Please bear always in mind: The purpose of this historical contribution is for studying purposes only, therefore, do not multiply it, as still Crown Copyrights being valid, partially!
Current status: 12 May 2023
Chapter 27 (since 29 March 2023)
Chapter 28 (since 8 April 2023)
Chapter 29 (since 14 April 2023)
Chapter 30 (since 19 April 2023)
Chapter 32 (since 24 April 2023)
Chapter 33 (since 1 May 2023) Please reconsider 33a (since 10 May 2023), as it contains partially some background information
Chapter 34 (since 12 May 2023)
Chapter 35 (since 15 May 2023) (new webpage)
Chapter 36 (since 20 May 2023)
Chapter 37 (since 23 May 2023)
Chapter 38 (since 26 May 2023)
Chapter 39 (since 29 May 2023)
Chapter 40 (since 31 May 2023)
Chapter 41 (since 5 June 2023)
Dr. Karl Heinz Krämer
photo typically taken at Camp 020, after Kraemer's arrest on 15th May 1945 and his arrival at Camp 020 on May 17th 1945
AOB: all these Camp 020 photos are typically bearing the separation between the two background cover plates. I don't like to designate them being white paper.
KV 2/153-1, page 1
KV 2/153 (minute 514b)
O.Ü. (place not named) dem 8.3.1945
Aus der Fülle des sich bei der Ic-Bearbeitung aufdrängende Materials kann in der zur Verfügung stehenden Eile zur kurz auf folgende Probleme eingegangen werden:
1. Der deutsche Ic-Dienst hat im Grunde genommen von 1939 bis Kriegsende 1944 versagt. Die Gründe liegen einmal im personell falscher Besetzung (zu alte Offiziere), im zu grossen Optimismus (weil es von oben nicht gern gesehen ist, gebe ich meine wahre Meinung über den Feind nicht weiter) und in teilweise personal zu starker Beschränkung. So hat es sich im Laufe der Zeit ergeben, dass die Feindbeurteilung nicht als eine saubere, gediegene Generalstabsarbeit betrachtet wurde, sondern dass jeder Dilettant glaubte, in dieses Gebiet hereinreden zu können. So ist es auch kein Wunder, dass die Führung (Chefs bezw. Ia-Sektoren) den Ic-Dienst überhaupt nicht für voll genommen haben und eine eigene Feindbeurteilung getrieben haben, die, wie ich jetzt zweifellos übersehen lässt, meist falsch gewesen ist. Der Grosse Optimismus, der von oben her gewünscht wurde, führte dazu, dass wesentliche Feinderkenntnisse überhaupt nicht, oder falsch mündlich vorgetragen wurden. sodass die Führung nicht die notwendigen klaren Entscheidungen fällen konnte. Es braucht hier bloß auf die Unterstützung der amerikanischen Luftrüstung, Baue der alliierte 4-mot-Muster, Hochfrequenztechnik usw. hingewiesen werden. Teilweise wurden auf dieses Sektoren bewusst erarbeitete Feinderkenntnisse nicht mit der erforderlichen Durchschlagskraft (besonders vor 1943) weitergegeben. Nach 1943 änderte sich die Sachlage ein wenig, im Grunde genommen ist sie jedoch bis heute dieselbe geblieben, d.h. Führung beachtet praktisch die Ic-Erkenntnisse nicht. Als Beispiel ist wohl am besten der Hinweis auf die alliierten Ferngleitgeschütz, der von führenden und höchsten Persönlichkeiten aller Wehrmachtsteilen nicht geglaubt worden ist. Zusammenfassend ergibt sich daher, dass die Führung wegen operativ nach taktisch Ic-mässig richtig beliefert worden ist. (Fehlen geeigneter fachkundiger Leute an höchster Stelle, dass die Führung die Ic-mässig ausgegeben Warnungen nicht →
KV 2/153-1, page 13b
genügend beachtet hat (Einzelbeispiel: Zu späte Verlagerung der deutschen Flugrüstungs- und Treibstoffindustrie).
