Carré-Bleicher-Walenty

Our two foregoing chapters have come to a conclusion, caused by the fact that we went through the entire

I would like to go through first to the nucleus files of the German Abwehr personality of Hugo Ernst Bleicher

Even his rank isn't yet certainly determined. Some say he was Uffz. (N.C.O.); albeit, that I tend to suppose he was a Sdf. Sonderfhrer (after all he was an Feldwebel)

This kind of personal were individuals possession some particular skill, as to fit them into the German Wehrmacht they got the rank of an Sonderführer distinguishing what his level constitutes these were additionally designated:

When Bleicher had been designated Uffz. being a Feldwebel; then he might have been: Sdf. (G); so far it is only my guess. During the course of our Survey we will learn that Bleicher possessed the rank of a Feldwebel, which was Uffz. rank (N.C.O.). Curious to me: he was so successful; apparently he did not was ever had been promoted.

Therefore: do not multiply its content - as on some Crown Copyright is still valid

AOB, the quite many stamps do indicate that it concerns a relevant subject, what it indeed is.

The red coloured word HISTORICAL often guarantees at least a minimum reproduction standard.

The conservation department has been informed about the condition of this piece and has been noted for future evaluation.

AOB: noticing the horizontal line in the background, we know that it had been taken at Camp 020

29.5.45 Extract from 12 A.G. (Army Group) report on Baby mentioning Bleicher. 1u

6.6.45 Note from W.R.C.4.a (War Room C 4a) to B.1.b. (M.I.5) re report at 1t. 1v

6.6.45 Note from W.R.C.4.a. to V.B.5 (designation of an M.I.6 handling officer) enclosing report see 1t 1w

6.6.45 To S.O.E. enclosing copies of a U.S. interrogation report mentioning Bleicher 1x

16.6.45 Note from Mr. Wilson (M.I.5) to Colonel Stephens, (heading Camp 020 on the background of the Bleicher case 2b

10.7.45 From Camp 020 giving information from Bleicher on Interallie (Interalliée) 20z

11.7.45 Note from W.R.C.4. to W.R.B. asking for copies of document received from S.O.E. 20a

With reference to the Questionnaire handed to the War Room by Capitaine Vaudreuil on 29.6.45, Bleicher has supplied the following information, as the result of interrogation and written statements, regarding the "Interallie (Interalliée)" affair:-

Q.1 Who denounced Robert Kieffer (Kiki)? Was it Lemeur? Had Kieffer's mistress Buffet no part in the denunciation? Was Kiefer arrested before or after (18 November 1941) the agents of the group? What were the conditions of release of these agents? Was it because Kieffer (Kiki) had agreed to work for the Germans?

A.1 Bleicher thinks it was about October 1941 that Kieffer (Kiki) denounced by Lemeur at the office of the G.F.P. (Geheimefeldpolizei) (secret Army Police) (Luft) in the Place Napoleon at Cherbourg. Lemeur had previously been recruited to Kieffer's organisation either by Kieffer or his mistress, Mme. Buffet. Bleicher does not know the reason why Lemeur denounced Kieffer. Kieffer (Kiffer often incorrectly written) was the first of the organisation to be arrested, in the following circumstances:-

The G.F.P. (Luft) (GAF), Cherbourg, sent a report on Lemeur's denunciation to Paris and Capt. (Hptm.) Borchers of III-F, St. Germain, was sent down to investigate. As there was no suitable person attached to pass the matter to G.F.P. (Heer) (Army), to which Bleicher was attached. Bleicher was selected as the man most competent (and competent he was!) to carry out the arrest (AOB, but the S.D., maybe GFP; did the actual work, as the Abwehr themselves lacked the legal competence). Lemeur accompanied Bleicher and four members of the G.F.P. to the station at Cherbourg, where he was expecting Kieffer to arrive from Paris. Lemeur met Kieffer and left the station with him to go to Mme. Buffet's house. About 500 yards (say, 500 m) from the station Bleicher arrested Kieffer. A few days later Mme. Buffet was arrested. She was unwilling to give any information and was in no way concerned with the arrest. (AOB, I don't know what actually is true?).

Q.2 What was the attitude of Kieffer (Kiki) immediately after his arrest? Why did he accompany the German Police led by Bleicher to the Place de l'Opera?

A.2 Kiefer's attitude immediately after his arrest was frankly uncooperative. He said, "It's a pity you've caught me. I should have caused you a lot of trouble in Normandy.: He was very unwilling to give away his comrades but finally agreed to do so because he could not stand imprisonment. He stipulated, however, that they should not be put to death and if they would not agree to work for the Germans they were to be set free after interrogation.

Bleicher cannot give the names of any of Kieffer's (Kiki's) agents not mentioned in the questionnaire. He says he was completely uninterested in the smaller fry (children). → (page 22)

Even in Paris Kieffer (Kiki) made final attempt to protect his organisation. In fact, it was with this end in view that he invented a rendez-vous with an agent in the Place de l'Opera, where he and Bleicher walked about during two days for an hour near the exit of the metro. Kieffer hoped for the chance of meeting someone in the organisation and warning him of danger. Later admitted to Bleicher that the rendez-vous at the Opera was intended for this sole purpose.

Bleicher then told him that he could seize the head of the organisation without him and in these circumstances everybody would be condemned to death, whereas if Kieffer cooperated he promised to try to save their lives, and in addition immediately released from prison. After much reflection Kieffer (Kiki) agreed and was released on parole.

At this time he did not know TCzerniawski @ Armand's (Walenty's) address and promised to contact Armand's (Walenty's) and Armand's secretary Christian. The following day he returned to Bleicher to say that he made the necessary contact.

Q.3 How was the Pole "Christian" liaison agent of the group, arrested Who gave "Armand's" (Walenty's) address? Who gave "Micheline's" (Victoire's) address?

A.3 Kiefer told Bleicher that he had asked Christian to arrange a redez-vous with Armand (Walenty), but without results. On the pretext of having an urgent question to ask Armand before leaving to Norway he arranged another meeting with Christian at Café Monte Carlo Bvd. Wagram, and here Christian was arrested by Bleicher. Christian would not give Bleicher Armand's address but subsequently Kieffer was sent to see him in prison and talked to him for half an hour in his cell, and persuaded him to give the address of the Villa Léandre in Montmartre, where Armand and his mistress, Renée Borni @ Violette were living (the arrests took place on 18th November 1941). Kieffer made no secret of the fact that he was now working for the Germans.

Armand (Walenty) and Violette were arrested and it was the latter who denounced to Bleicher Mme. Carré @ Micheline @ La Chatte @ Victoire, who was also living in the same house.

Q.4 How did "Micheline" (Victoire) behave after her arrest?

Bleicher states that he had never heard of Micheline before she was denounced to him by Violette. He later heard, however, that the Leitstelle (ALST) in Paris had also been investigating the "Interallie"(Interalliée) but had been unable to find the heads. He thinks that if he had not himself (Bleicher) discovered them they would have subsequently been arrested by the Leitstelle (Obstlt. Reile?).

Bleicher himself was not present at Micheline's (Victoire's) arrest, which took place on her arrival at her office (a few minutes walking from Bleicher's office), after a full description had been given of her by Violette → →

(T33) ↓↓ (T33return)

(AOB, in my perception, hypothetically: Violette's betraying Victoire together with the very fact that - before Violette entered the scene at Walenty's headquarters - and since becoming Walenty's mistress instead of Victoire - that these dramatic - culminating events - might have had a severe impact on her emotionally; which might have caused a mood of revenge against most French citizens engaged in Walenty's endeavours)

→ → She (Victoire) was taken to Fresnes prison and Bleicher saw her the following day. He was told that on her arrest she had demanded immediately to see "Le Chef" (Bleicher himself). She immediately told Bleicher that she was prepared to give away the entire organisation, even before conditions had been discussed. (Please, consider my foregoing hypothesis) She was released the same the same day (19 November 1941) and went to live with Bleicher until the time of her departure for London in ~~March 1942~~ (early February 1942). Bleicher says this arrangement gave him no personal satisfaction, but he considered it part of his job (A21) (A21return) and it was entirely due to Micheline (Victoire) that they were able to liquidate almost the entire organisation.

He (Bleicher) that Micheline was insatiable in her treachery and was prepared to denounce her nearest and dearest. In all Bleicher's experience he has never seen anyone who betrayed her friends with such cynicism and zest (enthusiasm). → (page 23)

Q.5 What missions did Bleicher entrust to Kieffer (Kiki) in Normandy? What were the results of these missions? (Dates, names of people to contact. Which were previously known to Kieffer, which given him by the Germans for the occasion?)

A.5 Bleicher is rather hazy at this stage about Kieffer's mission to Normandy. During 1942, Bleicher was away a good deal in unoccupied (Vichy controlled) France and he left Kieffer and Goubeau in the charge of Major Eschig and Eckert, who may have given them missions of which Bleicher is ignorant. In general Kieffer and Goubeau had the same missions as were given to all Bleicher's agents, which were to rout out underground organisations. (AOB, Bleicher might have been engaged in summer 1942 with "Unternehmen Dora" which aimed at -to wipe out illicit transmissions from the territories of Vichy France; which were becoming a headache for German counter intelligence and police organisations in occupied France)

Kieffer's most important work, however, was connected with the investigation of acts of sabotage which had occurred in the Caen district between January and March, 1942. A clue to this affair had been found in the papers taken from Lucas's courier arrested on the demarcation line (see answer to question No. 8). This was cutting concerning sabotage carried out against the Paris/Cherbourg express with a pencil note, "This is the work of my people". On Lucas's arrest he said that this was cutting had been sent to him by an English agent, Burdeyron (?), who was working in Normandy.

Bleicher subsequently arrested Burdeyron in Paris, where the latter confessed that he had indeed sent the cutting to Lucas but that it was merely bluff on his part and that he had had nothing to do with the sabotage in question.

Bleicher stated that Burdeyron had a wife living in England and had sent to work in Normandy where he had become attached to Lucas' organisation. When asked for the names of any agents he had recruited in Normandy he gave the names of two young men, one at Caen called Revillac (?) and the other at Lisieux (name forgotten). Kieffer was sent to contact these two but found that they were more boys and quite unimportant. The man at Lisieux did, however, put Kieffer in touch with a Dr. Hautechaud, a well-known doctor at Lisieux, and a French Army Officer. Hautechaud had been in liaison with French Commandant and worked in his information service. He had however lost contact with this man and on being told by Kieffer that he was a representative of an Allied Organisation in Paris ge agreed to collaborate with him (Kieffer?), and introduced him to Bloch, Froment and other agents of the Group.

Through Bloch, Kieffer learnt of another organisation at Caen, the chiefs of which called Combi and Robineaux. (Bleicher is not certain that these are the exact names.) These men ran an organisation in connection with parachuted material, etc, and were linked with a certain Blondel in Paris, whom Kieffer also contacted. Blondel, however, did not trust Kieffer and would not cooperate with him. Bleicher says that he is uncertain of dates but puts these events in the early months of 1943. He says that he personally took no action against Combi, Robineaux or Blondel, but that the two former may have subsequently been arrested by the S.D. (actually being the German Police like organisation), who, who independently discovered their organisation.

Q.6 What missions did he gave to Goubeau @ Bob @ Edgar in Normandy? What were the results of these missions?

A.6 Goubeaux @ Bob @ Edgard had been denounced by Micheline (Victoire) and subsequently accompanied Kieffer on various missions, until the end of 1943m in the guise (appearance) of an inspector from Paris keeping touch with the resistance movements in the provinces.

He was very young and the authorities wanted to send him to Germany for forced labour. Bleicher at first managed to keep him, but as it seemed inevitable that he would be sent sooner or later if he could not get into a reserved occupation Bleicher allowed him to quit his service and become an instructor of recruits for the Jeunesse Francaise at the Kellerman Barracks in Paris. He was, in any case, of very little use to Bleicher, who does not remember ever given him a specific mission, though as stated above he may have carried out some work for Major Eschig when Bleicher was out of Paris.

Q.7 What was the exact role played by Kieffer (Kiki), Goubeau and Micheline (Victoire) in the Le Tac affair?

A.7 Bleicher remembers the name Le Tac but is not entirely clear in his mind about him. He thinks he was an agent of the Vomecourt @ Lucas. If this is so neither he was an agent of Vomecourt @ Lucas. If he is neither Kieffer (Kiki), Goubeau nor Micheline (Victoire) were connected with him, though possibly his name may have first come to Bleicher's notice through a report from Micheline (Victoire) were connected with him, though possibly his name may have first come to Bleicher's notice through a report from Micheline (Victoire) on Lucas' agents (think of late December 1941 or very early of January 1942), but he does not think that Micheline (Victoire) knew him personally.

Le Tac's name (if this is the agent whom Bleicher remembers) was probably given to him by Volters, Lucas' secretary. Le Tac worked with a certain Miss Mary, and English woman in Lyons, who was part of Armand's (Walenty's) organisation. He was arrested on a denunciation of Alesch @ Axel @ Franklin, ex-Cure of St. Maure, as were also two doctors in Lyons, one by name Rousseau. Miss Mary managed to escape.

Q.8 What exactly was the part played by Micheline (Victoire) in the Lucas (Pierre de Vomecourt) affair? What were the circumstances of Lucas' arrest? (B22) (B22return)

A.8 Micheline (Victoire) made the acquaintance of de Vomecourt @ Lucas through a certain Brault, a lawyer in the American Chamber of Commerce in Paris. (Note: that at that time Germany and the U.S.A. were not yet at War between one another)

Lucas was in need of a transmitter set and send his messages to the War Office in London (actually directly to S.O.E., maybe S.I.S.). By January and his assistant, Rogés, as a Belgian friend of Micheline's (Victoire / La Chatte) had completely under her thumb (unter den Daumen) and they joined forces, taking an office at the Lido, where they worked together.

Bleicher was introduced to Lucas and his assistant, Roger, as a Belgian friend (the reason was: that albeit that Bleicher spoke French language perfectly, however he possessed an apparent Belgian accent) of Micheline's (Victoire's). (Bleicher does not believe that Lucas ever suspected a double-cross (AOB, given the circumstances - Victoire was at a certain point obliged to confess the true circumstances), or that Micheline gave Bleicher away to Lucas before leaving for England) (AOB, she damm did! The next link will show you circumstances which without knowledge could never have occurred this way (C21) (C21return) Notice also the Vaas affairs (E21) (E21return) )

An agent of Bleicher's, Jouffret @ Claude, was introduced to Lucas, Rogér and Volters (Lucas' secretary) and it was agreed that Claude should replace Micheline (Victoire) during the latter's absence. In reality Claude acted as a liaison between Rogér, Volters and Bleicher.

Bleicher heard of Lucas' secret return to France (1/2 April) in the following way: one day at his office Major Schaeffer gave him a few sheets of paper, saying that they had been found on a courier caught on the Demarcation Line. It was an agent's report containing messages to be sent off in the Zone Libre (Vichy controlled France).

A.9 Renée Borni @ Violette directly after her arrest revealed to Bleicher all she knew about the organisation, and denounced Micheline, of whom she was very jealous.

Violette took Bleicher to the office about three minutes' walk from the Villa Léandre (F22) (F22return), where Micheline worked, and gave all the details necessary to effect her arrest, (A39) ↓↓↓ (A39return)

8 Villa Léandre, apparently is a street-name, the house concerned at number 8 is good visible

Because: in this premises, house number 8, being the guest of Mme. Bavette; the Walenty group temporary stayed there.

When the arrest took place on 18th November 1941, their two W/T operators were staying some floors higher; only due to the fact that the Germans did not search the rest of the premises - these two men could escape via the adjacent roofs.

Because, Violette and somewhere also Victoire spoke about Villa Léandre - my thought was that it concerned a real Villa, which often constitutes a separate premises where hardly attached roofs will be encountered. But, Villa Léandre apparently concerns a street-name with houses attached on either side.

As to enhance your understanding we can see that the location of Villa Léandre is about west of Montmartre at ca. 600 m distance from one another

1. Since dictating my memorandum on this case yesterday I have received Lucas' account of his experiences (H22) (H22return). I enclose my only copy of this document and I regret that I have not got the secretarial services available to enable me to make a copy of this for you to keep... You may find it is sufficient if the interrogating officers read this through and then return it, but if you do make copies for retention (keeping) at Camp 020 I should be very grateful if you could let me have 4 copies. In any case I would like the document back reasonably soon.

2. There is no doubt whatever that Lucas is a man of the highest courage and there is every reason to expect him to be completely truthful. The only point on which there can be any suspicion that he might distorting the facts is on his behaviour after his arrest, when it is conceivable that he may have given away more information than he need have done and may be trying to conceal this fact by claiming that he was beaten up and by then describing later plans telling the Germans only that which they already knew. On the other hand he is one of the few people who might be expected to have sufficient courage and skill to carry out such an intention successfully as he claims to have done.

3. There is no reason to go into the Lucas story in detail in the report on Bleicher, but, as previously indicated, we were not previously aware of exactly why Lucas was caught, and Bleicher can no doubt confirm Lucas' account of why this happened. Lucas' treatment immediately after his arrest is important if he is correct in saying that he was beaten up as Bleicher's claim that he always prevented those captured through him from being maltreated falls to the ground and Bleicher loses a large part of his claims to be specially favourably considered by us. If, on the other hand, Lucas was not ill-treated or did give more information away to the Germans that there had already obtained or were bound to obtain from other sources, this is a blot (blemish) on his otherwise extremely record. Bleicher's account of what happened after Lucas' arrest will, therefore provide a most valuable comparison and a test of both the principal parties concerned.

4. Lucas said he was interrogated by Hptm. Broehm?. This, in the circumstances, is presumably an alias of Bleicher can no doubt identify the man concerned.

5. According to Reile (KV 2/3016, PF 601998) , an agent of his called Caen of the P.P.F. was immediately before the evacuation of Paris given 5 W/T sets and separate sets of codes for agents to be left behind in Paris and Orleans. Can Bleicher give details?

6. I should like to have information from Bleicher on the activities of Hptm. Bulag, who is about about to be interrogated. I believe he was assistant to Major von Feldmann (KV 2/3297) in FAK 306 in Paris in the summer of 1944, his function being to estimate the value of agents. Later he was, I believe, Commander of FAT 350 and on a date unknown to me was transferred to FAT 365 (AOB, Driebergen, NL, Giskes)

(Please bear always in mind: that these KV 2/xxx series have curious successions: whereas the minute numbers are increasing in respect to the increase of the page-numbers, whereas the document serials are running in a reversed manner. The further you approach in the file - how older the maters and see next page 43 is carrying minute number 15a)

10. There is no special secrecy about the arrest of the head of the Interalliee (Interalliée) Service, Walenty @ Armand @ TCzerniawski (his real name),, etc, nor of the fact that he subsequently escaped. What is Top Secret is that his escape was arranged by the Germans and that he came over with a mission which he subsequently proceeded (a German controlled mission) to carry out under British control. →→

(not correctly like this, he (Walenty/Brutus) might have went directly to M.I.5 or landed there later and became their most valuable agent "Brutus". The double-cross was organised such: that he was sent over to England by, I suppose, Bleicher, to accomplish intelligence; but became agent Brutus on behalf of B.1.a. and started to mislead Bleicher or, maybe, Major Reile, or someone else higher-up. The game was, in my perception: he entered in 1942 England as to spy for the Germans, soon now as British agent Brutus. The information which the Germans were fed with was to detract the Germans such that they expected D-Day everywhere - but not Normandy. This endeavour became known as Operation Fortitude. A huge complex, top secret, endeavour!)

→→ All references to his escape having been arranged or his subsequent history should, therefore, be excluded from the Interim report, but I would like to have separate report on the extent to which Walenty (= Brutus) in the course of his his (German) assisted escape gave away to Bleicher the patriot who helped him to escape without knowing that the escape was taking place at the instigations of the Germans. Walenty admitted that some patriots might have suffered through this act (his escape) and I would like to ascertain from Bleicher whether Walenty told us the whole truth about this matter.

11. There is no reason why Bleicher should not realize that we are now aware that Walenty (Brutus; but the Germans did not know this name) came over here with a mission. We have, in fact, been told it by Obst. Reile. Bleicher should, therefore, be left with the impression that we only recently learnt of this fact of which we had not been aware and he should be made to think that we are now trying to find Walenty who had disappeared. Source:

~~Ober~~feldwebel (Fdw) (X22) (X22return) Hugo Bleicher @ Verbeck @ Jean Castel @ Colonel Henri, who also used other aliases, a character of exceptional interest to M.I.5., S.I.S. and S.O.E., arrived at Camp 020 on 16.6.45. Although Bleicher, owing to the rigidity of the German military system, never obtained commissioned rank (hence, Bleicher was thus an N.C.O.) (AOB, I still imagine that he could have had the status of a Sdf. (G) which equals his status), he was well-known as one of the most successful members of the Abwehr in penetration work in France. He was originally a member of the G.F.P*. (Geheimefeldpolizei) (Secret Military Police) and got into touch with the Abwehr when he took part in the arrest at Cherbourg in 1941 of Kieffer @ Kiki, an agent of the important Interalliee (Interalliée) espionage organisation run by the Pole Walenty (real name Czerniawski) Bleicher rapidly exploited the penetration of this organisation and within a few days Walenty himself and his French woman assistant (Violette), best known under the name of Victoire (AOB: incorrect, first was Walenty's partner/mistress who did betray Victoire), were arrested. With the aid of Victoire (and less Violette) and certain other members of the organisation who were prepared to assist Bleicher in rounding up their colleagues, almost the whole of this valuable organisation was liquidated by the Germans in the course of a few weeks.

Bleicher then endeavoured to use Victoire (Mathilde Lucie Carré @ Micheline as Bleicher called her during the interrogations in England; albeit that in her personal Abwehr index card she was named: La Chat(te) (J25) (J25return) as a means of controlling, without his knowledge, the important agent Lucas (AOB, Walenty and Viollette and some others had been arrested on 18th November 1941 and Lucas enters the scene during the course of December 1941; and was coming in touch with Victoire independently); the idea being that Lucas in this country would receive instructions to unite all important resistance activities in France, would be sent back to France with Victoire and that Bleicher with Victoire's aid, would then be able to arrest all potential resistance leaders in one fell (cut down) swoop. This plan came to light when Lucas and Victoire were in England and, in fact, Lucas returned secretly to France while efforts were being made by false W/T traffic to persuade the Germans that he was still taking part in discussions in England. The deception seems to have been successful as far as it went, but unfortunately a courier carrying documents for (from) Lucas across the demarcation line was arrested and Bleicher, by recognising the handwriting, discovered that Lucas was back in France. (R21) (R21return) Bleicher managed to arrest one of Lucas' assistants who betrayed him. (N31) (N31return) → Subsequently Bleicher completely penetrated another large S.O.E. organisation and with his great skill in turning round Allied agents (because Bleicher's attitude was preventing torture and that like) continued to run it for some considerable time and even to satisfy the S.O.E. officer in charge who himself (Major Boddington) paid a visit to France. This visit was deliberately facilitated by Bleicher, who was able to persuade his superiors (Reile?) that that it was wiser to permit S.O.E. officer to return to England think his organisation was in order than to arrest him and bring the organisation to an end.

Under the alias of Colonel Henri, Bleicher suggested to members of his S.O.E. group that he himself should be brought to England. It is not as yet clear whether this was an attempt on his own part to get on favourable terms with the British who, he could see, would win the war, or whether it was a bold penetration move authorised by Bleicher's superior officers.

Bleicher also ran, with more or less success, at least two W/T agents of S.I.S. who were arrested in 1943.

When the III-F section of Alst Frankreich (Obstlt. Reile KV 2/3016) was reorganised into FAKs and FATs Bleicher was attached to FAK 306 with which he retreated from Paris to the area of Münster and subsequently to Holland where, in the last days two months of the war, he was attached to FAT 365 (Colonel Giskes). Not very much is so far known of his activities during this period, but he took an active part trying to set up one ring of stay-behind (R-Agenten) agents in the area between Münster and the Rhine.

Bleicher clearly has a most extensive knowledge of German penetration activities and agents in France and later in the lower Rhineland and Holland. Some of these matters, particularly the penetration of S.O.E. ring above referred to, are matters of extreme complication and their investigation is bound to take some little time. Preliminary indications are that Bleicher is being cooperative and in fact the difficulty of the interrogators is as much to select what is most important out of the mass of information he is producing as to persuade Bleicher to be cooperative. Bleicher, of course, claims always to have been anti-Nazi and to have struggled throughout the war to protect agents captured through his efforts from maltreatment at the hands of (R.S.H.A.) Amt IV (S.D.). There is a good deal of evidence to show that at least the latter part of his claim is to some extent justified. It is to the credit of Bleicher and his superior officers that the promises given to captured agents that if they give information about their colleagues their own lives and those of the colleagues would be spared have been carried out. He caused captured agents to be treated as Prisoners of War even in cases where, under international law, the Germans were entitled to impose the death penalty.

* AOB: in my perception - a reason why he turned out at the G.F.P. in France, may well have been his fluent French language speaking, albeit with a Belgian accent, because he before the war, represented a chemical company from Hamburg, in French North Africa.

With reference to B.1.W. (Mr. Wilson's) (L21) (L21return) memorandum PF 601998 of 20.6.45, Bleicher has been interrogated on the points raised therein and a translation of a statement on Lieut.Colonel Reile is given below:-

"I first saw Lieut.Colonel Reile (Leiter Abwehr III France, in Paris; KV 2/3016) in November 1941, when I was introduced to him, following the "Interallie" (Interalliée) affair by Major Eschig of the Saint-Germain Service. Short introductory interview. Reile was at that time Head of department III-F of the Paris Abwehrleitstelle (ALST), having their offices in the Lutetia Hotel (Headquarters of all the Abwehr sections), Bvd. Raspail,

Paris. It was on the third floor, room 350. His secretary Mlle Winkler, occupied the anteroom.

Hôtel Lutetia, the headquarters of the Abwehr in France, during their occupation by the Germans

A view of its surrounding south of the Seine, upper right-hand side we see the "Notre Dame" church, on the left-hand side we notice Hôtel Lutetia

"It was only after the dissolution of of "Ast St.-Germain" (when Major Eschig and I were moved from the "Leitstelle" that I saw Lieut.Colonel Reile now and again. I thought highly of him, knowing him to be very active, very intelligent and to have a broadness of outlook that I regret to say I scarcely ever found among other officers of our Services. It was incidentally thanks Lieut.Colonel Reile that I remained a member of the "Abwehr", he having personally intervened to prevent my return to the GFP (Geheimefeldpolizei). On the other hand, it was only natural that our association should be limited to visits strictly necessary for departmental matters of some importance.

"When Major Eschig was transferred in about June 1942 Lieut.Colonel Reile took me into his office, where I worked up to May 1943, under his assistant, Major Schaeffer. The Lieut.Colonel himself was too busy to deal with each one of us individually. On the other hand, as I was not an officer, I had no authority, according to the regulations to control agents. I accordingly made my report each day to Major Schaeffer who in his turn submitted them to the Lieut.Colonel. On a higher level, therefore, it was Major Schaefer who did everything, and he, being of a very jealous disposition, went so far on one occasion as to forbid me to go to the Lieut.Colonel.

"In spite of all this, Lieut.Colonel Reile took quite an interest in my work and I thoroughly cognisant (aware) of my activities. On the other hand, he may not know my cover-name. This is for simple reason that so far as Service was concerned, I had none. I was a Soldier. Even Major Schaeffer did not know for several months that in my dealings with agents I called myself Mr. Jean. On the other hand Lieut.Colonel Reile is well acquainted - and in fair detail too - with my more important activities such as Nobel I (Interalliée affair, Capt. ~~Tcherniawsky~~ Czerniawski and Grossfuerst (the French section affair with the agent Roger (Rogér) (Lucas affair after his return from England April 1942) . He (Reile) it was who arranged the conditions of departure of Captain ~~Tcherniawsky~~ (Czerniawski), and he too who agreed to the departure of La Chatte (Carré / Victoire) (together with Lucas) for England. It was also he (Reile) who in connection with Nobel II (Lucas (first) affair - Pierre Vomecourt) had to ratify with Berlin the promise made I made to Lucas that his life, and those of his organisation, should be safe. (M21) (M21return)

"Whilst, therefore, my direct connection with Lieut.Colonel Reile remained somewhat restricted on account of our relatively different ranks, and came to a definite end when I was transferred to FAT in the (late) summer of 1943 (FAT and FAKs were introduced to enhance the effectiveness of the limited resources available. The numbers contain the sort of intelligence concerned as well as the region in which it should operate; FAT 306 - Forntaufklärungtrupp section 3 (III) thus counter-intelligence 06 in Northern France. There existed also FAK (Frontaufklärungskommando) these were smaller tactical units),

I had, during 1943, met the people who were most closely connected with him, who were his agents and came, as I did, to Major Schaeffer's office to hand their reports or discuss matters. Among them was a Monsieur Pat, and also a Monsieur Robert (Robèrt), the former being one of Lieut.Colonel Reile's most intimate (friends). Robert comes from Luxembourg and his real name is Kaiser. These two men were Lieut.Colonel Reile's agents before the war. Another "Intimus" and well versed in Lieut.Colonel Reile's affairs, is Sdf. (Sonderführer) (?) Graf Kreuz, who although of German nationality is supposed to be Russian or Baltic by birth. He has a vast number of connections in Paris, as well in diplomatic circles, and I know that he has done a tremendous amount of work for Lieut.Colonel Reile.

"I know that Coonel Reile had a "Stadtbüro" (town office) in the Rue de Monsieur. I went there once to be introduced to two gentlemen who wanted to work for us.

"If I am not mistaken, the two people concerned were an ex-mayor of Marseilles, accompanied by a Police Commissioner from French Morocco (Marocco). The Mayor of Marseilles is well known, think his son was killed in Russia. At all events, the matter never came to anything, as these two had already offered their services to the S.D., from whom they finally worked.

"I was always very sorry to have been transferred to Major von Feldmann (KV 2/3297), and when I was ar Rorup in January 1945, knowing the Pat, Robert and Graf Kreuz were with Lieut.Colonel Reile, I wrote him a letter asking him to take me back into his service. You have his very kind reply to this letter with my papers.

"In his (Bleicher's) retreat from France, he arrived at Riedelbach, Kreis Usingen, Landjahrheim, a little place in the country, not far from Bad Ems. There, in Hotel Roemer (Römer?), was a whole group of French and Belgian agents, under the control of Sdf. Schneide. Some of them were learning W/T in a school set up at Bad Ems itself. Pat @ Goertz was the boss and even replaced the Chief. He had rented in the neighbourhood of Bad Ems a house himself and his wife with their three children.

"I don;t think that either of them was able to escape the advance of the Allied troops, and it was doubtless in the region of Bad Ems that they were taken, unless they were able to hide at the last moment.

