page initiated on: 4 April 2021
Current Status: 19 April 2021
KV 2/72-1, page 57 (minute 321a)
With further reference to the Zigzag-Brutus (Hubert) tie-up, you may be interested in the following message which was received by Brutus W/T on 21.9.44"-
"With regard top the delivery of the package, it is not necessary to make contact with the other person, but do you not think that the name given on the envelope may endanger you if the bearer is not quite reliable?"
I am passing this to you as it seems that the Germans are still somewhat dubious about zigzag's integrity.
B.1.a. 25.9.44 Sgd. Hugh Astor
KV 2/72-1, page 67
I. his agent is at present serving as a Wing Commander in the Polish Air H.Q. in London. He holds the Virturi Military 1941, the Polish Croix de Guerre and two bars, 1939, and the French Croix de Guerre, 1940. He is Polish by birth, having been born 6.2.1910/ he served as a pilot with the First Regiment of Avistion near Warschau (Warsaw) and earned the reputation one of their ace fighter pilots. In 1938 he went to the Staff College at Wasrschau (Warsaw), after which he was employed at the Air Ministry. After the German occupation of his country he escaped via Roumania and Yugoslavia to France, where he served as an Intelligence Officer attached to the 1st Polish Armoured Division.
During this time he wrote a treatise entitled "The Duties of a Deuxieme Bureau of a large Unit", which was circulated throughout the Polish army (AOB, outside Poland; which no longer existed then).
Following the collapse of France, he succeeded in escaping to Toulouse (then
in the un-occupied zone of France, also known as Vichy France),
and during the ensuing months decided to found a resistance organisation, which
later became known as Interalliéee
and had a membership running well into three figures. It is not necessary
to record here the details of this organisation, but in order to properly to
understand Brutus' (Hubert's)
later history it should be emphasized that the organisation was extremely
successful and was the first large organisation to be established in France; it
was, indeed, our sole regular source of information from France at that period.
In addition to regular courier services to England, Brutus (Hubert)
(AOB, strange that M.I.5 is expressing it
so incorrectly, Brutus was not yet existing, his cover-name then was Walenty!
originated from a later period)
had under his control four W/T's in Paris, which transmitted a mass of
information from the whole of France, and which enabled the Allied Intelligence
to build up a complete picture of the German Order in that country (France).
showed himself to be a man of greatest daring and initiative and had contacts
among both Vichy and
authorities, and was also able to produce false documentation. He himself
crossed the demarcation line between
→ (page 68)
KV 2/72-1, page 68
Occupied and Unoccupied France illegally upon
eighteen occasions and with false documents upon twelve occasions. he was
the first agent to leave Occupied France by air, arriving in this country in
october 1941, when he was received by General Sikorski (AOB,
this man was murdered by the British:
as he fell out of an aircraft taking off
at Gibraltar) and decorated with the
Viruri Militari, which is equivalent to the British Victoria Cross. He
returned to France a fortnight later. but owing to to the treasury of a
female (AOB, nonsense:
it was Kiki or Kieffer who was engaged and
not Mathilde Carré which was pointed at
Scandalous, that someone of M.I.5 is distorting
history so much!) member of the
organisation he was arrested on the 18th November 1941, and further
by the same agent (Carré
to have led to the arrest of some sixty Allied agents.
It so happened that the round-up of the Interalliée organisation was largely undertaken by a German named Bleicher, who is well know to us as a man of great ability and ingenuity and a specialist in running double agents. He is also a man of great personal ambition. The existence of the Interalliée organisation had been known to the Germans for some time, and they were well aware of its efficiency. They were still further impressed when Brutus himself fell into their hands, both by his own personality and by the completeness of the records which they found at his headquarters. Bleicher was no doubt quick to appreciate the tremendous gains to be obtained if Brutus (Walenty) could be recruited as a German agent, and preparations to this end were made almost immediately (AOB: from this point might, in some way or another, originate the cover-name Brutus!). It will be remembered that at that date the war was in a particularly critical stage, the Germans were at the doors of Moscow and fighting in the streets of Stalingrad (AOB, here we may conclude that Mr. Astor is a dilatant! Stalingrad was reached by the Germans about the end of August 1942, and the story reproduced was somewhere early 1942; what might have been the case: is, that he noticed the time that the German agent Walenty then name by the latter Hubert) They therefore considered that it would be an easy matter to convert Brutus (Hubert) to their cause. In essence their propaganda was to the effect that Germany was championing a great cause which called for sacrifices on all sides. They spoke of the "new world order" and referred to the tremendous losses already suffered by Germany in realising this ideal. They tried to persuade him that the future of Poland depended on the successful establishment of → (page 69)
KV 2/72-1, page 69
such an order and pointed out that the Anglo-Saxons would not be sufficiently strong to withstand the Russian claims to dominate Poland.
Brutus what prompted these propaganda talks and pretended to be impressed by them. Finally he addressed a letter to the German High Command, saying that he had been convinced that Poland's destiny lay in the German hands and offering to put his experience as their disposal.
The Germans were well satisfied with the result of their propaganda and were evidently convinced of Brutus's (Hubert's) genuine desire to cooperate with them. As a safeguard, however, they pointed out the Brutus (Hubert) that both his mother and his brother were in German hands, as were also large numbers of the Interalliée organisation, and they (Obst. Reile, at Hotel Lutetia, in Paris) in made Brutus (Hubert) (actually Czerniawski) sign an undertaking that if ever he should double-cross them they were at liberty to execute these hostages.
After a brief period of instructions in codes, etc., they therefore staged an escape, and Brutus, made his way south to Madrid and subsequently to Gibraltar in October 1942. (AOB, Bleicher's explained that he guided ultimately Hubert (Brutus) via Lyon to Toulouse, where he made further his way to Spain. Hubert (Brutus) even did sent a postcard to the Hotel where Bleicher was still staying, noticing Bleicher that he had reached Spain. But this was in June, in my perception - then is arriving at Gibraltar in October a bit too long staying in Madrid. Or, he went first to the British Embassy or that like and some investigation did take place, before Czerniawski was clearly excepted as a double-cross agent by M.I.5 (C70) (C70return)
→ he arrived in this country (England) in the same month, and was obviously in a very nervous condition. He was closely interrogated by both Polish and British security authorities, but was careful to avoid any reference to his recruitment by the Abwehr, as he was was very conscious of his of his responsibilities towards friends in German hands and was not yet certain of the degree to which the Germans penetrated the Polish H.Q. in London. He did, however, mention to the Chief of Polish Security Service that he would have an interesting statement to make in a month's time/ He duly satisfied the investigating authorities that his escape had been genuine (which wasn't) (D70) (D70return), but on the 20th November Brutus produced a document headed "Le Grand Jeu", in which he made a full confession of his recruitment by the Abwehr and produced some wireless crystals which he had kept hidden in the heels of his shoes. He revealed that his mission was primarily of a political nature, designed to foster discontent → (page 70)
KV 2/72-1, page 70
among the Polish armed forces in the U.K., and secondly, to transmit by W/T such military information as he was able to obtain, The Germans told Brutus (Hubert) that they would listen for his transmissions from the first days of November (1942).
These new confessions from Brutus, however, caused considerable doubts of his integrity and it seemed possible that he might be embarking on some form of triple-cross. These doubts, however. were finally dispelled, and it was decided that Brutus (Hubert) should be allowed to establish wireless communication with the Germans as a double agent. The first successful wireless contact was established on ?? (AOB the RSS intercepts, which reflects the messages sent towards Germany (E71) (E71return) )
Thereafter Brutus was allowed to lead a free normal life in England, the only outstanding high-light being his arrest in June of 1943, when it was discovered by the Polish authorities that Brutus (Hubert) was playing a leading part in Polish political affairs, and in particular had been responsible for cyclostyling a pamphlet attacking General Ujewski, who then held a position as ??? Brutus was duly tried by court martial and imprisoned for a week, when the remainder of his sentence was indefinitely postponed. Brutus's action in attacking Ujewski had the support of many rational Poles, including (not known details - or - being deleted in the context of censorship?) and time has shown that Brutus was in fact acting in the best interest of his country.
Some alarm was felt at the time about the effect of this arrest upon Brutus's development as a double agent, but, as reference to the fraffic will show, the arrest proved to be a happy incident which provided a pretext for back-pedalling on the political of his mission, which had always met with disfavour from the British Foreign Office.
The only other development of interest is his marriage to his sub-agent and mistress, Moustique (= Mme Simone Deschamps) (F71) (F71return)
Ever since his (Brutus' (Hubert's)) arrival in this country Brutus has always consulted the interests of M.I.5. before accepting any new job offered to him by his own country men. His career has of course → (page 71)
KV 2/72-1, page 71
suffered in consequence, though he was some time ago given the rank of Wing commander and appointed deputy Chief of Air at the Polish H.Q. More recently he had been transferred back to the Planning Section of the Polish Air H.Q.
The foregoing account of Brutus's (Hubert's) factual agent can be more conveniently dealt with separated herunder.
II. Brutus as a Double Agent.
Brutus has proved one of the most outstandingly successful double-agents. At the beginning of his case considerable doubts were felt about the advisability of using him for deception for two reasons:-
a) The circumstances of his recruitment by the Germans still appeared somewhat curious.
b) The Poles were in possession of his code and would therefore be able to monitor his traffic and obtain a knowledge of our cover plan for Operation Overlord. (D-Day at Normandy and all concerned)
The doubts expressed in (a), however, were soon dispelled, and efforts were made to overcome the danger of (b) by demanding a new code from the Germans. It was further found convenient for Brutus (Hubert) to recruit a notional (virtual) to act as wireless operator. so that Brutus (Hubert) himself need not to be present at the transmissions, although it was still necessary for him to prepare the messages. →(page 72)
KV 2/72-1, page 72
It finally proved impossible to continue the case because the military traffic had reached such a high level that it was no longer possible to obtain approval for it, and Anglo-Russian relations had become so delicate that the Foreign Office would not improve any political traffic. Furthermore, by January 1945 it seemed that Brutus could make no further serious contribution to the war efforts as an agent engaged on strategic deception.
AOB: we must consider that the one who wrote this recollection was not very well informed on the real facts, or was advised to put it this way.
For you we will jump back first to the quite long planned idea, that Brutus' (Hubert's) acting was due to terminate on 17 December 1944. Where he, in his London flat, was dismantling his W/T set. (G72) (G72return)
Secondly: The Germans wanted to pay their regards to Hubert (Czerniawski / Walenty / Brutus). Here, for me astonishingly, M.I.5 introduced Edward Chapman (burglar and safe cracker) who was first a German; at the time when he became engaged his German cover-name was Draht, whereas his British cover-name was Zigzag (Zig-zag). A whole game was engendering from early January 1945 up to 16th April 1945. Though, from a complete different content then I ever have seen before. (H72) (H72return) But the main reason was that someone should receive £2000 to the Wings Club at Grosvenor Place in London.
Also a point that really mattered was the fact, that in March 1945 M.I.5 applied for a new operation with Brutus as a spill; which was rejected by the Foreign Office on a meeting. (K73) (K73return)
KV 2/72-1, page 73 (minute 313a)
I cannot help feeling that Brutus is showing insufficient interest in military developments in France. It is true that he has told the Germans that he would obstinately refuse to be influenced by Allied propaganda and that he has recently (before 28 August '44) received an assurance from the Germans that they still have complete confidence in the military operations planned by them. Now, however, it is no longer possible for Brutus to believe in a German military victory in the west. This is not merely because of the optimism proclaimed by the press, but because he is known to be in contact with (Polish) senior Staff officers, who would leave him in no doubt as to the true state of the German 7th Army. Brutus must therefore suppose that the Germans are playing for a political victory in the west and a military in the east - a solution which Brutus himself suggested to the Germans some months ago. Granted this, Brutus would realise that no matter how assiduously (diligently) he works for the Germans , he cannot prevent the Allies from liberating western Europe, and there would therefore only remain one reason for which Brutus would continue to risk his life working from England instead of of returning to (Russian controlled) Poland, where he could continue to fight with some chance of success for the ideals which he has always pronounced dear to him.
It seems to me necessary, therefore, that Brutus should send a series of messages making the following arguments:- (it would be quite stupid and mad!)
"You are now opposed by an infinitely superior force in the west and nothing can stop the Anglo-Saxons from reaching the borders of Germany. I appreciate, however, that my work is still of the greatest value to you in so far as it enables you to anticipate accurately Allied intentions, and thereby to effect a strategic withdrawal with the minimum loss whilst inflicting the maximum casualties (thus also to their fighting opponents) → (page 74)
KV 2/72-1, page 74
upon the enemy. I presume, therefore, that when the Anglo-Saxons reach the Siegfried Line (the pre-war Westwall) the conditions will be favourable for discussing peace terms, as this Line can possibly be easily held and only breached at great cost to the Allies. Having thus secured our western flank, we will then be able to devote our entire energies to the eastern flank, and bring about the resurrection of Poland for which we have for so long been struggling".
I have discussed this verbally with Colonel Fleetwood Hesketh, and he agrees that some sort of comment is urgently required from Brutus, but I can foresee to me, however, that Brutus can still of considerable value to Shaef, and as we are frequently prepared to fight his last battle on reasonable that we should be prepared to fight the battle on the highest level of the military hierarchy, it seems reasonable that we should be prepared to dig our toes in and fight the same battle in the diplomatic world. Whenever the Foreign Office approving authority is confronted with an item of traffic which throws a somewhat adverse light upon our Russian allies, he expressed a twofold fear (a) that the Prime Minister (Churchill) may get to hear about it, and (b) that the Russians might get to hear it (too).
(a) appears unworthy of comment, and (b) presuppose that the Russians are monitoring the Brutus (Hubert) traffic. There are in fact no grounds to suppose that they are monitoring the Brutus (Hubert) traffic, but if they are they must by now have reached one of the two conclusions:-
1) That Brutus is a disgruntled Pole actively working for the Germans, in which case (acting in a truly Allied spirit) it should be their bounden duty to warn us that there is a spy in our midst; or
2) They must realise that Brutus is working under British control. They are well aware of D.A. technique, (are they?)→ (page 75)
KV 2/72-1, page 75
and consequently appreciate that military gains can only be achieved provided that the agent has a suitable cover for carrying on his activities.