2. Bereits in der Ziffer 1) was darauf hingewiesen worden, dass der deutsche Ic-Dienst (Ic = Feindlage-Information) nicht mit das qualitätsmässig guten Persönlichkeiten besetzt worden ist, wie es an und für sich aufgrund eines Defensivkrieges besonders in den letzten Jahren erforderlich gewesen wäre. Von 1939 bis 1943 sassen an führender Stelle teilweise Persönlichkeiten, die zwar die betreffende Länder, die sie bearbeiten, kannten, aber generalstabsmässig nicht geschult waren, irgendwelche brauchbaren Ic-Erkenntnisse zu bearbeiten, bezw. dann auch durchschlagkräftig nach oben hin zu bekräftigen. Dabei ergibt sich überhaupt folgendes Problem: Es ist nicht unbedingt notwendig, dass der Ic - Dienst nur von Leuten besetzt werden muss, die jahrelange im Ausland usw. gelebt haben. In Gegenteil hat sich weitgehend herausgestellt, dass auch Offiziere, die niemals im Ausland gewesen sind, Ic-mässig, brauchbar arbeiten können. Es kommt letzten Endes nicht auf die Auslanderfahrung und das Alter eine betr. Ic-Bearbeiters an; sondern zur der klare Verstand, eines kritischen Beurteilungsgabe und ein sensibles Fingerspitzengefühl entscheiden die Brauchbarkeit eines Offiziers für den Ic-Dienst. Vor allem muss eine generalstabmässige Schulung bei den führenden Köpfen eines Ic-Betriebe vorausgesetzt werden. Im übrigen hat sich bei der deutschen Luftwaffe auch beim Ic-Dienst herausgestellt, dass mit Reserve-Offizieren (Klosettendeckel-Verkäufer usw.) nicht das erforderliche herausgeholt wird. teilweise wirkten sich diese Offiziere direkt schädlich aus, da sie aufgrund ihres eigenen Schlendrians nicht in der Lage waren, überhaupt einen klaren Dienstbetrieb zu organisieren, bezw. einen Ic-mässig gute Entscheidung zu treffen. Hinzu kommt doch der Gedanke, dass verschiedenen Herren aufgrund ihren langen Auslandsaufenthalte teilweise moralisch nicht immer einwandfrei waren und teilweise auch zu abwehrmässigen Bedenken Anlass geben (Ic-Beurteilung England, Invasionsbeurteilung, usw.).
Der deutsche Ic-Dienst der Lw. (GAF) hat im übrigen noch die Schwierigkeit zu überwinden gehabt, immer gute Offiziere zu erhalten. Es zeigte sich grade bei der Personalbesetzung, dass von der Führung (politisch nicht fehlerfrei) aus gesagt wurde: "Dieser betr. Offizier hat nicht Silberlöffel gestohlen, ein bisschen dumm ist er auch noch, infolgedessen ...
AOB: this, what the Germans call "Polemik" is in our current context of no direct relevance. Albeit, that printed in red: abwehrmässigen Bedenken is pointing at German military intelligence matters)
KV 2/153, page 45a (minute 505?)
Luftwaffenführungsstab Ic (= Feindlage Intelligence)
Fremde Luftwaffen West
Nr. 18149/44 geh. (= Geheim / Secret) (C2).
Abwehr I Luft (2x)
z. Hd. Herrn Obstleutnant von Dewitz. (Hd (zur Hand = handed over)
Betr. : Ostro (= Paul Georg Fidrmuc)-Meldungen über Flugzeugausbringung GB (Great Britain)
Bezug : Fernmündliche (Oral) Rücksprache Obstlt. von Dewitz - Ltn. Graf v. Posadowsky am 12.6.44
Von Ostro wird seit Juli 1940 laufend die monatliche Flugzeugausbringung (production figures) in GB gemeldet. Ausbringungszahlen und ausgebrachte Muster (proto types) wichen im Juli 1940 in der allgemeinen Tendenz und im Detail beträchtlich von der auf Grund von Beutematerial (brit. Botschafter in Paris) bekannt geworden Ausbringung im Mai 1940 ab.
Für das Jahr 1940 wurde auf Grund eigener Schätzungen für das erste Halbjahr und der Ostro-Zahlen für das zweite Halbjahr eine Gesamtausbringung in GB von 9.900 Flugzeugen angenommen. Vor wenigen Tagen gab Cripps die Flugzeugproduktion in 1940 in GB (wahrscheinlich ohne Composed-Flugzeuge mit 15.000 Stück an.