"Below is a list of office employees of III-F at the beginning of 1942 and therefore working under the orders of Lieut.Colonel (Obstlt.) Reile, Hotel Lutetia, Paris:-

German; aged 46 years; thin; height 1m 80 cm; brown hair; brown eyes; oval face; matt complexion; straight nose; cleanshaven; well caredfor hands; perfect officer type - very sporting appearance; wore uniform or civilian clothes; deep, slow speech; does not speak French.

Seen: at his office, 3rd floor of Hotel Lutetia, Bvd. Raspail, Paris, 1942 - June 1944.

In what capacities employed: Said to have been former Chief of Police, but had returned to active list again.

Address of last Residence Hamburg-~~Poppenbeitel~~ Poppenbüttel, Blücherstrasse 6

In my perception it is essential to notice the application of Bleicher's military rank: Feldwebel. Feldwebel is one of the classes existing as an Uffz. (N.C.O.)

AOB: Bleicher had been with the military secret service in W.W. I. And his Uffz. rank might have originated from that latter mentioned period. Because, an Uffz. is often related to a full time military career, which does not match to Bleicher's representing a Hamburg Chemical factory in French North-Africa.

Oberstleutnant (Obstlt) Reile O.U. (un-named place) den 1. Dezember 1944.

Feldpostnummer 05995

Lieber Herr Bleicher!

Für Ihren Brief vom 18.11.1944 und die kameradschaftlichen Grüsse besten Dank. Besonders habe ich mich über das Vertrauen gefreutm das aus dem Brief zu mir spricht. Mmeiner seits was es ganz selbstverständlichm Ihnen das Wohlwollen engegenzubringen, von dem Sie sprechen, da Sie zu den wenigen Kameraden in unserm Dienst gehören, die nicht nur geschickt in der Planung, sondern auch in der Ausführung sind. Ich kann wohl sagen, dass Sie in dieser Beziehung, insbesondere was die Einsatzfreudigkeit betrifft, beispielhaft gehandelt haben. Wenn ich an die Jahre in Frankreich zurückdenke, wird mir immer Ihr Einsatz vor Augen stehen. Deshalb habe ich ganz besonders gerne zur Kenntnis genommen, dass Sie jederzeit nur zu gerne bereit wären, wieder bei mir zu arbeiten. Zur Zeit geht das nicht. Ich muss Sie bitten, im dortigen Raume Ihre Pflicht zu erfüllen. Es kann jedoch früher oder später der Fall eintreten, dass ich Sie hier dringend benötige und dann werden Sie von mir hören.

Suzanne (once Bleicher's mistress) ist von Oberstleutnant Dernbach übernommen worden, wo sie bestimmt nett behandelt und auch richtig eingesetzt wird.

Mit herzlichen Grüssen und

Heil Hitler, Ihr

Reile

AOB, significant is that every time in the Camp 020 and other papers they notice: Colonel Reile that this is nonsense - his real rank was Obstlt. (Lieut.Colonel)!

AOB: what is apparent also, is, the very kind way this letter is worded; most friendly, more comradeship like. Extraordinary for an Obstlt. is writing an Uffz (Feldwebel) personally.

Was from November 1939 until May 1940 in Duisburg 9infantry training), then joined the G.F.P. (Geheimefeldpolizei) (secret military police) (as existing up till now) - in contrast with the feldgendarmeie)/ Joined the G.F.P/ on the ground of his knowledge of various languages, English, French and Spanish.) Knows French well, because he used to be a correspondent in foreign languages and because he worked he worked as an interpreter for the director of the railways in Mainz at the end of the last war (1914-1918) during the occupation of the Rhineland. Went for the G.F.P. from Duisburg to the Hague in May 1940. Remained there 3 months; which group, he does not know any more. This group was presided over by Polizeikommissar Hubner (Group number is about 300). This man was in his turn being presided over by G.F.P.- director Rassow. He lived in the Hague in the Passsagehotel. The group consisted of about 100 men. He worked there as a French interpreter and did there nothing more. Then went with the whole group to France, to Rugles near Verneuil, at the castle l'Hermitage". Had to occupy himself with the purchasing of victuals. He was still under the guidance of Hubner and Rassow. The group had still nothing to do.

In June Hitler wanted to come to Paris. Then he prepared the security for the arrival. He specially was charged with the cleaning of the Champs Elysees and lived in Paris in the Terrashotel, Avenue de la Grande Armee. The entry did not take place and the group went back again to Rugles. (AOB, besides all this Hitler and Albert Speer and some others - arrived in the very early morning after Paris had been occupied and visited the l'Opera and the Etoile and some other buildings)

In July they went to Caen. There they began to work. The group consisted of Hubner with secretaries, Feldpolizei, secretaries, civilians and professional police. Each secretary got an interpreter and 4 men and formed a group of his own in this way. Each group dealt with various cases: espionage, etc. Lived in France until the retreat (in 1944?) Made many contacts with the French. A French agent for the Interalliee (Interalliée) was the Polish Hptm. Czerniawski. One of his aliases was "Armand" (Walenty). This man was a Pole and was arrested in Paris via (8 Villa Léandre) at about 5 a.m. (18 November 1941) → (page 100)

(T47) (T47return) after that declared himself willing to work for Reile (who is the leader of III-F = counter-espionage). This change probably was connected with the Polish question. Czerniawski has been tried by various people of the Abwehr. The case even has been brought up to Berlin. He then declared himself willing to work for the Germans and was being sent out to England (becoming double-cross agent Brutis) To avert suspicion of the outside world, they (The German Abwehr) let Czerniawski "escape" during the transport out of the prison. This took place in the environment of Boulevard Raspail (Where the Abwehr Headquarters Hotel Lutetia was located). He (Czerniawski / Walenty) was transported to unoccupied France by Bleicher who had to bring him into contact.

A discussion has been held with (Major) Reile and Pat (probably also with some other people, but the examination did not make this clear)

The description of Pat is: very tall, black, very lean, long face about 38 - 40 years. He was the most important agent of Reile, already before the war. Pat's wife is supposed to be in the neighbourhood of Bad Ems. Pat only had Funkkommunikation, no letters.

Bleicher does not know which addresses Czerniawski took with him to England. Czerniawski again made contact with Polish organisations in Toulouse. While he was at it, Bleicher brought about the connection Czerniawski-Reile, In Lyon a contact had to be accomplishes via the "Armistice Committee" by a Hptm. of the Abwehr (Probably Baier) (Bayer?).

Bleicher has worked from October until the end of February (1945) in Germany, where he had to build up an R-Netz (stay behind), which in case of a retreat of the army had to maintain communications with the supreme command.

von Feldmann is likely to live at this country seat in the Lüneburgerheide. It is situated on the ground of the forester Herbst (Same remembered that the name on the Lüneburgerheide was: Wilseder Heide).

7. Bleicher was most successful in using agents such as Kiki (Kieffer), whom he had turned round after the breakdown of the Walenty organisation (AOB, incorrect: Kiki had been turned around before the break-up of Walenty's Interalliée on 18 November 1941), for penetrating other Allied organisations. In particular, through Kiki and others, he got well inside a large S.O.E. organisation in France. The principal agents he used for this purpose besides Kiki (Kieffer) were Roger (Bardet and one Paul (Frager) turned Roger round in the course of an afternoon.

24. Bleicher is believed to be expert at his work and a relatively human man - he had no love for Nazis. He no doubt took a professional pride in the carrying out of his work efficiently and largely independently, but now that he has fallen into our hands i see no reason why we should not be as cooperative as Huntermann and Giskes are showing themselves to be.

As spoken I enclose two copies of the P/W report from the U.S. which deals with various activities of III-F in France and in particulars on page 9 and 10 with the part of Bleicher's activities which led to wild charges being made against (R21) (R21return) Major Boddington (S.O.E.).

I am sure that the enclosed report gives an accurate picture of the facts. A lot other information in the report is to my knowledge accurate, and the fact that the interrogators in the U.S.^* presumably had no previous knowledge of the case and the prisoner (Bleicher?) had no axe to grind precludes any possible desire towards conscious inaccuracy.

I should be grateful if you could let me have the real names of the other captured agents whom you are in a position to identify.

* My query: I get the impression that Bleicher had been interrogated in the U.S. whereas it is more likely that he had, if, interrogated somewhere in Europe; albeit it that he had been captured in Holland by the Canadians (S21) (S21return)

17.8.42 (36132)* Wiesbaden - Bourge. To Berta for Leo I :- In re consultation Hptm. Fuchs and Feldwebel Bleicher. Meeting agreed on will take place on 19 and 20.8.42 at 1600 hrs. Abw. Leitstelle France III-F IA Reile Obstlt. (Leiter. Egon).

21.8.42 (36612)* Bourges - Wiesbaden. To Egon. Ref. discussion Hptm. Fuchs / Fdw. Bleicher. Message berta no. 242?Wira No. 901, Rendez-vous arranged kept by our side on both days. Bleicher did not put in appearance despite considerable wait (langes warten). Leo. I Berta.

26.8.42 (26279)* Lyons - Bourges. Leo I to Egon. Ref. conversation Hptm Fuchs Fdw. Bleicher. Matter settled through later meeting.

22.12.42 (26279)* Paris area Borges. To Mars. I for Obstlt Bleibtreu. Ref. Polish Intelligence Service. Despatch of Sdf. Link and Fdw. Bleicher has been arranged. Will probably arrive some time during the day

* These numbers are likely related to the so-called Isk decrypts, which are based on Enigma machine codes, likely of the G-type machines. These numbers are provided in succession 23.8.45.

Albeit that the file is designated of "Historical" value, the way it once had been stored and preserved - looks like as if it had been kept under a train carriage for decades without any serious protection!

KV 2/165-1, page 68 (minute 43a) Please notice, that this reference is the first of some relevance of this new file series.

I enclose herewith three copies of a memorandum from Camp 020 and the original signed copy of Bleicher's statement to judge between the accuracy of Lucas's account of what happened after his arrest (24 April 1942) (L30) (L30return) , and Bleicher's story and each party has a certain amount of motive for contradicting the other, but it does seem to me that Lucas's claim not to have given away people other than those who would in any event have been found is largely justified because most of those mentioned at the foot of page 3 and top of page 4 of Bleicher's statement were I think already compromised, and I imagine Lucas did know of a great many more members of the Resistance.

As will be seen from this statement, Bleicher is prepared to agree that Lucas may have received some rough handling before his, Bleicher's appearance on the scene, but he cannot be made to admit at any time that he personally condemned or was in any way responsible for the ill treatment of prisoners. This is in fact his chief claim to consideration at our hands. In this particular instance he has gone so far as to confess that in a sudden fit to temper at Lucas' denial of having met him before, he smacked (hint at) Lucas' face. However, he states that he afterwards apologised to Lucas for this unique breach of etiquette on his part.

As regards the names given a considerable amount of valuable information, he would never have been able to arrange such "generous" terms for him and his agents, and he denies that the threat of "shooting hostages for the Caen sabotage affair was ever used by him to force Lucas' hand.

Bleicher seems to have a genuine admiration for Lucas and his attitude say be summed up as follows" "Lucas, in very difficult circumstances, did the best possible could to save the lives of the members of his organisation. He could not have done more, and it is a pity that he should try to justify his actions by falsifying the facts".

It is felt however that Bleicher's own version of some aspects of the story be treated with reserve, in view of his previous reticence (reserve) upon many points which have come to light through Lucas' statement. (M30) (M30return)

I am afraid I am not quite sure how many of the captured S.O.E. agents referred to in this memorandum have their own PFs. Copies should be put for whichever of the following possess them. It is not necessary to make a PF if one does not exist.

Frager @ Paul @ Louba (data covered with Kiki's file KV 2/753) (AOB, I would like to deal later also with this file; in due course)

Major Boddington (S.O.E.) (KV 2/830) (AOB: intriguing, and we have encountered his visiting France personally in Bleicher's file; including the very fact, that Bleicher's section saved him from being arrested. As it was far more favourable to let Boddington return to England than to arrest him, with all its complications) (N31) (N31return)

Question and answer 22 should be Volters which I think is also at times spelt Wolters @ Walters (the linked reference pointing at Carré/Victoire 11 file series) has a PF it should also be extracted into such a PF.

AOB, I like this kind of rather informative notes; as at least we know now that even a regular S.O.E. (SOE) Servant is possessing his own PF reference.

Bleicher was informed about Boddington's (notice forgoing document) arrival by the S.D. Sturmbannführer Kieffer personally told by Bleicher that he had been informed of it by Gilbert (notice forgoing document). Bleicher immediately told Frager (notice forgoing document), who at once warned Boddington (an active S.O.E. Servant) that his arrival was known to the S.D., but Bleicher says that no-one would believe in Gilbert's treachery.

According to Bleicher, Gilbert had handed over many of our officers to the S.D. (Bleicher says they arrived sometimes in two planes, six in each). He had, however, apparently some scruple in regard to Boddington and although he gave away his arrival he said he did not know his address.

(S.D. Stubaf.) Kieffer telephoned Bleicher in the hope that the latter might know the address, and it was then that Bleicher warned Frager.

A few days later Stubaf. Kieffer told Bleicher that Gilbert had told him that Boddington had again left Paris, though in point of fact Bleicher thinks that Gilbert had reported this prematurely as the result of an uneasy conscience (scruples).

Q. 11 According to one report Bleicher said it was through 'L'home qui fait le pick-up', which refers to Gilbert(?) To whom did Gilbert actually give the information, and how long does Bleicher maintain that Gilbert had been working for the Germans? For whom in the S.D. (?) was Gilbert working?

A.11 Bleicher states that if ever spoke of 'L'Home qui fait le pick-up', he was certainly referring to Gilbert, who worked for the B.d.S. (Befelhshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstesdienstes) (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des S.D.), Avenue Foch, Paris. He worked first for Stubaf. Boemmelburg and then, when Boemmelberg left for Vichy, for Stubaf. Kieffer, Chef of B.d.S. Avenue Foch. Therefore it was Stubaf. Kieffer that gave the information.

Bleicher does not know how long Gilbert worked for the S.D. but he had certainly been doing so for some time by April, 1943, and during the time of the negotiations for the release of Roger from the S.D.

Q. 12 Does Bleicher suggest that Claire (Gilbert's secretary) was aware that Gilbert was working for the enemy?

A. 12 Bleicher says that he himself, Roger and Stubaf. Kieffer often discussed this very question, without reaching a definite conclusion.

He thinks that on one occasion Claire said to Roger that she thought there was something fishy about Gilbert's attitude and that she hoped he would be recalled to London, and that the impression gained from this conversation was that she was not a party to Gilbert's treachery. → (page 15)

A. 13 Bleicher heard Frager's real name originally from Marsac after his arrest, and Roger later confirmed Marsac's information.

Q. 14 Bleicher told Frager that the British W/T operators were working for the Germans. To whom did he refer? What British agents were working for Bleicher of the S.D.?

A. 14 Bleicher says that he certainly told Frager that there were W/T operators of the 'French Section' working for the S.D. He does not remember saying four specifically, as the number varied ultimately there were about dozen.

Bleicher heard this from Stubaf. Kieffer and also through the Funkabwehr service (AOB, from experience, what he actually meant was accomplished by the Orpo, who also The Netherlands were responsible for D/Fing, interception and that like. Their main Centre / Headquarters was at Spandau; Why? because the Wehrmacht weren't fit for these kind of non-directly military endeavours), Bvd. Suchet. https://www.cdvandt.org/HW-34-2-RSS-Funkabwehr-Final-report-V4.pdf He says he knows no details and in any case it was more a question of W/T stations than actual operators, as W/T operators of the S.D. or Funkabwehr (Orpo?) usually took over the sets and operated themselves after they had got the necessary information from the operator.

This 'Normandy' business (as it was called by the B.d.S.) was kept very secret, and Bleicher only got scraps of information. He says it was certainly Gilbert who originated this traffic and later the others followed his lead, among them Archamboult a London architect, whom Stubaf. Kieffer described as 'magnificent'. Archamboult supplied the B.d.S. with a diagram of the entire set-up of the French section, with portraits of all the regional Chiefs.

Did Bleicher know Roger before the Marsac affair and were the arrests of Roger in 1942 and 1943 phoney?

A. 15 Bleicher did not know Roger before the Marsac affair, and knows nothing of Roger's arrest in Marseilles in April, 1943. Roger did, however, tell Bleicher that he had been arrested in 1942 in Cannes by the French police, in the house of a doctor who ran a school for allied agents. The doctor from Cannes had, it appears, been confronted with Frager or Colonel Buckmaster (The one who chased in a hatred manner Carré/Victoire during her stay in British prisons in London; between 1st July 1942 up to here transport to France on 1st June 1945) in London on the occasion of Prager (Frager?) last visit, to obtain the details of Roger's escape, which appears to have been genuine.

Bleicher therefore knows of the three occasions on which Roger was arrested, (i) Cannes, together with Bastien and Ballanca ...

Q. 16 Was Bleicher also "arrested" in Paris at the same time as Roger, Mme Marsac and Mirelle Lejeune, and was he beaten up for appearance's sake?

A. 16 Bleicher says he was certainly not arrested for appearance's sake at the same time as Roger, who, in any case, would have seen through such obvious subterfuge (trick). The circumstances of Roger's arrest are given in answer to Q.3 of French questionnaire (Affaire Frager). → (page 16)

AOB: Albeit, that the content of this Camp 020 interrogation document - is more or less outside our scope concerning the names we are acquainted with - though, the very fact of the reality in 1943 and beyond of the supremacy of the S.D. which was headed by Himmler's R.S.H.A. Amt IV (an SS controlled institution), in Berlin, is, in my perception, most relevant.

Q. 17 Why did Bleicher have Roger arrested? Why was there difficulty with the S.D. in having Roger released, if Bleicher was 'running' Roger?

A. 17 Bleicher says that at this time the S.D. were entirely responsible for arrests and releases, and if they refused to release a prisoner there was nothing to be done about it. In the case of Roger they raised innumerable difficulties and would not release him until they had closely interrogated him, and it was only after about three weeks that they let Roger go, after earnest representations from III-F (Reile?)

Ultimately, friction between III-F and the S.D. became so acute that any cooperation virtually ceased.

Q. 18 "S.D. infiltrated the Buckmaster (S.O.E.) section. This game blown by treachery of a certain Gilbert". To whom does this refer? How was the courier known to the Germans. Was it through Gilbert?

A. 18 The implications of this question are not fully understood. Whose words are being quoted in the opening sentence? Who is meant by "the courier"?

Q. 19 What led up to Frager's arrest, Why was he arrested. By whom? Did Bleicher try to warn Frager by phoning Frager's sister the same day?

A. 19 The telephone call to Frager's sister was not in order to warn Frager, but to arrange a meeting between him and Bleicher, at which Bleicher arrested him.

Q. 20 Did Frager save Bleicher with the S.D. by not revealing that Bleicher had told us that Gilbert was a traitor?

A. 20 Bleicher profess to have done his best for Frager after his arrest, and to have told Tescher of the B.d.S. (HQ of the S.D.), who was working on the Frager case, that Frager had really done nothing important and was not a dangerous man.

When Bleicher saw Frager at the headquarters of the S.D. he maintains that he told him all the circumstances leading up to Frager's arrest, and how Roger had let Bleicher down, and forced his hand, etc. Frager at first would not believe him, but finally said, "I am a Christian, Henri. I forgive you everything. As for Gilbert, don't worry; I will not give you away. But above all, do nothing against Roger, whom I look on as my son. Let us settle all those accounts after the war".

Bleicher ways he was horrified at what he had done, and told Suzanne (his sister or Bleicher's mistress) that he had committed the greatest folly of his life. he shortly after went to Auxerre, and never heard what happened to Frager "whose hand had hoped to grasp again after the war".

Q. 21 Did Roger show Bleicher copies of telegrams sent to U.K. Did Bleicher check to see if they were correct? Did he never suspect they might be faked? Was Bleicher aware that Roger and Kiki (KV 2/753) were double-crossing him?

A. 21 Bleicher says that if he had himself been the leader of the organisation he could not have been better served by Roger. He had from roger copies of all telegrams, courier mail, etc., and was informed of all Frager's movements, and journeys. He could tell by the arrival of parachuted supplies that Roger's information was genuine and he is certain that Roger played straight with him until the end of 1943. If in 1944, and particularly at the time of the invasion, Roger and Kieffer turned again, Bleicher considers this quite normal, as most of the turned agents began to panic. Roger's attitude, however, he finds difficult to understand.

It was Roger who handed over the list of B.B.C. messages about the invasion, which were proved correct. In fact, it was not till the invasion that he began to feel certain of Roger's defection, and he thinks it was Kieffer (Kiki) who saw the red light first, and persuaded Roger to throw in his hand. In which case, why did Roger come to Bleicher in May/June 1944 and tell him and von Feldmann that Frager was in Paris? Bleicher protests that Roger's behaviour throughout is incomprehensible.

Q. 22 Does Bleicher know if Wolters (P38) (P38return) was badly treated in order to make him betray Lucas, or did Wolters readily consent to betray him without much pressure?

A. 22 According to Bleicher, VWolters was never badly treated. he was arrested in Lucas' office at the Lido, Paris. Bleicher does not believe that he spent even one night in prison, and was prepared to betray everyone, whilst protesting that he personally was really involved in the organisation. In return for a promise of personal safety, he betrayed Lucas.

Bleicher says he had never seen such coward, and that he wanted to give all sorts of gratuitous information. He was allowed to take a job in a transport business, and Bleicher says he took no more interest in him.

AOB, let us skip the next paragraphs, as these are of hardly any relevance in our Survey.

Bleicher claims to have only second-hand knowledge regarding this organisation, of which the arrests and subsequent handling were the work of the S.D.

He says that during the summer of 1943, when visiting the B.d.S. (S.D. Headquarters) the general topic was the 'Normandie' affair, which began with the Prosper arrests and carried on till the time of the invasion, during which period Bleicher says nearly all the 'French Section' agents had been arrested and were working for the S.D.

It was in connection with 'Normandie' that Bleicher first heard of Gilbert (also referred to as Grandclement). Gilbert was described to Bleicher by Sturmbannführer Boemmelburg as of the highest importance, in that he passed on to the S.D. all information regarding the French Section. Bleicher says that he is certain that it must have been Gilbert who betrayed Prosper and Archamboult, and also the Bertrand and Valentin (was linked to Marseilles and Interalliee/Interalliée), though he claims to have no knowledge of how these arrests were effected and reiterates (repeats) his former statements that the S.D. jealousy guarded secrets of their own personal arrests, and the running of their won agents. What knowledge he obtained was largely through his personal contacts with Stubaf. Kieffer. with whom he was on good terms, and the visits he paid to Avenue Foch (B.d.S. HQ) regarding arrests carried out by the S.D. in connection with Bleicher's own cases.

Bleicher says he saw either Prosper or Archamboult (he is not sure which) at the Avenue Foch - a dark, handsome man with a small moustache, aged about 30.

Kieffer had a very high opinion of Archamboult, and Bleicher thinks it was he who gave the S.D. a description of the whole set-up of this organisation, with portraits of its members. He is not certain that this was Archamboult, but knows it was a London architect. (Bleicher has not heard of Bob Star).

Please notice the very many times this jacket has been stamped, and thus had been studied

Dec. 1941 At the end of December 1941 Bleicher returned to Cherbourg for three days to collect his personal belongings, and during his absence Borchers perpetrated (committed) a series of stupidities which subsequently led to his dismissal.

1942 Jan. Shortly after Bleicher's return at the beginning of January 1942, he installed himself with Micheline (Carré/Victoire) in the Rue de la Faisanderie. The radio station remained for some time still at Saint-Germain, it was then brought to Paris and set up in a house in the Auteuil district, a flat rented for this purpose by Bleicher.

Suzanne? Laurent? who had a so sound lodging in Saint-Germain on her arrival in Paris with Bleicher, had good?? to spend a few weeks with her sister at Laize-la-Ville. When she returned to Paris, ?? Major of the Saint-Germain Service, a friend of Major Eschig had put at her disposal a flat in Paris, 31bis, Bvd. Suchet (III°) Paris

Bleicher, as a reward for his services in the Nobel I affair (breaking-up of the Walenty's Interalliée Group on 18 November 1944), was promoted Feldwebel and received the Kriegsverdienstkreuz, 2nd Class (K.v.K. 2.Klasse)

Bleicher was introduced by Major Eschig to the Chief of III-F Abwehrleitstelle Paris, Obstlt. Reile, who was extremely interested in the affair. As Bleicher found much greater support and professional experience at III-F headquarters, he kept less and les in contact with the Ast Saint-Germain which, in any case, was to be dissolved shortly afterwards.

Meanwhile Micheline (Victoire), still anxious for work, and having finished with the Interalliée organisation, was seeking new victims. Through one of her friends, Brault, a former lawyer of the American Chamber of Commerce, she made contact with Pierre de Vomecourt @ Lucas (special envoy from (S.O.E.) London charged with the amalgamation of the French organisations, and attached to the War Office, London, Room 055) thus opening a new affair, called Nobel II (= Lucas affair, Carré/Victoire accompanying Lucas' trip to London).

Martecoutte @ Daisy Mistress of Lucas, and agent (AOB, before Victoire of after his return on 1/2 April 1942?)

KV 2/166-2, page 5 Bleicher's personal data (R79) (R79return) ↓↓↓↓ further dow we encounter also a photograph of Hugo Ernst Bleicher

Born at: Tettnang, Germany (a bit east of Friedrichshafen, Bodensee = Southern Germany)

Occupation/Employer 1939: Prokurist - Wilhelm Friedrich & Co. Hamburg Not noticed, but he represented a chemical firm of Hamburg in French controlled Northern Africa.

82, Avenue Foch, (might be incorrect as this most likely was the Headquarters of the B.d.S.)

22.4.59 "News Chronicle" report of a action brought by Major Vomecourt against Solikow re book "The Cat" (meant Victoire / Carré) (Q33) (Q33return) minute 77a

Languages: German, French, English, Spanish, Speaks French with a Belgian accent

Peculiarities: Might be taken for a Frenchmen, has a slightly Jewish look. (source S.O.E.)

AOB, almost every photo taken at interrogation "Camp 020" possess such a horizontal line in the background.

Nowhere in the file telling us whom she is, but I suppose, it might be: Suzanne Laurent (his mistress) whom is mentioned in Reile's letter (last sentence) (S33) (S33return)

Spy fights for his honour in Case of the Cat (Carré / Victoire); From George Vine

Bonn (Germany), Tuesday, Three wartime master spies, a German, a Britton and a Frenchman, stepped out of the shadows of 20 years and confronted each other in Frankfurt court yesterday.

I was a sensational encounter between three man who fought a pitiless underground battle in Occupied France.

Major Pierre de ~~Vormercourt~~ Vomecourt, aged 52, was French Resistance leader and principal British agent in France. he is now a financial adviser.

Major Hugo Bleicher, aged 57, was once a Wehrmacht counterintelligence man in Paris. Now he runs a tobacco shop in Southern Germany.

Major Benjamin Cowburn aged 50 was chief liaison between French Resistance and the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) in London. Now he is an engineer in Boulogne.

Not in court, but linking the three was the intriguing French woman known as The Cat Mathilde (Lucie) Carré, who spied for both sides and was sentenced to death by the French for treachery. This once - lovely Frenchwoman, reprieved in 1955, now lives alone half-blind and severely ill, in a little room in Paris.

Major Vomecourt, a friend of the French Premier Debré, brought an action for damage to his honour as an officer against Count Michael Soltikow, wartime German counter-intelligence officer now a journalist, →see next

They are author and publishers of a book called "The Cat" which tells the fantastic story of the Mata Hari of the second World War. Vomecourt claims over £12,000 damages.

Mathilde Carré, a member of the French Resistance group Interallié (Interalliée) from 1941 to 1942 (AOB, incorrect: 1940 - 18 November 1941), was said to have transmitted valuable intelligence to the British over a secret radio.

Then she was caught (18 or 19 November 1941) by Hugo Bleicher and saved her life by changing sides (T33) (T33return). She became Bleicher's lover and one of his closest collaborators.

The British did not discover that she was working for the Germans until Vomecourt (Lucas) was parachuted into France (again, on 1/2 April 1942). (AOB, nonsense!)

Once detected she changed sides again and fled with Vomecourt (Lucas) in a torpedo boat which picked them up on the Channel Coast. (Total nonsense!) (U33) (U33return)

The old antagonists, Vomecourt and Bleicher glared grimly at each other in court. Bleicher, main witness for the defence said: "Vomecourt had the order from London to liquidate me, but when he was arrested he saved his life by betraying 12 or 13 of his (associated) agents.

" I promised him that nothing would happen to them and they would be treated as prisoners of war. They all returned home after the war". Please read Lucas' own statements at: (V33) (V33return)

De Vomecourt wearing the button of the Legion of Honour in his lapel (revere), started icily at his old enemy with a white face.

"I gave the names only only of those whom I knew The Cat had already betrayed", he said. (AOB, this is not according Lucas' (Vomecourt's) statements given during his interrogation by the British Secret Service; please consider (V34) (V34return) again)

Bleicher replied: "I knew one of these names until de Vomecourt (Lucas) betrayed them".

Major Cowburn told the court: "Vomecourt was our principle agent in Occupied France. He played an important role and had more than 100 sub-agents.

Just as unemotionally as he used to pop in and out of wartime France. Cowburn described how the Cat (Carré / Victoire) was brought to London and wined and dined in the West End. The judge asked if it was how Britain treated traitors, and Cowburn replied drily (ironically) "That is an English method. We wanted to get to know her better".

The court travels to Paris in the next few days to hear The Chat (Carré / Victoire)

Count Soltikow has said he is prepared to put correction slips in all copies of the book withdrawing the allegations against de Vomecourt.

Bleicher denied that he was ever in Marseilles in June, 1942. He stated that at this time he left with Captain ~~Tcherniawski~~ Czerniawski on a trip to Lyons, Chamonix and Toulouse (in then - yet existing Vichy controlled France), where he (Czerniawski / Walenty not yet Brutus). At this time Bleicher was merely acting as a liaison officer between Czerniawski (Walenty) and the Paris service in case difficulties should arise between (Polish) Czerniawski and the French authorities. Czerniawski was trying to get in touch with the Polish organisation either Nestor at Toulouse of Tudor at Marseilles, and thus reach London. →→

→→ At Toulouse, Czerniawski went off on his own to make contact with the Polish organisation, whilst Bleicher stood by in the case of need. Bleicher spent about 10 days at Toulouse, waiting for Czerniawski to arrange his escape to England, and maintained that during this time, he (Bleicher) contacted no-one at Toulouse. Czerniawski eventually escaped to Spain, Bleicher receiving a post-card from him announcing his safe arrival, and later Bleicher learned from Major Schaeffer (in Obstlt. Reile's office) that Czerniawski had started communicating from London (at this point agent Brutus was born. I do not know which cover-name he used when communicating from London and the Germans in Paris nor do I know whether he was aware of his Brutus name) Bleicher never never learned any details of how Czerniawski escaped to England (AOB, I suppose he went to Lisbon, as from there frequent flights to London were maintained).