I am not suggesting that we should approach the Russians and see their approval, but am merely trying to point out that it is ridiculous to be affraid of any comeback on a message of the type described above. If you agree that this is worth taking up with the Foreign Office, I will work out a series of messages with Brutus.
B.1.a. 23.8.44 Sgd. Hugh Astor.
(AOB, belonged he to the core of British Intelligence Services (M.I.5?) Than - it would be an intellectual shame for the British Intelligence Services! Those men might have plaid too many Monopoly games with their children or grand-children)
KV 2/72-1, page 80 (minute 309a)
This is an omnibus note of certain developments which have arisen in the case of Brutus which we have discussed verbally.
On Sunday, 23rd July, Brutus' house was damaged by a 'doodle-bug' (A German V1 flying (buzzing) bomb) and his wife, Moustique, was injured and had to go to hospital. I understand that Brutus (Hubert) has sustained certain material loss and, in addition, medical treatment for Moustique (Mme. Simone Deschamps) will involve him in a certain amount of expense. She has suffered facial injuries and Brutus has McIndoe, the plastic surgeon expert, to arrange treatment for her. In this connection Brutus mentioned the sum of £50.
At the moment Brutus and Moustique are staying at the Regent Palace Hotel, but Moustique is shortly to be evacuated to friends in the country and I think that Brutus would be glad to accept your proposal that he should move into Hill Street as he finds living at the Regent Palace rather expensive.
Marshall is at present living in Hill Street but has volunteered to move out and I am taking Brutus on a tour of inspection this afternoon. I have told him that we are prepared to let him live at Hill Street rent free on condition that he will be prepared to move out at short notice should the necessity arise.
You will remember that we discussed the possibility of offering Brutus financial assistance to cover the medical expenses incurred by Moustique. I believe that this gesture would be very much appreciated by Brutus, who has worked valiantly (bravely) for us over a period of time without receiving any remuneration (payment). May I have your agreement to discuss this aspect of the matter with him?
KV 2/72-1, page 81
I have had several conversations with Brutus regarding the political situation in Poland and the Russian advance - towards which he appears to adopt a reasonably healthy attitude. He is particularly interested in the Russian advance because he believes that his mother who lives on Vistula (Weichsel), will shortly be liberated by the Russians and he is exploring the possibility of sending a reply-paid telegram to her, although this seems rather impracticable at the moment.
I know very little of Brutus' present political activities except that he tells me he is keeping in touch with a number of Poles over here. So far as Brutus himself is concerned he seems to think that the Polish Government set up in Moscow is at any rate a degree better than having no Polish Government at all and he likens it to the Petain Government which was established in (Vichy) France. He does say, however, that the Ministers who form this Government are nonentities (insignificant persons) who have played no active part either in the underground movement in Poland or in the Polish armies of the Exterior. He tells me that Rola, who is the leader of the Government, served a term in imprisonment in Poland some eight or nine years ago for criminal activities.
As regards the Polish Army fighting in Russia under general Berling, Brutus says that very few of the men in this Army are, in fact Polish nationality.
The advances of the Russians naturally call for some comment in the Brutus traffic. On 26th July I discussed a series of messages with Cavendish-Bentinck at the Foreign Office, the gist of these messages being that Brutus depended upon the Germans to save Poland from being overrun by the Bolsheviks. → (page 82)
KV 2/72-1, page 82
I am bound to confess that the working of the Foreign Office mind is an even greater enigma to me now than hitherto. Without going into details the attitude of Cavendish-Bentinck was that he did not wish Brutus to emphasis his Polish nationality or mention his apprehension (worry) of the Bolsheviks. I discussed the set up in some detail with Cavendish-Bentinck who was very sympathetic to my point of view, but he insisted that it was impossible for him to sign any message which might be objectionable to the Russians should it ever fall into their hands.
He suggested that such messages should either be sent without his knowledge or that the case of Brutus should be explained to the Russians and their suggestion is obviously impracticable, but I believe that the second is worthy of considerations. We could explain the circumstances of Brutus' (Hubert's) recruitment by the Germans, indicating that, for the purpose of cover, he had had to adopt an anti-Bolshevik attitude but we could produce considerable evidence showing that, in fact, Brutus had been prepared to render direct assistance to the Russians. The Russians obviously are completely aware of D.A. technique and I cannot believe that they would have any objection to an individual Pole representing himself as anti-Russian vis a vis the Germans, providing it was obvious to them that they would reap an ample profit from his activities as a D.A. Without wishing to expound on this matter at length, I feel that such an approach to the Russian might serve to improve Anglo-Russian relationship (What would Churchill himself have commented?) and would also give us a much freer hand on the political side of the Brutus (Hubert) case.
B.1.a. 27.7.44 Sgd. Hugh Astor.
KV 2/72-1, page 86 (minute 304a)
On 12/7 Brutus (Hubert) received an incoming message, coded on 12/7, stating: "Stopp immediately all observation on the destruction caused by flying bombs and only communicate to us information on location of troops etc. in accordance with instructions given". This is of interest, since on the 7th July the Germans learnt of the arrest of Garbo and assumed correctly that it was a result of him making enquiries about bomb damage. It is of interest to note, therefore that the Germans are now alive to the danger of making enquiries of this type and that they should have been so prompt in warning Brutus (Hubert) to discontinue these enquiries. I feel that this is another instance of the high regard in which the Germans hold Brutus (Hubert).
B.1.a. 15.7.44 Sgd. Hugh Astor.
KV 2/72-1, page 87 (minute 301a)
Masterman, Astor and I (Mr. Marriott) had a long talk this afternoon about the proposal to despatch Brutus to France for the purpose of carrying out operational deception. As you know, this is in accordance with the wishes of SHAEF, who appear to want Brutus in France roundabout the middle of August or the beginning of September.
On the assumption that Brutus is primarily regarded as an instrument of deception, and that, other things being equal, the reasonable wishes of SHAEF ought to be complied with, we came to the following conclusions.
1. That if the greatest possible degree of plausibility is required then we must insist upon the Germans providing Brutus (Hubert) with a transmitter in France.
2. That it is not possible to get Brutus to France anywhere near the date nominated by SHAEF unless we provide his transmitter, whether by allow him to be suupposed to have built one for himself in France, and that either of these two methods is stretching German credibility a good deal.
3. That it is utterly unplausible for Chopin (?) to be supposed to go to France, and that therefore Brutus must go himself.
4. That in consequence of paragraph 3, Brutus (Hubert) himself must be given some job in France of which he can be posted, and that the job must be such that he has some manifest duties to perform. In other words Brutus (Hubert) must be able to give some explanation to the general public of what it is that he is supposed to be doing.
It was the view of Masterman, with which I myself in the main agree, that SHAEF will in fact find the case much less useful in France than it is at present in England. and that the process of moving Brutus is bound to de-grade him as an agent. We also thought that, if the conclusion in paragraph1 above were accepted and acted upon, the net result would in effect be to decide to continue to use Brutus here, for the Germans are bound to be very long time producing the transmitters, and for the → (page 88)
KV 2/72-1, page 88
next few months therefore Brutus (Hubert) would in fact have to be run in exactly the same way as though it had never been suggested that he ought to be sent to France.
There is one minor point, incidentally, namely this.
SHAEF, in the supposed interest of the cover plan, have not allowed Brutus (Hubert) hitherto to nominate to the Germans as likely places for depositing wireless transmitters any place which the Allied are likely to reach before 1945. If the Germans are really to produce a transmitter for Brutus, he must ask them to do so at some convenient distance from the present front line.
It really remains therefore for SHAEF to decide the various outstanding points and for us to advice upon sort of case which are likely to have at the end of their machinations. One piece of advice I think we can give them is that if they adopt the less plausible course of allowing Brutus (Hubert) to provide his own transmitter, then they ought to reckon with the possibility of having to run the case on innocuous lines for up to a month in order to judge whether the Germans have swallowed the move. It may be that virtually to put the case out of action for a month in this way may persuade SHAEF that Brutus (Hubert) that Brutus had better stay in England.
B.1.a. 5.7.44 Sgd. J.H. Marriott.
KV 2/72-2, page 4
B.1.b. Mr. Hart
With reference to our conversation, you may be interested to have the following account of the efforts made by the Germans to drop certain material to Brutus by parachute.
At the end of last year (1943), Brutus told the Germans that in order to increase the efficiency of his espionage activities it would be necessary for him to receive a certain amount of money and a new wireless transmitter, and I think the best plan is for me (Hugh Astor) to set out an abridged form the traffic which has since passed between Brutus (Hubert) and the Germans.
4.1.44, incoming: "Many thanks for your hard and valuable work. In what can we best send you the money and the piano (transmitter / I suppose receiver included)? Can you suggest a place which would be suitable for a plane to come low enough to drop what you want? What signals could you give?"
6.1.44, Brutus (Hubert) replied that he would flash signals with an electric torch and asked what general area in England would be most convenient for the Germans.
23.1.44, Brutus (Hubert) announced that he had found a suitable place for the parachutage, 8 km North-West of Beccles in Norfolk.
The location of Beccles
28.1.44, Brutus announced that in addition to the money and wireless, he would require a Leica camera for photographing documents. He asked to be sent his own Leica which had been seized from him by the Germans in Paris (18 November 1941).
3.2 44, Brutus demanded an answer to the messages about the parachute, and on ??(deleted?)
6.2.44, sent a further message asking whether the lack of reply from the Germans was due to lack of confidence in him.
10.2.44, An apology was received in the following terms: "I was away preparing for the parachutage. send exact details of the place which is most suitable for you and which would give the greatest security for the pilot and plane. I have complete confidence in you but there are still difficulties. What is your present address? There may perhaps be an opportunity of sending indirectly to you that for which you have asked".
(Z82) ↓↓↓↓↓ (Z82return) see also map further down. In this period we should consider being connected to one another
KV 2/72-2, page 5
11.2.44, Brutus sent a detailed de4scription of the dropping place 8 km North-West of Beccles, but pointing out that the anti-aircraft defence at Noprwich, Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft were very strong and recommended that the pilot should cross the coast at very low altitude but taking care to avoid passing close to the aerodromes on account of the many light A.A. (anti aircraft guns). he concluded by saying that if the Germans considered the place unsuitable he would look for another dropping place in the region of the Wash.
12.2.44, The Germans replied that the place was unsuitable and told him to visit the Wash.
12.2.44, In accordance with the German request of the 10th February, Brutus gave his address except as a last resort on account of the possibility of an indiscretion. Do you not think that it would be wiser to deposit the packet in the cloakroom of one of the restaurants or hotels in London to be held for several days, giving a fictitious name for the owner and saying that he will come and collect it in several days. You would then transmit the name and I would pick up the package".
(D84) ↓ (D84return)
14.2.44, Brutus announced that he had found an excellent dropping place 1½km North-West of Dawsmere and 2½km South-West of Holbeach St. Matthew in the bay of the Wash. GoogleEarth
The location of the proposed dropping place near to Dawsmere (Wash)
16.2.44, The Germans replied that the possibility of carrying out the operation in the area of the Wash was being examined by the Luftwaffe.
23.2.44, Brutus asked to be informed of the date of the operation and suggested that the 10th March would be convenient for him.
25.2.44, A reply from the Germans was received: "Regarding parachutage, you will receive a complete radio (transmitter and receiver combined). The date will be indicated to you as soon as the preparations are complete. The operation will not take place on a Saturday or Sunday".
3.3.44, A further assurance was received that the photographic apparatus and money would be sent with the wireless.
KV 2/72-2, page 6
10.3.44, The following was received: "Parachutage will probably take place during the course of next week. Exact place and date will be communicated to you as soon as possible. Be ready".
12.3.44, Message received: "Parachutage not possible during this week. I regret that it will not be possible until the week 20th-27th March".
This message resulted in a further bleat (complain) from Brutus.
16.3.44, Message received: "(1) Parachutage during next week. Still not yet able to fix the exact date. (2) Give an exact address in London and name under which I could leave £1,000 in small notes and the Leica apparatus. This is in case the parachutage is not successful and so that you should surely have the money and the photo-equipment in approximately ten days".
19.3.44, Brutus replied: "In principle one of our agents could deposit the packet at the Connaught Hotel, Carlos Place in the name of Jean Pierre Lefevre, saying that he knows that this gentleman is due to arrive in London and spend several days afterwards so that I may pick up the package. In principle I prefer to receive everything by parachutage, because from my experience I am nervous of contact with agents of another network. Furthermore, the immediate parachtugae of a radio crystals and a supplementary reserve of money will be necessary. I prefer to make one operation instead of two, provided that the parachutage takes place in the near future.
21.3.44, Message received: "(1) We have taken notice of the address Jean Pierre Lefebre (wrongly spelt by Germans), Cannaught Hotel, Carlos Place. (2) Will let you know immediately the packet is deposited. (3) The radio will be sent to you by the same means, not by parachutage.
13.4.44, Brutus again repeated that this difficulties in operating from this country could only be resolved by receiving the necessary equipment by parachute, and he emphasised his opinion again on 20.4.44.
KV 2/72-2, page 7
23.4.44, Message received: "As already pointed out, the parachutage is not possible. You will receive the money, Leica. and later the radio".
Later, on the same day, another message was received: "No parachutage. The date for the radio, money and Leica will be indicated to you in time".
When the messages relating to the equipment being sent by courier were first received, it was at first thought that Treasure (Kliemann) and Tricycle (Popov) would be the couriers concerned as they were at that time in Lisbon, and Most Secret Sources (M.S.S.) seemed to bear this out.
As regards the Cannaught Hotel, this matter has been discussed with Hunter of B.6 who is of the opinion that it would be extremely difficult to organise an efficient watch at this hotel without jeopardising the security of the operation. He also pointed out that the manager of the Connaught Hotel is a German.
To complicate matters further, it is not customary for the Cannaught Hotel to receive parcels addressed to anyone not residing there, and I understand that they are not at present letting their rooms to foreigners who are not already well-known to them. No approach yet been made by us to the Connaught Hotel and if, therefore, a German agent attempts to leave a parcel at the hotel addressed to Jean Pierre Lefevre he will be turned away.