Laut Ostro betrug die Flugzeugproduktion in den folgenden Jahren für GB:
1941 10.400 Stück
1942 17.600 "
1943 28.400 "
Auf Grund zahlreicher Pressemeldungen und Äusserungen englischer Minister muss angenommen werden, dass die Flugzeugaufbringung in GB - insbesondere 1941, aber auch 1942 - beträchtlich höher lag als bisher auf Grund der Ostro-Zahlen geschätzt wurde. Die Produktionszahlen für 1943 können dagegen vorläufig als glaubwürdig angesehen werden.
1.Halbjahr 1941 1.Halbjahr 1942 1.Halbjahr 1943
Laut Cripps. (21.9.43) Flugzeuge (Stückzahl) 100 131 169
Laut Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) 100 180 290
In dieser nur auf Verhältniszahlen basierenden Aufstellung zeigt sich erneut, dass die Ostro-Zahlen 1941/42 wesentlich zu niedrig gelegen haben müssen, wenn man die Ausbringungszahlen von 1943 als glaubwürdig unterstellt.
Seit Anfang 1943 konnten die Ostro-Zahlen durch die Hektor-Meldungen überprüft werden. Sowohl in der Gesamtzahl der ausgebrachten Flugzeugen wie in der Aufgliederung der einzelnen Flugzeugmuster war eine sehr gut Übereinstimmung zwischen den beiden Quellen festzustellen. Lediglich bei der Herstellung von Blenheim und Beaufighter-Flugzeugen lag Ostro wesentlich höher.
Unter Berücksichtigung aller Quellen ist anzunehmen, dass die Flugzeug-Ausbringungszahlen von Hektor und Ostro für das Jahr 1943 glaubwürdig sind, zumindest kann angenommen werden, dass die tatsächliche Ausbringung auf keinen Fall höher lag.
KV 2/153-1, page 47b
Seit November 1943 erscheint jedoch in der Berichterstattung der beiden V-Leute eine immer grösser werdende Differenz, die sich sowohl auf die Gesamtzahl der ausgebrachte Flugzeuge wie auf die Produktion der einzelnen Flugzeugmuster auswirkt.
Diese Differenz lässt sich mit keinerlei Zahlenakrobatik erklären.
Auf Grund verschiedener sonstige Unterlagen über die britische Flugzeugindustrie ist anzunehmen, dass die Hektor-Zahlen (data reaching via Kraemer's source) glaubwürdiger sind.
Es ist ferner zu beachten, dass die Meldungen des V-Mannes Ostro über das Ausbringungsprogramm einzelner Flugzeuge im der letzten Zeit besonders häufig im Widerspruch zu den glaubwürdigen Hektor-Angaben standen.
Sollte im übrigen die von Ostro gemeldete Verschiebung in der Ausbringung der einzelnen Flugzeugmuster in der letzten Monaten tatsächlich eingetreten sein, so hätten zahlreiche Fabriken ihre Produktion umstellen müssen, worüber keine Meldungen von Ostro vorliegen.
Es muss daher mit der Möglichkeit gerechnet werden, dass es sich bei den Sobac-Unterlagen um Spielmaterial handelt, bei dem richtige und falsche Angaben gemischt werden, um durch die Reaktion auf die Meldungen und die neu gestellten Anfragen wichtige Erkenntnisse über Ausmass der deutschen Nachrichten-Gewinnung aud GB zu erhalten.
I.A. (Im Auftrage)
gez. (Sgd.) Owe
Major i.G. (im Generalstab) (the qualification as this person had been gone through military Staff training /education)
Milamt Gruppe D (2 x f. KTB (= Kriegstagebuch = War Diary)
KV 2/153-1, page 63
Anlage 1 zu Luftwaffe Führung Stab Ic (Feindlage)
Fremde Luftwaffen West Nr. 31073/44 geh. (= secret) (B2)
(Ostro - Cripps - Hektor)
1940 - 1943
Evaluating the three references: Ostro (=Paul Georg Fidrmuc in Lisbon) - Cripps (British Minister of Air Supply ?) - Hektor (= one of the Kraemer's sources)
KV 2/153-1, page 109
SSD (= Dringende operative und taktische Nachrichten) (Befehle der Obersten u. oberen Führung) (Z 3022!; ZR2673; PPKK)
Kurfürst Ic West A 3
Abwehr I luft
nachrichtlich an: Auswertestelle West Oberursel (NNW of Frankfurt am Main)
Chi (= Cypher)-Stelle Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Referat C
Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L., Ref. B
Betrift: Erkundungsfragen West.