Shortly after his return from Toulouse in July, 1942, Bleicher was ordered by Obstlt. Reile (Head Abwehr III in France) to accompany an expedition to the (then still) Unoccupied Zone to track down W/T posts (stations) (Unternehmen Dora). This expedition consisted mostly of S.D. men (AOB, likely assisted by Orpo men, who maintained most of the D/Fing work), but there were also some members of the Abwehr. Bleicher attended a meeting at Avenue Foch (B.d.S HQ of the Sipo and S.D.) which was addressed by Knocken for 2 hours, and at which the men were given their instructions. The Abwehr detachment was under Hptm. Schmitz, and Bleicher's special duty was to "safeguard the interests of the Abwehr", i.e. to try and glean (collect) from the arrests any information, especially of a military nature, which would be of interest to the Abwehr, and if possible, to turn round agents to work for III-F (counter-espionage).

Bleicher went first to Montpellier where he remained for a month or five weeks, and then returned to Paris for about a week. He then went to Lyons and to Marseilles for 3 or 4 days, after which he proceeded to Nice, where he remained until the 10th November (the moment of the German occupation of Free Vichy controlled France; initiated by the Allied Landing at Oran in Algeria).

Bleicher maintained that no W/T posts were found in Nice, and that he did nothing at all whilst there. He stated that before leaving Paris, they had been told that they were to have nothing to do with agents or information services.

He (Bleicher) admitted that he had been in contact with Baron Hessberg of the S.D. in Nice, as the two were staying at the same hotel, but denied that they ever discussed intelligence matters. Bleicher did not know if Hessberg was running any agents in Nice, but he was of the opinion that he was not, as Nice was covered as far as espionage matters were concerned, by Bleibtreu who ran the Marseilles region, and who undoubtedly had agents in Nice.

I have to advise you that the above-named German National was escorted to Croydon Airport this morning, and handed over to escort for return to France.

All property accompanied the body (Mr. Bleicher). This must constitutes an apparent incorrectness! Why? For instance: Bleicher's rather valuable personal (private) letter once sent by Obstlt. Reile - did remain in England. Proof? Please notice: (W35) (W35return) which are part of this very file.

1899 Born at Tettnang, small town situated on the shore of the Lake Constance (Bodensee); son of Karl Bleicher (owner of a large bicycle store) and his wife, Emma, nee Vogel. Two other sons, Karl (two years older than Bleicher) and Oskar (two years younger). Very happy home life at Tettnang, where Bleicher's family family had lived for several generations, one of his anecdote being Posthalter in the employ of the Count of Thurn and Taxis and another Chief of the Postal Service.

1912 - 1913 Completed education at the Oberrealschule, Ravensburg, passing the "Einjärig-Freiwillige" examination. Wished either to enter the Navy or become a concert pianist. Prevented from taking up the former because of defective eyesight and the latter on account of insufficient talent (did Bleicher say this himself - or came it out of the free mind of the interrogator of final editor?).

1914 - 1916 Bleicher's father secured him a two-years' apprenticeship (training) with the Gewerbebank Ulm, Filiale Ravensburg (Bankers), through his friendship with the manager, Rist.

1916 - 1917 Having finished his two-years' apprenticeship, Bleicher stayed on as an employee of the firm.

June 1917- approx. 1919 Called to the colours as a private. Served first in the Infantry and afterwards with a pioneer gas corps. Taken prisoner on the Somme, and sent to 165 British P.o.W. Camp, near Abbeville. Escaped four times, but did not succeed in returning to Germany. Finally repatriated, and returned to home at Tettnang.

End 1919 Followed a certain Mme. Favre and her daughter, Lilly, with whom he was in love, to Wiesbaden. Worked for a year for M. Glasser, in connection with the railways for the Occupied Rhineland (Belgian/French).

1921 Worked as interpreter in an office for compulsory taxation at Mainz, ultimately becoming head of the office.

End 1922 Returned home, and then went to Hamburg, where his aunt, Marie, was working as lady's made to the wife of General Levinski. Through the good offices of the latter, obtained a post in an export firm in Hamburg, called Afrikanische Handelskompagnie, of which the chief was M. Gleichman von Oven. Mainly concerned with export trade with North Africa.

1924 Firm amalgamated with various other Hamburg firms to form the Elka Company.

February 1925 Went to Tetuan as manager of the Bazar Aleman, run by that Elka Company. In contact with various members of the German Colony, but does not think any of them were connected with espionage.

1928 Obtained a post as foreign correspondent with firm of Bodenheimer Schuster & Co, Spaldingerstrasse, Hamburg, through the good offices of one of the travellers, H. Friedrich, whom he had met in North Africa. Friedrich ultimately became owner of the firm, and Bleicher rose to be chief clerk (Prokurist) . This firm was engaged in the export of chemical goods.

Married Lucie nee Müller and lived for a year at Waltershof, after which they took a flat at Pfauseweg, Hamburg.

Under the Nazi regime, the firm was forced to change its name to Wilhelm Friedrich & Co., as the former name was Jewish, and they were forced to dismiss all their Jewish agents.

September 1939 On the outbreak of the war, business still further deteriorated and although Bleicher was put on the reserved list, he did not think he would be reserved for long.

October He therefore applied for a job with the Postal Censorship which was advertising for people with a knowledge of foreign languages.

November 1939 Called up and was made a member of the Geheime Feldpolizei Gruppe 312. Under training in Duisburg.

July Gruppe 312 transferred to Paris to assure security of part of the route along which Hitler was to make his triumphal entry. This having fallen through, Bleicher and the Gruppe returned after a fortnight top Rugles.

August Transferred to Caen in Normandy. Here Bleicher met Suzanne Laurent (nee Renouf) who ran the Pelican Bar in the rue d'Ange and she became Bleicher's mistress. Suzanne sold her bar and lived with Bleicher from then on till November 1944.

March Oct.'41 During all this Bleicher says his duties were purely police work, of which he grew increasingly tired and he began to make applications through various channels to get transferred into the Abwehr or some other Intelligence Service where his capabilities could be more fully employed.

Bleicher's first introduction into the German Intelligence Service came about as follows:-

Kieffer @ Kiki, an agent of the "Interlalliée "organisation and the first of this group to be arrested, had been denounced by one of his associates, Lemeur, to the G.F.P. (Luft) Cherbourg. A report was sent to Paris and Hptm. Borchers of III-F St. Germain was sent down to Cherbourg to investigate. As there was no suitable person attached to G.F.P. (Luft) to deal with Kiefer's arrest, it was decided to pans the matter to G.F.P. (Heer = Army), to which Bleicher was attached, and Bleicher himself was selected as the most suitable man for the job. (AOB, indeed, he was!)

Bleicher, accomplished by Lemeur and a contingent of G.F.P. consequently arrested Kieffer (Kiki) while he was walking from Cherbourg station to the house of his mistress, Mme Buffet. A few days after the departure of Hptm. Borchers, who had taken Kieffer to Paris, a telegram arrived from the Feldpolizeidirektor, summoning Bleicher to Saint-Germain.

This was the beginning of Bleicher's activities in IXIF, and was at the same time the beginning of the first case:

1941 Nov. Cont Bleicher, having learnt in the meantime from Major Eschig that there was no question of his returning to the G.F.P., was already planning to recruit a few agents. He was helped in the choice of these by Micheline (Carré / Victoire) and, having obtained their agreement, the following persons were set at liberty:-

(When Bleicher left for the Unoccupied Zone (Vichy controlled) in June 1942 (Unternehmen / Operation Dora) he left Sdf. Eckert @ Evans, who had been posted to a Meldekopf at Rouen, take Marcel, Kleber and Lavallee with him. As Micheline had gone to London at the end of ~~March~~ 1942 (she arrived with Lucas on 26/27 February 1942 London), and Mme Borni @ Violette (Carré / Victoire's enemy) had been finally liberated and sent back to her home in Luneville about the end of the same month, Bleicher only had Kieffer, Jouffret @ Claude and Bob left with him. As the latter was also dismissed in Spring 1943, when he joined a Youth Camp in order to avoid forced labour, Kieffer and Jouffret were the only members of the organisation who worked for Bleicher until June 1944).

Of all the arrests carried out at the time of the Nobel I (Interalliee) (Interalliée) affair (the arrest on 18 November 1941 of the Walenty organisation), only two, Bleicher states, are worthy of note:-

Dec. 1941 was the Director of a large Colonial concern, and as such, had always given Micheline (then she was dedicated part of Walenty's organisation) information concerning sailings from Colonies of ships carrying cargoes of rubber, so that they could be bombed by the Allies en route. Legrand's office was in Bvd. St. Germain. His Christian name is, Bleicher believe, René. Bleicher remembers that Legrand had a brother who was arrested before him (Legrand) by the Germans, and then released. When Legrand himself was arrested, there were endless interventions: even the German Chamber of Commerce in (Handelskammer) in Berlin sent a representative on his behalf. The fact was that this same Legrand with his extensive connections overseas had carried through many deals in rubber on behalf of the Germans. So it had been in order to "ease his conscience (integrity) as a good patriot" that he had given his information to Micheline (Carré / Victoire). As a result of the above interventions, Legrand was set at liberty again.

According to Micheline (Carré / Victoire), the Comtesse de Dampierre and a certain Fred (real name Kraus) (KV 2/1727 ..KV 2/1729), an Austrian, who belonged to another organisation the head of which, an Englishman, Yves @ Courtois, had apparently been arrested a few weeks previously, had also been in contact with ~~Tcherniawski~~ Czerniawski. Under the pretext of getting news of Yves @ Courtois, who was supposed to be an intimate friend of Fred, Micheline (Carré / Victoire) arranged to meet the Comtess de Dampierre and Fred in a small bar. Bleicher went there with Micheline (Carré / Victoire), in the guise (show) of a Polish officer. After an hour's talk, Bleicher thought that he had absolute proof of the complicity of the Comtesse de Dampierre and Fred. He had them both arrested the next day. ... → (page 66)

Jan.1942 De Vomecourt @ Lucas arrived from the Unoccupied Zone (Vichy controlled), was introduced by the lawyer, Michel Brault, to Micheline and at once placed complete confidence in her Lucas meets Micheline (Carré / Victoire). As he had no one to act as liaison, he agreed to Micheline (Carré / Victoire) proposition of using her radio set (German controlled channel) for the despatch of his telegrams to London. As a result London, who at the outset were rather mistrustful as regards wireless communication and messages, were reassured, and Lucas received a million francs through the American Consulate in Vichy. He (Lucas) himself had boundless confidence in in Micheline (Carré / Victoire). He suggested to her that they should work together, and when Micheline agreed (at least sanctioned by Bleicher and presumably up to Major / Obstlt. Reile), they rented an office in the Lido where

Micheline (Carré / Victoire) made the acquaintance of the principle collaborators of Lucas, his Adjutant Roger (Rogér) and the secretary Volters.

Lucas, having thus founded a firm base for his work in the (German) Occupied Zone, wanted to return to London to make his report. An aeroplane was signalled by wireless to be in the neighbourhood of Vaas, where Lucas was planting minor agents. (X34) (X34return) Bleicher himself in the role of a Belgian friend (Bleicher spoke perfect French language though with a Belgian accent) of Micheline Lucas (Carré / Victoire), accompanied Micheline, a chauffeur, Lucas and Roger (Rogér) (the same one who was caught in April 1942) to the landing ground. The aeroplane never came.

~~March~~ Feb. 42 Further exchange of messages. The weather was too bad for flying. London suggested speed boats. Micheline proposed to Bleicher that she should accompany Lucas to London (Bleicher cannot remember exactly whether or not it was he himself who put forward this suggestion to Micheline (Carré / Victoire). Bleicher being in favour of Micheline's Lucas meets Micheline (Carré / Victoire) departure, submitted the idea to Reile (Major / Obstlt) Reile was head of Abwehr III in France stationed at its headquarters at Hotel Lutetia)

Roger (Rogér), who was to replace Lucas while he was in London, was introduced by Micheline as well as Lucas, to the agent Jouffret @ Claude, who was to be second in command, and it was this man who, during his (Lucas's) absence, was to keep in touch with Volters at the Lido office.

After two attempts (Y35) (Y35return), during the ~~second~~ first of which Micheline (Carré / Victoire) was almost drowned (the ~~boat~~ boats were overturned as a result of high seas running) Lucas and Micheline (Carré / Victoire) left Breton ~~in a speed boat~~ for England. Please notice: (Z35) (Z35return) (AOB, when we count all the attempts we notice four trials; please read the documents where the hyperlinks are leading you onto) (Bleicher's story is only from hear-say, because he stayed in Paris; albeit that the Germans watched hidden all the attempts undertaken) They estimated the journey would take about ten days. They left on the 26th r 28th ~~March~~ February 1942 (notice (Z35)). From Bleicher's point of view Micheline (Carré / Victoire) did not have any special mission for London. The main object of this journey was to establish herself with Lucas and her position with the French Deuxieme Bureau with which Micheline (Carré / Victoire) had good relations (in Vichy), which had weakend since the arrest of ~~Tcherniawski~~ Czerniawski. Furthermore, Bleicher feeling that he had 'scarified' himself long enough by living with Micheline (Carré / Victoire), wanted to get rid of her.

April 1942 From the time of their departure, Bleicher left the flat in the rue de'la Faisandrie and set up with Suzanne Laurent in her flat at 31 bis, Bvd. Suchet. Early April Bleicher and Suzanne left for Hamburg on leave. → (page 67)

The Ast Saint-Germain was dissolved in April. Eschig and Bleicher were transferred to the Abwehrleitstelle (ALST). Eschig was placed in charge of the "Meldekoepfe (Meldeköpfe)" of the coast, Cherbourg, Rouen, Le Havre, etc. which position he held until July (42) when, as a result of jealousies and intrigues, he left the service and went to Tunisia (Tunesien). Bleicher passed directly into the service of Reile, being placed under the orders of Major Schaeffer, assistant and right-hand man of Obstlt. Reile.

All this time Bleicher was in touch with London through his W/T post operated by Manuel? (ex-Interalliee (Interaliée) . The news was bad? The return of Lucas and Micheline (Carré / Victoire) was held up again and again. At first it was stated that they had to take a course of training then that Micheline (Carré / Victoire) was ill, and then that they had to return through the liberated zone (Unoccupied Vichy controlled France), all excuses which made it evident that something had gone wrong somewhere. Then it all faded out without with London, according to its last message, having discovered the game. This final telegram can be read at: (A36) (A36return) The W/T post was operating for six months. (N.B. It must be under stood that the above account is based on Bleicher's own impressions, without reference to outside information)

On the 22nd April 1942, Bleicher was suddenly called to the office of Major Schaeffer, who showed him an original report written by Lucas, which had been taken, with other papers from one of his liaison agents who had been arrested in an attempt to cross the demarcation line (a virtual border between the German occupied- and Unoccupied France). Bleicher recognised Lucas' handwriting and realised that Lucas had returned to Paris without his knowledge. There was also a message destined for London drafted in the following manner. "H.B. is still living in the rue de la Faisanderie, but sleeps somewhere else. I think I shall find him one of these days".

Bleicher immediately called his agent Jouffret @ Claude, and through him arranged a meeting with Volters, Lucas' secretary. This man, arrested at the Lido office, promised to give up Lucas on being guaranteed his liberty immediately, and no further persecution. Twenty four hours later, de Vomecourt @ Lucas, his assistant Roger (Rogér) and another agent, were arrested, together with Volters (the latter for appearance's sake only) at the meeting in a café.

During the interrogation Bleicher made a pact with Lucas who, in return for Bleicher's promise (backed by Obstlt. Reile and Berlin) of treating any prisoners as prisoners of war, gave away (after consulting Rogér) all the members of his organisation who, in their must have been about twenty people, of whom he remembers the following names (please view Lucas' report at (B36) (B36return) :- → (page 68)

In addition to the report from Lucas found on the agent at the demarcation line there was also a cutting from a newspaper reporting sabotage committed on the Paris-Cherbourg express, bearing a note in the margin?:- "This is work of my people". Lucas, after his arrest told Bleicher that this had been sent him by an English Burdeyron who was working in Normandy. Burdeyron was arrested and confessed to having sent the cutting, but it emerged that he had in fact nothing to do with sabotaging the train and had merely been bluffing in order to impress Lucas that he was working for the organisation (this in spite of the fact that Lucas had given strict orders against sabotage.)

Bleicher, being occupied with other affairs and leaving for the liberated zone at the beginning of June 1942 (Unternnehmen / Operation Dora), was not able to follow the affair to its conclusion. (Please notice again B36 foregoing mentioned)

It was Schaeffer who, discovering several traces leading to Lyons, sent his agent, Abbe Alesch @ Bishop @ Axel @ Franklin there in June 1942. This man established contact with Miss Hall, for whom he acted as a liaison for some time, causing the arrest of some few people in Lyons, one of whom was Dr. Rousseau. Miss Hall was able to save herself at the last moment. It was also Alesch who later, in May 1942, caused the arrest of Le Tac with some of his agents. (Bleicher is not quite sure whether he is right in thinking that Le Tac and Miss Hall were involved in the Lucas affair, or whether they belonged to another organisation.

May '42 At the end of the Nobel II (Carré / Victoire - Lucas; London trip) affair, Bleicher found time to make a short journey to Caen finally to regulate his affairs with his former group, GFP (Geheimefeldpolizei) 312 (Cherbourg), which at this time was making preparations to go to Russia. With the exception of one or two groups, all the GFP had to leave France, to be replaced by the Sicherheitsdienst (S.D.) (controlled by R.S.H.A., Amt IV, in Berlin).

This man had been betrayed by a mechanic whose first name was Marcel, who lived at Juvusy, about 30 km from Paris, and who often did small jobs at the Chateau de Juvisy. The owner of the Chateau was a friend of Comte Muns, who had planned to escape via England to America and before his intended departure had stayed there several days. → (page 69)

May 1942 Marcel, who knew all about the journey, denounced de Muns to the Kommandantur of Juvisy, we made a corresponding report to III-F. De Muns was arrested and interrogated by Bleicher. He stated that he only wished to go via England to America in order to rejoin his fiancée. He said in all good faith that he had never had anything to do with any resistance organisation, and gave as a reference his brother, who lived in Avenue ~~Bvd.~~ Henri? Martin. Bleicher went to check up on this man and learnt that de Muns was the black sheep of the family and quite irresponsible having a girl friend in America. he immediately released the Comte on his brother's guarantee. Marcel the mechanic kept annoying him with trivialities, but seeing that he was a 100% Communist, Bleicher let the matter drop without following up any further denunciation.

While dealing with the affairs Nobel I and II Bleicher through his agents from the Interalliees (Interalliées), was also working on schemes to penetrate other movements.

Kieffer @ Kiki, having worked in Marseilles in 1941 with Tudor organisation (linked to Walenty's Interalliée), had gone to Marseilles and got into contact there again with an agent Serne, a member of Tudor and had introduced Jouffret @ Claude. Under the pretext of having been "blown" in Paris and having to disappear for some time, Jouffret @ Claude through Serre, had penetrated the Tudor organisation. He had worked well and was on the point of getting to know the chief of Tudor when June 1942, following action taken by the French police against the organisation, he was arrested along with some fifty others, including Serre. He confessed to the French police that he had worked for the Germans and, as he was an Air Force Officer, he was summoned before a court-martial and condemned to eighteen months' imprisonment. In spite ???? effort, there was no way of getting him out, and it was not until June 1944 that Jouffret @ Claude came back to Paris and was finally released.

1942 June At the beginning of June 1942 Bleicher received orders from Obstlt. Reile (Head Abwehr III in France) to go to ~~Tcherniawski~~ Czerniawski (Nobel I Affair) on a journey to the Unoccupied (Vichy controlled) Zone. Berlin accepted the proposal made by Czerniawski to go to London to send back information and to try to get in, at the same time, with the Polish circle (Since be became a M.I.5 agent he got the cover-name Brutus their most important (influential) agent). Bleicher does not know the exact terms of the arrangement made, unknown to him, between Obstlt. Reile and Czerniawski direct. To remove all suspicion, Czerniawski's escape was staged when he was being brought by car from Fresnes (prison) to an interrogation, right in front of the Hotel Lutetia. After remaining for some time in a flat put at his disposal (by the Germans of course), and having been to see his fiancé Mme. Borni @ Violette at Luneville (this Bleicher learnt later from Hptm. Kaiser in the course of an interview on Violette), Czerniawski was to go to Unoccupied Zone to try to get in touch again with the Polish organisation, either Nestor at Toulouse or Tudor at Marseilles, and thus reach London. The role assigned to Bleicher was merely that of acting as liaison between Czerniawski and the Paris Service (at Hotel Lutetia) and to intervene only if serious obstacles arose.

Bleicher says that this mission (accompanying Czerniawski to Toulouse) really meant only a pleasure trip for him and Suzanne → (E37) (E37return) who, as always, accompanied him. The first stage was Lyons. Bleicher had received for the journey a German passport under the name of "Gottschalk"; a journalist of the "Pariser Zeitung" as well as a letter referring to him as "reporter" for that paper in the Unoccupied Zone. He never made use of of these, but travelled as a Frenchman and used his false identity card in the name of Jean Castel (This card was given to him in 1941 by the Commisaire de Police at Cherbourg). After a fortnight, Czerniawski, having had talks with the Polish Consulate, the Red Cross, etc., had to wait the result of these first approaches, and went for about ten days to Evian to rest. Bleicher took advantage of this to make a trip with Suzanne to Aix-les-Bains, where they stayed for about five days at the Hotel Terminus, and from there to Chamonix where they stayed three or four days at the Hotel Claridge.

On returning to Lyons towards the end of June 1942, and meeting Czerniawski again; another week's waiting was necessary. It was during this time that Bleicher sent towards two of Czerniawski's reports, through Hptm. Fuchs, Attaché to the Armistice Commission (Waffenstillstandkommission) in Lyons to the Paris Service, Obstlt. Reile. After a week they left for Toulouse. It was here that Czerniawski making contact again with the organisation, made preparations for his journey, and after another week, left for Perpignan and from there went on to Spain. As soon as Czerniawski left, Bleicher went on to Bayonne, in the (German) Occupied Zone, to report to Reile by telephone, and after spending a day in Biarritz and a few days at Lourdes and Cauteret for his own amusement, returned to Toulouse. Finding a postcard at his hotel from Czerniawski telling of his journey to Spain without incident, Bleicher considered his mission finished and returned, about mid-August 1942, to Paris. → (page 71)

1942 cont. Bleicher had scarily arrived in Paris when he was given a mission to accompany a big expedition arranged by the S.D. to the Unoccupied Zone to track down W/T post, of which the Radio Gonio Service (HF/DF) of the ~~Funkabwehr~~ Orpo! had confirmed an increased number. (AOB, Bleicher apparently mixed-up dates as he formerly notice that this operation took place in June 1942 instead) (The according operation was named: Unternehmen Dora) The larger part of the of the expedition considered of the S.D. men, but there was also a small detachment of III-F, of which the Chief was Hptm. Schmitz. Bleicher with Sdf. Link, also of III-F; was attached to the S.D. group going to Montpellier. The whole expedition was very badly planned, identity card being distributed at random without particulars being taken about the holders, and of twenty, there was perhaps one who spoke French. In short, the details of the expedition were known almost everywhere long before it actually took place. There were consequently no results at Montpellier. Other detachments were luckier, but the total number if W/T sets taken was not more than six, as far as Bleicher can remember. Bleicher also had serious disagreements with the S.D. chief of the detachment, and with Sdf. Link, whom Bleicher considered incompetent and too imbued (saturated) with Nazi ideology, and there was shortly afterwards a serious row as a result of which the S.D. chief wanted to report Bleicher. The latter took the train back to Paris and gave his version to Obstlt. Reile (head in France of Abw. III) for his judgement The affair was cut short and Bleicher and Link were at once sent on a similar mission to Nice.

Sept. 1942 Passing through Marseilles, where Sdf. Scheide of III-F Paris was attached to the S.D. group, whose chief was more tractable (manageable), Bleicher and Sdf. Link then went to Nice. There, contact with the S.D. represented by Baron Hesseberg (who had been, to his great regret, incorporated by force in the S.D., having previously been a member of the GFP (Geheimefeldpolizei)) was excellent, but the results nil. Bleicher saw he was wasting his time and therefore sent for Suzanne and with her spent a fortnight in Nice. Two days before the occupation of the Unoccupied Zone by the German Army (10/11 November 1942, reason was the Allied landings near Oran on 8th November 1942), the expedition was ordered back to Paris, and Bleicher and Sdf. Link crossed the frontier on the on the same day as the German troops entered the Unoccupied Zone (10 Nov. 1942)

Oct. 1942 Bleicher remained during October in Paris (this is a: contradiction in terminis as Bleicher just told that he stayed in Southern France and that he returned just before the Germans occupied the Vichy controlled territories). The following month November 1942, he received orders from Major Schaeffer to accompany the agent van de Casteel @ Leopold to Belgium to safeguard the interests of III-F in the affair called "Oppidana" Bleicher spent about twelve days in Belgium in connection with this affair.

Dec. 1941 On his return, Obstlt. Reile promised him a commission as a reward for his successful work in the services, but this promise was, in fact, never realised.

AOB, Let us skip this paragraph as it does not have sense in our context, and you can read it yourself above.

Dec. 1942 cont. Arriving in Paris on 23rd December, Bleicher was given instructions to accompany Sdf. Link to Marseilles to act as assistant to Obstlt. Bleibtreu in the action called "Polenklub Affair".

Bleicher's change of attitude (Haltung) due to the increasing powers of the S.D.

This trip to Marseilles was Bleicher's last mission of this sort, that is, as expert adviser of III-F H.Q., prepared to be sent anywhere as ordered. This change was due to the growing supremacy of the (S.S. controlled) S.D. which, becoming the sole executive body, would no longer allow and interference in its affairs. Bleicher states that it was his intense dislike of working for the S.D., and their constant interference which caused him to change his attitude towards his work. From this time on, he states that he slacked off (slowed) considerably, and it was the intervention of the S.D. which caused him to flirt with the idea going over to the Allied cause, and also accounts for his otherwise inexplicable (mysterious) behaviour in the Grossfuerst affair, as will be seen later.

Jan. 1943 Apart from Polenklub activities Bleicher spent most of January busy with the examination of files and documents seized by III-F from the English, American, Mexican and other Consulates in the Unoccupied (once Vichy controlled) Zone. It was dull work, and nothing of importance resulted.

AOB, again I favour to skip passages, as these do not contribute essentially to Survey.

AOB, again I favour to skip passages, as these do not contribute essentially to our Survey.

I lived, as a very young child, with my mother a few hundred meters from Bleicher's office at Koningslaan 60

I doubt that during his interrogations at Camp 020 in London, there exists a coherence to what I have later learned from te rather many events in Amsterdam just before and after our liberation of 5th of May 1945.

Towards the end of April (1945), Bleicher learned that the Landwacht Koningslaan had made an arrest of thirteen “Terrorists”, of whom one was carrying arms. The S.D. being too busy to carry out the arrests themselves sent orders that all should be executed if any arms were found on them. Bleicher was them all – the most important, and the one on whom arms had been found – being a man called Sneeboer. It ultimately transpired that Sneeboer and his colleagues were members of the N.B.S. (Nederlandse Binnenlandsche Strijdkrachten) who were preparing to take up their posts after the Allied occupation, and Bleicher arranged to have them all freed. → (page 9)

Sneeboer, head of a branch of the firm of Baerforts in the Kinkerstraat (163) (source Kees Neisingh found in the Communist newspaper De Waarheid), was very grateful to Bleicher, and his wife proposed that Bleicher and Samsz should take refuge in their house when the Canadians arrived.

Bleicher and Samsz discussed this proposal, having already been offered shelter in an empty apartment belonging to a Dr. Oeve, a friend of Samsz, and where they had already stored some provisions.

However, Mme. Sneeboer persuaded them, saying that her husband had discussed the question with his chief, Haas, who had said that it was a duty on their part to protect men who had saved all their lives. Bleicher and Samsz therefore transferred all their lives. Bleicher and Samsz therefore transferred their belongings to Sneeboer’s about 4^th May (1945).

Bleicher claims that his intension was to get in touch with the British Intelligence Service and put himself at their disposal. He did not not want to be taken prisoner of war by the Canadians. Sneeboer told him that Haas could get him false papers which would enable him to to get to Hamburg (there about his wife lived and was his own house) where, he (Bleicher) says, he would have given himself up to the British. Bleicher says that he did not destroy his Ausweis or the letter from Obstlt. Reile (https://www.cdvandt.org/Carre-Bleicher-Walenty-KV-2-164-p84o.jpg ₊ https://www.cdvandt.org/Carre-Bleicher-Walenty-KV-2-164-p86p.jpg ) because he intended to hand these over as a proof of his bona fides. (AOB, may we accept this being the reason for - that Reile's letter is among the KV 2/166 materials?)

Bleicher learnt of the capitulation and Bulang telephoned to say that he would arrive with his staff on 7^th May (1945) in Amsterdam.

7^th May. Bulang arrived at the Koningslaan (60) office and said that it was all over and that they must all give themselves up. Bleicher replied replied that he now owned allegiance (loyalty) to nobody and would fend (stand) for himself, and Samsz and he returned to Sneeboer’s.

15^th May. A week later, while on their way to see Hass about obtaining their false passport, Bleicher and Samsz were arrested on Haas’s orders by the N.B.S. (Binnenlandsche Stijdkrachten).

His dislike and mistrust of the S.D. appear genuine. In spite of this he undoubtedly cooperated much more closely with this service than he would us believe, and this can no doubt be confirmed by outside sources.

There appears to be no proof of any act of ill-treatment by Bleicher of his own prisoners, and according to his lights he is probably a relative humane man, carrying out a tough and dangerous job with the ruthless efficiency which it demanded. He would not appear to have been at any time an ardent Nazi, having good reasons, dating from his pre-war commercial career, for disliking the regime. Where his story has been subject to check, it has largely been proved to be accurate with in self-imposed limits, but it is not claimed that his mine of information has yet been exhausted.

KV 2/166-2, page 37 We jump now into Walenty's Interalliee (Interalliée) Affairs; but we start directly with Violette's instant arrest on 18 November 1941 and her instant betraying Victoire; all occurring before even the Germans had thoroughly interrogated Violette! This moment might have triggered Victoire's (Carré's) acts of revenge!

Nov. 1941 Affair Interalliee (Interalliée) (Called by III-F in Paris "Nobel I"), as Polish organisation.