B.1.a. 12.5.44 Sgd. Hugh Astor
KV 2/72-2, page 9 (minute 267x)
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)
G-3 (Ops) Division
SHAEF/24120/1/SM/Ops 10th May, 1944.
Mr. J.H. Marriott
Mr. H.W. Astor
Major R.F. Fleetwood-Hesketh
I attach a draft plan for the using of Brutus (Hubert) in connection with Plan 'Fortitude' upon which I shall be glad to have your comments as soon as possible.
C.H. Harmer, Major
AOB: This notice is for us of significance as it tells us that before he hardly had been involved in the strategic plan to mislead the Germans about the future invasion of the European Continent.
KV 2/72-2, page 10
SHAEF/24120/SM/Ops 10th May, 1944
Plan for use of Brutus
From Day - 20 to Day + 20.
1. Brutus (Hubert) appears to be well regarded. Recent Most Secret evidence supports on the whole a genuine belief in this reliability.
2. He is a Polish Air Force officer, who, however, had army experience in France with the Polish First Division as an Intelligence agent until his arrest. One of his sub-agents who escaped at the time of his arrest (18 November 1941), was a woman called Moustique (Mme. Simone Deschamps). She had been in charge of collecting information in the sector Bordeaux to the Spanish frontier and had had been most successful sub-agent.
3. On arrival in this country in 1942, Brutus started to live with Moustique (Simone Deschamps). He has just married her.
4. Brutus (Hubert his German agent name) is supposed to collect his own information and prepare and cypher his own messages. He operates his transmitter occasionally himself but the majority of his messages are sent by his operator Chopin. Chopin is supposed to be an ex Polish Air Force soldier, retired on account of ill health and age.
5. Both Brutus (Hubert) and Chopin work primarily for ideological motives.
6. Brutus (Hubert) was committed very heavily on the 'Fortitude (North), Plan. (seemingly focussing onto preparing for operations from Scotland) (M74) (M74return) Some suspicion may therefore fall on him. He should not be too heavily committed in 'Fortitude (South) before D day (now a general ruling in regard to all agents).
Objects of Plan.
7. To put Brutus in a position where he can from D day to D + 20 (until 26th June '44) implement ?? II and III of the Outline of the Order of Battle of Fusag (= a not existing US Army Group) 'Fortitude' as set out in Appendix 'B' of the above Plan (subject to general direction).
8. To enable from D - 20 to D day to continue to implement the build up of the Order of Battle of Fusag 'Fortitude' as set out in Appendix 'B' of the above Plan (subject to general direction).
9. To recruit a French Officer sub-agent to go overseas with 21 Army Group.
10. As a subsidiary objective, to implement Plan 'Ironside" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ironside).
Position of Polish Forces.
11. 1 Polish Armoured Division is in the 21 Army Group. It will be located until a late date in Scotland. The remainder of the Polish Forces, also in Scotland, are not in 21 Army Group Oder of Battle.
12. In Phase III of 'Fortitude (South)' Outline Plan, 1 Polish Armoured Division will probably be moved into Fusag to fill the gap caused by the moved of 4 Canadian Armoured Division to the 'Neptune' area.
13. Polish Fighter Squadron at D day will be stationed as follows:-
306, 315, 129 Squadrons (Mustang III) Coolsham
302, 308, 317 Squadrons (Spitfire IX) Selsey
316 Squadron (Mustang III) Coltishall
With the exception of 316 Squadron, all are in 2 TAF (Tactical Air Force?) .
KV 2/72-2, page 11
14. It is understood that Polish Liaison Officers are being attached to 21 Army Group. It is considered plausible to suggest that there are also being attached to Fusag.
15. If Brutus (Hubert) were posted notionally to Fusag just before D day, it would be necessary top explain the efficient continuation of the service after that date. If that could be explained he would be in an excellent position to report on the Order of Battle and operational intensions of Fusag.
16. It is considered that his recent marriage to Moustique (Simone Deschamps) provides the basis for such an explanation.
17. It is considered moreover that the fact that she is French and that she has lived and worked in the 'Ironside' area (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ironside) offers opportunities
(a) of recruiting a (virtual) French Officer sub-agent
(b) of implementing 'Ironside'.
18. Brutus (Hubert) is to pay further notional (virtual) visit to Scotland between 12 and 15 May 44, to anable him to continue implementing 'Fortitude (North)'
Plan Proposed ('Fortitude (South)').
19. (a) his marriage to Moustique and that she has been helping him for a considerable time.
(b) the possibility of his being given an operational liaison job.
20. On his return from Scotland, Brutus (let us never forget that - Hubert it all is about!) will
(a) further implement 'Fortitude (North)'
(b) announce nomination to post in Fusag, to join up about a month before D day.
(c) give general lines of operational role of 1 Polish Armoured Division, i.e. general reserve.
21. Brutus to announce his intention to leave Moustique in charge of the service, if he has to leave London or go to overseas. This is to implement in necessary by putting a notional (virtual) Moustique on the air.
22. Brutus (Hubert) to announce dispositions of Polish Fighter Squadrons at Coolham and Coltishall and their bomber squadrons and to say that until he joins Fusag he will have an an opportunity of visiting them all for service reasons and further that he intends to keep close touch with them as they are to be used in the operations and will be briefed beforehand.
23. Moustique to present Brutus (Hubert) with a free French Officer sug-agent who is going overseas. The background, positioning and method of communication to be employed, will have to be worked out very carefully. It is suggested that some notional (virtual) tie-up with the French or Polish Deuxieme Bureau (identical to French Secret Service Bureau) might be adopted.
24, Between Brutus' (Hubert's) completion of his Scottish report (20 May) and D -5, Brutus (Hubert) to pay visits:-
(a) to South coast and report all quiet,
(b) to Polish Squadron at Coltishall to report 5 US Armoured Divisions at East Dereham,
(c) (if time permits) to Lincolnshire.
KV 2/72-2, page 12
25. On D-5 Brutus (Hubert) to report posting of Fusag and to hand over to Moustique.
26. On D-3 Brutus (Hubert) to report through Moustique:
(a) commander and Order of Battle of Fusag
(b) that D-day is fairly long way off.
27. From D-day to D+10 Brutus (Hubert) through Moustique, to report that 1 Polish Armed Div. has been attached to Fusag in substitution for 4 Canadian Armed Div.
(a) to complete Order of Battle of Fusag.
(b) to report separate operational role of Fusag against Northern France and Belgium.
28. From D+10 Brutus (Hubert), through Moustique, to report that 1 Polish Armed Division has been attached to Fusag in substitution for 4 Canadian Armed Division.
29. From D+10 onwards Brutus (Hubert), through Moustique, to report:
(a) preparations for move to embarkation areas of Fusag formations.
(b) forthcoming move South to advanced base of 316 (Polish?) Squadron.
30. Later, according to developments in Operation 'Neptune', to explain away failure to carry out Pas de Calais operation. (AOB, Hitler thought: that there the main thrust of the Invasion would be)
31. If, after 30, Brutus (Hubert) appears still to be believed, Moustique (Simone Deschamps):
(a) to send from sub agent in France
(b) to report Brutus (Hubert) himself in France.
Subsidiary Plan for 'Ironside'
32. This Plan is subsidiary to the main Plan. It is suggested as a possible implementation of Plan 'Ironside' on the basis that the Plan will in any case difficult to implement and no better scheme is available.
33. It is based on the following story:-
Brutus and Moustique are entertained, in celebration of their marriage, by the British officers who ran Brutus in France. In the course of dinner they are reminded of the fact that Moustique was a very valuable agent in the Bordeaux-Pyrenees area.
I would like to propose read this number yourself as copying is becoming difficult for my eyes.
KV 2/72-2, page 13
34. The above story gains plausibility in the light of the facts:
(a) that Moustique (Simone Deschamps) was a quite amazingly good agent in France and is a very clever and talented woman.
(b) that she did have several sub-agents in the area in question (Sector A as it was called All the agents pseudonyms started with A) (do we talk about Simone's time in Bordeaux, but in the days of Interalliée (pre-18-11'41) her cover-name was apparently Moustrique)
(c) that Moustique and all her sub-agents in this Sector ,managed to escape and, it is most certain, the Germans never established their identities (AOB: how do they know this for certain?)
(d) that, having worked for her once and having been introduced to this job by her, he would be more likely to talk later on.
Please consider the extensive RSS intercepts which Brutus thus Hubert as the Germans knew him!
35. If the above Plans are accepted a draft timing programme is submitted at Appendix A (not certain we will have access to it)
36. Brutus' (actually Hubert's, because this cover-name links him to Mr. Czerniawski; his real name, they knew and Walenty he used in the Interalliée, days) requests for money and assistance and notional (virtual) plans for sending back reports by air will be worked in with the above Plan.
I have skipped some references as these are, in my perception, far too much beyond reality.
Please consider also: https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm
Don't forget: all stories forwarded by Hubert, and tended to include strategic disinformation, had to he handed-over to the OKW* - and their specialists were very suspicious and sceptical.
We have noticed this in the context of Johannes Jebsen - British cover-name Artist - including Popov (Tricycle) they weren't taken for granted, and they were highly suspected of providing deception information; which does not imply - that their concerned Secret Service branches were still very well impressed by the (actually) chicken-feed the Allied provided them with.
But the aim of Fortitude was different, it aimed on pushing the 'German Army' away from all matters concerning Operation Overlord, the actual landing on the coasts of Normandy.
Don't forget, that Operation 'Fortitude' did not brought what some might have expected - for at least two basic reasons: Hitler's opinion, whatever this implied, prevailed first, secondly: the OKW had a section which just dealt with Fortitude like deceptions, and in this section it were long-standing professional officers who were in charge.
After-all - the Germans weren't much misled.
There were various signs received in the circles of the that a landing stood before, even some indicating where about. (Consider informing the French Resistance)
Not often referred onto: The Normandy area was supposed once by Hitler as a strategic logical place.
Though, Hitler considered that the actual D-day was part of the Allied Fortitude or whatever they thought its cover-name was and the main thrust was, according to Hitler's perception: the area of about Calais or a bit more to the south.
We should also not forget, that the Germans fought their main battles against the Russians, which in scale was far more material demanding than in the west of Europe.
* OKW = Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (the German High Command)
KV 2/72-2, page 21 (minute 241b)
You will remember that the Germans have given Brutus to understand that they are going to make two deliveries to him at the Connaught Hotel, the first delivery consisting of money and the second, to be made at a later date, consisting of a wireless set.
During the last week Brutus has notionally (virtually) been in Scotland, but so far as I know the Germans have made no progress, in completing their arrangements for these deliveries. Brutus is going on the air this evening, and if the Germans make no mention of the money or wireless sets, I suggest that tomorrow, Tuesday, Brutus should sent a complaint in the following terms:-
"Am still awaiting the money, which is long overdue. Also urgently require two new wireless sets and two new codes. As a result of my (virtual) visit to Scotland I have a report of many pages to send you urgently, and I am afraid that without the necessary assistance from you it will be impossible for me to transmit the information which I am collecting with sufficient speed. It the wireless set are not already on the way, please reconsider the possibility of parachuting them, together with the new codes, within the next ten days. Coastal restrictions are already in force in many areas and conditions for carrying out the operation areas and conditions for carrying out the operation will probably become increasingly difficult." ("would the loss of an aircraft out-wage the value of a spy set, and some small money? Of course not!)
The reasons for this message are, I think obvious. In the first place, Brutus (Hubert) has a considerable amount of (chicken-feed) traffic which we (the British Secret Service) want him to transmit fairly quickly, and it seems desirable that in the future his rate of sending ('chicken-feed') should be greatly increased. In the second place, we (British Secret Service) are still anxious to obtain the new code. The demand for two new wireless sets and two new codes is in accordance with Brutus' (Hubert's) previous requests.
If the Germans are unable to comply with Brutus's (Hubert's) request, I think it would be as well as for Brutus to state → (page 22)
KV 2/72-2, page 22
that he has arranged for Chopin to sleep in the radio station so that he will be able to have two spells of transmission, at midnight and at 6 a.m.
B.1.a. 10.4.44 Sgd, Hugh Astor
KV 2/72-2, page 25 (minute 222a)
B.1.a. Mr. Astor
Thank you for the attached note. I have summarised it on my cover-address records.
It is difficult to offer any views on the form in this case, but presumably the Germans were relying on the postman on this particular walk to hand over to them and correspondence to Antonio da Silva, well knowing that he had left the address a year ago. I believe a similar arrangement was made in at least one case for a Garbo address. If this should be the same arrangement, I presume that it has fallen down owing to the postman with whom it was made being removed from his particular walk. From the efforts that the Lisbon Postoffice has made to deliver the letter, the Germans would not appear to have any long-stop arrangement in operation at the Lisbon G.P.O. (General Post Office).
KV 2/72-2, page 32
Brutus Supplementary Report.
This report is intended to be a continuation of the report on the Brutus (Hubert) case, dated 30.11.43, filed at (minute) 29z of Volume II of PF 65363(Walenty - Brutus file series) the conclusions filed at
29Y of that file. A duplicate of this report is attached hereto for reference.
The whole circumstances of the case were carefully considered by B.1.a in conjunction with D.B. (= at B.1.a. - Mr Masterman) and a decision was made on 12.12.42. that the case was worth running for the time being. This decision was communicated to, and agreed by, both Colonel Gano, on behalf of the Polish Deuxieme Bureau, and S.I.S. (M.I.6) (Commander Dunderdale and "C" (Sir Steward Manzies) personally being interested in this matter). The case has now been run for somewhat over a year. During all this period a close watch has been kept on Brutus (Hubert) himself in the form of a permanent telephone check and other watches intermittently (irregularly). (AOB, think of (retaining) such as mail-censorship and likely for some time a policeman watching who goes in and out; as well as following a person when he leaves the premises)
This agent was given the code-name Brutus (he possessed already, before he left France in June 1942, the German cover-name 'Hubert'). Up to the past few days he has drafted and sent his own messages. He has not perhaps cooperated as energetically as was expected at the beginning, and in the middle of the summer (1943) it was found that he had concurrently been carrying on political activities in connection with various Polish Air Force intrigues. This culminated in the editing and preparation by him of a pamphlet to be circulated amongst Polish Air Force (Walenty / Czerniawski (his real name) once was an Polish Air Force officer), which was discovered and led to the arrest and court-martial of Brutus.
