Page initiated 28 January 2019
Status: 11 February 2019
1 + 2
The Nordpol affair, as well as the related Englandspiel,
were probably the most successful
counter espionage affairs
on the German side.
Its British counter-part was S.O.E.
What makes it all so intriguing, is, the fact that it lasted for nearly two years!
You will encounter a most dramatic story; very sad and a real drama,
as > 50 persons had been involved and with a very few exceptions, they lost their lives ultimately.
You will be confronted with genuine British document sections, which are being selected by my choice out of the bulk of paper materials available.
Such endeavour is only fruitful, when we are in the position to take notice
of the main 'entities' involved.
Before starting our Survey, I would like to point at the fact, that I previously (before 7 February 2019), I did suppose that the famous telegram once sent to S.O.E. on 1st April 1944, could only have been addressed on behalf of Schreieder, but he, in his post-war book : Englandspield, on page 281, he quotes:
in Dutch language: De vijand brak het spel niet af; daarom moesten wij het wel doen. Giskes stuurde dan ook op 1 April een radiogram, dat als volgt luidde:
“Aan de heren Blunt, Bingham en Co.,
Wij zijn ons ervan bewust, dat u sedert enige tijd zonder onze hulp in Nederland zaken doet. Daar wij gedurende ruime tijd uw vertegenwoordiger zijn geweest, vinden wij dit heel onbillijk. Maar dat sluit niet uit, dat, als u mocht besluiten, ons op grote schaal te komen bezoeken, wij u de zelfde gastvrije ontvangst zullen bereiden, als uw agenten.”*
Equally can be found in Guy Liddell's war time diaree 1942-1945; on page 251
Therefore. I would like to stress, that when otherwise being noticed, you should understand the foregoing text lines. Thus: that it was Giskes who arranged this telegram (radiogram)
We should confront ourselves with:
Huntemann, Giskes assistant
Schreieder the "Kriminalkommissar" of the Sipo
who 'invented' the name Englandspiel
and he actually was the executive of the German Police operations
Maybe concluding with an abstract of the final British
RSS report of 1945.
Before hand: Britain gained upmost from wireless (W/T) intercepts, but just this aspect might have been the braking point; as in Holland, the Germans possessed an excellent telephone network and almost all crucial communications went through wires instead of wireless!
This may be considered as the main reason why these events have been so disastrous!
I choose first to digest Obstlt. Herman Joseph Giskes' file series
KV 2/961 - 962 and 963
Not foreseeable, was the fact that it would cover too many pages at once, and I have therefore decided, to divide this file into two chapters.
of which we today will have
Obstlt. Hermann Joseph Giskes
Leiter Abwehr III F of Ast-Niederlande (1941 - 1943)
Photo taken during his interrogation in Camp 020 (May/June 1945)
KV 2/961 - 962 Part I (31-1-2019)
The next file is the second part of the previous document. In some respect it gives to me the impression, that everything around has been collected in a box and ultimately made it a file. But, it also contains some unexpected aspects. His file is most interesting as he dealt with it at a practical level, but still operating in between Giskes' circles and the daily operational practice.
KV 2/962 - 2-KV 963 Part II NEW (11-2-2019)
The third part of this quite comprehensive contribution, is on:
Huntemann Gerhard Gottfried Eduard:
Uffz. Gerhard Gottfried Eduard Huntemann
Considering, for example, a Dutch dissertation on Nordpol and Englandspiel (2003)(J.P.M.H. Wolters), its scope is rather narrow, albeit that when going into details it is done solid; but just outside it, it provides hardly anything! Therefore providing all the efforts, a quite meagre understanding of what happened in the Netherlands on the same time.
KV 2/967 Part I NEW (11-2-2019)
Huntemann, although he was an Uffz. (N.C.O.) in the quite small organisation of III F, he did almost the daily work on behalf of its Leiter Major/Obstlt. Giskes. He therefore is an excellent source of information; because he really dealt with most people concerned.
However, the latter contribution covers only the file sections 1 - 3. In my perception, the most intriguing section is number 4 (to be covered within Part II, as it considers the names of all those Huntemann could add what he knew about a person. Maybe for historians the most fruitful source of information.
To be continued in due course
By Arthur O. Bauer