It is considered that the Nobel I and Nobel II affairs are now well-known through the Victoire Report (our Carré-Victoire Survey and Carré-Lucas- Brutus) and other sources to be set down in great detail. Bleicher has already answered long questionnaires for the benefit of services interested in these cases. It is, moreover, proposed to give Bleicher's activities for III-F in a summarised form, and where greater detail seems necessary a longer account will be found in the Appendices to this Report under appropriate headings).

As soon as he arrived at (Ast) Saint-German Bleicher was received by Hptm. (Captain) Borchers and introduced to the chief of the Abwehr III-F office, Ast St. Germain, Major Eschig. He was told that he was to be transferred from the G.F.P. (Geheimefeldpolizei) (at Cherbourg) to III-F service as a result of his assistance in the Kieffer (Kiki) (KV 2/753) arrest. After a few days, through Kieffer's, Bleicher succeeded in arresting Christian, Czerniawski's secretary. Though, he found out the head quarter of the organisation which was Czerniawski's lodging, the Villa Léandre 8 (A39) (A39return) in Montmartre, Paris. Major Eschig put the case into the hands of of the GFP from the Hotel Edouard VII, rue Royale and Bleicher, together with representatives of this body, swooped (jumped) on the Villa Léandre, arresting Czerniawski and his mistress, Violette. After Czerniawski had been taken away by the GFP Bleicher did not see him again until June 1942, when he was accompanied him to the Unoccupied (Vichy controlled) Zone.

She (Carré /Victoire) declared that she was ready to reveal the whole organisation to him (Bleicher) and as she knew everything ( for she had collaborated with Czerniawski right from the beginning Bleicher had her taken out of prison straight away, and installed himself, with her as his mistress, in a villa in Saint-Germain which had been put at his disposal by Major Eschig. When Marcel, former W/T operator of the organisation, had been arrested, the radio station started working again. Marcel was taken from Paris to the above mentioned villa at Saint-Germain. Violette, who had also agreed to work for Bleicher, was also installed in the villa, where she encoded and decoded the messages exchanged with London (S.I.S.).

Thanks to Micheline's (Carreé /Victoire) hard work, they were able to liquidate almost the whole of the organisation, the total number of arrests made by the GFP being about 90. Sdf. Eckert @ Evans was in charge of the interrogations. Almost all the lesser agents were subsequently released by Bleicher.

(1) Alst Paris III-F (please notice: that Alst was responsible for all Abwehr sections, thus not only section III)

German (Austrian); aged 45; slight; height 1m 85; brown hair; light eyes; oval face; fresh complexion; straight nose; good teeth; cleanshaven; well cared-for hands; intelligent; well cared-for clothes; deep voice; speaks very good French. Married, with three children. Home at Salzburg.

Head of III-F Ast Saint-Germain in 1941, when Bleicher met him in November. In this capacity he had several agents under him, using alias of Salzberg, he was occupied by part of the GFP.

When the Saint-German service was dissolved, in March 1942 Eschig was attached to "Abwehrleitstelle Paris" and installed himself at Hotel Cayre. Bvd. Raspail. His mission was to take charge of the "Meldeköpfe" on the cost, Cherbourg, Rouen, Le Havre, etc. Apart from that, he continued to direct his agent, but obtained no worthwhile results.

He was transferred in June/July 1942, as the result of intrigues against him by other officers, and also as the result of his incompetence, and left for Tunisia, where he acted as Ic (Staff officer for information on the enemy) for a division.

When Tunisia was taken by the Allies (13 May, 1943), Eschig returned among the last batch to Italy, and left for the Balkans; the last news of him reported him dead or prisoner of war with the Russians somewhere near Belgrade.

The remaining rest of this file is of no relevance in respect to Carré, Vomecourt (Lucas), Czerniawski (Walenty, Brutus)

AOB: a brief glance showed me that these files differ from the regular systematically built up series, starting with the successions of minutes an their according serial-numbers.

B. During the ~~winter~~ Autumn of 41 ~~and 42~~ Abwehrstelle St. Germain discovered an espionage organisation known as Interalliée. This organisation covered the whole of occupied France and carried out excellent work for the Allies. The leader of the organisation was a Captain in the General Staff of the Polish Air Force. He was known under a variety of extraordinary names, some of which was Bielawski. This man was subsequently given the cover name Hubert by the Germans. Abwehrstelle St Germain was in due course able, with the help of the GFP (Geheimefelfpolizei), to arrest about 60 members of this organisation and to capture its transmitter in Paris and a considerable amount of documentary evidence. The documents showed → (page 3)

that the organisation had carried out extremely successful espionage and had obtained very good information about the German Air Force, Navy and Army. The organisation contained several main agents who worked under the Polish Captain. They were known as Section leaders and were also Poles. Most of the agents were French nationals.

PW (Bleicher?) (I doubt Czerniawski alias Walenty himself) believes that Ast. St. Germain started to transmit as soon as the transmitter was captured, with the object of reporting deceptive information to England. In connection with this operation one of the captured agents remain started to transmit as soon as the transmitter was captured, with the object of reporting deceptive information to England. In connection with this operation one of the captured Allied agents, a Frenchman, was released. He ~~She was known as La Chatte (Carré / Victoire) worked well for the Germans. As far as PW can remember he she even went to England with one of to England with one of~~ Hubert~~'s main agents.~~

(AOB, what is this? Such nonsense we haven't encountered before! I therefore have to skip the rest of this baloney recollection!)

I attach a rough note from the interrogators at C.S.D.I.C.* in what Obstlt. Reile (the one whom gave this this forgoing baloney summary) has said about Brutus. It seems to me to conform exactly to the existing knowledge and personally I do not think there are any specific questions of this matter to be put to Reile, although, of course, a show of interest will be maintained in the hopes that it will not to be too obvious that we know all about Hubert.

I suggest that the attached should be p.a. in the Brutus file, as I see no need to retain a copy of it in Reile's file - this note of mine will be sufficient evidence of its existence. I have asked C.S.D.I.C. to make no reference to the matter in their final report. Map of German communication lines. I have reached the conclusion, that the designations used, were British made

I have cost me considerable work to peu à peu reconstruct the state of affairs in regard of the German links of Communications.

I have for practical reasons, considered only the main W/T links, as otherwise this map cannot be employed anymore; but essentially it tell you already some.

Roman I/xx tells us that 'I' is the W/T station: Domaene (Domäne) of Ast Hamburg (Ast-X)

There existed other serials as well, but these are in our Survey of no relevance.

KV 2/72-1, page 7 (P75) (P75 return) Please use Ctr+F and enter Moustique; you will notice that she isn't found in the British RSS intercepts (P111) (P111return)

"Top Sec U" was a precaution that material based on (Most Secret Source) thus Enigma decodes and that like.

I am myself not yet certain whether I have to transcribe everything entirely or only capturing the essential W/T message.

My years long engagements with RSS transcripts incorporates a huge volume of hidden information, in nearly every transmitted message.

ISBA = a notice that it concerned a special Britain Agent controlled by decrypted code (Intelligenge Service British Agent)

II/380 Berlin - to W/T communication link 380 Czerniawski, Capt. @ Walenty @ Hubert his designated German cover-name (Deckname)

AOB, that the RSS intercept starts in August 1943, might have been originating from circumstances that Walenty arrived in England, say, about August 1942. Then the British Secret Services had to come "clean" with themselves and the implementation of Walenty converting into their own Brutus case, which the Germans designated their special espionage against England. They, considered Hubert their genuine agent)

23.8.43 (Isk 61808 = Enigma decrypt serial number) Paris-Lisbon via Berlin. To Lina (= KOP Lisbon) no. 34. For Ciro (= Fritz Kramer (Cramer) at KOP in Lisbon). For hitherto valuable AFU (Agentenfunk)-Mann in England forwarding (U) (= cover address) address in Lisbon is urgently needed. As the possibility that the enemy (Britain's) is now behind the AFU is not to be excluded. U address must be so selected, that its being sent can endanger neither German requirements or the V-Mann (the person or address pressed for on the British side). Please send reply by 27.8 at latest. Paul Leiter III (= Obst. Rudolph/Rudolf Leiter though Chief of Abwehr France) (Paul = normally the cover-name of Obst. Rudolph)

25.8.43 (Isk 62082) Lisbon-Paris via Berlin. 71. From Lina (KOP Lisbon) No. 186. To Paul (= Leiter Abwehr France Obst. Rudolph) new address is Antonia da Silva, Lisbon. Rua Marques sd Bandeira 61, 2nd left. Please state where mail is coming from. Heading signature ... (end)

25.8.43 (Isk 62035) Lisbon-Paris via Berlin (Belzig). Message 186 to Paul Leiter III Paris (= Obst. Rudolph's section III) Forwarding (U) address is Antonia da Silva, Lisbon, rua Marques S.D. Bandeira 62, second left. Please inform us whence mail comes made of address and signature of letters and language Ludovico (von Karsthof(f) - real name Cremer/Krämer von Auenrode)-Ciro (Fritz Kramer or Cramer).

9.9.43 (Isk 63014) Paris-Lisbon. To Lina (KOP Lisbon) (KOP = Kriegsorganisation Portugal) Message No. 18. Reference No. 186 of 25/8 (Isk 62082 see above). Thank you very much for forwarding address. Mail is perhaps to be expected from England (Hubert), neutral countries or Portugal. Very few incoming letters are to be expected. Signature will be Jubert (or Habert) (AOB, this uncertainty often was due to a corrupted decrypts) text in French. Preamble will be estimated soon. (message originating from Paul III Leiter Abwehr in France Obst. Rudolph; section III)

20.10.43 (Isk 69152) Paris - Lisbon. Paul Leiter III for Ciro. W/T message No. 36. reference Message 186 of 25/8 (Isk 62305 see above) and Paul No. 19 of 9.9. (Isk 63914). 3 Cards have been sent to the forwarding address (in Portugal) from England. signature probably Hubert (= German cover-name of Walenty real name Czerniawski).

29.12.43 (Isk 78896) Paris - Baden-Baden. (AOB, Obstlt. Reile attended the major conference held on request of Admiral Canaris in Baden-Baden where all Abwehr leaders in Western Europe gathered https://www.cdvandt.org/KV-3-3-Canaris-WT-transcripts-IV-1943.pdf pages 76-77) the Reile (Leiter III Paris) to Graf Kreuz, back from Spain has, with the assistance of Don I (= Obst. von Borscheid) opened successfully contact with Picador. Atlas (= Abwehr H.Q. at Nikolaiken, East Prussia) & Hubert have reported diligently (meticulously)* in the last few days. Otherwise nothing special at Gruppe III. 28/12, 2100 hours Reile (Leiter of Abwehr France)

* We encounter here, in my perception, a sign of very well 'misleading information provided via M.I.5 into the direction of the OKW decision makers; including Hitler'. All in the execution of Operation Fortitude!

17.3.44 (ISBA 709) To Abwehrstelle I West (Paris?) - Geheim. Ref. England. G. V-Mann 7167 (Was Hubert's official designation 7167?) reports on 16/3 by W/T from England:- "1 Robate vehicles passing through with insignia black stripes on red square and the figure 863 on green square. Petersfield - vehicles passing through with insignia - stars."To the east of the town huts with insignia black horizontal strips on red square and maple leaf (Canadians?) on yellow circle. Bramden - vehicles passing through with insignia red-blue-red one on top of the other. On the whole length of the "Route Private" in Winchester widening work in progress. (word or two smudged (dirty) - field: In the wood, 1 km outside the town widening works by infantry.

23.3.44 (Isk 88277) Paris-Lisbon. 135 From Westerwald (= Alst /Leitstelle Paris) no. 30. To Ciro (Fritz Kramer, KOP Lisbon). Please report by W/T whether mail (from England) has been received at forwarding address, Antonia da Silva, Lisbon, Rue Marques O (or S) (AOB, some symbols not well received) D. Bandeira 62, 2nd floor left, report when and how it was forwarded. Westerwald III-F West (at Hotel Lutetia in Paris) (D40) (D40return)

23.3.44 (Isk 88898) Lisbon-Paris via Berlin (Hiob / Belzig). No. 50 From Lina (= KOP Lisbon) N. 533 For III-F. So far nothing has arrived at cover address Da Silva (da Silva). Message will be sent as soon as post arrives. Ludovico (von Karsthoff, an alias) (Leiter KOP Portugal, in Lisbon) Ciro (= Fritz Kramer (Cramer), at KOP).

6.4.44 (Isk 91509) Paris-Padua area (Italy) No. 2. For Tacticus (Oblt. Hoermann / sometimes Feldmarschall Kesselring) V-Mann reports 1/4 from England: according to reports of our pilots the a/c (Aircraft) groups (Geschwader) of B 25 Mitchels which are operating in Italy have had 75 mm guns installed. In spite of special construction the speed of the a/c degreases after every shot. Britta.

20.4.44 (ISBA 2333) Wiesbaden - ? From Wilja (= Abwehr Wiesbaden) Ref Hubert. Please transmit the message of todays transmission at 2100 hrs and give the arranged QRX time. Of No. 633 only 39 groups were received then nothing could be heard. Wilja (Abwehr Wiesbaden).

20.4.44 (Isba 2329) Wiesbaden -Paris. No. 115. Uhu, Dora, Wilja Thomas Liss Charles Biber, Percy Primo 2 Red, Lucian 1 red, Henri 1 red, Hubert 4 red, Tramp 1 red. Sgn Wilja (Abwehrstelle Wiesbaden)

21.4.44 (Isba 2348) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 30 Hubert 634. Rosyth du sommet cotiere vy dans le port quelques grands bateaux et quelques destroyers et mombreux petits bateaux. (Hubert /Walenty did not speak German and quite poor English language). Activite semble extre importante. Dans le Firth of Forth un battleship et un croiseur aven 3 cheminees. Toute cette region reste interdit pour la publique a partit du 1 Avril. Hubert. (AOB, here we encounter a serious attempt to mislead the Germans; as to turn their focus to the northern waters, detracting from Normandy; which was the purpose of Operation Fortitude!)

21.4.44 (Isba 2349) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 34. Hubert no. 635. Je transmets une suite de messages sur l'ordre de bataille de l'armee polonaise (Hubert / Walenty / Czermiawski was Polish). En general pas de changements essentiels. Details a suivre.

21.4.44 (Isk 93896) Wiesbaden-Paris. 126. To Westerwald (Alst / Leitstelle Paris). R-communications (stay-behind?) on 20/4/44: Uhu; Dora, Abel, Marius, Fidelio 2 red 1 blue, Eiking 2 blue, Liss 1 red, 1 blue, Tramp 1 blue, Dingo 1 red, Hubert 1 red Biber 2 blue, Calvet 1 red, → (page 8)

21.4.44 (Isba 2363) Hamburg (Domaene) -Wiesbaden. 32 Hubert No. 633. Mon Colonel (Obstlt. Reile, in Paris) apres vous jusqu'ici je supplie que j'aie la droit demander la response sur les questions suivantes: 1) Puis-je ecrite a Violette (once his mistress also at Villa Léandre 8, in Paris) 2) Quand recevrais-je le courier de la ja quelques fois promis? 3) Quand puis-je esperer paracrutage ecriteaux, codes et radio? 4) Quel est le danger d'apres votre opinion enveres la radiogonio de continuer notre travail dans les condition actuelles? Je Voulais augmenter notre traffic mais manque d'aide de votre part le fait impossible et me decourage. Hubert. (AOB, of course, he should ask for financial support, as he should let the Germans believe that he operates independently in England; also giving signs that he is afraid of being DFed upon, this is part of the game)

22.4.44 (Isk 94273) Wiesbaden-Paris. (ca. 10 characters corrupt) 138. Ref. (16 characters corrupt) (10 corrupt) CV (V-Mann) 7167 reports on 21.4.44 by W/T from England (text doubtful) .. H.Q. of 1st Armoured Corps and the signals company in Kinnaird House, Falkirk. H.Q. of 1st Armoured Division in Melrose. Belonging to it is the 6th Armoured Brigade in Kelso with the following regiments: 1) Armoured regiment in Langton Camp in Duns. 2) Armoured regiment in Kelso, 24th (last figure doubtful) armoured regiment in Earlston. 10th motorised battalion if dragoons in Duns. →→

AOB: Again misleading the Germans, in detracting their attention from the danger of an invasion at French territory towards the north; as was one of the aims of Operation Fortitude!

→→ 2) Apart from the preparations observed in the north I have received numerous reports according to which preparations are being begun with very great care in the south. Addendum (Supplement) for (text doubtful) Paris. Ref. paragraph 1. Presumably 1st Polish Army Corps. Addendum to paragraph 2. V-Mann has been instructed to travel to the south at once if possible. (signature missing)

22.4.44 (Isba 2391) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 17. From Wilja (Wiesbaden) Code of abbreviations for Domaene - Wilja contact traffic with Hubert messages have been received. Comes in force immediately.

23.4.44 (Isba 2353) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 49. No. 648. From Hubert from from 20/4 to 23/4 1335. Equipe la division, en plus en chars type Crusader, un peu Sherman type standard, equipe de canon calibre 75. Hubert.

23.4.44 (Isba 2354) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 54. Ref. abbreviations code Hubert. Knp (5 lost) with relevant statement of number of messages received. Our No. 52 thereby invalidated.

23.4.45 (Isba 2359) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 45. No. 645. From Hubert. Composed 20/4 Received 23/4 1319 Supply commandment Stillig 3ieme Compagnie a Galashields. 10ieme a Kels. HUB (Hubert)

23.4.44 (Isba 2388) Wiesbaden -Hamburg. (15 corrupt) 9. ref. Hubert. We monitored him at 12 (13 corrupt) without success. Did you establish contact? If so, please report next QRX time at once.

23.4.44 (Isba 2360) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 47. No. 646 From Hubert. Composed 20/4 Received 23/4 1324. Meme commandement Melrose. 10ieme compagnie a Chirnside, 3ieme a Motherwell Saint Airdric. HUB (Hubert)

23.4.44 (Isba 2364) Hamburg-Wiesbaden, No. 642. Transmitted by Hubert. 23/4 received 23/4 1036. 43 Espere partir mardi en voyage de service Torquay. Laisse plusiers messages a Chopin. Hubert.

23.4.44 (Isba 2365) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. No. 644. (? from Hubert sent: letters missing) 20/4, received 23/4, 1315. Transmissions, commandement et premier (8 corrupt) a Melrose, deuxieme a Cartairs Junction, dixieme a Kelso, troisieme a Galashiels. Hubert.

23.4.44 (Isba 2366) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. No. 647. Hubert, sent 20/4 received 23/4. 1332, 48 RAMC dixieme leger ambulance a Galashiels →→

Galashiels again apparent in the North of England and meant to distract the German attention from France towards the North of England, typically in the line of Operation Fortitude!

→→ onzieme ambulance a Gifford, field dressing station a Bothwell, premier field hygiene station a Prestonpans.

23.4.44 (Isba 2352) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. (No corrupt) 3 from Hubert, sent 23/4 1311. Subject 4ieme division. Jái vue personellement a Torquay le soldats Americain portant leur totem de la 4ieme division americaine. Hubert.

22.4.44 (Isk 94255) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 13. For I H Following text of our FS (Fernschreiben) No. 245 of 15/4 and No. 239 of 16/4. 1) GV (German V-Mann?) 7167 reports on 14/4 by W/T from England. In the district of Scotland bounded on the north by Perth and Dundee, in the west by Callender, in the south by Kelso, which I visited between the 4th and 10th of April, the following troops identified. 1) The defence troops of the Scottish Command, composed of a number of independent units in the Home Guard. 2)The main body of the 4th Army, the H.Q. of which is in Currie near Edinburgh, and its army corps in Stirling and Dundee. 3) The Polish armoured corps, of which the 1st armoured Division belongs to Montgomery's army group. 4) According to statements of some officers, the 3rd English inf. div. is in Inverness area, for training purposes (lack of time made it impossible for me to visit this district.) 5) The situation in Scotland has changed very much since my last visit. Preparedness for the offensive, as, apart from small elements of Montgomery's army group, there is a complete army there, which is equipped for operations overseas. According to reports from the Polish staff it has been equipped for operations in Norway. It was formed within the Scottish Command but the Command, continues to exist simultaneously as a Territorial Defence command, a Corps H.Q. In name Thorne (Thonbe) is still chief of the Scottish →→ (page 9)

(Y82) (Y82return) AOB: an example of G-V-Mann 7167 but he appears rather frequently - wheather it was the Abwehr designation of Hurbert (Brutus) I dont't know.

AOB, intermediate query: was the OKW really so naive? I personally have no knowledge that they weren't 99 % convinced that the expected Allied 'Invasion' will take place somewhere on French territories!

→→ Command and the army has received the number 4. There are Americans liaison officers at the H.Q. 2nd German V-Mann 7167 reports on 16.4 by W/T from England. From general impressions the 4th (spoof) Army is destined for special operation. A Polish Army officer heard from C.O. (Commanding Officer) of Lowland Division that this division has been equipped for operations in the Artic and is expecting to go into action at the beginning of May. from this one is justified in concluding that the attack on Norway is to be expected during May and will be directed at part at least against the Artic area. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

24.4.44 (Isba 2502) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 51. For Obstlt. Schmitt. Ref. your message No. 14 (not received) Ref. 1) The date of starting has still not been fixed ref. 2) Money is already being taken along one V-Mann of III-F. More cannot be taken on and account without compromising Lehar. Ref. 3) For the same reasons, an AFU set for Hubert cannot be taken along.

24.4.44 (Isba 2273) Wiesbaden-Paris. No.155. Ref. England, Wilja (= Wiesbaden) see our FS 441/4/44 Secret of 22/4/44. GN German V-Mann 7167 (likely a imagination of by W/T from England: As cont. to above FS the Staffs of the regiments belonging to it. The 1st Highland Regiment, 8th and 9th Regiment. Staff of the div. are in Melros. 1st and 2nd reg. mot. in Polkemmet Camp, in Hitburn, 30 km west-south-west of Edinburgh. !st A.A. (Anti-Aircraft) regt. in Dunn. 1st squadron in Dalkeith. Supply staff in Stirling, 3rd company Galashiels, 10th in Kelso, Ree staff in Melrose, 10th comp. inn Chirnside, 13th in Motherwell Saint Airdric (perhaps Airdrie). Equipment of the Div. mainly Crusader tanks, some Shermans and Standards with 75 pounders. Signed Wilja (= Ast Wiesbaden)

25.4.44 (Isba 2252) Wiesbaden-Paris, No. 162. R connections on 24/4:- Thomas, Dora, Charles, Biber, Abel, Louis, Mirabelle, Dbjian, Nero, Uhu, Fidelio 2 red, Eikens 1 blue, Liss 1 red, Ases 1 red, Hubert 1 red, Tramp 1 red (repeat), Percy 1 red, Secundo 1 red.

25.4.44 ? .... 21 We request Hubert 751 to be passed, since not quite clear here, Traffic time 2030 could not be monitored. Pass messages and give next QRX time. (Wilja) (= Wiesbaden)

26.4.44 (Isba 2253) Wiesbaden-Paris. No.170. R contacted on 25/4:- Dora, Thomas, Liss, Ases, Pitt, Mirabelle, Dorian 1 red, Alto 1 red, Tramp 1 red, Hubert 1 red, Banjo 1 red, Uhu 1 red. Wilja (=Wiesbaden)

26.4.44 (Isba 2257) 174. Ref. our FS No. 452/4/44 secret of 24/4. Subject England: German V-Mann 7167 reports on 24.4.44 by W/T from England:- Field party equipped with 25 pounder gun, 1 regt. has them mounted on limbers of Ram type. The anti-tank party has 17 and 6 pounder guns at its disposal. 2) The H.Q. of the independent parachute bde. is in Leven. The 1st Bn in Eslie, the 2nd and 4th bns in @ Eslie, the 3rd bn in Falkland. The (9 corrupt) group of airlanding light armoured troops is in Markinch. The 1st squadron of parachute-engineers in Arstruther. The bde has no a/c (Aircraft) and is at present directly subordinated to the Polish Gen. Staff. Sgd. Dr. Steffan. Obst.

28.4.44 (Isk 95028) Wiesbaden-Paris. 62. No. 664 From Hubert 3 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

29.4.44 (Isba 2299) Paris-Wiesbaden. 125. Ref. your No. 191. Passing of Hubert report of 23/4 on 27/4 seems here too long. It must be assured that your reports from England be passed to this end with all possible speed. Westerwald (= Alst; Abwehrleitstelle Paris)

29.4.44 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 62. No. 664. From Hubert, sent 29/4, received 29/4 1510. Entends qu'il y a maintenant des mouvements et concentrations plus importantes dans le region de Southempton et Porthmouth. Lundi, j'ai arrange visite de service dans cette region. Partirai dimanche. Hubert.

29.4.44 (Isba 2357) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. No. 65. In re Hubert. 3 messages each received at 1300 and 1500 C.E.T. (GMT + 1). State which are lacking.

29.4.44 (Isk 95830) Hamburg-Wiesbaden, 64 to Obstlt. Schmitt. Your message 24. Your request that money and camera be taken along in unfortunately quite impossible as the V-Mann (7167) would be overloaded. Obst. Praetorius (KV 2/170 - KV 2/171) (Leiter Gruppe I Ast-X; Hamburg) (Abwehr I = espionage /intelligence abroad).

29.4.44 (Isba 2315) Wiesbaden-Paris. 215. Your No. 6320/44 secret (25 corrupt) 1 of 25/4. GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports on 28.4 by W/T from England. The 1st Polish armoured division is not complete, as the Polish general Staff intends to form two divisions even if they are incomplete. general Montgomery declared on the → (page 10)

cont. →→ occasion of his visit to Scotland that he will use in his Army Group only complete divisions and the first reserve. In consequence the 1st Polish Division is to be completed from the second. The divisional sign will remain the same. Addendum VP: anti-tank division, in the original text: Division de grenadiers blindee. Sgd. Obst. Dr. Steffan ~~Obst.~~ (AOB, typical British way of translating German praxis)

29.4.44 (Isba 2268) Wiesbaden-?. We request Hubert 651 to be passed since not quite clear here. Traffic time 2030 could not be monitored. Pass message and give next QRX time. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

29.4.44 (Isk 95134) Wiesbaden-Paris. 212. R-communications (stay-behind) 28/4/44: Uhu, Dora, Thomas, Charles, Biber, Pitt, Abel. Dora 1 red, 1 blue. Hubert 2/red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

14.4.44 (Isba 2467) Hamburg-Area-Wiesbaden. No. 590 from Hubert. received on 13/4 2121 (= time of reception) No. 8 Contents urgent. Je veux transmettre d'urgance mes rapport d'Ecosse. Si je ne veux pas qu'ils perdent la valeur, je dois travailler 10 jours a la cadence minimum 3 heures par jours. Quel est le danger de la part Radiogonio (DFed upon him) d'appres votre opinion? Hubert.

2.5.44 (Isba 2335) Wiesbaden-Paris. 7. Ref. England GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports on 30/4 by W/T from England. 1) On Exeter railway station there were a few soldiers of the 29th U.S.A. div. and some American officers, wearing as insignia a black beaver's head, full face in yellow circle. There were in addition members of the Royal Marine wearing as insignia, a red lozenge, and also a red lozenge (AOB, tablet) with a blue circle, contain an upright yellow seahorse. 2) Torquay. Soldiers of the 4th and 29th American div, and soldiers of the American commandos. In the harbour were 26 American Lsts and 12 for troops. In addition 3 aux. motor boats of the R.A.F. 3) Teignmouth. In the estuary there were about 30 troop landing craft. 4) Newbury. A considerable number of railway hospital coasts? On the race course is a large U.S.A. camp. Signed Obst. Dr. Steffan.

2.5.44 (Isba 2337) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 6 Ref. Hubert. Ref. your 125. Hubert left on 23/4, leaving his assistant the remainder of the signal serial numbers. This W/T operator transmitted messages up till 30/4 with the date 23/4 when Hubert was there. All messages are passed on the day they arrive. Obstlt. Schmitt.

2.5.44 (Isba 2340) Wiesbaden-Paris. 1 for Obstlt. Praetorious (Leiter Abwehr Gruppe I Hamburg, Ast-X, Hamburg). Ref. your W/T message 64. V-Mann (7167?) is already taking money with him for Hubert in any case. Why can the amount not be increased? From the point of view of weight, a Leica (German world top-class photo camera) will not make any difference either. Obstlt. Schmitt.

2.5.44 (Isba 2341) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 2. Please transmit to Hubert. (AOB, was it Hamburg / Domaene which was in W/T contact with MI.5 c.q. Hubert / Brutus?) 1) Quel est le totem de la 50 division anglaise? Depuis grand se trouve-t-ell au sud-est de Stirling? 2). Quelle est la composition de la 58 division anglaise? 3) Quels sont les numeros do troupes americaines en Ecosse? Obst.

3.5.44 (Isk 95227) Wiesbaden-Paris. 11. R-communications (staybehind?) on 1/5. Bombe, Ratte, Eikens, Thomas, Calvet, Dingo, Dora, Primo, Uhu, Matelot. Fidelio 1 red, Antoine 1 red, Liss 5 blue, Hubert 4 red. On 2/5 Altom Matelot, Dora, Thomas, Abel, Pitt, Level,Liss 2 red, Banjo 1 ref (red?).

3.5.44 (Isba 2377) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 68. No. 677. From Hubert, sent 2/5, received 2/5 2055 (time of reception). Winchester (14 corrupt) la region entre Lasham et Farham Cosham.

3.5.44 (Isba 2379↓) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 69. No. 678. From Hubert, sent 2/5. received 2/5, 21/4. Contents: Dans tout (22 corrupt) dans la region de Porthmouth un grand nombre des unites (rest corrupt).

3.5.44 (Isba 2379↑) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 71. No. 682 from Hubert composed 2/5 received 3/5 2004 (time of reception). Contents: d'apres cette voyage et conversations avec mes camarades il m'est encore impossible de definir la date d'invasion. Les opinions sont tres partagees. Hubert.

3.5.44 (Isk 96068) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 70 for Obstlt. Schmitt. 1) V-Mann (7167) is already taking a fairly large sum of money in a soldered container for your V-Mann. 2) More money and other packets cannot be taken along, as packing and conveyance are impossible. 3) V-Mann (7167) expects to be called away at any moment. Most emphatically request you not to make any fuss (worry), especially as WI-Burg has already given warning against taking money in sealed containers. Leiter I. Obstlt. ~~Preatorius~~ Praetorius K.d.M. Hamburg (KV 2/171- KV 2/172).

5.5.44 (Isba 2433) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 76. Hubert no. 691 traffic today 2200 C.E.T. (GMT + 1) on frequency 3.