In order to give a coherent account of the career of Brutus during the past year, not only as a double-agent but also as a security case, this report will be dealt with in the following parts:-
Part I. The acts and decisions taken on the discovery that Brutus was a German agent.
Part II. Evidence which has come to light during the past year bearing on Brutus' (Czerniawski's) motives and intentions.
Part III. Conduct of Brutus in Polish internal politics, his arrest and court-martial.
Part IV. Evidence disclosed by the various checks kept on Brutus.
Part V. Progress of the Brutus case.
Part VI. Present assessment of the position and prospects in regard to Brutus (a) as a Security case, (b) as a double agent.
The action and decision taken on the discovery that Brutus (= Hubert) was a German agent
It will be remembered that on his arrival in this country (England)
was in a unique position. Ha had been very important and successful (Interalliée
in France before 18 November 1941)
Polish/British agent, he had endured imprisonment for a long period without, as
far as we know, giving away information of the Germans, and he had finally
escaped in circumstances which, in view of his previous report every body was
prepared to accept as genuine. (AOB:
Czerniawski, after a while
must have approached Bleicher the successful German Secret Service (Abwehr);
Czerniawski finally managed to convince Berlin and finally came to an agreement
with Obstlt. Reile in Paris; that he should be set free when he agreed to act as
a German spy. They agreed upon this. Now, a scene was set-up that Czerniawski
could escape (under
when he arrived by car
at the Abwehr HQ at Hotel Lutétia, in Paris).
He told a very convincing story of his escape to this
and, although some were doubtful at first, they came in the end
unanimously to the conclusion that Brutus (Czerniawski)
was sincere. The admission by him a month after his arrival that he had
been given a mission (Hubert)
by the Germans was a bombshell, particularly for the Polish Service.
(AOB: true is: that Uffz. Bleicher travelled with Czerniawski and Bleicher's mistress, to Vichy France, and stayed first, like a tourist about Lyon, and the three travelled step by step Toulouse (June 1942), where Czerniawski found after some time a means to travel to Spain. Not simply escaping, but after two weeks at Bleicher's hotel arrived a postcard from Spain, signed by Czerniawski confirming his safe passage into Spain) (Q77) (Q77return)
KV 2/72-2, page 33
It was particularly unfortunate because the officers put in charge of the case general Gano had expressed their findings that Brutus was honest, and their personal reputations were involved. There was a tendency on the part of the officers (one of whom at least missed promotion because he had been fooled by Brutus (Czerniawski) to go to the opposite extreme and assume that Brutus was wholly bad. Colonel Gano accordingly decided that in connection solely with Brutus' conduct as an officer is (it?) was necessary to have a Military Court of Inquiry to go into the question of his escape. It is a rule of polish military law that any prisoner has to go before a Court of Inquiry. The present present Court consisted of Colonel Mayer (previously a high official of the Polish Deuxieme Bureau and at that time head of the Polish Intelligence School in Glasgow), Major Zychon (Colonel Gano's deputy and who had been in charge of the preliminary investigation of the case) and Major Zarembski xxxxxxxxxxxx name deleted (typically M.I. 6 praxis) who was a personal friend of Czerniawski (Brutus) and with whom Walenty / Czeniawski had collaborated to some degree in France. Captain Ploceck of the Deuxieme Bureau was Secretary of the Commission.
A report of the Commission appears at (minute) 78b, copies are available from the Polish service or from S.I.S. (M.I.6). The Commission suggested that Czerniawski's (Brutus') explanation be accepted as sufficient, but they expressed their opinion that he should be severely reprimanded for jeopardising several persons, including an officer from a neighbouring post, by his behaviour. They also expressed the opinion that Czerniawski (Brutus) should be severely reprimanded because he did not report the whole matter to his superiors immediately on his arrival. They also expressed the opinion that the affair initiated by Czerniawski (Brutus) should be continued and then made a cover award award accepting Brutus' explanation of his escape.
Meanwhile, it was decided by M.I.5. (D.B. = Masterman and B.1.a) that Brutus (Hubert) should be run as a double agent, at any rate for the time being, and this decision was communicated to Colonel Gano of the Polish Deuxieme Bureau and Commander Dunderdale of S.I.S. (M.I.6.) on 17.12.42. The Polish commission also met on that day and continued until 22.12.42. The Commission was held in secret at commander Dunderdale's house. It was not supposed to be known about at the Polish Headquarters. It should be put on record that, according to Czerniawski's (Brutus') information did, however, leak out and to some degree the fact that the commission was being held became a matter of discussion there.
To cover the possibility that Czerniawski (Brutus) had another mission, and also because the revelation (disclosure) that he had accepted a mission for the Germans made it appear that he was a very much more sinister individual that had been expected, it was decided to keep Brutus under closest watch, and a telephone check (AOB, of course!) (typically M.I.6. praxis deleting names and that like) xxxx and a H.O.W. (= Home Office Wanted List, often given for : any name appearing at that entire address, like house-number; normally executed via an Order to G.P.O.) revealed nothing of importance, and there was no reason to suppose that Brutus (Hubert) had any correspondence of which we are not aware. It is not known whether the Poles also kept him under some sort of observation although a certain Polish soldier in the security department of their Air Force has recently stated that he was instructed by Chief of the Air Staff, who in turn received his instructions from colonel Gano to watch Brutus closely as he was suspected of being a German agent.
With regard to the job which Brutus was to take in this country, it was decided that it would be unwise to let him rejoin the Polish Air → (page 34)
KV 2/72-2, page 34
Force and fly. Colonel Gano originally proposed to try and get him a job in the Military Attaché's office in London. This was because he considered that it would be unwise to have a man known to be a German agent working in the (Polish) Deuxieme Bureau, not for security reasons, but if it ever leaked out it would have been a means of levelling criticism against him, Colonel Gano, not only only on the part of rival officers of the Polish headquarters, but also, for example, by the Russians. However, on reconsideration Colonel Gano decided after all to employ Brutus in the Deuxieme Bureau, and he received position in the section studying the Italian army. At the same time Brutus was commissioned to put up to Colonel Gano his suggestions for the organisation and running of a system of agents reporting military information on the Continent of Europe.
On the other aspect which should be considered here is Brutus' (Czerniawski's) personal life. It will be remembered that Mlle. (Simone) Deschamps, alias Moustique, had escaped from the (German) Occupied Zone at the time of arrest of Brutus (Walenty / Czerniawski) (18 November 1941) organisation in Paris, and she reached this country shortly before he did. →
(AOB, according this summary, Czerniawski reached England shortly after he arrived from Gibraltar in October 1942) (AOB, I try omit to use the name Brutus too often, because this cover-name was provided to Czerniawski operating virtually as German agent Hubert, guided by M.I.5)
She thereupon started to live with Brutus and has been his mistress ever since. There is no evidence either way to determine whether she does or does not know that he is operating as a double agent. He maintains definitely that she does not know. But, on the other hand, he did at some time ask for permission to take her into his confidence, which was refused, and it is difficult to believe that he could have kept it from her all this time. It is confirmed to some degree that she does not know because when he was arrested (by the Poles in London), she was understood to say that he had two English friends who rang him up periodically (presumably the Case Officer and the wireless operator (at M.I.5) but she did not know who they were.
At the beginning of December 1942, Brutus (Hubert) started to call with a wireless set constructed for him by us. He established contact (first?) on 20.12.42, and contact has been pretty regular since that date.
Evidence which has come to light during the past year bearing on Brutus' (Czerniawski's) motives and intentions.
It is considered necessary to comment on this as it was suggested in my conclusion to the Brutus report that he had told the truth about his mission (being German agent Hubert), but that he had held back various matters in connection with the circumstances of his recruitment (by the German Abwehr Uffz. Hugo Bleicher* in Paris, in early 1942, as Carré / Victoire when she reached London with Lucas, knew about 'virtual' escape from prison; which actually was from about Hotel Lutétia in Paris; though actually German facilitated as to provided an alibi of trustiness for Walenty / Czerniawski)
* (R79) (R79return)
The evidence which has come to light during the past year, such as it confirms that he told the truth about his mission (German agent Hubert), and in regard to the second point does not appear to carry the matter much further. One question which was slightly disturbing was that it turned out that the code given to Brutus (Hubert) was very similar to the code captured by the Germans from a British agent Pelletier. This might have pointed to the fact that the Germans intended Brutus (Hubert) to give himself up and offer himself as a double agent since, if such were their intensions, they would not be compromising a code. An expert opinion on this from S.I.S. (M.I.6), dated 24.12.42, and filed at (minute) 52b, states as follows: "Similar they certainly are; both are double transposition, and both have keys based on memorised phrases, but Brutus' (Hubert's) has the extra complication of (a) a special indicator indicator system, and (b) the use of dummy letters. Whilst it is perfectly clear the Pelletier's code is a simple modification of the original British Service code, the difference of Brutus' (Hubert's) code are such that it would not be automatically compromised by the possession of Pelletier's code."
This expert opinion appears to support, if anything, the belief that Brutus' (Hubert's) mission is a true one, and the subsequent traffic has to a large extent borne this out. There are also various Most Secret references which put the issue, for all practical purposes, beyond doubt. Thus, on 7.5.43 Brutus (Hubert) reported on the arrest of Careless (most likely a German agent). It was hoped by this message to get a reaction of Most Secret Sources because Brutus' (Hubert's) message → (page 35)
KV 2/72-2, page 35
was so worded that it should suggest to the Germans that another double agent, Garbo (Spanish Pujol; PF 64226), was in danger, and thereby cause them to communicate with Madrid and warn them. Actually they did not do this, but on 21.5.43 Berlin informed Madrid that Paris (this was the organisation where Hubert communicated with) had reported that the English (Engländer) had arrested someone with the same surname as Careless. There was no qualification to suggest that the source was not a genuine one. Later, when Brutus (thus Hubert) was arrested and asked for a cover address in Lisbon, Paris communicated with Lisbon and described (their Hubert) as a "hitherto very valuable wireless agent", and added that the address should at the same time protect the agent and, in case he had fallen into British hands, the German Service as well. This quite clearly implied that the Germans were suspicious that Brutus (thus Hubert) might have been arrested by us (British Secret Services) and that we were then putting out a cover story to continue the case, but it did not on the other hand prove almost conclusively that up to the time of his arrest they (the Germans) believed him to be a perfectly genuine agent., A number of Brutus! questions have also appeared in Most Secret Sources, which is consistent with the questions being genuine and Brutus (Hubert) being regarded as a reliable agent. It can be stated, therefore, almost certainly that Brutus (Hubert) did not have a triple-cross mission.
With regard to the question of his part in his recruitment, one or two small points have indicated that the original conclusion was correct. Thus, one of the code phrases used by Brutus (Hubert) consists of the words "Londres est Angleterre" Whenever Brutus writes the word "Londres", he leaves out the final "s", and when he wrote out the details of his code the word appeared as "Londre". The first message received from the Germans was coded on this phrase they would code up with the final 's". Nevertheless, the message was to be coded with "Londre" without the "s", and all messages based on this phrase have been similarly coded ever since. This implies either that the Germans made the mistake or, more likely, that Brutus (Hubert) himself chose the code phrase. In the later case it is not only obvious that he was not speaking the truth, but also it implies that he took a greater part in preparing the details of his mission than he has admitted. Another point of small importance, though perhaps significant, is that in the messages sent by Brutus (Hubert) by the Germans about Violette (Czerniawski's former mistress in France) they have shown that they (the German Abwehr) are still in contact with her, and it seems to indicate that she is in the secret as well.
Finally, the fact that Brutus became embroiled in Polish politics, based largely on extreme anti-Bolshevism, would appear to be consistent with his being really actuated by anti-Russian sentiments. As will, however, be indicated later it is considered that Brutus' (Czerniawski's) activity in this connection, however, much is shows anti-Russian sentiments, does not involve and pro-German and direct anti-Allied activity.
As a result, therefore, of a year's working of the case, and over a year's watch, the original conclusion in my view stand, namely that Brutus (Hubert) told the truth about his mission, but that the circumstances of his recruitment have not been entirely divulged by him.
AOB: Please forgive me - when he was in danger and had to find out a means to leave the European Continent, this Civil Servant, editing this summary, was sitting with his arse on a chair or in his bed - and he is now and then doubting Czerniawski's truthfulness!)
Conduct of Brutus (Czerniawski) in Polish internal politics, his arrest and court-martial.
(G85) ↓↓↓ (G85return)
From the moment Brutus (Czerniawski) arrived and set up an establishment at 41 Redcliffe Square, it was known that he was having meetings of his compatriots, who were largely Air Force officers (AOB, as was genuinely Czerniawski himself) , to discuss matters of current interest. At the beginning these meetings appeared to be principally to discuss the preparation of Brutus treatise on the organisation of an efficient network of agents on the Continent.
As pointed out above, his relations with a good many officers of the Deuxieme Bureau (AOB, similarly designated here as the genuine French Secret Service Bureau) were very bad, not only because he had held back his true story and made fools of them, but also because at the Commission → (page 36)
KV 2/72-2, page 36
afterwards which enquired into his conduct he was very roughly handled by Major Zychon. In addition to this, he not unnaturally threw his weight about in the (Polish) Deuxieme Bureau and gave himself airs about his experiences in the field. Added to all this was the fact that he is a vain and conceited man and, moreover, a man who had spent a considerable period of the war in exciting activities and now found himself doing a largely academic job. The result was that, except for a few of the younger officers and Colonel Gano who has gone to a great lengths to remain loyal to Brutus (Czerniawski), he got at loggerheads with all the officers in the Polish Deuxieme Bureau. The mutual antipathy was increased by the fact that when Colonel Gano came to study his recommendations for the network of agents in Europe, it was found that it was a totally impracticable scheme and, however nice it looked on paper, it would be impossible to realise. Brutus (Czerniawski) did not like being told this.
