. Request copy.

Secret Telegram Received in Cipher

From: C.I.C.I.
Baghdad

Secret.

Addressed Mideast for S.I.M.E. repeated Snuffbox London (AOB, searching Google: In January 1945, Radó arrived unexpectedly at the British The codenames of MI5 and SIME used in this report were 'Snuffbox London' and 'Subsided Cairo')

Snuffbox signal DS/3645/44 of December 4th. PF 600,528/ B.1.B (AOB, M.I.5)(AOB, However, a search on the web as well as at GB-NA pointed at the **Alexander Rado** files KV 2/1647 KV 2/1648; and on the **Pescatore Hans von/ Piert Willy** file KV 2/1329, quite a have bunch of paper!)

↓

↓

Names requested to be carded on SIME reports at 17a
in PF 600,528 WIELAND

36B

HUBBARD	Scoutmaster in Jerusalem and leader of the Hitler Youth before the war.	N.T.
HOFFMAN, Sam.	Leader of the Nazi Party in Palestine before the war.	NLT.
MICHELS, Hpt.	PGR 92 serving in the Balkans. (No further information)	NLT.
DJANDALI, Dr.	Connected with the Grand Mufti in Berlin.	NT.
AKEL, Dr.	" " " " " "	NT
TSCHIRCHKY	Waffen SS. Connected with the Mufti.	NT
RUNF	German Official at the Consulate in Istanbul.	NT
RIX	Member of the German Staff in Athens	NT
KUSMAN	Asst. to Major BARDEN - of the Commandateur in Athens.	NT
FABER	Civilian who worked in Abw. I. Luft Berlin. (No further information)	NT
STOCKY, Lt.	Member of the Brandenburg Regt. in Berlin.	NT
SPIEGEL, Dr.	German Supervisor of the Free Arab Radio Station in Athens.	NT

Names requested carded on SIME report at 17a in PF 600,528 Wieland

Hubband Scoutmaster in Jerusalem and leader of the Hitler Youth before the war.
Hoffman, Samuel? Leader of the Nazi Party in Palestine before the war.

Michels, Hptm. PGR 92 serving in the Balkans (No further information).

Djandali, Dr. Connected with the Grand Mufti in Berlin.

Akel, Dr. " " " " " " "

Tschirchky Waffen SS. Connected with the Mufti.

Runf German Official at the Consulate in Istanbul (Istambul).

Rix Member of the German Staff in Athens

Kusman (Kusmann?) Asst. to Major Barden – of the Commandeur in Athens

Faber Civilian who worked in Abw. I Luft Berlin. (No further information)

Stocky, Lt. Member of the Brandenburg Regt. In Berlin.

Spiegel, Dr. German Supervisor of the Free Arab Radio Station in Athens.

KV 2/40102, page 4

R.S.H.A. AMT VI.

49. W. has given the following information on the R.S.H.A., AMT VI located in BERKAERSTR. 32-35, SCHMARGENDORF, BERLIN.

50. Head of the AMT: Brigadeführer SCHELLENBERG. } own file N.N.I.

Personal Representative: Stubaf SCHMITZ.

Gruppe VIa : Ostuf SANDBERGER ? } P. 602, 130

Gruppe VIB : ?

Gruppe VIC : Ostuf TSCHERSKY
(Until June, head of the Aussenstelle, DRESDEN, so formerly AMT IV)
See Ostuf GAMOVSKY.

VIC 12 Stubaf. SCHUBACK
Interest - Iran

VIC 13 Stubaf. SCHUBACK P. 600, 756
(Until July 44 Stubaf BEISSNER was head. He was removed and WEIHRHUCH took charge until Sep. 44, when SCHUBACK took over).
Interest - Arab countries;
- Middle East.

13a Ostuf HEYER
Interest - Personnel and agents of VIC 13.

13b Clerk - WENKMANN
Interest - Collation of reports and information.

RECORDED
Secured 22/11/61

R.S.H/A. Amt VI.

49 W(AOB, [Wieland](#)) has given the following information on the RSHA, Amt VI located in Berkaerstrasse 32-35m Schmargendorf, Berlin.

50 Head of Amt: Brigadeführer Schellenberg

Personal Representative: Stubaf.(AOB, [Sturmbannführer](#)) Schmitz

Gruppe VI A: Obstubaf. Sandberger

Gruppe VI B: ?

Gruppe VI C: Ostubaf. Tschiersky
Until June, head of the Außenstelle, Dresden, so formerly Amt IV) See Ostuf. Gamovsky.

Gruppe VI C 12 Stubaf. Schuback, interest – Iran

Gruppe VI C 13 Stubaf. Schuback (Until July 44 [Stubaf Beissner] was head. He was removed and Wehrhuch? Took charge until Sep,44, when Schuback took over). Interest – Arab countries Middle East.

Gruppe 13a Ostuf. Heyer Interest Personnel and agents VI C 13.
(AOB, [Decarded](#) ment: [removed from card index](#). I suppose from long experience, that he became engaged in friendly (like Nato) services or other friendly means)

Gruppe 31B Clerck – Henkmann. Interest Collation of reports and information

KV 2/402-3

90. DOH, Willi

This is DOH @ RACHAD who was a W/T operator at the Abwehr post at Kabul. On 16.6.43 WITZEL, German Military Attache at Kabul and head of the Abwehr post, suggested that his own recall should be expedited and that DOH should be commissioned and should take over the post of Military Attache's representative, in order to continue WITZEL's work. He added that DOH was the only person with sufficient linguistic qualifications. DOH was recalled to Berlin at the end of September 1943.

There are also traces in Hart's material of Unteroffizier DOH. Gruppe II Berlin told Athens on 29.10.41 that he had received training as a pioneer and that he was, at that time, taking part in a course which would delay his despatch to Athens. He was in Salonika in the following year and Gruppe II Salonika was told by Berlin on 13.5.42 that DOH was earmarked for a new operation in Africa. Despite numerous appeals from the Ic officer with the Panzerarmee Afrika, he was still in Europe at the end of the year. I should think it is unlikely, however, that he is identical with the man in Kabul although he (the Unteroffizier) is presumably yet another of those Palestinian Germans.

90 DOH, Willi

This is DOH @ Rachad who was a W/T operator at the Abwehr post in Kabul. On 16.6.43 Witzel, German Military Attaché post at Kabul and head of the Abwehr post, suggested that his own recall should be expedited and that DOH should be commissioned and should take over the post of Military Attaché's representative, in order to continue Witzel's work. He added that DOH was the only person with sufficient linguistic qualifications. DOH was recalled to Berlin at the end of September 1943.

There are also traces in Hart's material of Unteroffizier DOH. Gruppe II Berlin (AOB, [Abw. II sabotage, Brandenburg](#), [but in 1941 still named: z.b.V. 800, or Lehrregiment](#)) told Athens on 29.10.41 that he had received training as a pioneer and that was, at that time, taking part in a course which would delay his despatch to Athens. He was in Salonika in the following year and Gruppe II for a few operations in Africa. Despite numerous appeals from the Ic officer (AOB, He [was responsible for intelligence about "Feindlage-Information"](#)) of the Panzerarmee Afrika, he was still in Europe at the end of the year. I should think it is unlikely, however, that he is identical with the man in Kabul although he (the Unteroffizier) is presumably yet another of those Palestinian Germans. (AOB, [like was Kurt Wieland](#))

Termination of Part II