5.5.44 (Isba 2443) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 77. No. 694. From Hubert. Sent 3/5 received 5/5 at 1715 hrs. Contents:- Autres totem conq etoiles formation une croix sur le rectangle rouge-noir-rouge. Il a ete dans la region et il semble representer Southern Command. → (page 11)

5.5.44 (Isba 2444) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 78. No. 693 from Hubert. Sent 3/5, received 5/5 at 1700 hrs. Contents:- 26 corrupt une quaraintaine de comions avec totem dans le circle rouge le triangle noir avec un autre triangle rouge dedans en position renversee. Nombreux voitures avec totem croix (4 corrupt) sur blason blanc, A suivre. Hubert.

5.5.44 (Isba 2438) Wiesbaden-Paris. 29. R-connections (staybehind?) on 4/5/44. Fidelio, Mirabelle, Eikens, Thomas, Marius, Asses, Biber, primo, 1 blue, Hubert 4 red, Liss 5 blue, 4 red, Dorian 1 bleu, Uhu 1 red. ... Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

7.5.44 (Isba 2431) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 95. R-connections on 6/5. Fidelio, Alto, Henri, Dora, Ases, Calvet, Pascal, Uhu, Abel. Primo 1 blue, Bussard 2 red, Bikins 1 blue, Liss 2 red, 1 blue, Odeon 1 blue, Mirabelle 1 blue, Hubert 3 red, Hermes 1 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

11.5.44 (Isk 97171) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. (ca. 65 missing) Toute la region au nord de Tamise appelee East Anglia appartient au Eastern Command dont totem bulldog blanc sure carré noir. La region au nord du ligne Cambridge-Ipswich appartient au Norfolk and Cambridge district dont commandement a Newmarket. (ca 25 corrupt and missing) sixieme corps signale actuellement en Ecosse. Hubert (part missing)

12.5.44 (Isba 2435) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 96. Hubert (22 missing corrupt) (12 text doubtful) 5 2124. Voitures avec totem de quartier general de Home Forces, alors lion rampant jaune dans un cercle rouge noir, partage horizontalement USA Newmarket. Hubert.

12.5.44 (Isba 2445) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. No. (?8) Owing to bad conditions impossible to receive Hubert message today. Please pass on state QRX. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

12.5.44 (Isba 2440) Wiesbaden-Paris. 107. Same text (26 letters missed and corrupt). 1 Staffel. ref. England. GV (German V-Mann) -7167 reports on 4/5 by W/T from England. 1) The Highland division No. 51 has returned from Italy and is in Suffolk. 2) The Lowland (15 letters missing) reported ... Scotland has the number 52. 3) The 50th Division south-east of Stirling has as insignia; on a black square a stag's head from the front. 4) Concerning the 15th Division Unknown. What insignia has it and where am I to look for it? 5) As I learned from the headquarters a Russian military and naval delegation has arrived and is establishing itself in Edinburgh. Addendum (6 letters corrupt) (? not received). Ref. para 4 see your message no. 6677/44 Secret I. Heer West of 26/4 (? not received in England) Ref. of 22/4 (Isk 94273)(see our page 8) Leitstelle will receive this by W/T. Ast XII (= Wehrkreis XII Wiesbaden) Field-Post (Feldpostnummer) No. 76/5/44 (AOB: Not a regular Feldpost designation) signed Dr. Steffan.

12.5.44 (Isba 2452) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 93. Hubert No. 173 of 12/5 2018 (time of reception) (9 corrupt) de service (8 corrupt) et avec totem de la 14ieme division blindee, voitures avec totem de War Office Eastern Command. Hub (= Hubert).

12.5.44 (Isba 2453) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 95. Hubert Nr. 714 of 12/5, 2030 (time of reception) Bottisham est de Cambridge aerodrome d'ecole. Avions: Mothmasters, quelques Mustang et Thunderbolts. Atelier de reparation pour bombardiers lourds. Hubert.

13.5.44 (Isba 2424) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 98. Message from Hubert no. 719 T.O.O. (time of origin) 12/5 T.O.I. (time of intercept) 13/5 1603 hrs. Contents: subject bombe. Anglais utilisent une bombe de douze mile pounds qui doit produir un effect important. Apres ce que je sais les Anglais nont pas de nouveau explosive. HUB (= Hubert) .

13.5.44 (Isk 97101) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Our No. 935 (20 corrupt and lost inc. address and signature) should read Cambridge american (rem. corrupt).

14.5 44 (Isba 2476) Wiesbaden-Paris. 121. R-connections (staybehind?) on 13/5 ... Hubert red 3 ...

7.3.44 (Isba 2427) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 52. Subject England. GV (German-V-Mann) 7167 reports on 6/5 by W/T from England. 1) Waterlooville on the northen edge a camouflaged camp, on th eastern side of the main road. Another camp on the southern edge of the town. In the town soldiers with badge a triangle. Many bren-carriers (M/T vehicles), A/T guns and other guns, Red Cross ambulances and direction signs. 2) Passing S. of the town M/T vehicles of the Southern Command and heavy lorries with cylinders 2½ metres long and about 15 cm (across) presumably for balloons. 3) Coaham. Many vehicles with sign two triangles. Ducks, ambulances. Material of all kinds. Soldiers of the RAMC and REME. Few men of the signalsor navy. 4) On the Cosham-Fareham road, heading East a long lorry column with sign two triangles, also vehicles of the Southern Command. Many material dumps all the way along the road. Addendum F Leitstelle will receive this by W/T/ Sgd Obst. Dr. Steffan.

11.5.44 (Isba 2456) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 91. R-Links on 10/5. Uhu, Charles, Henri, Alto, Bombe, 1 ble, Bussard, 1 red, Liss, 2 blue, Mirabelle 1 red, Tramp 1 blue 3 red, Biber, i blue, Thomas, 1 red. Hubert 2 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

12.5.44 (Isba 2460) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 94. Hubert. Nr. 716. of 12/5 2127 (time of reception; GMT + 1) Bury St. Edmunds, sur aerodrome une quinzane de Mustang, Thunderbolts et autres avions legers. Hubert.

16.5.44 (Isba 2480) Wiesbaden-Paris. 144. R Links (staybehind?) on 15/5, Bombe, Eikens, Thomas, Dora, Charles, Pascal, Primo, Percy, Matelot, Fidelio 1 red, Bussard 1 red, Ratte 1 red, Uhu 1 red, Liss 1 red 2 blue, Hubert 1 red, Tramp 2 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

4.5.44 (Isba 2483) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 17 Ref. invasion situation in England. Our FS (Fernschreiben = telex, teletype) 3037/5/44 Secret refers. GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports on 3/5 by W/T from England. After my journey and also after conversations with my comrades I am still unable to fix the date of the invasion. In my opinion the invasion will begin in the south and one from Scotland will beginning simultaneously (AOB, clearly an attempt of misleading the Germans in coordination with Operation Fortitude). It is not possible for me to go to Scotland on about 10/5 but perhaps that will be too late. It seems to me necessary that the troop movements should be covered by you by other means. According to statement by one of the pilots air activity in Scotland has increased many recce (reconnaissance) (AOB, again an attempt to mislead the Germans in the context of their Operation Fortitude) planes to Norway. A squadron of Bostons recently left Lavhan for Tetterheaden and the 309th Polish Squadron has moved from Suffolk to Drem in Scotland. Sgd. Obst. Dr. Steffan.

4.5.44 (Isba 2484) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 19 R-connections (stay behind?) on 3/5: Dora, Thomas, Charles, Lucien, Henri, Uhu, Percy, Primo, 1 red. Hubert, 3 red. Mirabelle 1 blue. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

12.5.44 (Isba 2457) Wiesbaden-Paris. 99. To Westerwald (= ALST in Paris) R links on 11/5 Airo, Thomas, Abel, Dora, Jux, Uhu. Fidelio 1 red, Bombe 1 red, Bussard 1 red. Primo 1 red, Cello 1 blue, Dora 1 red, Liss 1 red, Tramp 1 blue 3 red, Ases 1 blue, Hubert 3 red, Dorian 1 blue, Secundo 1 blue, Beeton (Breton?) 1 blue. Wilja (= Wiesbaden).

17.5.44 (Isba 2526) Wiesbaden-Paris. 159 R-links on 16/5 .... Hubert 3 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

10.5.44 (Isba 2485) Wiesbaden-Paris. 78. R contacts on 9.5.44. Fidelio, Bombe, Uhu, Pauline, Dora, Thomas, Henri, Bussard 1 red 1 blue, Liss 1 red, Mirabelle 2 red 2 blue, Odeon 1 red, Pitt 1 red, Hubert 4 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

AOB, I tend now to believe, that the succession of names and data of number and the named colours constitutes a kind of code.

10.5.44 (Isba 2488) Wiesbaden-Paris. 84. To Westerwald (= ALST (Abwehrleitstelle) Paris) (16 corrupt) GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports on 9/5 W/T from England: 1) Fareham: text doubtful (Zweifelhaft) Passing through cars with badge letters JP on a red circle. In the town soldiers with cars with badge 2 triangles, also soldiers with badge yellow cross on a black shield. Card with the same badge passing through to north and south. Passing through to west lorries with badge 2 red bells joined by a band on a black square. 2) Newmarket: area: region occupied by 51st Highland division. It seems to be south-west of Newmarket. Identified units: Seaforts, Camerons and Gordons. 3) Bury St. Edmunds' east of Newmarket: H.Q. of 20th American Army Corps, badge 2 Roman figures crossed, in yellow, on a blue shield surrounded by yellow and red border. In the town elements of the 4th USA Armoured Div. which seems to include the 8th Armoured Detachment 51st inf. regt., 22nd and 94th RSA (or Ria) Addendum FP Leitstelle informed. Obst. Dr. Steffan.

4.5.44 (Isba 2495) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. No. 75 Ref. Hubert. 1930 CET (GMT + 1) 3 messages received here? at 2100 CET (GMT + 1) 2 messages received. Transmit missing one. Next Hubert Traffic 5/5/ 1700 CET (= GMT+1) freq. 1.

4.5.44 (Isba 2498) Wiesbaden-Paris. 24. England. GV (German V-Mann) 7167 on 4/5 by W/T from England. The 19th Air Suppot Command is in the area of Kent, its military operational bases on the airfield between Ashford and Tonbridge. The 9th Troop Command is mainly in the region Ealisbury-Plain (Salisburry). Effective strength? smaller than with the other commands. The 8th Air Force is stationed in East Anglia. It is composed on the 8th Bomber Command and the 8th Fighter Command. Addendum FP. See our FS (Fernschreiben = telex) No. 22/5/44 Secret of 2/5. Leitstelle I West informed by W/T. Obst. Dr. Steffan.

20.5.44 (Isba 2534) Wiesbaden-Paris. 187. R.f. England. GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports on 18/5 by W/T from England. He had had confirmation that the 20th USA army corps, which was stationed in Marlborough until the end of April, was moved to Bury St. Edmunds at the beginning of May. Addendum FP. Leitstelle informed. Obst. Dr. Steffan.

25.4.44 (Isba 2502) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 5a. For Obstlt. Schmitt. ref your message no 14. Ref. 1) date of starting has still not been fixed. 2) Money is already being taken along for one V-Mann of III-F. More cannot be taken on any account without compromision Lehar. Ref. 3) For the same reasons, an AFU-set for Hubert cannot be taken along.

25.4.44 (Isba 2503) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 52. reference joint monitoring of Hubert. Additional abbreviations code to follow.

17.5.44 (Isba 2526) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 159. R-links on 16/5. Primo, Uhu, Airo, Henri, Antoine, Dora, Thomas, Liss, Ases, Jux, Omi, Level, Bussard 3 red, Cello 1 red, Tramp 1 red, Pitt 1 blue, Odeon 1 red, Hubert 3 red, Banjo 2 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

18.5.44 (Isba 2439) Wiesbaden-Paris. 186. P Links on 17/5. Primo, Uhu, Alto, Liss, Charles, Mirabelle, Ratte, Henri, Thomas, Dora, Dorian, Abel, Dingo 1 red, Bussard 2 red, Tramp 2 red, Hubert 3 red, Matelot 1 blue.

18.5.44 (Isba 2540) Wiesbaden-Paris. 166. For Paris. Reference England. G V (German V-Mann) 7167 reports by W/T from England on 17/5. 1) After return from Edinburgh General situation unchanged apart from the fact that the H.Q. of the 4th Army is now in Glasgow. (AOB, again an apparent attempt to mislead the Germans in the context of Operation Fortitude) 43rd English Inf. Div. on longer in the north and no trace of the Lowland division.

18.5.44 cont. 2) The 58th Inf. Div. is continuing its manoeuvres. It has 3 brigades, one of which bears the number 175l Other units with Green Howards and Cameron 3) Confirmation of the presence of the Russians. It is said that invasion ships are assembled in the Clyde estuary. (Not own observations). I have received confirmation that the Air Force in Scotland has been increased. (AOB, all to be noticed: the aim was to mislead the Germans away from the real invasion area, in the context of the Operation Fortitude) 4) By virtue of the fact that the 58th Division is continuing its manoeuvres, an attack is in my opinion, not directly imminent. Have heard nothing there concerning troops movements and troops concentrations. Have once again received confirmation that the 4th Army is not to be used in an attack against France, but that it is ready to carry through an independent task. 5) Situation of the Polish Army unchanged with the exception of the 1 Polish Armoured Div. which, in accordance with agreement with Montgomery, is to be transferred southwards to Yorkshire. It is to be used for the second wave, therefore has become a reserve unit. Addendum FP. See our Nos (Fernschreiben) 245/4/44 secret of 15.4.44. FS 293/4/44 secret of 16.4.44 and FS 374/4/44 secret of 19/4/44. Ast Wiesbaden No. 418/5/44 Secret (Geheim). Obst. Steffan.

22.5.44 (Isba 2545) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 207 R-contacts on 21/5/44. Uhu, Mirabelle, Liss, Biber, Bussard, 2 red, Omi 1 red, Fidelio 1 red, 1 blue, Banjo 1 red. Hubert 6 red, Percy 1 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

22.5.44 (Isba 2549) Wiesbaden-Paris. No. 212. Reference England. It is said that there is a new American A.F.V. M 8, GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports on 18/5. D'apres un American ils ont maintenant une nouvelle auto blindee qui representé un melange des qualities d'un char leger (41 missing and corrupt) chiffre 8, 6 rouge, Poid(s) 8 tonnes (7 letters missing) 35 miles par heure, armement un canon 37 et une mitrailleuse lourde. Addendum FP. Ast has no material about this vehicle. Ast Wiesbaden. No. 523/5/44 (2 missing)/ Observation of vehicles of the 51st Inf. Div. in London. GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports (time - ? corrupt) 18/5, Ai vu dernierement pour le premier fois une quantite des officiers et voitures de la 51ieme division a Londres. Addendum. Amt Abwehr I Heer informed. Abwehrstelle Wiesbaden No. 339/5/44 secret Fern. Paris sgd Oberst. Dr. Steffan.

19.5.44 (Isba 2557) Wiesbaden-Paris. 176. R links Uhu, Eikens, Airo, Thomas, Ases, Biber, Primo, Bussard 3 red, Cello 1 red, Tramp 1 red, Liss 1 blue, Level 1 red, Hubert 1 red. Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

20.5.44 (Isba 2534) Wiesbaden-Paris. 187. ref. England. GV (German V-Mann) 7167 reports on 18/5 by W/T from England, he has confirmation that the 20th Army Corps, which was stationed in Marlborough until the end of April, was moved to Bury St. Edmunds at the beginning of May. Addendum FP Leitstelle informed. Obst. Dr. Steffan.

27.5.44 (Isba 2626) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 764 Hubert sent 25th, received 27/5, 1414 Haynards Heath nord de Brighton nombreux soldats et voitures, totem, sur carré rouge chevalier blanc qui semble etre le totem du corps dármee qui (14 corrupt) dans cette region. nombreux soldats et voitures de la Guards Armoured Division. A suivre. Hubert ?25.

27.5.44 (Isba 2627) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 766. From Hubert 127. Sent 25/5 received 27/5. 1245 (= GMT + 1) Vu de passage un peu de voiture de las 28 ieme U.S.A. division specialement 112ieme RI? et 109 ieme Field Battery. Autre voitures de 61ieme division et de 12ieme corps, totem, 2 arbes, Nombreuses voitures, totem croix bleu sur blason blanc. HUB (= Hubert)

27.5.44 (Isba 2628) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. No. 768. From Hubert sent 25/5. received 27/5 1701 (time of reception GMT + 1) 129. Tout la region visitee est occupee par les unitees de la Tactival Air Force et 9ieme U.S.A. Air Force. A Coolham sont stationees Fighters Squadrons polonais numero 306 et 315 et anglais numero 129, tout equipes de Mustangs ... HUB (Hubert)

27.5.44 (Isba 2629) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 769. From Hubert sent 25th, received on 27th at 1712 (time of reception; GMT + 1). A Chailey sont stationnes Fighter Squadron polonais numeros 302 et 308 et 317 tout equipes de Spitfiers.

27.5.44 (Isba 2930) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 124 763 Hubert sent on 25/5, received on 27/5 at 1407 (time of reception; GMT + 1) Contents. Suite Nombreuse voitures de la Guards Armoured Division avec units Grenadier, Coldstream, Irish et Welsh dans le rues chars parques Sherman, Stewards et Crusaders. Hubert.

27.5.44 (Isba 2631) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 128. No. 667 from Hubert sent on 25.5.44 received 27/5 at 1704. Dans toute la region visitee nomreux convois de voitures de la Tactical Air Force et Anti-Aircraft Command.

27.5.44 (Isba 2632) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. Please (?pass-text doubtful) to Hubert. (AOB, this might acknowledge that Hamburg /Domaene was the place where communications with Hubert /Walenty was commenced) 12 from Colonel. 1) J'ai ete absent quelque temps et regrette beaucoup que vous etes encore toujours sans aide. 2) To tes le choses demandees par vous ont ete envoyees mais la transmission impossible, car dangereux pur vous. 3) J'ai tout prepare de nouveau. Leica et assez d'argent sont en route. 4) Tout mes felicitations pour votre situation. Dommage que vous ne pouvez pas rester a Londres. Je suis fier de vous, que vous travaillez si brave tout le temps. Je vous assure que ma premiere pensee toujour de vous. Procurez L'assistance necessaire. Mais premierement il faut faire attention que vous ne seriez pas en danger par transmission quelcomque.

27.5.44 (Isba 2634) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 765. Hubert, sent 25/5, received on 27th on 1418 (time of reception; GMT + 1). 126 Suite. Quelques soldats du 8ieme Corps Americain, totem chiffre 8 blanche sur octogone bleu. Un convoi de camions Americain, de passage ver est de la division avec totem croix de Lorraine d'argent sur blason bleu avec bord d'argent. Hubert.

2.6.44 (Isba 2656) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 147. From Hubert No. 783. Sent on 2.6.44 received on 2.6.44 2103 (GMT + 1). Contentes: compte rendu Kent. Region visitee Maidstone, Canterbury, Dover, Ashford, Tunbridge Wells, Hubert.

2.6.44 (Isba 2657) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert. No. 784 sent on 2.6.44 received on 2.6.44 210? (87 missing) Sussex estoccupee par la iere armee canadienne Composition 2ieme corps canadient et 12eme U.S.A. Corps. Hubert.

2.6.44 (Isba 2658) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert. No. 786. Despatched 2.6.44 received 2.6.44 at 2205 hours (GMT + 1). Contents Douzieme Corps U.S.A. composition 83ieme U.S.A. Division, 28ieme U.S.A. Division et encore un numero inconnu. Ce corps remplace dernierement (47 missing) units. HUB (Hubert).

2.6.44 (Isba 2662) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 150. Hubert No. 787, sent off 2.6.44 received 2.6.44 at 2210 hrs. Contens 48ieme division commandement a Bladbean nord de Welham. Le totem sur triangle noire renverse et a dessin jaune dans le carole 3 lignes certicale (verticale). 1 horizontale et un petit cercle au milieu. Hubert.

2.6.44 (Isba 2663) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert. No. 788, sent off 2.6.44 received 2.6.44 2215 hrs (GMT + 1) text: 28ieme division est partie est dernierement de Kent a Essex. Ces divisions s'assauts ont totem esece ce carafe rouge (? et un: text doubtful) signe come Keystone of Pennsylvania.

29.5.44 (Isba 2668) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 134. Hubert No. 773 sent 26/5 received 29/5 2216 hrs. (GMT + 1) Contents: Votre numero 295. Ce convoy etait a Walton nordest de Winchester. Le totem de 2 triangles appartient a la 2ieme division d'infanterie anglaise. Ces unites etaient vus dans tout la region de Fareham au commencement du mois de mai. J'ai vu aussi des hommes et voitures avec ce totem a Horham le 23 mai. Hubert.

29.5.44 (Isba 2971) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 133 Hubert No. 751 sent on 22/5 received on 29/5 ?? Contents: Norwich, nombreuse voitures et soldates 8ieme Airforce, DAF (or: Aff) division, 20eme U.S.A. Corps Eastern Command, Anti-Aicraft Command. Hubert.

29.5.44 (Isba 2672) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 135. Hubert No. 772 sent 26/5 received 29/5 2128 hrs (GMT+1). Contents: Subject renseignement sur bateaux. Je n'ai pas essaye d'obten cettes renseignements car j'ai suppose que vous pouvez avoir plau facilement pas reconnaissance photoaerienne. Je vous ai tranmis le nouvelles occasionnelles, par example sur les concetrations regionSolent au commencement du Mai et Clyde (AOB apparently misleading) Hubert.

3.6.44 (Isba 2679) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 153. Hubert No 792 sent 2/6 received 3.6.44 1322 hours. De cote sud de la ro te Canterbury Dover, dans la region de Barham un grand camp de 2ieme Can. Corps. Sous le arbres dans cette region, les endroits pour les voitures sont soigneusement prepares comme point d'assemblement pour 'laction démbarquement. Hubert.

AOB, we have to bear in mind: that some weeks before the actual invasion should take place, all communications towards outside of the U.K. - as well as incoming - were entirely blocked. No one, normally was allowed to travel abroad, as well as mail-service was totally blocked; even the distribution of British periodicals and newspapers. This was known to the Germans of course.

The latter measures were - for the Germans - always a strong warning signal - that an attack stood before shortly!

3.6.44 (Isba 2680) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 156 Hubert No. 794 sent on 2/6 received 3.6.44 at 1512 hrs. Totem de 2ieme Corps Canadien sur le rectangle rouge blanc rouge, une losage bleu et une feuille canadienne au milieu. Hubert.

3.6.44 (Isba 2684) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 151, Hubert No. 790 composed 2.6. received 3/6 1312 hrs. Charing entre Maidstone et Canterbury soldats de la 61ieme division et de la division avec totem signale pyramide (25 corrupt). Hubert.

3.6.44 (Isba 2685) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 152. Hubert No. 789 composed 2/6, received 3.6.44 at 1307 hrs. Maidstone voitures et hommes 61ieme division totem losange rouge dans le cercle bleu deja liere armee canadienne,, et 21ieme armee anglaise. Hubert. Please insert: signale, Voitures de TAF 9ieme Air Force.

31.5.44 Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 136 Nr. 774. Hubert, despatched 30th, received 31st at 1717 hrs. Je commence serie de messages au sujet de la premiere groups d'armees Americains (5 corrupt) Fusag commandant en chef: General Patton, pose de commandement Wentwork, pres de Ascot, location exacte 1½ au sud de Virginia Water. A suivre. Hubert. 137 at 1720 Suite: Mon bureau se trouve a Staines, a une distance 8 km de Quarter Generale. Serais oblige accompagner un officier American sur les voyages de service aux unites Polonaise et Americaines. Hubert.

3.6.44 (Isba 2686) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 154, Hubert No. 791, composed 2/6 received 3.6.44 at 1316 hrs. Canterbury soldats et voitures totem pyramide, et autres avec totem obstacle. Voitures avec totem de 21eme corps et 2ieme division Canadianne, Hurbert.

6.6.44 (Isba 2733) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 168 (40 lost) received 6/6/ at 1918 hrs. Contents: Tres surpris que les groupes d'armee, quique independantes, attaquent seperament. Opinion generale a Wentworth etait que ca doit arrive simulanement a chaque moment, mais cést evident maintenant que ca sera un action separeee. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2734) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 170. Hubert No. 808 composed 6/6/ received 6/6 on 1927 hrs. Contents: Neanmois je suppose que tous mes renseignement derniers, complete parcelles d'autres sources, vour ont permis d'avoir l'ensemble necessaire pour les derniers preparatif et pour preparer le detait des Anglo-Saxons. Hubert.

6.6.44 (Isba 2736) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 164. Hubert No. 804 sent off 6/6 received 1908 6/6. 164 (22 letters) ... elle du commencement d'invasion. Tres surpris car notre FUSAG ne bouge pas. Il est certain que le debarquement est fait seulement (25 letter corrupt) ... groupe d'armee. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2737) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 171. Hubert No. 809 sent 6/56 received 1931 hrs 6/6/. Content: J'attend avec une grande emotion les resultats, qui me permetront commencer la travail d'une grande evengure. Je suis de mon couer avec vous. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2738) Hamburg-Wiesbaden) 173. Hubert No. 811. Sent 6/6, received 2107 hrs 6/6. Contents: Je passe d'urgence les messages suivantes. Enverrai les details aussitot possible. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2739) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 175. No. 813. Sent off 6/6 T.O.I. (Time of intercept) 2115/6/6. Contents: composition de la 20ieme corps, la 4ieme IUSA Div blindee, commandement a Bury St. Edmunds, la 5ieme USA Div. USA Div. blindee, commendement East Dereham, et la 6ieme USA Div. Blindee, commandement a Woodbridge. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2740) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 176. Hubert No 818 of 7.6. at 1725 hrs: Autres divisions la 76ieme div. Brit, region nord de Norwich, la 2ieme Brit. Airborne Div. region Grantham. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2741) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 177. Hubert No. 815 of 7/6 1700 hrs. Ai vu encore a Brentwood quelques soldats de la 35ieme div. infantrie USA. Elle a ete actuellement attack au 12ieme corps USA et envoye dans le Kent. (AOB, in my perception, an apparent attempt to mislead the Germans as to give the impression that the real main invasion could take place into the direction of Calais; as Hitler counted with) Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 7242) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 178. Hubert Nr. 814 of 7/6 1707 hours. Il ya a tres peu de temps la 3ieme Armee englobant 12ieme U.S.A. Corps dernierement signal a Folkestone sous la liere Armee Can. Hubert.

7.6.43 (Isba 2743) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 172? Hubert. No. 819 of 7/6 1733 hrs. (9 corrupt) les unites avec totem de 58ieme div. Brit. et un peu de 2ieme corps Brit. dernierement sign als par moi en Ecosse. Dans le (? region - corrupt) nombreux unites USA service of Supply. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2944) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 180. Hubert No. 817 received 1721 hours. Romford un peu de voitures de la 50ieme div. anglaises, totem 2 lettres T entre croises rouges sur carré noir et un peu de voitures avec totem de la 51ieme Div. Highland. Hubert. (AOB, in my perception, in confusing the Germans they might have lacked some fantasy as the number '51th' being used, a bit too often!)

7.6.44 (Isba 2945) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 181. Hubert No. 816 of 7.6.44 1715 hours. Comme de ja signale la 28ieme Div. d'assut fait aussi part de 12ieme Corps. Elle est actuellement situe a Harwich ou elle vient de completes des exercise amphibes en laiason avec Royal Navy. Vu unites hollandais dans la meme region. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2746) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 182 Hubert No. 820 of 7.6.44 on 1905 hours. Newark Soldats de la Div. d'Infanterie avec totem peroquet bleu dans losange rouge sur cercle bleu. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2747) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 183. Hubert 821. of 7/6 at 2112 hours. La premiere div. polonaise blindee se trouve a Bridlington en Yorkshire. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2748) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 185. Hubert Nr. 823 of 7/6 2124 hours. Dans toute la region attitude offensive. region nord de Harwich et autour de Ipswich semblement etre prepares comme region de rassemblement d'alert pour embarquement. Route marques avec fleches indicatrices avec lettre R. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2749) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 184. Hubert No. 824 of 7.6. on 2126 hours. Some foux de chiffrement. Aidez-s.v.p. Sommes aux bordes de nos limites. Hubert.

7.6.44 (Isba 2750) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 186. Hubert No. 822 of 7.6. on 2118 hours. Vu toujours dans la partie sud de la region visitee les unite's de la 9ieme Air Force et Tactical Air Force et plus nord le 8ieme. Le 316ieme squadron polonaise est toujours a Coltishall. Hubert.

21.5.44 (Isba 2756) Wiesbaden-Paris. 193. R. contacts on 20/£. Primo, Uhu, Alto Eikens, Henri, Ases, Airo, Bussard 2 red, Dora 1 red, Liss 1 blue, Hubert 4 red.

6.6.44 (Isba 2758) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert No. 810 sent (15 corrupt) 6.6 19 (22 corrupt) contents: Pour máider et comme je ne sais jamais actellement quand j'arrive en Londre, je vous prie de mécouter dorenavant a 13, 18 et 22 heures a l'heure Londres charque jour. Hubert.

26.5.44 (Isba 2765) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 123. Hubert No. 760 or 25th T.O.I (time of intercept) 1723hours/26/5. Suite. La defence aniaerianne semble etre rengorces. Au long de la plage nombreux canons son le plupart les Bofors. Aux bords de la ville batterie lourde. probablement 37 calibres. Hubert.

11.6.44 (Isba 2802) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 190. Hubert 828. T.O.O. (Time of origin) 10/6. T.O.I (Time of intercept) 10/6/ on 2148 hours. Contents: Suite, britainiques, sixieme Airborne Division, Royal Marine commandos, troisieme division canadienne et la cinquantieme anglais secteur est. Hubert.

11.6.44 (Isba 2818) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 188 Hubert No. 826 T.O.O. 10/6, T.O.I on 2140 hours. Contents: j'ai ete oblige demander Chipin le venir a Stains pour les nouvelled. (9 letters corrupt) le quitter la localité pour Londre. Hubert.

11.6.44 (Isba 2819) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 189 (40 missing) 6 ewxs? 100/6 received 2125 hours (5 missing). Subject: debarquement en France. Malheureusement je ne suis en contacte directe avec le bureau d'operation de la 21ieme group d'armes, d'apres mon colonel les unites suivant par. A suivre. Hubert.

11.6.44 (Isba 2820) Hamburg-Wiesbaden, 191. Hubert 829, sent 10/6, received 10/t 2151 hours. Text 422 (remainder corrupt). (RSS in England did copy the fore-called message likely only fragmentary)

11.6.44 (Isba 2821) Hamburg-Wiesbaden, 192. Hubert 830, sent on 10/6, received on 10/6 on 2155 hours. Contents: d'apres mon colonel, le premier but etait dóccuper le part de Cherbourg de la reste de peninsule et it est d'opinion que (section text doubtful) se develope bien, car les parachutistes se sont (deja - text doubtful) mis en contact avec divisions d'infanterie. Hubert.