It was apparent from the start that Brutus (Czerniawski) was involved in minor intrigues in the (Polish) Deuxieme Bureau, and it appears, in the light of subsequent events, that Brutus (Czerniawski) must have also started intriguing in the affairs of the Polish Air Force in the spring of 1943. It is very unfortunate that the checks (telephone taps and police watched as well as G.P.O. sencorship) did not lead (reveal) us on to this activity. It is, of course, doubtful whether we ever have got on to it independently because, although meetings were known to take place, the reception was always very bad (meant what M.I.5 knew what played in the Polish quarters). Moreover, it is not uncommon for Poles to take an intense and dynamic interest in politics. However, in the spring occurred the rupture of Russian/Polish relations, due to the digging up of the corpses of (10,000) Polish officers (Katyn) and the publication of details on the German radio. Concurrently with the political aspects was the opposition among the Polish Air Force here to the then Inspector General, general Ujejski. The younger members of the Polish Air Force were strongly opposed to this man, not only because he had held the office several years before the war, but also because he had never been a piot and owed his position to political intrigue in Poland in peacetime. As is so eloquently (powerfully) stated in the pamphlet subsequently written by Czerniawski (Brutus) he graduated to the Air office through the captive balloon section. On 22.12.42, on the 25th anniversary of the Red Army, there was a reception at the Soviet Embassy which was attended by General Ujejski. This was resented by various leading Polish pilots, among them Squadron Leader Poziomek who, and his contrary to the military law, was passed to him direct and through the usual channels. This protest was a dramatically phrased document about "dishonour to Polish uniform", and violenty anti-Russian. General Ujejski found out about the letter and had the Polish airmen responsible imprisoned for breach of military discipline. This caused intense indignation (anger) amongst the junior officers of the Air Force, and particulars were published in the various underground pamphlets circulating amongst the Polish Forces, amongst them a journal circulating in the Polish Army called "Alarm", which was thought to be a successor of, or connected with, a previous anti-Russian underground pamphlet called "Walka" which had been exposed and closed down. "Alarm", which was also circulating in the Polish Army, closed down voluntarily. It appeared that Czerniawski (Brutus) then got together certain of his friends, purchased a duplicating machine and produced many copies of a pamphlet entitled "In defence of our colleagues", which exposed the whole history of the Ujejski / Poziomek affair and set out a short biography of General Ujejski, which on any showing is tantamount (equal) to the gravest military indiscipline, and which is tainted throughout with violent anti-Russian sentiments. (AOB, don't forget - that the Russians possessed / occupied - what later was called Poland - up to the start and beyond of First World War)
In some way the Security Department of the Polish Air Force got to hear that this pamphlet was being published, and on 17.6.43. Brutus was arrested by the Polish Air Force police and his flat searched by the Special Branch (thus a section of Scotland yard) under a warrant issued on request of the Poles on that date. In the flat were found the duplicating machine, the copies of the pamphlet prepared ready for circulation, lists of Air Force personnel and various other papers relating to Polish underground activity. A list of the relevant documents appear under (minute) 134ax in the file, and there are duplicates in PF 64455 "Walka" and presumably in Special Branch records.
KV 2/72-2, page 37
Brutus (Czerniawski) was held in detention by the Poles first in London, and afterwards sent to Scotland, where he remained in custody for six weeks. From there he wrote a series of letters to Moustique, which are of no importance in themselves (AOB, via the Home Office, these letters must have been 'retained' for censorship!), but which demonstrate a desire to dramatise himself and a capacity for exhibitionism which almost suggests the first signs of delusion of grandeur. (They were his friends, wasn't it? Sitting with their arse on chairs; instead of facing bare reality)
In Scotland he was examined and he was then released on the 24.7.43 by the Polish military authorities, pending court-martial. His release was probably due to various factors, principally the death of General Sikorski (whose death might have been happened with British involvement; who else in the world falls out of an taking-off aircraft at Gibraltar? The reason likely was: that he was blocking settlements with the Russians, because of the Russian cruelties and the according murder at Katyn, on ca. 10,000 Polish PoW officers)
and the appointment of General Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief. The latter was apparently anxious to have a little bitterness as possible in the Polish Forces, and was in addition himself reputed to be anti-Russian. Shortly after taking over he retired General Ujejski and substituted a new Air staff, including Czerniawski's (Brutus') friend Poziomek, who became deputy Chief of Staff. From that time Czerniawski's (Brutus') court-martial appears to all intents and purposes to have been a farce. On the one hand it was impossible to interfere with the course of justice once it had been set in motion and the court martial had to proceed; on the other hand been the Supreme military and Air Force authorities were obviously anxious to hush the whole matter up as much as possible. Czerniawski (Brutus) was kept waiting until the end of November 1943 before the court-martial proceeding actually started, and in the meanwhile he was given a job in the Planning Office at Polish Headquarters. He continued to hold meetings at his house, and these meetings have continued to discuss political affairs. He has, in addition, declined to give any promise that he will not interfere in Polish internal affairs, explaining that it is impossible in the Polish Forces to divorce politics from military matters, there are two are intermingled (amalgamated) and that if any interest is taken in the country's affairs it is necessary also to interfere in military matters.
Finally the court-martial started on 26.11.43 and finished on 9.12.43, and Czerniawski (Brutus) was condemned to fortress imprisonment for two months, from which the six weeks in prison in Scotland are to be deduced, leaving a fortnight's further imprisonment, which he has been deferred (postponed) until after the war. The position, therefore, is that Czerniawski (Brutus) has received a nominal punishment only for his admitted military indiscipline. he was probably come out of a little tinpot hero in the eyes of fellow Polish airmen. The young airmen have been placated (pacified) by a complete reorganisation of the Staff of the Polish Air Force, and finally it is understood that as a result of further Polish intrigue Colonel Gano and Mayr Zychon are both retiring from Polish Deuxieme Bureau and are being replaced by officers brought from the Middle East. Czerniawski (Brutus), meanwhile, is still working in the Planning Office and his personal position would appear to be better than his conduct warrants.
KV 2/72-2, page 38
Progress of the Brutus case.
As appears in the Minutes by Major Masterman at 58a, the Brutus case was considered by the Twenty Committee (XX Committe = Double-Cross Committee) on 31.12.42 (43?). The Committee, after hearing an explanation by Colonel Robertson (TAR), took the view that the case should not be proceed with without the approval of the "W" Board, on the grounds that it was necessary to give the Poles full information about the case, and that some of the members of the ("W") Board were always sensitive about the passing of information to officers of Allied countries. The "W" Board was therefore convened and duly considered the case and decided that it should proceed on the understanding that the Poles would wish not to be supplied with copies of the traffic, and that they were not allowed to discover that other cases were being run. The ("W")Board also decided that so far as possible the Brutus (Hubert) case should not be used used for operational deceptions, and it if it became too difficult it should be closed down. The ("W") Board further stated that they had no objection to the case being used for the purpose of attempting to improve treatment meted out to the Poles by the Germans. The Foreign Office also, in agreeing to the case being run, were of the opinion that the Poles should be let in fully, From that time onwards, efforts have been made to steer the case clear of any deception and correspondingly the Poles have not been supplied with traffic, but Colonel Gano has been shown interesting messages. he has shown no desire to pry (interfere) into details of the case, but it is only right to point out that this may be due to the fact that the Poles have Brutus (Hubert) code and could well monitor and read all his messages. (AOB, from earlier notice, due to this circumstance - M.I5 applied for a new code - and the Poles weren't able since to read messages in the context of the Hubert messages)
It will be remembered that Brutus' (Hubert's) principle mission was to report on aircraft productions, nevertheless, he started off in January, 1943 giving details of the polish Armed Forces, and followed with general information and an appreciation of the political situation so far as carrying the Germans were prepared to improve the condition of the Polish population, and the absence of German victories on the eastern front, it was impossible to raise a Fifth column of Poles in this country. In March, 1943 he paid a visit to Scotland and prepared an exceedingly good report on the situation there, which was largely passed and sent over (to the Germans) in the first half of April (1943). The great number of messages passed was used by us as a reason for asking the Germans to send him another operator and some money, and they agreed in principle and asked Brutus' (Hubert's, as this was the name they maintained) advice. He proposed that they should drop the operator and the money by parachute. He then proceeded to send over a very lengthy report on the South coast. On 4.6.43 the Germans said that they would not parachute an operator but would send money. Having agreed to the place proposed by Brutus (Hubert), namely the Wash region, they subsequently, on the eve of departure there in June, said it was too near too London. Meanwhile, Brutus (Hubert) had himself done a tour of the South-Eastern command and turned in another exceedingly good report which formed the basis of many further messages.
In regard, however, to his political mission, messages were always much more difficult to provide. The Russians having broken off relations with Poland, it was obvious that the German propaganda being very successful (Germans call this: "ein gefundenes Fressen" wouldn't the unprecedented discovery of the 10,000 murdered corps, at Katyn, not so dramatically sad!) and Brutus' (Hubert's) obvious course in truth an agent (Hubert), would have been to encourage them in their propaganda →
(AOB, propaganda generally means "bending the truth"; but, this time the Germans did not necessarily had to do this, as the evidence and circumstances were true and clear) (Propaganda? We should more considering it - exploiting the circumstances and calling it: publicity).
→ As we could not obviously do this, we have had to hedge (?) to a very large degree, and we indicated shortly before Brutus' (Czerniawski's) arrest that he was in indirect contact with the people who were directing the underground newspapers. When Czerniawski (Brutus) was arrested on 17.6.43, we were in a very difficult position. However, permission was given to see him in London and he prepared a → (page 39)
KV 2/72-2, page 39
message which was sent on 18.6.43 by the operator, imitating his style. In this passage he said that his collaborators in the underground newspaper affair were wanted by the Police, he anticipated his arrest very probable, he was going to hide the set and all compromising documents and asked them to go on listening for a long time on Sundays.
The case was then discontinued until Brutus (Hubert) was released from prison, when another message was sent on 22.8.43, in which he reported his arrest, detention in Scotland and his release. he added that he had liberty to remain in London and was awaiting a trial during September. He thought it was too dangerous to transmit, but asked for another address and a method of secret writing and asked further that the Germans should send their reply blind.
On 29.8.43 the Germans replied with the address, but unfortunately as appeared from subsequent messages sent on the 5.9.43, they hedged on the question of secret ink. This appears to be consistent with an understandable suspicion of Brutus (Hubert) in the peculiar circumstances of his arrest and release. Actually the main object of getting the address was to be able to write and show that it was Brutus (Hubert) himself who was operating the case. To carry this out, a postcard was sent to the address given on 10.9.43, and this has since been followed by a further postcard and also a letter to Violette (Czerniawski's former mistress) on 9.11.43.
For some time no information was sent except an account of Brutus' (Hubert's) arrest, in which was told more or less the full story but alleged that although he had been able to hide the transmitter and everything, compromising his colleagues had unfortunately left the duplicating machine in his room. On 7.11.43 the Germans sent a message from which it appeared that they were still suspicious to some degree of Czerniawski / Hubert (Brutus), to which he reported on 11.11.43 that he had supposed wrongly that his difficulties interested them as well as other information. He then proceeded to start a report on the south-east coast which was only completed at the end of the year.
After Brutus' (Hubert's) arrest and release the case came up for review, and it was decided, to continue it but, as a precaution against Brutus (Hubert) starting some other activity, to interpose an operator as soon as possible. A favourable moment appeared to have arisen when Brutus (Hubert) was about three quarter of the way through his long report on the south-east coast region. The Germans then appeared to have regained confidence in him (Hubert), and the operator accordingly started on Christmas day and seems to have been accepted. His cover name is Chopin, and he is supposed to have been recently retired from the Air (Polish?) Force, to be in receipt only of a small pension and to be working principally for idiological motives, having lost his family in Russia. In the message received just before Christmas, the Germans expressed their great appreciation of Brutus' (Hubert's) work.
Present assessment of the position and future prospects in regard to Brutus (Hubert) (A) as a Security case, and (B) as a double agent.
(A) Brutus (Hubert) as a security case.
If the conclusions set out in Part IV can be accepted, Brutus' (Hubert's) present position, at the worst, is merely that of a member of a subversive movement inside an Allied government. In my view we can never guarantee that he will not intrigue and get into trouble, but we are justified in assuming that he will not directly as a German agent without our knowledge and authority. It is to be hoped, however, that the reorganisation of the of the Polish Air Force and the retirement of the former chiefs of the Deuxieme Bureau will keep him quite, at any rate until the war over here becomes sufficiently exciting to occupy his thoughts and activities.
The real problem is that of his future career. He states that he has possibilities either to going to America at the end of January for → (page 40)
KV 2/72-2, page 40
three-months staff course, or of being nominated for one of the eight staff-liaison jobs which the Air Ministry have offered the polish Air Force, or of doing a refresher course in aeroplane or of remaining in in his present office.
So far as the British authorities are concerned, I consider that our security interests in the circumstances can be adequately safeguarded by refusing him permission to go back to fly duties. Insofar as the interests of the case are concerned, I also consider that it would be inadvisable to let Czerniawski (Brutus) leave the country. The choice therefore appears to be between allowing him to go to the Air Staff or his remaining in his present office, and of the two, the latter alternative appears to be the more desirable. The job of the (Polish) Air Staff for which he might apparently be nominated is in Air Intelligence.
To sum up; it is not considered that Czerniawski (Brutus) represents a serious security danger to the country, though he represents a real danger to the Poles, and he can be a great nuisance to us insofar as the case is concerned if he gets into troubles again.
B. Brutus (Hubert) as a double agent.
In considering the objectives we have in view in running Brutus (Hubert) case it is necessary to examine certain questions which are fundamental.
These questions are the following:-
1. The extent of the Germans' believe in the (Hubert) case.
2. The security of the case.
3. The collaboration with the Polish Deuxieme Bureau.
4. The difficulties in carrying out Brutus' mission.
The position is, and has for a long time been, that the bar (court) against operational deception makes the case a trial or complete waste of time. It appears to be an appropriate time now to review the situation and see whether it is worth making application to have the bar bar against deception raised, or alternatively deciding whether the case is worth continuing. The various questions will therefore now be dealt with.