11.6.44 (Isba 2822) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert No. 834 of 11/6 on 2132 hours. Secteur Seine-Some disente come permettant la co-operation oeux d'ouest de la Seine, mais, difficile au point de vue de terrain et debarquement. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2812) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert No. 838 of 11/6 No. 216. 198, On m'a dit aussi que la quatrieme armee reste encore en Ecosse et elle reste toujours indenpendente. Hubert.

12.644 (Isba 2813) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 200. Hubert No. 840 12/6 on 2240 hours (8 corrupt) peux suppose que Fusag peut aussi partir chaque moment. Je peux pendre liaison avec radio. Aidez vite. En tout cas restez en contact avec Chopin. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2814) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert 843 of 11/6 on 2251 hours. Je ne sais pas si vous voulezchasser les aliies vers la mer ou de les attirer au fond du pays pour les y bettre quand un certain nombre des divisions sera deja sur les continet. Dans ce deuxieme cas je vous prie de preparer un certain nombre de postes et de personnes sures. Avec ma possition actuelle, ma connaissance de France ? mon experiance je peux fair un bon travail et non seulement une importvisation comme jusqua ce moment-la. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2823) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 195. Hubert No. 838. of 11/6 on 2128 hours. Sujet: Fusag. Il m'est difficule de penetrer dans le bureau de'operations, car mes realtions personeele sont encore fabbles et les restrictions au sujet de secret tres severes, et en principle les officiers de liaison allies sone tenus a part? Neanmoins je suis oblige y etre toutjours et chaque (30 corrupt).

12.6.44 (Isba 2824) 196. Hubert No. 833 of 11/6 on 2128 hours. Je (peux definir - text doubtful) que Fusag donne l'impression d'etre pret pour l'action chaque moment, D'Apres les conversations (7 letters corrupt) des officiers, la dislocation montre que l'attaque est preparee et des troupes deja engagis.

It seemingly is becoming a quite endless story, but history isn't always easy to digest.

12.6.44 (Isba 2825) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 197. Hubert No. 836 of 11/6 (60 corrupt) sont pas consideres comme convenables a vause de difficultes de terrain et specialement les inondations. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2826) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 199. Hubert No. 839 of 11/6 2222 hrs. Mon colonel, j'attends toujours cotre aide. je veux faire Chopin independant de son travail, qu'il puisse fairella liaison avec moi et m'aider. J'ai difficultes enormes a vause de distance et en plus il y a des difficultes locales Stains au sujet de chiffrement. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2827) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 201. Hubert No. 841 of 11/1 2255 hours. Suite. Comme je ne peux pas pendre mon appareil avec moi, je vous prie de preparer et bien chacher dans un et meme (word missing?) quelques point le appareiles portatifs et autres choses qui peuvent me faciliter le travail. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2828) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert No. 837 of 11/6 on 2219 hours. Les cotes d'Allemagne et ouest de Dannemarque ne sont pas exclues dans les discours, malgre qu'on souligne la distance difficult du transport et de protection aerienne. On souligne possibilite de surprise. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2829) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 204. Hubert 835 of 11/6 on 2205 hours. Secteu Somme Dunquerque est considere comme plus possible pour attaque, mais on le fair que votre defense y est tres fort. Neanmois apres les experience actuels ils peuvent juger que le succes ne serait pas exclue. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2832) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 195. Hubert No. 832 of 11/6 on 2128 hours. Sujet Fusag. Ilm'est difficile de penetrer dans le (5 corrupt poss. champ) d'operation(s) cas mes relations personnel(le)s sont encore faibles. Le (14 corrupt) au sujet de secret tres severes et en principele(s) officiers de liaison allies sent tenus a part. Neamonis je suis oblige d'etre toujours (remainder corrupt and lost).

12.6.44 (Isba 2833) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 202. Hubert No. 842 of 11/6/ 2248 hours. En principe je voudrai les avoir (6 corrupt) pres de la cote et dans les endroites ou ils ne seront pas detruits. Tout mon travail depend de vos preparatifs. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2837) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 205. Hubert 843 of 11/6/ 2251 hours. Je ne sais pas si vous voulez chasser les alies ver la mer ou de les attirer au fond du pays pour les y battre quant un certain nombre des divisions sera deja sur le continent. Dans ce deuzieme cas je vous prie de prepareer un certain nombre de postes et de personnes sures. Avec ma position actruelle, ma connaissance de France et mon experience je peux faire un bon travail et non seulement une improvisation come jusq'a ce moment-la. Hubert.

12.6.44 (Isba 2938) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. No. 2 Service Message. In order to resume monitoring of Hubert we ask you to give the next QRX time. At the same time the old arrangements and abbreviations for the Domaene (Ast Hamburg W/T station) Wilja (= Ast Wiesbaden) contact traffic concerning Hubert come in force again. Wilja (= Wiesbaden) (AOB, had there been some doubt on Hubert's trustfulness?)

14.6.44 (Isba 2861) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. 220? Hubert 847, sent 14/6, received 2107/14/6. messages reads. Je viens d'apprendre que la troisieme armees englobe actuellement 37ieme corps USA commandement a Chelmsford. Espere le visiter dans 2 ou 3 jours. Hubert.

18.6.44 (Isba 2912) Berlin-Arras. No. 24 Hubert Nr. 858 of 17th, received on 18/6 1521 hours. Stichling. Sujet. Bombardement. Chopin va ramasser les nouvelles car he viens rarement a Londres. Une a tombe chez nous a Stains la huit 16 au 17 en detruisant. 2 maisons et en dommageant les autres. 2 autres dans la region de Wentworth. Hubert. (AOB, might we encounter signs of V 1 damages? As according Google the V1 bombardments did start on 13 June 1944)

18.6.44 (Isba 2913) Berlin-Arras. No. 22 Stichling. Hubert No. 859, sent on 17/6, received on 18/6/1707 hours. Contents. Suite. A Londres d'appres ce que j'entends, les bombes (V1) n'ont pas cause les degats speciales. Je ne pouvais pas encore obtenir les details precis mais j'ai l'impression que la dispersion est grande, qui peut etre causee par le vent fort. Hubert.

AOB, please bear in mind, that the Abwehr was in a process of merging with the R.S.H.A. controlled Amt VI / Mil/Amt.

18.6.44 (Isba 2914) Berlin-Arras (the latter area was from where Vi rockets had been fired on England) Stichling (the code-name of the Amt VI / Amt Mil section) Hubert No. 860, sent on 17/6, received 18/6 1710 hours. Contents. J'entends que les Anglais essaient (de)les faire descendre deja sur le cote. Le barrage au-dessus de Londres est aussi fort. Hubert.

24.6.44 (Isba 2965) Arras-Berlin. 3. To Domaene (W/T station to K.d.M. Hamburg) from Arco. Stichling. Contents. Nous n'avons pas le ca te Bartholomew echelle 2 inches mais la carte Bartholomew echelle 3½ inches. Utilsez. Utilesez cette carte.

24.6.44 (Isba 2967) Berlin-Arras. Stichling. Hubert No. 861. Composed 23/6 T.O.I. (Time of Intercept) 24/6 1725 hours. Contents:- Mon colonel (does Hubert / Walenty / Brutus addresses this message towards Reile, called colonel, albeit that he actually was Obstlt.?) . Ne pouvais pas transmettre details sur East Anglia, car he suis directement a Staines et pas a Londres. Conditions difficiles a cause de (V1) bombardement. Malheureusement pendant mon absence Chopin a recu l órdre d'evacuation. Il est parti a Reading dans leur autre atelier. ferons les arrangements pour transferer maintenant les appareils bien caches dans quelques point de la France pour eviter (10 missed) difficultes dans l'avenir. Hubert.

24.6.44 (Isba 2968) Berlin-Arras. Stichling. Hubert No. 862. Composed 23/6 T.O.I. 24/6 1735 hours. Contents: Avant le depart Chopin m'a laisse quelques details sur les dommages le 19 de bonne heure (4 corrupt) tomba a Richmond et an autre a Twickenham Junction. Le 17 une a Clapham Junction et autre Putney High Street, dans la nuit de 18 a 19 bombs a Isleworth. Le 20 autre a Mams (or Fzen) Hubert.

24.6.44 (Isba 2869) Berlin-Arras. Stichling Hubert No. 863. Composed 23/6 T.O.I. (Time of Intercept) 24/6 on 1740 hours. Contents. Suite. Ne peux pas trouver la carte Pharus. Dans lávenir utiliserai carte Bartholomew, echelle 2 inches. Hubert.

AOB: apparently there must have existed also communication from Germany towards Walenty/ Brutus / Hubert; which would be interesting to digest this also. But I suppose, this will not have been stored for later considerantions.

24.6.44 (Isba 2970) Berlin-Arras. Stichling Hubert No. 870. Composed 24.6 received 24/6 on 2013 hours. Contents: Essayerai venir a Londres au cours de la semaine. Ecoutez toujours regulierement. Hubert.

24.6.44 (Isba 2995) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert 868 sent off on 23/6, received on 24/6 at 2005 hours, contents: Woodbridge traces centres de la 61íeme division brit. et d'une division blindee brit. avec totem tete de taureau dans le trangle jaune renverse. Hubert.

24.6.44 (Isba 2996) Hamburg-Wiesbaden. Hubert No. 864, T.O.O. (time of origin) 23/6, received 24/6 1937 hours. Contents: Dans Fusai (? Fusag) Eisenhower a rendu dernierement quelques visites a Weyhforth? pour assister a des conference imoprotantes. Hubert.

25.6.44 (Isba 3003) Arras-Berlin. No. 2 For Sabine (= W/T station of K.d.M. formerly KOP, Madrid) Stichling (= Amt VI or Amt/Mil). We have the Bartholomew map scale 3½ inches. Use this map Arco (AOB, I suppose the cover-name of the one who handles this kind of communications in Arras or Berlin).

24.6.44 (Isba 3004) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. No. 3 Please transmit Hubert nos 864 and 865.

12.6.44 (Isba 1192) Berlin-Belgrade. To Armeegruppe. G Ic (Ic = the officer in charge for intelligence concerning the direct enemy) F Ic Heeresgruppe, E Ic Panzer AOK 2 (Armeeoberkommando). Sitrep? West. No. 1293 of 11/6/44. 1 Great Britain: The 47th English inf. div. hitherto assumed in Porthmouth region, was moved? at an unknown time to the Southend area (north bank of) in the Thames estuary region, according to tallying reports from various sources. According to an Abwehr source (Hubert?) which has reported correctly for a long time, the 2nd English Airborne div., hitherto assumed to be at an unknown place in the Western Mediterranean area, is in the area of Grantham (30 km east of Nottingham). It thus seems possible that this formation, some of it with battle experience, .... in exchange for ... (rest lost).

2.7.44 (Isba 3111) Berlin-Arras. Stichling. Hubert 882, sent on 5.7, received on 6/7 2020 hours. Contents: Subject: La Carte. Pour le moment je vais continuer d'apres la carte Batholomew, echelle 2 inchs. Vous peuves reconstruir me? cartes sur votre carte car j'ai donne les precisions necessaires. Hubert.

5.7.44. (Isba 3118) Berlin-Arras. Stichling. Hubert No. 875 of 3/7, received 5.7. on 2126 hours. Contents. J'ai visitie l'aerodrome de Staplehurst. Japlis (= J'appris?) 19me Tactical Air Command occupe actuellement les aerodromes dans le Kent, compose de U.S.A. wings dont chaque compose de 4 groupes destinee dans l'avenir a la cooperation et support de Fusag. Son commandement apasse le 16 a 18 juin les exercices avec etat Major de Fusag. Domaene (Domäne W/T station to K.d.M. Hamburg, formerly Ast Hamburg) addendum "Japiis" not clear.

6.7.44 (Isba 3119) Berlin-Arras. Stichling (= likely the cover-name of Amt/Mil the successor of the former Ausland/Abwehr) Hubert 876, sent 3/7, received 6/7 on 1910 hours. Contents: L'aerodrome Staplehurst stationnent squadron, 380, 321, and 322 equipes de Mustang. Ils participent actuellement dans al chasse de bombes volantes. Avions sont armes de mitrailleuses calibre 5 et sont consideres bons pour cette tache. Hubert.

2.7.44 (Isba 3071) Arras-Berlin 1. To Domaene (= W/T section of K.d.M., formerly Ast Hamburg). Stichling. Why does not (V-Mann 6767 report? Sgd. Arco (a one from K.d.M. / Ast. Arras) (K.d.M. = Kommandomeldegebied).

2.7.44 (Isba 3072) Berlin-Arras. Stichling. Hubert No. 873, sent 1.7, received 2.7 on 2047 hours. Contents: Nuit 23-24 une chez nous a Staines. Nuit 24-25 une a Staplehurst dans Lskene (Le kent), sture dans lower Thames Street, carré 10 F. Nuit 22-23 une Buckingham Gate, carré 9 H, Bruit 22-23 une a Sunbury, ouest de Londres. La nuit 25 (June) une a Filten Roadm carré 9 H. (rapports on V1 hits). Hubert.

2.7.44 (Isba 3073) Berlin-Arras. Hubert No. 874 sent 1/7, received 2/7 on 2233 hours. Stichling (Controller of Amt/Mil or Amt VI in Berlin). Contents: Nuit 26 une (V1 attack) a Southfield Road, carré 3 G, autre Brichlands Avenue, carré 8 K, autre Thompson Avenue, carré 3 J, autre Albert Road, carré 3 H, une a cote de London-Bridge, carré iiG, autre a cote de metro Elgin Avenue, carré 2 K, autre Egham, autre Woldingham Way, ouest de Londres. (AOB all data concerned V1 flying-bomb hits on peripheral London) Hubert.

?.6.44 (Isba 1240) Berlin-Salonika. Situation report West 10/6/44. 1) Great Britain. According to credible Abwehr reports, the American 28th div. which was previously assumed to be in the area round Dover, has been transferred to the Harwich area. The American inf. div. which was previously presumed to be in Norwich area, the number of which is unknown, may be the 35th inf. div. according fresh findings. According to the credible Abwehr report (Berlin likely mixing in knowledge, by Hubert?) it is alleged to be in the area of Brandwood (about 30 km north-east of London) at present. Further, the American 5th div. has been reported by a credible Abwehr source as being with the group of American Forces in the area of Norwich - Ipswich. presumable this is the Armoured Div. of the unknown number which was at first assumed to be in Cornwall, but which has not been confirmed there for a considerable time. (short passage corrupt area of Ipswich the American XII Army Corps was named (Remainder missing).

?.6.44 (Isba 1812) Berlin-Belgrade. To Heeresgruppe E, Ic (Ic = officer in charge of enemy intelligence) (passage corrupt) To Panzer AOK 2 (Armee Oberkommando 2) Ic To Heeresgruppe F Ic Secret (Geheim) Situation report West No. 1307 of 25.6.44 I Great Britain (England). According to an unconfirmed V-Mann report the American XXXVII Army Corps is in the Harwich area and SW thereof with the subordinated American 7th Arm'd Div. (Chelmsford region) and the American 59th Inf. Div. (Harwich region). The 7th Arm'd may be the div. of an unknown number which from information previously received was at first supposed to be in s.w England. The 59th Inf. Div. is presumably the American Infantry, still in Great Britain (England) number unknown, which has hitherto been assumed to be in Scotland area for lack of further information, but for some time past has not been confirmed there any more. II. Northern France. a) Enemy activity. 2nd English Army east of the Orne Local enemy attack repelled (abgewiesen). After the mopping-up on 24/6 of the enemy penetration at Hottot the enemy went over to attack on 25/6 on both sides of Tilly-sur-Seulles after heavy artillery preparations (Vorbereitung). No report have been received yet on the course of the battles. 1st American Army. In the area S. and W. of Carentan (6 corrupt and lost) M/T movements. In the attack on Cherbourg the enemy thrust into the centre of the town with artillery and air support. b) Sea situation. (rest lost).

(AOB: Just the day after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler took place; which changed the attitude due to the total control by the R.S.H.A. Amt VI / Amt Mil, in Berlin)

21.7.44 (Isba 3307) Paris-Wiesbaden. No. 68. Ref. Hubert. Employment of Lehar w will not take place. Money is in Hamburg. Employment of Fritzchen with money and Leica (camera) for Hubert was carried out with success. (AOB: the route was via an address in Lisbon / Portugal, managed via KOP there) Please get into contact with Rittmeister (= Hptm. / Captain) von Groening, at the Dienststelle at this end (Abwehr Leitstele Paris).

30.7.44 (Isba 3324) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. No. 8 Hubert No. 937 received 1542 hours. Suite. En plus j'ai ou a Gratham quelque soldats de la 2ieme Division Airborne Brit. Qui serait partie vers le sud. Hubert.

8.8.44 (Isba 3432) Paris-Wiesbaden. No. 37. For Major Jennewein (= officer of K.d.M. - formerly - Ast Wiesbaden) Ref. supplying Hubert. Fritz proproses that it be deposited at a cloak-room and the ticket of the deposit be sent to Hubert (AOB, maybe it delt with handing over the money and Leica camera in Lisbon towards London?), or that the articles be concealed in the Central or North London whereupon Hubert would be informed from your end (Wiesbaden, why not K.d.M. Hamburg?) about hiding place. Report your decision. Sgd. Born.

14.8.44 (Isba 3473) Berlin-Paris. 38. Secret (Geheim). For Britta, Ref. England. Hubert of ~~KDO DM~~ K.d.M. (Kommando Meldegebiet) Wiesbaden reports on 13/8/44. Here are the details about the air landing exercises visited. In company with other officers of Fusag (spoof: First United States Army Group), I attended exercises of the second British air borne div. in Netheravon north of Bulford on 8/8 '44. The state of training of this div. is very high. Numerous officers were already in action with the 6th British air borne div. and a number of the men have likewise collected practical experience in Normandy. The composition of the 2nd air borne div. is as follows: 11th and 12th parachute infantry brigade and 13th air born brigade. Each brigade is composed of three battalions. In addition there is an Air Landing Reconnaissance Squadron, No. 6, and an Air Landing Artillery Regiment. The Commander of the division is Major general D'Arcy who formerly commanded the 9th armoured div. Especially (13 letters missing) is the extraordinary mobility of these units. Each single man has means of locomotion, (14 corrupt and missing) the well known small motor cycles which can be folded up and have a relatively high speed. Artillery is also very strong. It consists chiefly of 25 pounders and AA (Air Artillery) weapons. It is taken along in gliders and can be loaded on Jeeps after the landing. I also saw flame throwers mounted on M.T. with radius of action up to 20 metres. Addendum Mil B - L (Amt Mil section B subsection L in Berlin): Inquiries are in progress regarding brigade numbers. Ludwig (someone at: Amt Mil or N.B.O.; both in Berlin) No. 01690.

15.8.44 (Isba 3633) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. Please send us Hubert Nos. 974, 976, 977 and 978.

30.7.44 (Isba 3646) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. No. 4 Hubert called you in vain today from 1500 GST (GMT) We (Wiesbaden) took over traffic at 1520 hrs. and received messages 934 to 941 which will be given subsequently. Hubert gave QRX nest TMV? Wilja (= Wiesbaden)

30.7.44 (Isba 3647) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 5. Hubert No. 934. received 1527 hrs. Je veux visiter le commandement de la 20ieme Airborne Division a Fulbeck Manor a cote de Grantham. Commandant le general Cutler. Totem: 1e mot. Airborne jaune sur le bande noir et au sessous, sur le cercle bleu, 2 images blanches superposes traverses par 3 foudres jaunes. Hubert.

30.7.44 (Isba 3648) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 6. Hubert No. 935 received 1532 hrs. On me dit que l'autre division sur Orne porte le numero 9, est stationee dans Leicestershire at appartienne a la 14ieme armee.

30.7.44 (Isba 3649) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 7. Hubert No. 936 received 1538 hrs. Suite. Dans toute la region de Grantham grand quantite de Dacotas et de planeurs. Certains planeurs sont tres grands et peuvement emporter 50 soldats ou 2 voitures Jeep avec personel et equipment. Comme j'ai deja signal, certain planeurs sont equipes de 2 petits moteurs. Hubert.

30.7.44 (Isba 3650) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 8. Hubert No. 937 received 1542 hrs. Suite. En plus j'ai vu a Grantham quelques soldats de la 2ieme division Airborne Brit. qui semble partir vers le sud. Hubert.

30.7.44 (Isba 3651) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 9. Hubert No. 938 received at 1604 hours. J'appris que la 20ieme Airborne division doit les exercisses aves 9ieme Troopcarrier Command le 26 et 27 juillet. C'est dommage que je ne suis pas y arrive a ce moment la car il faut attacher und grande importance a la role de Airborne unites dans les operations futures. Hubert.

30.7.44 (Isba 3652) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 11. Hubert No 940 received at 1617 hours. Dans le commandement de cette division j'ai vu les soldats de la 48ieme U.S.A. division d'infanterie. Ils y passent prendre part dans le combat apres l'atterissage, tandis que personel du 9ieme Troopcarrier Command reste comme non-combatant. Hubert.

30.7.44 (Isba 3653) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. 12. Hubert No 941 received 1621 hrs. Composition de la 20ieme Airborne Division: 277ieme regiments des planeurs et 521ieme regiment des parachutistes. Hubert.

30.7.44 (Isba 3669) Wiesbaden-Hamburg. Hubert No. 939 received 1612 hrs. Details sujet Airborne Division USA. Cooperation etroite avec Troopcarrier Command, dans ce cas avec 9ieme. Avions pour parachutistes type Dacota et planeurs lourdes. Les avions doivent etre utilises quelques fois pendant la journee d'operations. Aussi une partie des planeures doivent etre repris par les avions par les instalations speciales sans necissite d'atterrir. Hubert.

21.6.44 (Isba 2935) Arras-Berlin. Stichling. No. 2 From Arco to Domaene (W/T station of K.d.M. Hamburg; formerly Ast Hamburg) Demandons d'urgence et regulierement des nouvelles comme il a ete convenu.

12.7.44 (Isba 3162) Arras-Berlin. 2. To Domaene. Stichling. Contents: Certains espaces determines d'advance seront bombarde (V1 related) prochainement. La date vous en sera communiques a temps. On attache und grande valeur a l'indication de lieu et de l'heure de chute des engines ainsi que des degats causes. Arco.

13.9.44 (Isba 3791) Berlin-Wiesbaden. 34. Secret (Geheim). To ~~KDM~~ K.d.M. Wiesbaden for Hubert (thus concerning a query to be forwarded towards Hubert) Y a-t-il encore officiers de liaison du Eight Fighter Command pres de Fusag? Quel est leur devoir? Avez-vous observe execices du Eight Fighter Command en correspondance avec certaines unites de Fusag? Colonel 04038.(?)

13.9.44 (Isba 3792) Berlin-Wiesbaden. 36. Secret (Geheim) To K.d.M. Wiesbaden. For Hubert. Quels buts operatifs sont envisages pour First Allied Airborne Army? Quand et en quelle direction se dirigeratelle? Obst. Mil /Amt No. 10588/9/44 Geheim.

13.9.44 (Isba 3794) Berlin-Wiesbaden. 31. Secret (Geheim) To K.d.M. Wiesbaden for Hubert. Quelssont les prenoms des generaux brit. Molgan Chef de la 4me Armee et Erskine Chef de la 5me Division brit. Airborne ? Obst. Mil / Amt section B subsection H No. 10587 (Geheim).

12.9.44 (Isba 3801) Berlin-Wiesbaden. 28. To K.d.M. Wiesbaden for Hubert. Y-a-t-il preperatifs pour operations contre nord de Norvege (Norwegen) en vue de la situation actuelle Finlande? Obst. C.d.s.u.d ?? SD?? Amt /Amt B II No. 11320/9/44/ (Geheim).

20.9.44 (Isba 3812) Berlin-Stn Westerwald (likely Taunus area or a site near to Wiesbaden Frontaufklärung Leiter Obstlt. Herlitz) ZF 83 Secret (Geheim). When transfer is effected it is intended to place at V-Mann (7167) Hubert's disposal the W/T set brought to Parkstadt (= Paris) by Stock. Your agreement to this is requested, likewise exact statement of location. Alfons. 12436.

15.9.44 (Isba 3815) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 46. For Amt Mil B. Subject England. Airborne landing planned. Hubert reports on 14/9/44 message 63. D'apres un de mes camarades j'apprends que le premiere brigade de parachutistes polonais devait prendre part dans une operation airborne contre Pas de Calais 1 (?) 3 septembre et que l'operation a ete suppremee a cause d'avance rapide de la vingtunieme groupe d'armee. On garde en grand secret sujet airborne preparatifs et mon informateur ne connaissait pas meme les numeros de unities du premier Airborne Corps Brit. Message no. 46. D'Autre part j'apprends justement quíl, avait dernerement une grande (11 missing) H.Q. de Allied Airborn Army et qu'on a (10 corrupt) la deuxieme Task Force. Message Nr. 65 has already been sent in advance. Message 66. Ca semble confiirmer mon impression generale deja transmise il y a quelques jours et speciaement quand j'appris de mouvements de la quatrieme armee dans la region Essex/Kent et d'apres mon opinion l'attaque peut etre faitre par la Task Force speciale que j'ai (? deja) signalee comme adjointe a la quatrieme arme Brit.

21.9.44 (Isba 3863) Westerwald-Berlin. No. 133 For Alfons. Your 83 (Isba 3812). Approval for buried set with 50.000 French francs. (AOB, you might remember the place might have to found (P41) (P41return) (just dealing with these latter very facts). Details at conference with Born, who arrives at your end in a few days. Description of site as a precaution: on road Paris - Maux nears kilometre stone (3 corrupt) 3 km 9 on the narrow side, broad side once (einmal) Clye (Claye) 2.3. km and Maux 12.4 km 5 metres down from the stone in the ditch under a mark in the grass, 10 cm deep. Born. (please notice the foregoing P41 ↑ link!)

22.9.44 (Isba 3880) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 82. For Mil Amt B. Hubert reports on 22/9: message 78. Je dois partir demain passer quelques jour a Blackpool. message 79. Dans les dernier jours on a entendu ici quelques explosions mysterieuze qui ont cause une certaine curiosite. Dans mon quartier general on suppose qu'ils peuvent etre les V 2 (first German ballistic rocket with an average range of 250 km). Est-ce vrai ? Wiesbaden addendum: Answer for Hubert requested. Wiesbaden No. 401/9/44 Secret (Geheim) Jennewein (= officer to K.d.M. Wiesbaden).

24.9.44 (Isba 3887) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 133. For Alfons (text identical with first part of Isba 3863. On road Paris - Meaux kilometre stone N 3 km ... notice: foregoing link P41↑ ...

16.9.44 (Isba 3902) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 48. Secret (Geheim) For Amt Mil B, Subject: 9th USA Army. Hubert reports on 15/9/44: J'ai lu dans les journaux que la neuvieme armee USA est actuallement en France. J'ai verifie immediatement et on m'a confirme qu'elle est sous douzieme groupe d'armees USA/ K.d.M. Wiesbaden. No. 276/9/44Ia. Secret of 16/9/44. Steffan.

16.9.44 (Isba 3903) Berlin-Wiesbaden. 49. To K.d.M. Wiesbaden. Secret (Geheim). To Hubert: Y-a-t-il a part 1st Allied Army und 2nd Allied Airborne Army? Quel numero porte corps Brit. Airborne auquel appartient brigade polonaise? Comment s'appelle commandant de ce corps? Quelles division lui appartiemment ? Brereton est - il sous les ordres de Witt? Quelle division Airborne se trouve deja en France? Ou sont concentrees unit de Gliders en GB? Obst Mil B-H 10590/9/44 Geheim.

16.9.44 (Isba 3904) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 51. For Amt Mil B. Geheim. Ref. our 229/9/44 been forwarded Hubert says secret I A of 12/9 concerning Hubert stating that his proposals had been forwarded Hubert says in No. 67 on 15/9/44: merci. Faites ce que vouz pouvez pour amelorer la situation a Prusikow. K.d.M. Wiesbaden. No. 275/9/44. Geheim A of 16/9/44. Steffan.

19.9.44 (Isba 3916) Wiesbaden -Berlin. No. 62. For Amt Mil B. Hubert reports with messages No. 70 to 72. Je crois que vous et mois nous pouvons etre contents du travail fait deja et specialement dans les conditions sidifficiles. J'ai transmis tant de details sur ordre de bataille et la situation generale que je ?iis que je ne suis plus utile ici. Maintenant apres les manouvres retardatrices excellentes vous etes sur la ligne Siegfried et sans doubte vous avez les meilleurs conditions pour conclure la paix dans l'ouest. Wiesbaden No. 319 Geheim. Steffan 71.

21.9.44 (Isba 3947) Wiesbaden-Berlin. No. 77. For Amt Mil B. Wiesbaden. Hubert reports 2?? Message 76 Sujet: attaque Airborne. Je viens d'apprendre (12 letters corrupt) du ler Corps Airborn Brit. et 18ieme Corps Airborne USA. et pas du Task Force come suppose par moi. D/ apres ce queje sais ce Task Force est toutjopurs pret pour l'operation avec la 4ieme armee. Englobe la 2ieme and 7ieme Div. Airborne USA et la 2ieme Div. (supplement: British). Addendum: Message 77. Nothing fresh. 993 already communicated in 27 and 48. Jennewein (Wiesbaden) No. 375/9/44 Geheim.

27.9.44 (Isba 3959) Wiesbaden-Berlin. No. 100. To Amt Mil B (Geheim). Hubert radios 26/9 message 80. Rentre de notre ecole a Blackpool. Peu de troupes et attitude calme. Ai constate qu'il y a des traces de la 38ieme div. infanterie. Totem. croise jaune sur blason noir et on m'a dit que son H.Q. se trouve a Saint Annes et quúne partie de la division reste sur la cote au service de camps.

29.9.44 (Isba 4009) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 11. For Amt Mil. B ref. convoy. Hubert messages 81 to 84. Situation navale: J'appris quún convoi de 76 bareaux vient d'arriver de nuit. Ils sont disperses ayant passe le Nord d'Irelande. 15 vaisseaux sont arrives a Liverpool 21st Sept. dont indentifie: De Cavina 7000 tons, Manchester Trader et Cornebroop dúne pareille grandeur. Quelques vaisseaux. (Contd.)

1.10.44 (Isba 4067) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 2. For Amt Mil B. Ref. Amt Mil B No. 13347/26/9/44. Hubert No. 100 of 30/9. D'apres ce que je sais on a lance environ 2500 planeurs contre Hollande (65 lost) Allies mais je sais quíl y a toujours une enorme quantité en GB. Wiesbaden 9/20/44 Geheim I. A.

1.10.44 (Isba 4068) Wiesbaden-Berlin. For Amt Mil B. Ref your 04038 (Burg (= Berlin) 34). (15 lost) 29/9/ with message 93. Quand j'etais a Fusag il y avait des officiers de la 8me Airforce et je peux confirmer que les exercices avaient lieu entre Fusag 8me Airforce et la 9me Tactical Airforce. Wiesbaden 26/10/44 Geheim I.A.

1.10.44 (Isba 4069) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 5. For Amt Mil B. Hubert signals on 20.9 with message 94: J'esperre visiter mon Colonel (spoof Polish) a Wennworth dimanche et notre q squadron a Lasham lundi. Wiesbaden I.A.

1.10.44 (Isba 4070) Wiesbaden-Berlin. (Contin.) on a utilise vers 25 aerodromes/ D'apres ce que je sais il y a 2 phases d'operation airborne. Dans la premier les parachutistes doivent sémparer de terrain et s'etablir et la deuxieme ou le materiel lourd peut atterrir par les gliders.

1.10.41 (Isba 4071) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 6. For Abt. Amt Mil B. Ref. Amt Mil. B-H 10590/9/44 Secret (Geheim) Suject: Airborne divs. in France. Hubert signals on 30/9, message 95: Je n'ai rien entendu des division airborne en France. Il est possible quand meme qu'il y reste les elements de la 6me Div. Airborne Brit. Wiesbaden 12/10/ 44 Secret (Geheim) I. A.

1.10.44 (Isba 4072) Wiesbaden-Berlin. For Amt Mil B. Ref. Amt Mil B - H 12208/9 secret (Geheim) of 20/9 (received here 25/9). Hubert reports 30/9, message 96; Sujet, operation airborne. J'appris que ppur cette operation on a forme une allied airborne force composee (14 corrupt) tiree de 18me Corps Airborne USA et de 1er Corps Airborne Brit. Addendum: SWimilar to Hubert 76. Message 97; Suite. Motamment la 82me et 101me Div. USA et la 1 ere Div. Message 97; Suite Montamment la 82me et 101me Div. USA et la 1ere Div. Brit. et 1ere Brigade de parachutistes polonais. Wiesbaden 1/10/44 Geheim I. A.

1.10.44 (Isba 4073) Wiesbaden-Berlin. For Amt Mil B. Ref. Amt Mil. B/H No. 12909 Hubert radioes on 29/9 in message 89. Je ne recconnais aucuana trace de la huitieme division blindee Brit. La soixanteunnie,e div. inf. brit. sont englobes par le sprieme corps brit. Les quelles etainet stationnees, comme j'ai signale, respectivement a Wye et Canterburry. Come je sais qu'il y avait des chargement dans la quatrieme armeem? j'assayerai de decouvrir si ces divisions on charge de location. Inquiry as to present location of inf. div. not yet answered. Hubert had already reported its subordination in message 4. Wiesbaden No. 27/10/44.

1.10.44 (Isba 4089) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 3. For Amt Mil, B/H 10590/9/55 Secret (Geheim). Last question. Hubert No. 99 of 30/9. Sujet, concentration de Gliders. La derniere attaque Airborne a ete meme(e) de plusieurs regions notament Grantham. Cheltenham, Andover et Oxford, Chopin (W/T assistent! signale qu'une grande partie de l'armade a passe au-dessus de Reading. (Remainder not to hand). Wiesbaden No. 8/10/44 Secret (Geheim) (Roman) I.A.

1.10.44 (Isk 118672) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 4. For Amt Mil B. Ref. Amt Mil B/H 10590/9/44 Secret (Geheim). Hubert 98 of 30/9. Je n'ai rien entendu en Angleterre il est possible qu'il a líntention de former une 2ieme Armee. Wiesbaden No. 10/10/44 Secret (Geheim).

3.10.44 (Isba 4177) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 15. For Amt Mil B. Hubert radioes on 2/10 message 101. Je peux dire que les 3 divisions et la brigade de parachutiste(s) par les 38eme et 46 em groups brit. et la 9me USA Troops Carrier Command. Addendum refers to Herbert 97 message 102. Comme deja signale je peux supposer les allies peuvent transporter une force aitrborne deux fois grandes. Wiesbaden No. 53/10 Secret (Geheim) I A.

6.10.44 (Isba 4131) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 26 To Burg (= Berlin) for Amt Mil B Hubert message 105 of 4/10. Retourne de Wentworth et (18 letters missing) squadron Lasham. La region toujours occupee par la qutorzieme armee U.S.A. L'atmosphere (5 corrupt) Wiesbaden I A.

6.10 44 (Isba 4215) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 34. For Amt Mil B Hubert message 105 of 5/10 106. Pas de details recuillis (50 missing corrupt) unieme et 80me Div, Inf. Brit, retirees du 7me Corps mais restent a Wye et Canterbury. Addendum CF Hubert 89 107. H.Q. 7me Corps maintenant quelque part sud de Newmarket englobe 5me Div. Inf. Brit. Addendum. The armoured Div. stationed in Newmarket district according to Hubert 13 inf. Div up to now with 2nd Engl. AC according to Hubert 987 108. La 4ieme Armee a son HQ dans la region de Witham (20 km SW of Colchester) Wiesbaden I. A.

6.10.44 Wiesbaden-Berlin. 35. For Amt Mil B Hubert 109 of 5/10. C'etait difficile de definir le stade de preparatifs d'apres le HQ. sans visiter les unites. Je ne peux pas definir s'il y a de changement des plans a la suite de votre succes a Arnheim mais on m'a dit qu'i;s sont maintenant tres occupes dans le HQ. Wiesbaden I.A.

7.10.44 (Isba 4126) Wiesbaden-Berlin. Nt. 38 For Amt Mil B Ref. Wiesbaden No. 364/9/44 Secret (Geheim) I.A. of 20/9. Hubert message No. 110 j'espere que mes nouvelles vous ont (? assure - doubtful) Arnheim. On m'a dit que General Sasabo ici commandant de notre brigade a deconseille l'operation de Arnheim comme un risque trop grande Addendum. Hubert seem to expect praise for message 67 (?ff - text doubtful). Nothing has been done about it yet at this end. Wiesbaden I.A.

7.10.44 (Isba 4127) Wiesbaden - Berlin. 39. For Amt Mil B Secret (Geheim) ref. Wiesbaden 25/10 I.A. Secret (Geheim). Hubert message 111. j'ai trouve la response sujet General Morgan Initiales W.D. Wiesbaden. No. 142/10. I.A. Secret (Geheim).

7.10.44 (Isba 4128) Wiesbaden-Berlin. For Amt Mil B. Ref Hubert W/T message 105. Hubert radioes on 6/10 in No. 112. Dápres me visite a Lasham je peux dire que la 14mr armee USA occupe toujours le sud Angleterre. La 33me corps semble rester toujours dans la region de Southampton. Wiesbaden No. 143/10 I.A. Secret (Geheim).

8.10.44 (Isba 4149) 44. For Amt Mil B. Hubert message 113 of 7/10 dans la region Basinstoke Alton je pouvais les totems dedifferentes divisions plusieurs soldats Airborne apparenant probablement a la 2me division Airborne deja signale a Bulford. Addendum refers to Hubert 948 and 949 of 9/8. Wiesbaden No. 152/10/44 I.A. Secret (Geheim)

8.10.44 (Isba 4151) Wiesbaden-Berlin. 46. For Amt Mil B. 11th American inf. and 25th American arm'div. Hubert 7/10 message 114. Suite. Soldats et voitures de la 11me div. inf. USA qui semble occuper region plus au sud-ouest de cote de Winchester et de la 25me div. blindee USA qui semble etre stationee plus a l'ouest dans la region Andover. message 115. Unites identifiees de la div. Message 116 de la 25th div. blindee 448me Field Artillary bataillon Wiesbaden No. 153/10/44. Secret (Geheim) I.A.

26.12.44 (Isk 130452) (K51) (K51return) Lisbon-Berlin. 707 ~~Baette~~ Babette (Sibelius?) for Mate (Sachbearbeiter at Amt Mil B)(= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen Obstlt. KV 2/1975). Ref. your message 12773/12 (not received) 1) Notes can be delivered in London via Draht Dulce. 2) 2) Method of issue as discussed with Mate Apitsch end of November. Notes will be brought by Huetten courier (courier from Switzerland) from Lisa (KOP in Lisbon) to London and consignment issued by post to Club wither as a whole or in part as Draht thinks best. 3) Date immediately on receiving of notes. They will be sent off by next Huetten (Huette or Hütte = Switzerland) courier, who admittedly does not go regularly, but certainly every 14 days. Feder (Balhorn, real name: Hans Brandes; half Jewish; who lived in Portugal - but whom had rather close contacts with KOP up to the bitter end in 1945) http://www.cdvandtext2.org/Klatt-Ostro-Josephine.mp4 (Chapter III)

Addendum Hyon (cover-name of: Leiter KO Portugal Obst. d. L. Dr. Rolf Frederici) posting of notes to be sent. We point out that in currency traffic in case of pound notes larger than £5 - frequently certificate of origin has to be produced, also acc. to experience thare are many counterfeit notes in circulation. Forros Hyon. (Forros = Hyon = Frederici Leiter KOP in Lisbon)

8.1.45 (Isk 132473) (N52) (N52return) Lisbon-Berlin. 92 To Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen Obstlt. KV 2/1975). Ref. your 12773/12 our message 707 of 26/12. 1) next opportunity for despatch to Draht (his other cover name Fundus) is from 14/? According to Daily Mails of December '44 the British treasury has forbidden bank notes of iver? £10 as legal tender Feder (= Balhorn / Hans Brandes) Forros (= Leiter KOP Obst. Frederici)

(U47) (U47return) (X28) (X28return) (Y29) ↓↓ (Y29return) (Z29) ↓↓ (Z29return) (L51) (L51return) (M52) (M52return) (P52) (P52return) (J72) (J72return)

11.1.45 (Isk 133514) Berlin-Lisbon. 29. Secret (Geheim) Ref. your 92 of 8/1 para 1. For Harry (= Leiter I KOP Dr. Schreiber) for Feder (= Balhorn / Brandes). Please give orders by quickest route to Draht to send Squadron Leader Romone (Ramon) Wings Club, Grosvenor Place by some inconspicuous means as a small parcel or a letter £ 2,000 English notes. These can be sent over by messenger or by post. Draht (might this have been Zig Zag?) must manage the payment in such a way that he himself can in no way be compromised, Money must be advanced by Draht in London and will be supplied in Devisen as desired. Report when commission has been sent off to London. Babette Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen Obstlt. KV 2/1975) 12773/12.

3.2 45 (Isba 6090) Stn Romme?? - Wiesbaden. No. 2 To Wilja (= Wiesbaden) for Tazy No. 1. From Romme. Peux enfin indiquer endroit ou argent est depose. Allez Route Nationale jusque la pierre militaire avec inscription cote large Claye 2, 3 km Meaux 12,4 km cote mince Route Nationale 3 km. 9 (Q42) (Q42return) Please read the story provided down the (Q42) hyperlink. du mileu du fosse cote tallus 10 cm sous sol valise contenant post et 50,000 Frcs. Gardez le post. Laisses le secher. Vous demandrai plus tard le deposer quelque part. Amities Willy.

10.2.45 (Isba 6177) Nastaetten (Westerwald) - Goor (Poker) (AOB: Goor likely a place in the eastern part of the Netherlands) No. 56. Now that Tazy has been able to secure the W/T set which I burried near Paris, there is great interest in activating V-Mann Desire whom I personally consider as thoroughly reliable and politically complete on our side. I should be grateful if Charles, who has become friendly with Desire, would enquire after Desire's whereabouts, in order to activate this man who promises well. Sgd. Stock.

19.2.45 (Isk 132887) (R55) (R55return) Lisbon - Berlin. 271. To Babette for Mate (Babette likely at the reception end and Mate is the actual handling officer) Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen Obstlt. KV 2/1975) direct. 1) The assignment advised in 11749/2 are going by courier to Draht on 25/2, to be dealt with urgently. 2) Draht asked for more new valves for his set and these will be sent over by the same courier. Following this according to Draht, commencement of traffic out to be expected. 3) £3,000 sterling in £10 notes are no longer usual in circulation we shall try to change them in to smaller notes here and since English money is not in demand on the Exchange a possible (11 letters missing) is to be expected Feder (Balhorn / Hans Brandes) Hyon (= KOP Leiter Obst. Dr. Frederici)

20.2.45 (Isk 133328) Madrid - Berlin. 599 To Burg (= Berlin) for Mate direct. Exchanging £10 notes involves a minimum 1 ss of 30%. Please signal to Lisa (KOP Lisbon) whether (?minimum amount is cash corr.) or whether £10 notes are to be sent to London. Hyon (= Leiter KOP Obst. Frederici) Colon (= Guiterrez, he often signed W/T messages) No. 6558.

9.3.45 (Isk 135117) (T60) (T60return) Berlin - Lisbon. 579. To Lago (= Oblt. Wilhelm von Carnap) for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen Obstlt. KV 2/1975). direct. In re delivery of (bank) notes to V. connection in England. If the execution of the matter by the route suggests this end is still of interest (our message 400 of 23/2 not received) remittance from Debitor (= paymaster) at the earliest moment is requested, since the next courier to England leaves this end about the 20th (There existed up to the final days of the war regular passenger flights between, say, Berlin and Madrid /Lisbon; mostly accomplished by the Lufthansa) Forros, Hyon. (= Leiter KOP)

On 7.3.45 a meeting was held to discuss the future of Brutus (= Hubert in the vision of the Germans), which was attended by Colonel Wild, Colonel Hood, Mr. Mariott, Major Masterman and myself (Hugh Astor).

It was explained to the meeting that the decision had been taken by M.I.5 (Brutus / Hubert was their double-cross agent) to continue the case of Brutus (Hubert), as he still considered a secure channel, and although there was at present no obvious advantage to be gained from the case one could never foresee how events would develop, and it was felt in M.I.5 that it would be a mistake to discard this excellent channel of communication with the Germans.

Colonel Wild stated in terms that, so far as Ops. B. were concerned, they did not and never had already been taken, however, he said that he would be prepared to assist in supplying chicken-food for Brutus (Hubert) to transmit, and that he would be prepared to supply details of a certain deception plan which he had just completed. he emphasized, however, that he was the only proposing to use Brutus (Hubert) to implement this deception plan for the sake of our convenience in giving Brutus (Hubert) something to transmit, and that he would be perfectly able to implement the plan through the other channels at his disposal.

Some doubts were felt as to the wisdom of plunging Brutus (Hubert) into a deception plan after such a prolonged silence, and before accepting Colonel Wild's proposal it was decided that the Foreign Office should be consulted as to their views on continuing the case.

In accordance, therefore, with Mr. Marriott's note of 7.3.45, Major Masterman and I visited Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck at the Foreign Office on 7.3.45. Major Masterman → (page 26)

→ gave a brief explanation of the situation and of M.I.5's desire to continue the case as a form of insurance against our other channels being compromised. he pointed out that although it was felt desirable from M.I.5 oint of view to continue the case, there were nevertheless objections and difficulties to be overcome. He concluded by saying that, in spite of Colonel Wild's expressed disinterest in the case, it would be nevertheless be re-opened unless the Foreign Office raised a positive objection on diplomatic grounds.

Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck recalled the extremely delicate political aspect of this case, and said that he had only been prepared to pass political traffic in the past on the grounds that Brutus (Hubert) was one of the highest grade agents passing military deception. In view of the fact that Ops. B, SHAEF, had stated that they no longer required this channel, Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck did not feel justified to continuing to accept the diplomatic dangers involved in running in this case.

Major Masterman accepted Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck's views on the matter, and agreed to refer the case again to D.B. with the request that he should reverse his decision of 6.3.45.. In fact D.B. had already left for France when we returned from from the Foreign Office, but as a result of a conversation which he had already held with Major Masterman earlier in the day he had agreed to accept any recommendation made by Mr. Masterman in the light of his discussion with Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck.

The case Brutus (Hubert) will not, therefore, be re-opened, and on 8.3.45 I informed Colonel Hood of Ops. B that we would not participate in the new deception plan.

AOB, all efforts put in on the British side, especially on behalf of M.I.5, did not really result in misleading the German military side. The Wehrmacht, whatever been pointed against it, did, nevertheless, expect that the invasion blow would taking place somewhere in western France. Hitler - for some time to come after D-Day on 6th June 1944 - expected the main blow in the area of Calais.

Not always put clear in literature, maybe consider it: the circumstances not emphasised upon, but the impression, erroneously, was: - that the landing on the shores of Normandy, nearly instantly resulted in the liberation of France.

But, it didn't went like this, as Paris was liberated not before 25th August 1944; whereas D-Day took place on 6 June 1944. Quite a long lapse - isn't it?

Google provides: that the distance between Caen and Paris is ca. 234 km; covering this in 75 days, isn't a striking achievement; but against desperate Germans - it certainly was!

It necessitated three determined Nations: USA, the Russians - who took the real burden of the war - and the smaller British partner; before the Germans could ultimately be conquered.

I know, this wasn't a linear conflict, what I, nevertheless, would like to emphasise upon, is, that the many glorious stories told, actually had to be fought extremely tough against a well experienced and motivated enemy; which was hampered by many disadvantages - such as the total absence of air cover.

One major strategical mistake, far more reaching than all efforts of British Secret Services:- were the un-expected appearances of the Boscage barriers, in Normandy!

A tremendous cover exploited by the German troops extensively!

A second disadvantage: the Germans soon did hardly communicate by wireless means!

Consequently, the Allies lacked - for this period - intelligence based upon lower echelon communications, for several months.

Please bear always in mind, that the peculiarity of these KV 2/xxx series is that progressing page-number imply going reversed in the time-sequence!

On 23.1.45 a meeting was called by colonel Wild, which was attended by Colonel Bevan, Colonel Robertson, Major Masterman, Mr. Marriott, Mr. Milmo, Mr. Stamp, Mr. Wilson, Major Wells of S.O.E., Captain Vaudreuil (Frenchman) and myself (Hugh W. Astor).

Colonel Wild had originally summoned the meeting so that everybody should be acquainted with the recent dangers which were supposed to be confronting the case of Brutus (Hubert), and so that these dangers could be carefully considered and a decision taken as to whether the case should be continued and, if so, what measures should be adopted to preserve its security.

Colonel Wild began by explaining that four members of the Walenty organisation (Interalliée) were at present under arrest in France for collaboration with the Germans, and that they were all aware of the fact that Brutus's (Hubert's) escape from German imprisonment had been facilitated and that he was in fact a German spy (his German cover-name Hubert). Colonel Wild appeared to have little idea as to the charges levelled against these four persons or the extent of their allegations against Brutus (Hubert), and that a certain Roger Bardet (KV 2/1175) was a particular danger in this respect. he had clearly not examined the case of any of these agents with a view to discovering whether the dangers could be neutralised, but had been influenced both by the French and by Major Harmer (once engaged at M.I.5 B.1.a), whom he met in Paris, into believing that the danger was serious.

Colonel Wild continued to explain that following the decision taken at the previous meeting on 12.1.45 he had approached General Eisenhower and had succeeded in obtaining the concurrence of all parties in France to the four agents being sent to the U.K. (AOB, General Eisenhower lacked the jurisdiction to decide it against the French Government). The object of these manoeuvres was to prevent the four agents from being publicly tried in France, but the further consequences of the manoeuvre were not apparently given any serious consideration. Colonel Wild was, however, aware → (page 28)

that there was a danger of the arrest of the two of the agents becoming known to the Germans through a leakage by means of their respective mistresses, and he prepared a plan to meet this contingency (eventuality), which is filed at (rest deleted).

Colonel Wild then admitted that in making the above arrangements he had acted hastily, and now appreciated that he had taken the wrong course of action. He felt that the correct course would now be for the four agents to remain in France, and to let the French legal procedure run its course and Brutus (Hubert) face the music. If Brutus was able to survive the storm, "tant mieux"; if not "tant pis".

At this point all of Colonel Wild's observations were rendered irrelevant by the late arrival of Captain Vaudreuil, who brought hot intelligence direct from Paris. To the surprise of one and all, he announced that Kiki (Kieffer; KV 2/753) and Bardet (KV 2/1175) had been subjected to intense interrogation by Kressman, as a result of which their innocence of collaborating with the enemy had been established. He added that he had no idea as top the present whereabouts of Jouffret (no file any longer existing; maybe some to be integrated within another related file series) who had hitherto been believed to be in prison in Marseilles. As to Goubeau (no file existing), Vaudreuil thought that this man was probably guilty of assisting the enemy; though he did not present and any great danger to the case of Brutus (Hubert).

This new information came as a complete surprise and caused stupefaction (confusion) that the original purpose of the meeting was forgotten. The meeting then proceeded to discuss what course of action should be taken with regard to Kiki (Kieffer) and Bardet. neither B.1.b. nor Wells of S.O.E. were convinced by Vaudreuil's story of their innocence, and they pointed out that if these two were released, as suggested by Vaudreuil, and allowed to come to this country as free men, it would be impossible to interrogate them under favourable (from British point of view, thus unfavourable for both men)circumstances. Vaudreuil acquiesced (agreed), and it was decided that the two men should not be released until full reports of their interrogation had been brought to this country (England) by Kressman. Owing to technical difficulties → (page 29)

in France it was not permitted for the original reports on the interrogation to leave that country, but Vaudreuil telephoned to Kressman, arranging for him to make exact replicas of the original reports, which he would bring to this country at the earliest possible date. It was thought that there might be further information in this country which would establish the guilt of Kiki and Bardet.

Thus if B.1.b. and S.O.E. are satisfied by the reports brought by Kressman, then the two agents will be released in France. If, however, they are not satisfied, the agents will be brought to this country as Category A for further interrogation.

In the absence of the full reports regarding these four sub-agents in France, it is still impossible to assess the dangers which exist to the security of the Brutus (Hubert) case, but there is every reason to hope and believe that the dangers are less than was supposed ten days ago. There is no doubt in my (Hugh Astor's) own mind that it is perfectly possible to continue to run the case (R44) (R44return) with with the same degree of safety as hitherto, but certain certain parties show a singular lack of interest in the continuance of the case, not on account of the dangers surrounding it, but because it is thought unlikely to serve any useful purpose. It will be seen, therefore, that a decision still has to be taken as to whether or not the case should be continued, and if as to whether or not the case should be continued, and if the decision is in the affirmative (favourable) I shall then busy myself (Hugh Astor) preparing the necessary safeguards. As a result of a few minutes' chat with Vaudreuil I learned that the French are in possession of information relating, not only to the four above named agents, but also to the German penetration of Interalliée and to the perfidious behaviour of Gilbert, al of which is relevant to the case of Brutus (Hubert) but none of which had yet reached the responsible case officer. Indeed, it is a matter of great regret that I allowed my better judgement to be overruled and should thereby have been deprived of information which would have gone a long way towards resolving some weeks ago the difficulties which face now.

On 10.1.45 a meeting was held to discuss recent developments in the case of Brutus (Hubert). The meeting was attended by Colonel Bevan, Colonel Wild, Colonel Robertson (TAR), Colonel Hood, Mr. Marriott, Colonel Fleetwood Hesketh, Major Masterman, Mr. Harris and myself (Mr. Hugh Astor).

Mr. Marriott explained the dangers which had arisen in France on the basis of my note of 9.1.45. he explained that these developments presented new dangers to the security of Brutus (Hubert) as a special Agent, and that if this man should be blown it was quite probable that the Germans would become aware of our Fortitude deception plan, and indeed of our strategic deception technique (AOB, after all not so exceptional successful), 'Y' Service (AOB, most successful!), etc. These far-reaching effects were duly understood and appreciated by all present. Mr. Marriott pointed out that there still remained certain unknown dangers to the case of Brutus (Hubert) in the shape of sundry (various) sub-agents believed to be imprisoned in various parts of France, but about whom nothing was yet known, and the discussion was therefore confined solely to the case of Kiki (Kieffer).

Colonel Bevan stated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarded strategic deception as Top Secret, but that they were fully alive to the possibility of it becoming blown to the enemy (AOB, they, those latter meeting, lived in a kind of vacuum, as Amt VI in Berlin had left their capital, and started to move down in groups to the southern parts of Germany; Germany was in a state of dissolving), and said that this was a risk which they were prepared to face. Colonel Bevan and Colonel Wild both agreed that the danger of blowing Fortitude in the pre-D period as it would reveal little intelligence of value to the enemy.

It was therefore agree that the case of Brutus (Hubert) should be continued (S46) (S46return) (the latter hyperlink (S46) brings you at the point where it finally all was 'in vain'; as it wasn't permitted (allowed) by the Foreign Office!), and that all efforts should be made to arrange for the trial of Kiki to receive the minimum publicity, and that if need be representations should be made on the highest level. Colonel Wild, who was due to return to Paris on 10.1.45, agreed to undertake the preliminary moves with the French, and to explore how the affair could best be handled.

It was also agreed that as soon as possible an effort should be made to access the dangers to the Brutus (Hubert) case provided by the various other sub-agents under arrest in France.

At the present time we are hampered by lack of knowledge. It is not even known on what charge Kiki (Kieffer) was arrested, or what mission he is supposed to have for the Germans. As soon as pour knowledge is more complete it should be possible to devise a scheme for safeguarding Brutus (Hubert).

Major Harmer's letter of the 27th December, together with the enclosures, was considered at length by Mr. Marriott, Major Masterman and myself (Hugh Astor) on 5.1.45.

a) because any possible danger from Victoire was now overshadowed by new and much more serious dangers; and

b) because no danger was in fact likely to arise owing to the Home Office having readily consented to the continued detention of Victoire (Carré) in this country. Furthermore it was agreed that there was no need to ask the Home office to reconsider this matter.

2. With regard to the renewed threats to the security of Brutus (Hubert), they can be enumerated briefly as follows:-

a) Violette (she betrayed Victoire to the Germans after she was arrested by the Germans), the former mistress and sub-agent of Walenty, was arrested by the F.F.I. at Lunéville in autumn of 1944. She is aware of the fact that Brutus (Hubert) is working for the Germans and is therefore able to compromise him. Violette herself does not present a security danger, and she has therefore been released and allowed to return in liberty to Luneville. In view of the proximity of Lunéville to the German frontier and of the fact that her case must be fairly widely discussed in the neighbourhood, it is possible that the Germans may learn of her arrest by the F.F.I. and may assume that she has denounced Brutus (Hubert). It is worth mentioning that Violette's account of the financial arrangements existing between herself and the Germans does not tally with Brutus' (Hubert's) account of this matter, and it therefore seems probable that he (Brutus) may be lying on this point and will require further questioning.

b) The greatest danger to the case, however, is provided by Kiki. This man was a former member of the Walenty organisation and was in fact the first man to betrayed to the Germans in November 1941. he was duly arrested by the Germans, and was compelled under duress to take certain action which resulted in the arrest of further members of the Walenty organisation and and the subsequent dissolution of the whole organisation. Kiki himself proved to be a bad hat, being ultimately recruited by the Germans as an agent and coming to this country on their behalf. He returned to France, and has now been arrested by the French on account of his collaboration with the Germans. He is now in the hands of the police Judiciaire, who are likely to put him on trial in a civil court in the near future. For diverse reasons it has not been possible to obtain from the Police Judiciaire a full account of the interrogation of Kiki, but it is known that he has revealed that Brutus's escape from the German prison (T47) (T47return) (the foregoing link brings us to Bleicher's statement; which, of course, was not yet known) was facilitated by the Germans, and that he was sent to England with a political mission for the Germans. It is not yet known whether Kiki (Kieffer) is aware that Brutus also had an espionage mission and that he has been able to maintain contact with the Germans. This information must by now be known to a fairly large number of Frenchmen who are not intelligence officers.

c) There are addition certain other unknown dangers. It is believed that two further members of the Walenty organisation are still in prison in France, one in Marseille and the other at L??. The cause of their imprisonment is not yet known, nor is it known whether they are aware of Brutus's (Hubert's) mission, though whether they are aware of Brutus' (Hubert's) mission, though this may quite possible be the case.

d) There is also a slight risk to the security of this case owing to the intrigues and allegations against → (page 34)

Brutus (Hubert) which have recently taken place in Polish circles in this country.

It will therefore be seen that the security of the Brutus case on the Continent is at present in a bad way. It is perhaps easy to exaggerate the dangers, but, though the chances of a leakage back to the Germans may be small (remember that during the course of January 1945 it was foreseeable that The Russians headed for Berlin, therefore the Amt VI /Amt Mil offices and personnel were leaving Berlin towards the southern areas of Germany; leaving behind some key figures, at the offices at Berkaerstrasse 34-36 in Berlin), these must nevertheless be faced. The most immediate danger is undoubtedly provided by by Kiki, and steps have already been taken to try to postpone the trial of this man, or at any rate to ensure that the trial is conducted in secret (in camera) by an intelligence organisation. (AOB, in this respect the British Secret Services did not dare much about legal means, and France isn't Britain).

3. There are two courses of action open to us, depending on whether it is decided (a) to close the case, or (b) to continue to run it.

In the event of (a), it is suggested that Brutus (Hubert) should inform the Germans and disclosures made by Kiki and some of the others, explaining that they have resulted in a further investigation into his escape. He will explain that in view of this development it is no longer possible for him to maintain his position, and that his best defence would be to make a partial confession of his mission. He will say that he is proposing to tell the British authorities that the allegations against him are true and that he was sent to this country with a political mission to ferment (tumult) trouble in Polish circles;

!! that on arrival in this country he started to carry his (German) mission (AOB: as the German agent Hubert?), with the result that he was arrested in the summer of 1942. He will tell the British that as a result of his arrest he saw the error of his ways and had been a good boy ever since. He will pleaded for Mercy, referring to his excellent work as Walenty and pointing out that he had been subjected to great nervous strain whilst under German arrest. !!

traffic, either from this country or from the set in France is not altogether excluded.

In the event of (b), it would be necessary to explore fully into the situation at present existing in France and to make the necessary arrangements for trial of Kiki etc. to receive the minimum of publicity. (they, at least M.I.5, gave in Britain a damm on legality, when ever possible; but in France they did not rule the waves) It will also probably be found possible to devise a plan to safeguard Brutus (Hubert) against future denunciations.

4. It was agreed at the meeting that in the event of Brutus (Hubert) becoming blown, the whole of Fortitude would probably also be compromised and the Germans would become aware of our deception technique. The strategic deception and the "Y" Service etc. would therefore be compromised. →

(AOB, in my perception - Fortitude itself, after all, wasn't really significant; what was significant was: M.S.S. or Most Secret Source. One gets the idea that this was the success of the Secret Services; but it wasn't their achievement. M.I.5 was only in charge of keeping security tight about M.S.S. It were the brilliant British mathematicians and crypto-specialists, whom made it work and engendered Britain's most successful endeavour; we have to think of - Bletchley Park and that like!)