1. The extent of the Germans' belief in the (Hubert) case.
It has already been indicated that up to the time of Brutus' (Hubert's) arrest there is almost incontrovertible evidence that Brutus' (Hubert's) arrest there is almost incontrollable evidence that Brutus (Hubert) was regarded by the Germans as being reliable agent. This is born out by the various Most secret references referred to in Part I. It was of course natural that when he announced his arrest Brutus (Hubert) should come under a certain amount of suspicion, and a careful reading of the (German W/T) traffic confirms that this suspicion did exist, but their recent reaction to the information which Brutus (Hubert) has been sending, and also a further Most Secret reference, now appear to show that they regard him once more as being genuine. In other words the position has been restored, and if all other things are equal it is believed that that the Brutus (Hubert) case could be developed as if an effective means of deceiving the enemy. There must be a certain lingering (remaining) amount of doubt in the mind of the Germans about the circumstances of his arrest, and there may also be doubt either in Paris (at the level of Obstlt. Reile or even in Berlin) or in higher quarters arising arising from the background as a loyal Allied agent. It is submitted, however, that once they have accepted him and regarded him as an important agent, they are unlikely to go back on their judgment unless an entirely new factor in the situation arises.
2. The security of the case.
This point must be considered because, in spite of the directions which were made in the Polish Headquarters when Czerniawski (Brutus) his mission, there does appear to have been a leakage there which has resulted in a great many people knowing that Brutus' (Czerniawski's) escape was staged by the Germans. There is no evidence xxxx (typically deleted on behalf of M.I.6.) to show that Czerniawski's (Brutus')
friends know this, although Zarembski at least must know it because he was on the → (page 41)
KV 2/72-2, page 41
Commission which examined the case. Most of them, on the other hand, probably do know that there was something funny about this escape and his position as a result was rather tricky. In the Polish Headquarters itself a great many people know probably now that he was sent over here on a mission from the Germans. In addition there has recently arise a further danger to the security of the (Czerniawski / Hubert) case in that after Czerniawski's (Brutus') arrest in June rumours were current that a wireless set had been found in his flat, and was finally traced by Brutus to be certain Skirmunt (AOB: I tried on the Web to find out something about this person, but either found a Roman Skirmunt- as well as a Konstanty Skirmunt, in Polish language lacking a translation option entirely). Czerniawski (Brutus) then acted in his usual hot-headed manner and demanded Skirmunt should be reprimanded for making untrue allegations against him. This has resulted in court-martial proceedings being started against Skirmunt, who is a private soldier in the department of the Air Force security Police. Skirmunt's defence is, in effect, that he received instructions to keep Czerniawski (Brutus) under observation from the Chief of the Polish Air Force because Czerniawski (Brutus) was suspected of being a German agent. The Chief of Air Staff in turn has alleged that he received information from Colonel Gano that Czerniawski (Brutus) was suspected of being an agent and needed observation. Now, of course, everybody is trying to put the blame on somebody else, and the only important thing is that the matter may become aired in a court-martial and thus come to the knowledge of several people on whose confidence no reliability can be placed. Colonel Gano to the president of the Court, and says that the enquiry into Skirmunt's alleged offence will be kept within proper bounds.
Another respect in which the security of the case has suffered is in connection with the enquiry which has taken place over a period of many months into the activities of the (Polish) Deuxieme Bureau. The story of this is long and complicated, and has resulted finally in both Colonel Gano and Major Zychon being relieved of their posts. Allegations were made against them even of being in contact with the Germans, but this has certainly not been proved, although the enquiry has brought to light that they have indulged in activities outside their proper charter. colonel Gano states that one of the allegations made against him to support the suggestion that his Deuxieme Bureau were in contact with the Germans was that Czerniawski (Brutus) was a German, and therefore the whole Brutus situation had to be aired at the enquiry. Once again Colonel Gano thinks that all those who were concerned in the enquiry are secure and will not pass the information on, but it does represent a danger to the security of the case as a whole.
One further point might effect the security of the case. The Germans might possibly get confirmation of the arrest of Czerniawski (Brutus / Hubert) and of his court-martial and punishment. Brutus (Hubert) has already said that if they could get full information about the circumstances of his arrest, it would prove to them exclusively that he was not carrying out his mission for them. On the other hand if they heard merely that he had been arrested and court-martialled it would bear out the story which he has told the Germans and be an added check on his reliability. It is considered, therefore, that his point is proably a neutral point because in the first place it is very improbable that the Germans will get direct evidence of his arrest and court-martial, and in the second place any evidence they (the Germans) did get would be as likely to prove that he was a genuine agent as the reverse.
3. Collaboration with the Polish Deuxieme Bureau.
As stated above, the original "W" Board ruling was that this case should not be used for operational deception if possible, and the reason → (page 42)
KV 2/72-2, page 42
appears to have been that to do would be tantamount (synonymous) to putting the Polish Government in possession of our deception plans. Actually Colonel Gano has never asked to see all traffic, but so long as the Poles have Brutus' cypher they can always monitor and read the messages if they want to. Therefore, the present cypher, if we ever use the case for operational deception there can never be any guarantee that the Poles will not get to hear about it. In addition, Colonel Gano's successor may want to pry more into the case. In spite of these difficulties, it is suggested that the practical purposes adequate safeguards should now exist in that (a) we have interposed an operator who can send messages if necessary without knowledge of Brutus, (b) we hope to get a new wireless set delivered, and will ask for a new code and (c) polish Forces themselves form part of the 21 Army Group and, presumably therefore, in the closing stages will know the whole plan, or sufficient of it to blow the operation if they are insecure.
4. The difficulties in carrying out Brutus' (Hubert's) mission.
In the Brutus (Hubert) traffic insufficient attention has clearly been paid to the political side of his mission, but it is difficult to see how any other course could be adopted having regard to the extremely delicate position between Russia and Poland*. There is, therefore, a real difficulty in continuing the (Hubert) case in that we cannot deal with the political side of the mission as Czerniawski (Brutus), as a German agent, would. Nevertheless it is submitted that this difficulty should be capable of being surmounted (overcome). In the first place Brutus (Hubert) can say, with some justification, that he tried to start the political side of his business and got arrested as a result, and that the military developments now to be expected make it important that he should not run any further risk. Secondly, the Germans themselves will probably, as the spring progress, be far more interested in the military side of his mission that the political side.
To sum up, the Brutus (Hubert) mission, as revealed by him, was probably a genuine one; The Germans, at any rate up to June (1943) when he was arrested, probably thought he was carrying it out genuinely, after his arrest they probably suspected him to some degree, but their confidence has now been largely, if not entirely, restored; the dangers arising from the insecurity of the case and the collaboration with the Poles exist but are probably not acute. In all the circumstances, therefore, that a case should be made out in an attempt to have the ban on the use of the case for deception lifted (a "W" Board obligation), either in whole or in part. If the ban could be lifted the opportunities for using (exploiting) this case for deception are very great, and could be indicated if necessary.
31.12.43 Sgd. Christopher H. Harmer (Captain) (AOB: He once was Carré's guiding officer on behalf of M.I.5)
* Russia signed the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Treaty), on 23 August 1939, in Moscow; wherein, among many settlements, it was agreed mutually - that both Russia and Germany would on their own schemes attack Poland and that they shall cut the country into two parts - where Brest-Litovsk was the (main) separating place. Because this was a given fact; that the "Neurnberg-Tribunal" had to keep Poland out of the Prosecution Charges - as Russia in this case was an aggressor like were the Germans.
KV 2/72-2, page 43
From Most secret Sources (M.S.S.) and from the messages themselves, it appears that the case (Hubert) is under control of (Obstlt.) Reile, the head of Abt. III, in Paris. At least one incoming message on most Secret Sources about the case and the description given by Brutus (Hubert) was signed 'Colonel R' (T.A Robertson?) he signs messages on Most Secret Sources about the case and the description given by Brutus (Hubert) of the Staff Colonel (Ost.) who finally settled his recruitment agrees tolerably well with descriptions from other sources of Reile. It was suggested that the fact that this was dealt with by by Abt. III (counter-espionage) might imply that the counter-espionage experts to deal with. It is considered, however, that this is not so because, Brutus (Hubert) having been in prison, it is not unnatural that the counter-espionage people should run him. Moreover, a recent (RSS) Most secret message shows that they are also running the Atlas organisation, which S.I.S. (M.I.6) have every reason to believe is regarded seriously by the Germans.
KV 2/72-2, page 47 (minute 152a)
Extract from Weekly Traffic summary 18
Message received 29th August 1943.
My dear Monsieur Hubert (Czerniawski's German cover-name), heartiest congratulations. I hope that the trial will end favourably for you. Take the greatest care. The address at Lisbon is the following:
Antonia da Silva
rua Marques S.D. 62, 2nd Esqu (floor)
That is where you can write with your ink if you can find a means of getting news there by a safe route. The next to Sundays you will receive more news again. Cordial greetings from your Lieut. Colonel (Obstlt.) Reile.
(AOB: these messages generally were communicated in the French language, thus this concerns a translation!)
KV 2/72-2, page 48 (minute 151a)
B.1.b. (Mr. Hart).
Brutus (Hubert), after a long period of silence, sent a message on Sunday telling the Germans that he was under observation on account of his Court-Martial and that it was too dangerous to transmit by radio, and asking for an address in Lisbon and a method of secret writing.
If you see on your sources and enquiries to Lisbon for an address they may, therefore, refer to this message.
B.1.a. 23.8.43 Sgd. Christopher H. Harmer (Captain).
KV 2/72-2, page 70
all translations, as genuine messages were always fashioned in French language
Message No. 60.
Since my arrival I have examined the possibilities of approaching the circles directing Polish policy with a view to collaboration with Germany. I perceive great difficulties in this line and change of outlook during the year that I have been away (from German France?). Possibly there would have been more scope in the summer at the time of the victories. I feel it my duty in all sincerity to explain, in the four message following, the reason for this.
Message No. 61.
Firstly, the treatment without any change for the better of the Poles, and the placing of the nation in a state of inferiority compared with other European countries. A great deal of news on the subject keeps arriving from Poland and most seems to be true. These facts have formed the base of a powerful and well organised propaganda and until the time when the cease to support this propaganda there is no chance of establishing and extending relations for collaboration.
Message No. 62.
Secondly, the arrangements between the Polish Government and the Russians are progressing favourably. By this clever political political move the most likely opening for collaboration with Germany has been destroyed. Present relations with the Russians, although not perfect from the point of → (page 71)
KV 2/72-2, page 71
view of Polish interests, are better than several informed people hoped. Anti-Russian feeling is therefore slight at the moment and there is even talk of collaboration with them.
Message No. 63.
Thirdly, the most recent (German) defeats on the Russian front. The absence or air-raids over England and the fact that Germany is at present everywhere on the defensive, has created an unfavourable situation for collaboration and one extremely difficult for me. Any attempt whatever to arouse opinion would certainly place me in a dangerous position.
Message No. 64.
Fourthly, while studying, even-so, the possibilities of overcoming these difficulties, I ask for help from your (German) government. Please do your utmost to effect a change of attitude towards the Polish people. Please place them on the same level as the other (west-European) nations. I also consider in the coming months as essential. Especially in times of temporary military difficulties, it is absolutely necessary (essential) to obtain German victories in other spheres, on the defeats and losses of the Allies.
KV 2/72-2, page 72
Simply from the technical viewpoint I do not think it possible for our Russian ally to have intercepted the Brutus (Hubert) transmissions.
Brutus (Hubert) has been transmitting at 0900, 1000 and 1600 GMT (for CET = + 1 hour) on 6 MHz and 7 MHz. The reply station (Wiesbaden = Wilja or Domäne = Hamburg) has been working on 6 MHz. Both London and Paris are approximately the same distance from Moscow (Moskau) and is 1600 miles (ca. 2575 km), and about 1300 miles (2100 km) from Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) area. During the day time the range (skip) the range for the low power of 400 miles, and as the transmissions have taken place during the daylight hours it would seem quite impossible for any Russian intercept station to have received the signals over a greater radius. (AOB: and when the Russian Embassy or Consulate would have possessed an according receiver?) At the beginning of the Brutus (Hubert) transmissions the low frequency crystals were used, and at night time these only have a range of about 500 miles (AOB, nonsense!) so that it is unlikely that any interception was made on these frequencies.
This does not exclude, however, the possibility that the signals were intercepted in London or perhaps in Ireland, but that raises quite different quite a different matter. Of course freak reception is possible over greater distances than those I have mentioned, but in that case it would not be possible to get solid reception and the mutilation of groups would be considerable. (AOB, why does he, deliberately, neglect the Russian diplomatic premises in London?) (did the Britain's really knew what happened inside the Russian representations in England?) Furthermore, it would be difficult to follow the traffic in any case because of the lack of consistency of interception. (from the Russian Embassy inside London, whereas Hubert's W/T station was also situated in London?) If the Russian would had an interception station in the southern half of Sweden they might, on occasion, receive the Hubert (Brutus) traffic from either London or Paris, because it is only about 600 miles (> 1000 km) to Malmø. As Paris is the higher powered of the two stations it would probably be that that end which it received, and undoubtedly if they have an interception system which has been watching the German control stations they would notice the increase in the schedules which Paris maintained and realise that this station was working to another out station.
B.1.a. 5.5.43 Sgd. R.T. Reed (AOB, Mr. Reed clearly is a dilettante in the field of short wave communications; I trust that Britain possessed far more capable personnel than this Mr. Reed!) (Have they ever considered that inside the Diplomatic premises in London there did exist one or more receivers (camouflaged broadcast or other means) with which they could have intercepted communications?)
KV 2/72-2, page 73 (minute 109b)
Colonel Robertson (TAR).
I saw colonel Gano on 16.4.43 and showed him the messages which had passed recently. On the question of Czerniawski's (Brutus') in his office (The Polish Deuxieme Bureau) he reported that things were getting much easier and that Czerniawski (Brutus) was calmer.
On the question of Czerniawski's (Brutus')
political mission, however, the situation was far from perfect. Apparently the
German anti-Russian propaganda directed towards Poland and the Polish forces in
the country (U.K.)
is being extremely effective. They have dug up some cemeteries of Polish
officer prisoners of war murdered by the Russians after the 1939 battle, and are
having these corpses identified by relatives. (AOB,
the War crime to place about
> 10,000 officers
murdered Polish officers!)