5. In reaching a decision as to whether or not the case of Brutus (Hubert) should be continued, it is therefore necessary to weigh the advantage of the two schemes outlined above. (a) provides complete protection for our strategic deception technique, but would probably permit the continued running for Brutus (Hubert) as a high-grade agent for a period of time, but there would be a risk that he might at any moment become compromised, with the result that not only would the immediate deception plan on which he was engaged be blown, but also the other far reaching consequences described above would have effect.

As reference to the traffic file will show, arrangements are now complete for the return of Burton (Communist - Sonja (Ursula) Kuczynski's husband Len Beurton?), alias Chopin, to London from reading. Arrangements have also been made for the telephone privacy (scrambler) equipment etc. to be collected by the G.P.O. (General Post Office).

Brutus (Hubert) would notionally (hypothetically) have decoded this message on the morning of the 17th December when he was assisting to dismantle the W/T, and accordingly the last message transmitted was in reply to the German enquiry. It was to this effect that the that the packet could safely be left at the Wings Club, Grosvenor Place addressed to Squadron Leader Ramon, (U47) (U47return), (AOB, from this link we learn that the communication in this case went via KOP in Lisbon; quite logically because from there there existed a regular airline connection with London) and that Brutus (Hubert) would arrange to have it collected in fifteen day's time. In view of the possibility that this scheme might result in Brutus (Hubert) being put into touch with another member of the B.1.a. (M.I.5) group of agents, I discussed the matter with Colonel Robertson (TAR), who agreed with the scheme outlined above.

The final transmission took place on the afternoon of 17.12.44, and Burton tells me that the German operator waxed quite sentimental, thanking him for his excellent work in the past and expressing sorrow that the contact should be temporarily interrupted.

KV 2/72-1, page 37 (minute 356d) I have chosen to consider this reference as it might lead us no a new, not before, aspect. (A150) (A150return)

With regard to the return of Burton to London, I think that this could be effected about the middle of December. The only disadvantage of having Chopin in London is that it will be necessary to give speedy answers to questions receiver from the Germans, and in the absence of any competent approving authority at SHAEF it is sometimes difficult to obtain necessary approval.

As a prelude to the move, I suggest that Brutus (Hubert) should inform the Germans that Chopin may shortly be moved back to London by his firm, which presents considerable financial difficulties, as the flat where the W/T set was formerly installed has now been surrendered and it will be necessary for him to rent a new flat (that is the story told to the Germans). This would open the way to a considerable exchange of messages relating to the financial transaction which has been in abeyance for some time. Whereas before we were slightly wary (cautious) about carrying out this transaction as it would involve Zigzag (Zig-Zag) (Edward Arnold Chapman) (KV 2/455 .. KV 2/463) (AOB, might Zigzag have been the German agent 'Draht' (X28) (X28return); considering the reference in this M.I.5 reference, it is not unlikely that Draht = Zigzag = Edward Arnold Chapman), we can now press for it without fear of any evil consequences. When the Germans admit that they are no longer able to effect the transaction, we will be able to discuss again the possibility of a parachute.

The following decision was made in connection with this case during discussion with Major Harmer (formerly B.1.a, once also Carré's case officer).

With great reluctance Harmer admits that to start up the transmitter in France will probably involve the whole case in all those risks of compromise which we are hoping to avoid by closing down Brutus (Hubert) himself. Thus, except in case of great necessity, Harmer wishes to abandon his share in the project. As soon as Brutus (Hubert) has been closed down (17 December 1944), or as soon as the notionally pays a visit to the Continent, Harmer will arrange to pick up the French transmitter (which was forbidden!).

With reference to our discussion, the arrest of Violette seriously complicates the case of Brutus, as on several occasions Brutus (Hubert), as on several occasions Brutus (Hubert) has asked the Germans to pass on messages of goodwill to Violette, as a result of which Violette was able to deduce that Brutus was communicating with the Germans. The following exchanges of message:

"Violette is very well. because of our dealings with her (AOB, she received payment on behalf of the Germans) she seems to have deduced that you are on our (German) side (acting for them as Hubert) side, her friends (AOB, also former Walenty/Interalliée comrades) also are doing well."

"Many thanks for the news, but I am very much displeased that Violette (his former mistress) should have guessed the real situation because I fear any involuntary indiscretion which might destroy all my efforts. I should therefore like to send her a personal letter in French (AOB: what now follows might have been edited by M.I.6 or M.I.5, as they knew the actual situation in Lisbon, as it is unlikely that Brutus - Hubert would have been bothered with such technical details) via Antonio. He should change the envelope in Lisbon. Do you agree?"

I think it important to discover at an early date the exact circumstances in which Violette was arrested (by the French F.F.I. in 1944/45), and the degree to which she is known to have collaborated with the Germans during recent months, so that we we can assess the danger the danger of the Germans learning of her arrest. If this danger is considered to be great, then I think it would be necessary for Brutus to take the bull by the horns, and I suggest the following plan.

Brutus (Czerniawski) should report in a frenzy (anger) of anxiety that S.I.S. (British, Secret Intelligence Service) have told him of the capture of Violette and asked him to assist in that part of the interrogation which concerns the break-up of the Walenty organisation (Interalliée; on 18 November 1941). Brutus (Hubert) will remind the Germans of their message telling that Violette knows that he is working for the Germans (code-named: Hubert), and will ask to what extent she had been taken into the Germans' confidence and whether she is still → (page 42)

likely to collaborate with them (actually her first action was, instantly, betraying Victoire / Carré). He will point out that the charge against Violette at the present time concerns her collaboration with the Germans in (early) 1942, and he can point out that his own position is so strong that he can easily justify this action in the eyes of the British. (AOB, but the dilemma that the British did not want to join these thoughts at all, and the matter was French judicial) When he meets Violette, however, he will put his cards on the table and recruit her as a sub-agents. Before attempting to recruit her, however, Brutus (Hubert) will have to receive an assurance from the Germans that she is likely to fall in with this suggestion.

The above is, of course, only a brief outline and would require considerable elaboration. If Violette is recruited she can either work as a sub-agent (German Reich was still in existence for about half a year to come) through Brutus (Hubert), sending chicken-food from France, or possibly she can be run entirely independent of Brutus (Hubert) and direct to the Germans (controlled by M.I.5) In the latter course is adopted it should be possible to devise a means whereby even if Violette subsequently becomes blown it would not react against Brutus (Hubert).

RSS II intercept series (J97) (J97return); (K98) (K98return) please click at the map as to open it in wide-screen PDF, as to get an impression of some of the main German communication lines

My map reconstruction based on my years-long lasting engagement in fields of German communication channels

The line-number maintained must be, most likely, originated from British operational praxis.

(Isk ... concerns the unique running decrypt number, based on, say, Enigma communications)

4.9.44 (Isk 114292) Madrid - Berlin, Feder (= Hans Joachim Brandes @ Ballhorn) (he lived in Lisbon) to Erizo (= Kleyenstueber Leiter K.d.M. Madrid; formerly KO Spain). Training of Draht (Edward Chapman @ Zigzag / Zig-Zag) in Metro (Madrid) ended on 4/9. Further practices are to be carried out from 6/9 in Barcelona (Barca) as Dulce is also expected there on 7/9. Draht (German cover-name for Zigzag, whom as a double-cross-agent on behalf of M.I5) and Dulce will probably leave Lisa (= Lisbon) on 28/9 and will then go to Huette (= Switzerland). 3 reports of Patron (cover-name Pedro) have again, contrary to expectations, gone direct to Berne (Bern the capital of Switzerland) by Huette courier post (likely in diplomatic bag). Is there, for your part, and possibility of a link in Berne (Bern) with the courier despatch (department) in the Parliament (Bundeshaus) there? If there were, personal contact with my V-Mann there would have to be made by me as quickly as possible. Please report by FS (Fernschreiben = Telex) in this connection via Elcano (former Leiter KO Spain Freg-Kapt. Leissner; but still working under the new Leiter Kleyenstueber) for Portal for Feder (= Balhorn / Hans Brandes; whom was half-Jewish) Feder K.d.M. Sp, 3163

15.9.44 (Isk 115738) Madrid - Lisbon. 18. To Lina (= Lisbon) For Forros (= Obst. Frederici Leiter KOP) Feder (Brandes) via Portal number? of 14/9 on 11/9 Draht (Zigzag) and Dulce training completed at this end (= Spain). Friday 15/9 towards this evening I (= Feder / Brandes) return to Lisa (Lisbon), request immediate meeting with Harry (= Dr. Aloys Schreiber Leiter I KO Portugal). Draht (British Zigzag) is leaving Lisa (Lisbon). probably between 27th and 30th. Elcano (former Leiter KO Sp Freg-Kapt. Leissner @ Lenz) 3300.

21.9.44 (Isk 116505) (G49) (G49return) Berlin - Lisbon (via: line XIV/39) 78 Secret (Geheim) For Harry (= Dr. Schreiber Leiter I KOP). Ref. W/T message 3163 of 5/9 from Sabine (= wireless station of KO Sp / K.d.M. Madrid) (Isk 114292 of 4.9.44 show above) following answer sent to Feder (Hans Brandes) via Portal on the Colibri (in Switzerland?) affairs on the 15th:- Contact enquired about is here and has been asked how contact can be established with this V-Mann. Decide whether Patrol (cover-name (of?) Pedro) can establish this contact between V-Mann Feder (Hans Brandes) and ours, when in Huette (= Switzerland) and how. radio where Draft (Draht?), Dulce and Feder (Hans Brandes) are now? Sgd. Papier. HIOB (= Heer I Ost Berlin; the organisation/service in Berlin) Plisch No.10606/9/44 Secret (Geheim)

25.9.44 (Isk 117059) (H39) (H39return) Lisbon - Berlin (line XIV/39) 715. Feder Forros Harry to HIOB. (Brandes → Leiter Federici KOP → Dr. Schreiber Leiter I KOP → Berlin Service desk) (please notice: that old names remained in use, whereas that officially other designations had to be maintained) Ref. your Nr. 10606/9/44 (Isk 116505 previous message). 1) Draht (Zigzag) arrived in Lisbon on September (? 22 - doubtful) Dulce arrives September 26th. departure by air to England of both finally fixed for October 3'44. As was reported in my FS Fernschreiben, telex; but might also have been used for regular W/T traffic) Madrid, the training of Draht (Zigzag = alias of Edward Chapman) and Dulce was carried out in Spain and is now being recapitulated in Lisbon. 2) Sabine (the W/T station of KO Spain / K.d.M. Spain) 3163 of September 5 (Isk 114292 first message of this series) concerning the set up of a link, it is suggested that Patron should not carry out the establishment of contact between the 2 V-Leute himself, so as to avoid becoming known unnecessarily, and that this contact should be by Feder personally in Switzerland (Switzerland forbade all illicit W/T communication strictly!), as soon as Draht (Zigzag) and Dulce have left. Feder (Hans Brandes, he was a business man) will call in in Berlin before his journey to Switzerland (AOB, Hans Brandes travelled frequently, by the airline Lufthansa, to Berlin, up to the bitter end of the war).

4.10.44 (Isk 118279) (J40) (J40return) Lisbon - Berlin. 772. Feder - Forros - Harry to HIOB (Brandes → Leiter Frederici KOP → Dr. Schreiber Leiter I KOP → Berlin Service desk) for Papier. 1) Draht (Zigzag) and Dulce left by air from Lisbon for England on 3/10 as intended. Training was successfully checked over. They were given (Huff)duff- instructions in duplicate. 2) Draht will start traffic for the first time on Wednesday 18/10 at the stipulated time, and if contact does not materialise he will repeat on 19/10 and 20/10. Should Domaene (the W/T station of K.d.M., formerly Ast, Hamburg) get no reception from Draht (Zigzag) on these days (3 days) he will having difficulties with set or accommodation, which will be assumed to be overcome in a future two weeks. 2nd traffic will then start Wednesday Nov. 1st and will be continued on 2 and 3/11/44 in accordance with requirements. 3) Patron will arrive in Lisbon between 17 and 20/10/44 on the way back to Switzerland and there, or if necessary not until he is in Switzerland, he will make a report to Feder (Hans Brandes) orally concerning all details of the Draht (Zigzag) operation in England. Feder (Brandes - Forros Leiter KOP Frederici - Harry Dr. Schreiber Leiter I KOP).

29.1.45 (Isk 130947) (Q54) (Q54return) Lisbon - Berlin. To Babette Mate (Amt Mil personnel in Berlin) (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975) direct 236. Draht (Zigzag) reports by letter from Club (Wings Club Grosvenor Place (Y29) (Y29return) ?) , middle of January arrived in Lisa (Lisbon) 27/1. Ref. coordination of offensive plans. Dulce learns from Borisenko (Borishenko?) that the Russian Ambassador in London was asked, in a personal letter from Eisenhower to inform his government that in order to coordinate the offensive in the East (AOB, the Russians stood in central eastern Europe, such as Poland and German East-Prussia but also Hungary and Yugoslavia and of course Rumania) and in the West, the Russians main attack would have to be postponed until later date fixed, as owing to the German counter-offensive in the West, the offensive plans had to be altered and at the present moment it was not possible yet to estimate the time which must elapse before the offensive can begin.

26.12.45 (Isk 130452) Lisbon - Berlin. 707. Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Ref. your message 12773/12. 1) Notes can be delivered in London via Draht Dulce. 2) Method of issue as discussed with Mate Apitsch end of November. Notes will be brought by Huetten (Switzerland / Swiss) courier from Lisa to London and consignment issued by post to Club (Z29) (Z29return) either as a whole or in part as Draht (= Zigzag = Edward Chapman; who was British but a German spy as well as a British double-cross agent) thinks best. 3) date: immediately on receipt of (£ Bank) notes. They will be sent off by next Huetten (Swiss) courier, who admittedly does not go regularly, but certainly every 14 days. Sgd Feder (Hans Brandes)

Addendum Hyon (Oberst d. L Dr. Rolf Federici, Leiter KOP): ref. posting of notes to be sent. We point out that in currency traffic in case of pound notes larger than £5- frequently certificate of origin has to be produced, also according experience there are many (German produced!) counterfeit notes in circulation.

6.1.45 (Isk 134171) Lisbon - Berlin. Contin) and the Russian Embassy in London (4 corrupt and lost) especially strongly Switzerland (or Swiss) (long portion missing and corrupt) instructions requested for forwarding to Dulce concerning her (was she a female?) attitude towards Borisinko. Sgd. Feder-Forros-Hyon (Forros = Hyon = Leiter KOP Federici).

6.1.45 (Isk 134183) (S58) (S58return) Lisbon - Berlin. 65. Top Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht reported by letter (via Lisbon → KOP → Berlin Amt Mil) from (Wings) Club (Grosvenor Place) in second half of December, received in Lisa (Lisbon) on 3/1/45. In re Dulce contact with Russian Embassy in London. Some time ago Dulce got in touch with D. Borishenko, Commercial Attaché of the Russian Embassy in London, who is at the same time Director of the Stanko import in Moscow. The Stanko import is a semi-State institution for centralised purchase of machines for the armament industry. Borishenko was in Berlin from 1939-1940 and speaks good German. His main task in London lies in the sphere of ferreting (hunting) out information about British industry, for which purpose he maintains a fairly large and very well paid network of agents and takes delivery of the information generally in his private residence in London. B (Borishenko) has requested Dulce to work for him, in that Dulce is to find out, in the course of conversations with authoritive men in English industry, especially the chemical industry, such things are in general not accessible to him, since people are extremely reserved in their conversations when Borishenko appears. B (Borishenko) was able to make this offer to Dulce as Switzerland is still making efforts to secure a Russo-Swiss rapprochement. (Contd)

16.3.45 (Isk 136119) (T59) (T59return) Lisbon - Berlin. 636 To (Babette)-Sibelius for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). direct Draht reports by letter (to Lisbon cover-address → KOP to Berlin by W/T or mail bag) from London date despatch 0/3 date of receipt at Lina (= Lisbon, likely KOP) 13/3 Conversation ~~Dulve~~ Dulce - Borishenko asked? Dulce, the following questions, skilfully veiling (hiding) them and alleging references to rumours. 1) Borishenko asked when mentioning Churchill's wanderlust whether Dulce had heard anything about Churchill meeting General Franco and Salazar (head of the State of Portugal) on his return from the Crimea (Krim) (cont)

6.4.44 (Isk 90547) Berlin - Lisbon. 37. Secret (Geheim) HIOB (Heer I Ost Berlin) to Ludovico (von Karshoff about one month thereafter succeeded by Obst. Federici) for Harry (= Dr. Aloys Scheiber Leiter I at KOP in Lisbon) for Ballhorn (= Hans Brandes later alias Feder) Postpone the departure of Fundus (might be equal to Draht alias Zigzag) until 14/4 as instructions cannot arrive at your end (KOP in Lisbon) until 12/4. HIOB I No. 5956/44 Secret (Geheim).

8.4.44 (Isk 91067) Lisbon - Berlin. 644. Ludovico (Leiter KOP) Harry (Leiter I KOP; Schreiber) to HIOB (Heer I Ost Berlin) I. Ref. your message No. 5959 of 7/4 (Isk 90547) Departure of Fundus (Draht = Zigzag -= Edward Chapman) postponed by him until 15/4.

14.4.44 (Isk 92031) Lisbon - Berlin. 675. Ballhorn Ludovico Harry to HIOB I. Fundus (Draht = Zigzag) is flying to Golfplatz (= England) on 15th, as was reported in our FS 644 of 8/4 (Isk 91067). Date (?) can no longer be postponed, As the instructions announced for April 12th in yours FS HIOB 1 No. No. 5959/44 (Isk 90547) of April 7th had not arrived up to noon on April 14th I settled matters with Fundus (Edward Chapman @ Zigzag) on the on the basis of the last discussion in Palais (Berlin) Ador requests that proposed meeting in Quadrat (= the territory Spain) be arranged together with Fundus (Edward Chapman = Zigzag) for beginning of May.

24.4.44 (Isk 93333) Lisbon - Berlin. 748. Ballhorn (Hans Brandes), Ludovico (alias of: von Karsthoff Leiter KOP) Harry (Leiter I KOP) to HIOB I. Fundus's (Zigzag / Draht) office expect Fundus' return on 27/4. It cannot be ascertained whether according to the latest regulations, it is possible to take courier mail from England to Lisbon. Pedro (Patron) arrives in Lisbon from Switzerland (Huette) on 29/4. His journey on to England as special courier has been arranged owing to commencement of economic negotiations between Switzerland and England.

5.5.44 (Isk 94983) Lisbon - Berlin. 840. Ballhorn (Hans Brandes) Ludovico (von von Karsthoff; real name Major Ludwig Craemer von Auenrode) Harry (= Dr. Aloys Schreiber Leiter I KO Portugal) to HIOB. Return journey Fundus (= Draht = Zigzag) not possible for present owing to too known Golfplatz (England) Legation of this office at this end for me stated nonessential changes for the next 2 weeks. As this information was couched in the form of a commercial text discussed between us, it must be related to the invasion. Pedro arrived at this end and instructed. Sanction for this journey to Golfplatz (England) is to be here by (?8/5. Leaving for Golfplatz (England) immediately afterwards. Reference your HIOB Co. 7425 (see Isk 94832) on Brandes on 4/5. I am ready for journey to Berlin when called.

4.9.44 (Isk 114292) Madrid - Berlin. Feder (Hans Brandes) to Erizo (= Obstlt. Kleyenstueber after mid August 1944). Training of Draht (Zigzag / Fundus / Edward Chapman) in Metro (Madrid) ended on 4/9. Further practises are to be carried out from 6/9 in Barcelona as Dulce is also expected there on 7/9. Draht (Zigzag - Fundus) and Dulce will probably leave Lisa (= Lisbon) on 23/9. Patron (Pedro) will probably arrive Lisa (Lisbon) on 28/9 and will then go to Huette (Switzerland). 3 reports by Huette courier post. Is there, for your part, any possibility of a link in Bern (Bern) wit the courier despatch department in the Parliament (Bundeshaus) there? This message is a duplicate of 5.9 44: 4/9/44 (Isk 114292)..... Please report by FS in this connection via Elcano (= Former Leiter KO Sp. Leissner) for Portal for Feder (= Hans Brandes). Sgnd (Feder K.d.M. Spain).

15.5.44 (Isk 115738) Madrid - Lisbon (line II/1060). 18. To Lina (Lisbon) for Forros (= Obst. Federici just new Leiter KOP). ~~Defer~~ Feder via Portal no number of 14/9 on 11/9 Draht and Dulce training completed at this end. Friday 15/9 toward the evening I return to Lisa. request immediate meeting with Harry (Dr. Aloys Schreiber Leiter I KOP). Draht is leaving Lisa probably between 27th and 30th.

18.9.44 (Isk 116178) Lisbon - Berlin. 642. To HIOB. Draht (Zigzag) learnt on 10/9 from Huette (Switzerland) is Chief, Obst. Divisionaer Masson, is shortly going to Quadrat (Spain) in order to hold discussion in Merkur (Barcelona) (AOB, I doubt, more likely is Madrid) with his Spanish and Portuguese representatives (Military Attachés) From the preparations (being made) it is concluded that the great importance is attributed to this meeting. The exact date of Masson's arrival will be reported later. Feder (Hans Brandes).

25.9.44 (Isk 117059) Lisbon - Berlin. 715. From Feder (Hans Brandes) to Forros (Leiter KOP Obst. Federici) to Harry (Leiter I KOP Dr. Aloys Schreiber) to HIOB (communication bureau in Berlin). Ref. your Nr. 10606 (Isk 116505 of 21.9.45) Draht (Zigzag) arrived in Lisbon on September (? 22 - doubtful) Dulce arrives September 26 AOB, again duplication with (H39) (H39return)

4.10.44 (Isk 118729) Lisbon - Berlin. 772. From Feder to Forros to Harry to HIOB for Papier (someone at Amt Mil-B?) 1) Draht (Zigzag) and Dulce left by air from Lisbon for England on 3/10 as intended. Training successfully checked over. There were given duff (HF/DF)-instructions in duplicate. 2) Draht (Zigzag / Edward Chapman) will start traffic for the first time on AOB again a duplicate (J40) (J40return) albeit with another Isk number)

4.10.44 (Isk 11833?) Lisbon - Berlin. 707. Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). ref. your message 127733/12 1) Notes AOB: apparently also a duplicate (K51) (K51return)

5.1.45 (Isba 5901) Lisbon - Berlin. Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975) 46. Draht (Zigzag) in writing from Club (the money transfer at Grosvenor Place, London) Also duplicate (L51) (L51return)

5.1.45 (Isk 129005) Lisbon - Berlin. 49. Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht (Zigzag) reports by letter from Club (M52) (M52return) in second half of December, received Lisa on 3/1. Subject USA a/c (= aircraft) reserves in England. During a journey to Plymouth in December '44 Draht ascertained that West of Plymouth near Higher Predannak Downs there has for a considerable time been a USA aerodrome which is principally intended as a supply base for the USA aircraft coming to England. According to report by a USA heavy-bombers stationed on this aerodrome since July '44. They are all brand new and were said not to have flown on operations to date. It is said that delivery of certain instruments is still being awaited in order to make certain the machines ready for operations. Feder (Hans Brandes) Forros (Leiter KO Portugal)=Hyon.

5.1.45 (Isk 129006) Lisbon - Berlin. To Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht (Zigzag) reports by ?? from Club, half December, second half of December. Received Lisa (= Lisbon) 3/1/45. Ref. retrogade tendency in US war economy. US circles in London are surprised at the decrease in US production of ammunition which has persisted since September. According to information from the Embassy counsellor to the US Embassy in London, David Williamson, the production of small-calibre ammo. in the USA is said to have decreased by 10 - 18% in the months September and October '44 althoough an increase in production has been demanded by the competent ministries. According to Williamson this is connected with the sudden shortage of tools, matrixes and apparatus (Text - Zuegen - technical meaning not known )AOB, I suppose it had to do with producing artillery barrels)) for the production of cartridge cases. W (Williamson) attributes this phenomenon to work already taking place on peacetime programme and to the insufficient significance attached to the European Theatre of war by the American industry. As a further example W (Williamson) mentioned an American a/c (aircraft) factory in Detroit which suddenly stopped producing big bombers in June '44 without instructions from any official authority in order to begin building motor-cars. Feder (Hans Brandes) Forros (Leiter KO Portugal)= Hyon.

5.1.45 (Isk 129759) Lisbon - Berlin. (Cont.) The size of the works is usually large. This is already evident from the fact the 3 new power plants alone have been laid down for these works. Work was to have begun as early as December '44 but installation of 6 electrolysers, which had been completed in England apart the most important part - ~~abestos~~ asbestos, is still awaited. The latter was to be delivered from the USA or South Africa, bith (British) firms have now extended the date for delivery of the asbestos by 5 months (consequently - text doubtful) the possibility → (page 48)

5.1.45 (Isk 129019) Lisbon - Berlin. 47. For Babette to Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht (Zigzag) reports by letter from Club in the second half of December, received in Lisa (Lisbon) on 3.1.45. Subject. New USA aerodrome n England. At the beginning of December '44 the USA Air Force brought into service a new aerodrome which lies south of Lincoln between two places Seaford and Grantham. The aerodrome is intended only for operation of USA machines and has a large repair workshop which is run by USA engineers along, as compared with other military aerodromes one is struck by the greater than normal length of runway. The Swiss family De Neully wich have a country house near the aerodrome was requested to quite it (zu räumen), the USA Embassy in London has paid compensation put to the family to the required amount. Feder - Forros = Hyon.

22.1.45 (Isk 129810) Lisbon - Berlin. 185. To Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht (Zigzag) reports by letter from Club on the middle of January, received Lisa (Lisbon) 21/1/45. Subject difference between Eisenhower and Montgomery. In the higher British officer circles in London it is said that there is a difference of opinion between Montgomery and Eisenhower regarding the offensive planned by the Allies and interrupted by the German attack (Unternehmen Wacht an Rhein, Battle of the Bulge, Ardennen-Offensive). It is said that Montgomery wishes to exploit the German withdrawal east of Bastogne so as to follow up the further repulse of the Germans with with and improvised offensive to be put in simultaneously with the long planned large-scale offensive. Eisenhower on the other hand, takes the view that it would require (4 corrupt) to 6 weeks to assemble the formation again in their intended positions according to the strategic plan. This concern especially motorised fast formations and armoured troops who were moved from the southern part of the front to the Ardennes area. In the same circle it is thought that the Eisenhower plan will be carried out owing to the dangers which are involved in the Montgomery plan owing to the uncertainty about the use of new German weapons and especially owing to the possibility of the increased employment of the Luftwaffe. Feder (Hans Brandes) Forros = Hyon (Leiter KO Portugal Obst. Federici)

22.1.45 (Isk 129779) Lisbon - Berlin. 191 To Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht (Zigzag) reports by letter from Club (= London?) in mid-January, received in Lisa (Lisbon) In re-observation of the port of Southampton. 1) I ascertained by personal observation in the city and port of Southampton. in the first half of January that 69,000 tons of transports were loaded with US troops and on 6 and 7/1 and sailed in convoy. 2. British 12,000 ton tankers and 3 US 7,000 ton tankers also joined this convoy. On 9/1 embarkations of US troops for a fairly large convoy were observed at the Prince of Wales Quay and Trafalgar Dock. At the above quays lay a total of 15,10,000 ton transporters with steam up. On the same occasion large numbers of heavy Chevrolet lorries and fairly light cross0country vehicles were observed, attached to which were light field howitzers. Although the soldiers were not informed of the port of destination it appears from these observations that the transports → (page 49)

→ are going to France. 2) According to statements by the porter in the Roles Hotel, he is his turn having received this information from an American officer. 3) US armoured divisions and 6 US infantry divisions are said to have arrived in Southampton work is proceeding in the day and night shifts on the outer docks in order to repair the bomb-damage of an earlier period. According to workmen in the docks are to be ready for traffic again in about 4 weeks. The damage caused to be in the inner docks by bombing attacks is so severe that there is no question of their being restored for the time being. 4) The US troops arriving from an interior of England for embarkation in Southampton are taken in the first instance to large US barracks near corporation Baths. The port official for the transportation of the US troops from Southampton who is also the camp commandant, is US General Fred Hopkins. Has H.Q. is in Above Bar Street in Southampton. Feder (Hans Brandes) Forros = Hyon (= Obst. Federici Leiter KO Portugal)

24.1.45 (Isk 130439) Lisbon - Berlin To Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht (Zigzag) reports by letter from Club (London?) middle of January, received Lisa (Lisbon) 21.1.45. Ref. USA deliveries to Russia. Boris(h?)enko has original letter to USA lend-lease commission to be sent to Moscow, in which the commission proposes to make up for still outstanding a/c (aircraft) deliveries claimed by Russia by increased tank deliveries. In this connection, pointed out that last year America approached Russia with request that USA ...

24.1.45 (Isk 129742) Berlin - Lisbon. No 87. To Forros (Obst. Federici Leiter KO Portugal) Secret (Geheim). For Hyon (= Obstlt. Federici Leiter KO Portugal) for Feder (Hans Brandes) 1) In your re 112 of 12 January a report of completion is to hand saying that Director of the Consulate general has been duly informed. 2) In re your 576 of 14th December para 1 instructions will follow shortly. 3) In re 576 para 2 no instructions have yet been given because payment in accordance with your message 13007 of 25/9 is still outstanding according to information from debitor ( is likely Paymaster / Zahlmeister ZF). 4) Reports from Draht (Zigzag) are good. Carry on in the same way, and establish soon direct connection. In re your 181 of the 21st January, designations of formations are unfortunately missing Babette Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen Obstlt. KV 2/1975) 12309/1

27.1.45 (Isk 129952) Lisbon - Berlin. 199. To Babette for Mate (= Obstlt. Friedrich von Bohlen KV 2/1975). Draht reports by letter from Club (London or England?) at the middle of January. Arrival Lisa 21/1/45. Us deliveries to Russia. Boresenko (Boreshenko?) has original letters of the US Lend and Lease Commission. To be passed to Moscow, in which the Commission propose that it should compensate for the aircraft deliveries still outstanding and already asked for by Russia by increased tank deliveries. It is pointed out in this connection that America approached Russia last year with the request that US Bomber squadrons be allowed to start from Russia front line air-fields, for the purpose of a large scale attack on the Silesian industrial area. Russia made the counter proposal that America should carry out the delivery of the bombers as settled in the agreement. The above letter refers to the decision at that time. Feder (Hans Brandes) Forros = Hyon (= Obst. Federici, Leiter KO Portugal)

29.2.45 (Isk 132409) Berlin - Lisbon. 45. For Forros (= Obst. Federici Leiter KO Portugal) for Feder (Hans Brandes) Recce (recognisance) assignment 1) Is there a British 4th Army and in what area is it located? 2) Of what formation is it composed? Are they destined for operations → (page 50)

→ at the front or merely units in training? 3) How many air-borne divisions are in Club (En