(AOB, always denied by
ultimately gave the
according documents free;
likely in modern days
it might have become a taboo again!)
It is all being presented in a very skilful manner and the Russians cannot make
any reply, except to allege that the men in question voluntary were working in
factories in Smolensk and were but death when the Germans entered. (AOB,
it is well documented that the Russian committed their killing quite a while
before the Germany came at War with Russia, on 22 June 1941).
Moreover, the stories leaking out from the Middle east about Russian treatment
of Polish prisoners of was are so horrifying that the Polish Forces in the
are seething with anti-Russian sentiment. colonel Gano therefore feels
that it would be quite incredible if Czerniawski (Brutus),
who is supposed to be a German spy, were not affected by the
and thinks that he ought to comment on it in his messages.
This raises an extremely tricky point. If Czerniawski (Brutus)
were in fact and German agent he would no doubt urge the Germans on to an
intensification of the
the news). I was
rash enough to suggest to Colonel Gano that we might discredit it by urging the
Germans to exaggerate - my argument being that if they would palpable untruths
none of their propaganda was believed. This led him on to show to me
in about an hours discourse that exaggeration of Russian atrocities was
impossible. Colonel Gano thought that the attitude we had taken up in our
recent message was exactly the right one, namely congratulating the Germans on
their propaganda, and tell them (really?)
that they will receive no results whatever unless they stop doing the same
things themselves. In this way, at any rate, we improve the lot of the
Polish people. → (page
KV 2/72-2, page 74
It occurs to me that the Foreign Office may have some view about this anti-Russian propaganda on the subject of Poland and that we may in a position to implement some of their (whose?) plans. They, presumably, are concerned in patching up Polish-Soviet relations and I wonder, therefore, whether the point can be raised next time you see Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck or, better still, whether I might have an opportunity of the accompanying you or Major Masterman next time you go, or in order to take this matter up.
B.1.a. 18.4.43 Sgd. Christopher H. Harmer.
(AOB: As not to disturb the British-Russian relations, and considering that Polish General Sikorski refused to maintain some kind of Russian support; please read:
KV 2/72-2, page 84 (minute 30c)
B.1.a (Major Robertson)
This is such a masterly report and represents so much more detailed knowledge of the case than I possess that I hesitate to criticise it in any way. Moreover it seems to me that from a strict B.1.a point of view we are very much concerned with the reliability of Walenty*, exception in so far as his reliability has any bearing upon the question whether the Germans are likely to place upon messages transmitted by him. Purely as a personal opinion, however, I feel I ought to say that in my view Walenty (later designated Brutus) has been rather more truthful than Harmer suggests. he seems to me to have made out of a very good case for concealing his true story for as long as he did, and I gather that commander Dunderdale (S.I.S. M.I.6) , at any rate, thinks that he acted wisely. secondly I do not share Harmer's doubts about about the accuracy of Walenty's story of his recruitment. These doubts are set out on page 2 of Appendix J of the report, and the first of them strikes me as being unsound. Harmer's view about Victoire's veracity may well be correct (Harmer was about springtime 1942 Victoire/Carré's guiding officer), but I should have thought that the application of Harmers test could produce a totally different explanation of Victoire's statement that she was heard from the Germans that Walenty had volunteered to work for them. (AOB, Victoire together with Lucas left France about 24/25th February 1942 - hence Walenty's Germans controlled escape from Hotel Lutetia, must have (virtually) occurred before that date. That she was well informed at that moment, was - because she was Bleicher's mistress at that moment) Victoire knew that she had acted discreditably throughout, and she may have thought that her offence would be regarded as much less serious if we were told that even Walenty himself had offered to work for the Germans. I think it is quite possible that Victoire invented this altogether. (AOB, Actually it really went like this).
However this may be the only concern of B.1.a is the question whether Walenty's
transmitter can, and should, be used. So far as the first part of the
question is concerned we know that the Germans are calling
presumably therefore contact can be easily established. With regard to the
second Part I am by no means so clear. The objectives to be gained by running
double agents are numerous, but surely one over-riding objective, namely to
the enemy to his doing. Indeed the whole essence of a double agent is the fact
that the ostensible (supposed)
master is deluded (misled)
into the believe that he is operating as a free agent. If we operate
successfully the Germans will labour under this delusion (misbelieve),
but I am not at all sure that they will thereby suffer any particular
disadvantage, and I a, afraid that the balance of disadvantage will be on our
side. What the Germans will first of all believe is that the turning around of
enemy agents is a practical proposition, and
KV 2/72-2, page 85
that this affords a good way of getting agents into this country. Sooner or later this belief, which appears already to be dangerously widespread, will be shared by S.I.S. and S.O.E. (both part of M.I.6) agents. It seems to me that in the interest of both two services it ought very soon to be made absolutely clear to them that we are never going to tolerate any person who had worked for our service agreeing in any circumstances to work for the Germans. Secondly with regard to this mission to recruit a Polish Fifth Column, I cannot for the life of me see how this can possibly do us any good. I should have thought that the lasting thing we want the Germans to believe was that there was, or could be, such a thing as a Fifth Column amongst any of the exiled governments. Thirdly, the Germans must suppose that if Walenty (thus Czerniawski) is believed at all by us he will be regarded as a most important man, and will accordingly, in view of his vast experience, be employed in a highly confidential position. The information which he could get would therefore be of the highest grade. I doubt very much whether the provision of misinformation of this level is within our powers under the present arrangements. It is, incidentally, curious to my mind that the Germans should have given Walenty the instructions which he has reported. Walenty is an Intelligence officer, and one would have expected his first assignment would have been information about Polish organisations working working on the Continent.
The other objections to running the case ate sufficiently obvious in view in view of the fact that, as I see it, it will be necessary to collaborate completely with the Poles. This I am sure will meet with disapproval from the Twenty-Committee (XX-Committee). Moreover I think that it is important not to over-estimate the importance of the case. The Germans have really lost nothing by letting Walenty go, for they had cleaned up the whole of his organisation (Interalliée), and the only thing left to them would have been the doubtful satisfaction of executing Walenty himself.
B.1.a. 5.12.42 Sgd. J.H. Marriott
* This reference is, in my perception quite relevant, because we possess since an indication: that the designation "Brutus" was not yet officially adapted, maybe even not yet coined; since Mr. Marriott of B.1.a, thus of the same office within M.I.5, used still Mr. Czerniawski's former French code-name Walenty.
KV 2/72-2, page 87 (minute 29z)
Walenty arrived in the United Kingdom from Gibraltar on 2nd October, 1942. His passage had been facilitated as an accredited agent of the Polish Secret Service and S.I.S. He had formerly been the chief of the Polish Intelligence Organisation working in Paris under the code name Interalliee (Interalliée). This organisation was broken up on 18th November 1941, in circumstances, and with results, set out in the summary of the (Carré) Victoire case. https://www.cdvandt.org/carre-victoire-survey.htm, to which reference should be made. Walenty was arrested and during the period 18th November 1941 to 29th July 1942 was imprisoned by the Germans at Fresnes, near Paris. (This contradicts with Bleicher's, and also Carré's (Victoire's). (S80) (S80return)) (but it is known from previous references, that Walenty actually did tell the full truth in succession over due time) .....
On arrival Czerniawski (Walenty) was exhaustively examined by the Polish Intelligence Service and completed a series of reports setting out in great details his account of (a) the reasons for the break up of Interalliée, (b) his interrogation and treatment in prison, and (c) his escape (AOB: actually different then he then told them, because his escape was particularly facilitated by the German Secret Service at Hotel Lutetia in Paris (T80) (T80return) ) and subsequent journey to this country. (consider (U80) (U80return)) →
→ After this was presented with reports on interrogations of Victoire (Carré) (Victoire arrived about 26 February 1942 together with Lucas in London, and she was imprisoned 1st July 1942; in between she had been interrogated thoroughly and also the story of Czerniawski's / Walenty's German facilitated escape was then already noticed) (all have been extensively dealt with in: https://www.cdvandt.org/carre-victoire-survey.htm ) and Maurice ex W/T operator of Interalliée, who escaped on 18th November, 1941 and reached England in May 1942 (V81) (V81return) and of certain other agents formerly belonging to, or connected with, Interalliée. he was given in additions the Memoirs of Victoire in four parts as follows:- (Victoire / Carré once was also Czerniawski's / Walenty's mistress)
AOB, I prefer, due to historical irrelevance to skip some; as later new fact were admitted by Czerniawski (Walenty).
On 20th November, 1942, Walenty asked to see colonel Gano and presented him with a manuscript book entitled "The Great Game", in which he set out the true facts of his escape from prison (actually in front of the Abwehr HQ, at Hotel Lutetia (W81) (W81return) ). This revealed that while in the hands of the Germans he consented (complied) to return to England as a (German) secret agent, that his escape was deliberately staged by them (the Germans) and that he was provided with crystals for constructing a W/T set and instructions with regard to W/T communication and codes and given a mission which involved sending back either W/T messages or by means of of landing a plane on a discussed airfield in Northern France, information on military matters, and the attempt to mobilise the Poles in Great Britain as a Fifth Column to work on behalf of the Axis. In this book he sets out his reasons for not revealing his true story earlier, which are that he deliberately created a smoke screen to be circulated round the departments concerned (he being convinced that the Germans have well placed agents in official quarters) → (page 88)
KV 2/72-2, page 88 (partially)
behind which he could tell his true story to his Chief. He also offered to work a W/T set against the Germans in order to deceive them, this being "the great game", and demanded a revolver to shoot himself if his request were refused and he was found to have failed in his military duty. .....
After reading through what he had written, Colonel Gano informed Walenty (Czerniawski) that he had not carried out his military duty in that he had withheld this vital information for so long (AOB, all is quite arbitrary, as Walenty arrived in England after half October 1942 and we are dealing now about late November 1942), and that in any event he had failed as an Intelligence Officer in that he had not convinced anybody as to the complete accuracy of the story so far told by him. Colonel Gano then reported the matter to Commander Dunderdale, S.I.S., and it was in turn reported to M.I.5. Colonel Gano subsequently told Walenty in my presence that he must reveal the full story to me (= Christopher H. Harmer). I therefore commenced an interrogation on 23rd November, 1942.
The interrogation is directed to forming a conclusion of the following three points:-
A. Whether Walenty's new story is a true one and what is his position from a security point of view.
B. What his true motives were for holding it back.
C. Whether it is possible to play "the great game" as suggested by Walenty.
AOB: I have decided to skip Walenty as Chief of Interalliée, because this subject have been dealt with in foregoing web pages extensively.
AOB, To what brief reading of the following pages reveal to me, is, that Czerniawski (Walenty) still did not spoke the truth.
However, following might be of mutual interest, as Czerniawski / Walenty explains his trip south-wards; which does not match with Bleicher's time schedule (X82) (X82return) , but on the other hand some matches quite well; but just about two month later than according Bleicher's statement. What becomes apparent, that it is likely that Bleicher might have mixed-up names and the according places.
KV 2/72-2, page 99 (partially)
I. Walenty's Journey.
Walenty (Czerniawski) left Paris on the morning of August 16th from Gare de Lyon. He bought his ticket the afternoon before which was irregular, but which he managed to do by obtaining the assistance of one of the railway employees. He crossed the frontier (demarcation line) (AOB, have the Germans him provided him a special passport?) at Paray-le-Monial as described by him in his (Czerniawski's) report. Tow or three days later he met Bleicher in Lyon in the café specified and gave him a not saying that everything had gone all right and that he had heard that the Polish agent Nestor was going to see him. He subsequently met Bleicher on three occasions in the café at Lyon and told him that he had spoken to Nestor, that there were no more Polish organisations in unoccupied (Vichy) France, that Nestor himself was remaining to direct the work but would soon leave and the Polish Service had almost ceased to exist. He added that he did not know Nestor's correct name or address. he told Bleicher that he had been ordered to hide in the Alps district and that he was going to Aix-les-Bains, and arranged to meet him the 2nd September outside the (train) station there.
This meeting duly took place. Madame (Suzanne) Laurent (Bleicher's great love!) was present - she was staying with Bleicher at the Hotel terminus. It was arranged that Czerniawski (Walenty) should communicate with her at this address. Bleicher by this time seemed much more interested in seeing scenery and very pleased that he was having a holiday at the expense of his (Abwehr) organisation. Walenty advised him to go off to Chamonix and said he could go there without fear because he would probably have to stay at Aix-les-Bains for a long time. Actually Czerniawski (Walenty) his orders (by whom - Reile's office?) to move before Bleicher had returned and therefore he left a note at the Hotel terminus telling him to meet him at a certain time at the Brasserie Belosi at Toulouse. Walenty arrived in Toulouse on September 8th, and met Bleicher on the afternoon of the following day at the hotel and was ready to move immediately. Bleicher was staying with Madame Laurant at the Grand hotel d'Orleans, 72 Rue Bayard, and it was arranged that if he received sudden orders to leave he would send a note round by hand. He left the next morning. On his way to the station he gave a not to the porter → (page 100)
KV 2/72-2, page 100 (partially)
at the Grand Hotel, saying that he had to go immediately. In this note, which is described in his own account, he asked Bleicher to give his regards to everybody and ended "long live Hitler the great creator of new Europe". he subsequently sent a card from Madrid, and another from Gibraltar, to Madame Laurent at the Grand Hotel. The remainder of his journey is accurately described in the reports which he made immediately on arrival, and it is not proposed to set out in details here.
AOB: this summary is quite well in the line of Bleicher's post war statements, albeit, maybe Bleicher did not remember dates quite correctly.
KV 2/72-3, page 23 (minute 29y) (partially)
In making any conclusions on this case it is necessary to bear constantly in mind the backgrounds and character of Walenty. It is not possible, for instance, to resolve and question by a simple test whether he is pro-German or anti-German; it is necessary always to bear in mind that his loyalty is entirely to his own country, Poland, and that every problem he sees is bound up with the destiny of Polish people. Therefore one has to be on ones guard against trying to interpret his actions as those of, say, an Englishman or Frenchman.
Secondly Czerniawski (Walenty) is admitting of an intensely dramatic and egoistical nature. This may be due in some part to his size but has undoubtedly been magnified to an enormous extent by his work in the Interalliée organisation (which was admittedly of the greatest value) and the strain under which he was living during that period and later on. even before he started his Interalliée Office in Paris we see him expressing his personality in his writing; he refers to propaganda articles he wrote before the war, to the treatise he wrote on counter espionage when a Staff Officer attached to the 1st Polish Division in France, and we know his capacity and style ourselves from the reports from Paris and his writings since he reached this country. In order to keep a correct sense of proportion, it is necessary to avoid taking him at his own valuation. His character, sense of drama, and the feeling of self importance which his intelligence work has given him (which makes him regard himself in some ways as a sort of Joan of Arc of Poland) cause him, I feel, to dramatise and overrata the part he has played in all the incidents of his case, and this may operate to his detriment as well as to his credit.
AOB, who was the editor of this conclusion? Mr. Christopher H. Harmer, who at its final status of war was Major; which, in my perception, was far over-rated (qualification) for such a personality. He might have been advised to leave M.I.5 for the 21th Army Group, early 1944. He should be: regarded being a minor civil servant. I suppose - his only useful ability was - that he spoke French language.
To close KV 2/72-5, I would like to ultimately copy a hand-written map of the situation in front of the Abwehr Headquarter Hotel Lutetia.
First let us have again a view of the current location by means of GoogleEarth:
I suppose that the green triangle place is also visible on the next drawing
Please notice, that Roman Czerniawski's escape was facilitated by the Germans, as to legitimate Czerniawski's reaching his unsuspected liberty
Walenty's (Czerniawski's) car in which he was transported by the Germans, all was fake!
Please reconstruct the circumstances yourself, with bearing in mind, that it should look like plausible that Czerniawski could escape.
KV 2/73, page 1
Walenty Armand (Roman Czerniawski)
For papers relating to Brutus (German cover name: Hubert) found at Abwehr H.Q. Wiesbaden (Wilja) and all correspondence relating to them.
KV 2/73, page 7
W.R.C. (War Room) - Mr. Milmo
On of our agents (Czerniawski
known to the Germans as Hubert was controlled by Obstlt.
often did not dare about correct spelling!) at Abwehr H.Q.
Wiesbaden. On 12th April the C.O. of S.C.I/ Wilhelmstrasse in this town.
These papers show that Schmidt (Schmitt) was in civil life a lawyer, and it would be worth
having him carefully interrogated if and when he falls into our hands.
B.1.a. 15.6.45 Sgd. W.E. Luke (Major).
KV 2/73, page 10 (minute 6a)
Extract from SCI T Force report S 853 on Wiesbaden Operation
Abwehr Hq. building totally bombed on 2 February 45. Sign indicated K.d.M. (Kommandomeldegebiet) Amt VI / Amt Mil designation since about spring 1944; formerly Ast) moved to Hotel Palast (see target 88). A number of safes in the rubble had been opened by the ... and docs burned, Five safes remained unopened is attached herewith; and were opened by BdS (Befehlshaber des Sichheitsdienstes) at request of SCI. safes contained few docs of interest. However, one envelope is attached herewith given info on Agent G 7167 operating in England (likely a British spoof agent invented in the Brutus / Hubert game) (https://www.cdvandt.org/carre-bleicher-walenty.htm) (AOB, please press together Ctr+F and a search window will open; then enter 7167 and you will see that this virtual V-Mann invented by Brutus / Hubert will appear) One safe still unopened owing to technical difficulties and inaccessibility. Efforts being made to get it open.
KV 2/73, page 20
Geheime Kommandosache was generally abridged: gKdos
Ast i: W.K. XII → points at: Abwehrstelle im Wehrkreis XII = Wiesbaden
(another example Ast-X was Hamburg)
KV 2/73, page 21
For this occasion I have copied the entire A4 size Formular. Directed onto: Abwehrleitstelle Frankreich Referat I (intelligence) H (Heer = Army) Bestimmungsort Paris
Zur Weitergabe an die dortigen Stellen:
German V-Mann 7167 (Y82) (Y82return) meldet:
Meine Vermutungen hinsichtlich der Invasions-Vorbereitungen sind durch folgende Aeusserungen Montgomery's bei seiner letzten Truppenbesichtigung in Suedosten bestaetigt, das er niemals
(Please be always aware: that Czerniawski / Hubert / Brutus 'he' only communicated in French language)
KV 2/73, page 26
Directed onto Abwehrleitstelle Frankreich Bestimmungsort Paris
betr. (concerns) Hubertsprueche.
(German W/T message) Funkspruch an Hubert (Czerniawski / Brutus):
"l'hauteur de la somme pour l'aviateur dépand de ce qu'il emporte avec lui.
Donnez des déetails exactes et la somme qu'il demand."
Abwehrstelle XII (Wiesbaden), Fernverbindung Paris
gez Schmitt Obstlt. (KV 2/227?)
KV 2/73, page 29
This is how it was found in the Abwehr office in Wiesbaden
Please notice: Abwehrstelle XII, Fern
Br.B.Nr. 120/2 and compare it with below KV 2/73, page 29
Telex message to be addressed onto: OKW Amt Ausland/Abw. I (= Intelligence) Luft (GAF)
Zu Hände Herr?/Herrn? Major Dr. Strohe Berlin
(AOB: these copies are in black and white and represents a photo-copy, as it otherwise would have been in colour like is shown in the foregoing picture)
Es is beabsichtigr durch Abw für German V-Mann 7167, (Golfplatz) = England, Geld und einige Geräteteile xxx Angefragt, wann mit Start entsprechenden Flugzeuges zu rechnen? (Z82) (Z82return)
Here we have found the proof: that Hubert was Abwehr agent Nr 7167!
Genehmigt: (open - thus not yet sanctioned)
Abwehrstelle XII (Wiesbaden), Fernverbindung (long distance, likely telex)
Br.B.Nt. 120/2 (notice foregoing red-colour fragments) /44 g.K.dos (Geheime Kommandosache)
gez. Schmitt, Obstlt.
KV 2/73, page 32
An Abwehrleitstelle Paris, Referat I H
Zur Weitergabe an die dortigen Stellen:
G.V-Mann 7167 (Czerniawski / Hubert / Brutus) meldet:
meine Vermutungen hinsichtlich der Invasions-Vorbereitungen sind durch folgende Aeusserungen Montgomery's bei seiner letzten Truppenbesichtigung im Suedosten (Kent?) bestaetigt, dass er niemals eine Armee in den Kampf fuehre, ohne des erfolges absolut sicher zu sein: "Wenn ich die geringsten Zweifel haette, wuerden wir nicht beginnen."
KV 2/73, page 94
Der Deutsche Automobil-Club (D.D.A.C.)
1. Oktober 1941 - 30. September 1942
Mitglieds-Nr. 35651 Betrags-Gruppe A Gau 15
Herrn Josef Schmitt Rechtsanwalt
München 1. Oktober 1941
der Präsident (des D.D.A.C.)
Mainz Ludwigstrasse 16
AOB: at least we know now the Obstlt. Schmitt was baptised Josef, and his profession was Lawyer; albeit that in England the system was not directly comparable. His home-address was Ludwigstrasse 16 in Mainz. Mainz and Wiesbaden are each-one situated on the banks of the Rhine just opposite to one another. Wiesbaden being situated on the right-hand side of the Rhine; whereas Mainz lays on the left-hand side bank of the River Rhine.
KV 2/73-2, page 104
Astleitstelle Frankreich, Leiter III
Betr.: Hubert (V-Mann 7167)
"1. Hubert fragt an: Wie es Violett geht und ob sie seinen Brief (mailed via Lisbon) erhalten habe. Weiterhin, ob er einen neuen Brief durch Antonio senden kann." Deckadresse Antonio hier bekannt. Was kann geantwortet werden, wie laeuft Verbindung Deckadresse hierher?
2. Hubert fragt wieter an: Welches ist das Schicksal seiner Kamaraden (from Interallée formerly) und Freunde, die er in Frankreich gelassen hat? "Mitteilung erbeten, wo Naeheres ueber Schicksal von Kameraden und Freunden festgestellt werden kann.
Abwehrstelle i. W.K. (Wehrkreis) XII (Wiesbaden)
Fernverbindung Paris B.Nr. 200/2.44g (Geheim)
gez. (Sgd.) Schmitt Obstlt.
Genehmigt: initial of Obstlt. Schmitt
KV 2/73, page 132
An: OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr I Luft z.H.H. (zu Händen Herrn?) Major Dr. Strohe (most likely a "Reserve-Offizier" as they persisted often on their academic degree being noticed) Major Dr. Strohe
SSD (one of highest degree of priority in communication) Berlin.
Bezug: F.S. (Fernschreiben = telex) Nr. 120/2.44 g.Kdos. vom 15.2.44 Ast XII (Wiesbaden) Fernverbindung Paris.
Von G.V-Mann 7167 (Czerniawski / Hubert / Brutus) wird als Abwurfplatz vorgeschlagen die Gegend der Bucht von Wash (D84) (D84return), 21 km nordostwaerts von Spalding und 17 km suedostwaerts Boston genau 1½ km nordwaerts von Lawsmare und 2½ km suedoestlich Holbeach - Sorst - Matthe.
G(erman).V-Mann 7167 (Czerniawski / Hubert / Brutus) haelt diesen Platz fuer absolut sicher, weil weder Truppen noch Scheinwerfer noch Flugplatz in unmittelbarer Naehe. Am Tage wird Platz zu Schiessuebungen benutzt fuer die Jaeger, nachts absolute Ruhe. Der naechste gelegenene Flugplatz befindet sich 12 km SSO-warts bei Suttonbrie.
Abwehrstelle XII (Wiesbaden), Fernverbindung Paris
Genehmigt: Br.B.Nr. 2/44. g.Kdos. gez. Schmitt Obstlt.
KV 2/73, page 135
SSD - Fernschreiben.
Abwehrstelle XII, Wiesbaden, Fernverbindung Paris.
Am 11.2.44 ging nachstehender (Funk-)Spruch Nr. 162/392/393 ein.
Die beste Gegend für Fallschirmabwurf die ich gesehen habe, befindet sich 8 km nordwestl. von Beccles (E84) (E84return) und 2½ km suedlich von Londdom, genau zwischen den Waeldern Woobxarm and Hares Grove, auf der suedoestl. Seite des Baches. Der Platz ist leicht vom Flugzeug aus zu finden und nicht gefaehrlich um Zeichen zu geben. Aber die luftmaesige Verteidigung in Norwich, Gratyarmouth and Lowestoff ist sehr stark. Er mueste die Kueste in sehr niedriger Hoehe ueberfliegen, aber (I cannot understand the hand writing) die Naehe der Flugplaetze wegen der zahlreichen Flak vermeiden?
Wenn Sie diese Gegend für gefaehrlich ?? festhalten, koennte ich Sonntag eine andere Gegend mehr noerdwestlich in der Gegend von Wash suchen. Wenn es noetig ist, bitte morgen, Sonnabend, 1500 Uhr zu antworten durch ein nicht chiffriertes Wort bon, wenn nicht, dann non.
Abwehrleitstelle Paris, nr. 1809/44 geh. (Secret)
I H (Heer = Army) gezeichnet i.V. (in Vertretung) Waag Obstlt. (the latter was the deputy of the Abwehr Leiter in France Obst. Rudolph)
KV 2/73, page 136
Funkspruch der Ast Paris am 13.2.44 um 1159 Uhr
uebermittelt duch Eiserne Hand am 14.2.44 um 0810.
Meine tatsaechliche Adresse
41, Redcliffe Square,
Aber bitte diese Adresse nicht durch irgendeinen Andern zu gebrauchen, sondern nur wie letzte Moeglichkeit wegen einer moeglichen Diskretion. Glauben Sie, es ist besser ein Paket in die Vorhalle eines Hotel von London zu stellen, um es fuer einige Tage hueten, einen bestimmten namen der Wahrscheinlichkeit zu geben, man wird in einigen tagen es holen kommen. Uebermittelt den Namen, und ich werde das Paket zuruecknehmen.
Please: compare yourself with: (F85) (F85return)
KV 2/73, page 139
Received 9.4.45 (WRB = War Room section B)
A. Safe at Wiesbaden yielded info on a German agent in UK. (Czerniawski / Brutus / Hubert was actually of Polish decent, but was acting on behalf of the Germans, his only way out from German imprisonment)
B. Agent cover name Hubert known as George Victorman (GVN?) 7167 (incorrect; 7167 was Czerniawski's / Brutus' / Hubert's German administrative cover-name). Residence in Feb. 44 apparently 41 Redcliffe Square (G85) (G85return) London. (AOB: curious, is, that Hubert apparently gave his true address really)
C. Obstlt. Schmitt operated this agent (from Wiesbaden)
D. Traffic concerned Feb. 44 one msg. dated 15 Feb. 44 dealt with American airman in Norwich. Another message. a safe dropping zone near Bay (Bat) Wash Following data incorrect; therefore skipped further.
E. Hubert name included in monitoring log of Eisernehand (The W/T site of Ast (K.d.M.) Wiesbaden. and W/T station.
F. Documents forwarded filed in PF 65363 (Czerniawski's file series)
Info: V/48/B (4) V48 sometimes V48 is a designation for the officer or section particularly designated for a special case (case officer)
2 SIS (VF) see forgoing information
Termination of the quite huge: Carré - Walenty - Brutus - Lucas - Bleicher file series
closure: 19 April 2021
I now have to continue to digest the Kieffer (Kiki) file KV 2/753 and decide - whether going into it - does really make sense.
On 18 April I went briefly through Kieffer's files, and decided that, compared to what we already have dealt with before, that hardly any new - relevant - details came to light; and we therefore will skip this reference.
Consequently: I have to go for Zigzag's - Edward Arnold Chapman's - file series, tomorrow, after I have concluded this Chapter 8 on our website.
Therefore - file series (KV 2/455 ... KV 2/463) consisting of >> 1000 pages on Zigzag will, Deo volente, be dealt with first.
Please wait and see.
Those, who feel that they can contribute additional information or other means - please come forward
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By Arthur O. Bauer