Es wird gebeten über sehr zuverlässigen V-Mann bzw. Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc in Lisbon/Portugal) folgende Fragen zu klären:
1.) Nach Angaben "Eisberg" (Finnland-Switzerland sources) von 26.4. sollen in der 12. USAAF 2 Wing mit Mosquito ausgerüstet sein (AOB: not valid), davon 1 Wing als 90. Wing. Nach hiesigen Erkenntnissen ist der 90. PR-Wing mit Lightning (P-47?) ausgerüstet. Ein weiter amerik. Wing mit Mosquito is hier nicht bekannt. Kann hier eine Verwechselung mit der 60. südafrik. PR-Squadron die mit Mosquito ausgerüstet ist und auch die Amerikaner Bildaufklärung fliegt, vorliegen?
2.) Bez.: Abw. I Luft/E 2947/4.44. (England-Kanada):
Die in o.a. Bezugsmeldung aufgeführten Nummern, insbesondere in Verbindung mit Fliegerkompanien, sind hier nicht bekannt. Welche Angaben haben diese Kompanien, wie ist ihr Unterstellungsverhältnis bzw. dienen diese Kompanien nur zur geschlossenen Überführung von Fliegendem Personal?
3.) Sind brasil. Flieger für den Einsatz vorgesehen bzw. bereits im Einsatz, sind die in rein Brasil. Verbänden zusammengefasst, welche Aufgaben haben sie und wem unterstehen sie? Flugzeugmuster?
4.) Wo befindet sich die 300. und 305. brit. Bomber-0Squadron, Aufgaben, Ausrüstung und Unterstellung?
U.V. Ic 1177
Major im Generalstab
KV 2/153-1, page 113
KTB (Kriegstagebuch) (War diary)
OKL. (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe) Fü. Stab. (Führungsstab) Ic/Fr.Lw.West (Fremde Luftwaffen West)
S.S.D. (Dringende operative und taktische Nachrichten) - geh. (secret)
AQn Robinson (Göring's mobile Headquarters) Ic/Fr.Lw.West (nachrichtlich) mit Anschriftenübermittlung. RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) Mil Amt B/L zur Hand Obstlt. von Dewitz.
1. Es wird um eingehende Charakteristiken der Generale Brereton und Browning gebeten.
2. Anscheinend ist im Zuge der Invasion Air Marshal Tedder nicht in dem Masse führungsmässig eingeschaltet worden wie es nach zahlreichen Pressemitteilungen, Josefinemeldungen, usw. zu erwarten war.
Es wird gebeten, Erkundigungen einzuziehen, ob diese Annahme zutrifft, indem General Eisenhower sich doch stärker durchgesetzt hat, ob Air Marshal Tedder bewusst im Hintergrund verblieben ist.
O.K.L. Fü.Stab Ic
Fremde Luftwaffen West
Nr. 30079/44 g.v. 13.10.44
gez. (signed) Zetzsche Hptm. (Captain) i.G. (im Generalstab)
KV 2/153-1, page 138a (minute 514aa)
Report No. VS/1499
No action to be taken on this report without prior reference.
Axis Intelligence Activities
1. Swedish Police Interrogation of Eberhard Schrott and Hans Schumann.
Schrott, the German Vice-Consul in Gothenburg, who formerly worked for Abwehr III F (counter espionage) Norway (Oslo?) and subsequently for Dr. Hans Wagner (Leiter) of the K.O. (Kriegsorganisation) Schweden, arrived in Gothenburg from Oslo on 1.2.43 to take up his post.
Under interrogation Schrott said that Fräulein Fischer, formerly Dr. Wagner's secretary, had stated that there was a man in the Swedish Foreign Office using the name "Siegfried" who was receiving 12,000 Kr. a month; that Ast-Copenhagen* had contact with Iceland (c); that he had reported often to the Germans on an expected invasion by the British.
* AOB: generally K.O. Offices had been established in most friendly (neutral) capitols on the European continent. Before the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, thus prior to 9th April 1940, there should have existed K.O. Offices in Copenhagen and Oslo, as well. Though, after the invasion of these two former countries, they got regular so called Abwehrstellen abbreviated named Ast.
Schumann, a clerk employed employed in (Dr. Hans) Wagner's Bureau (located within the premises of the German Legation) in Stockholm, member (Leiter) of the K.O. Schweden, stated that Dr. Wagner was meant to contact Swedish shipping circles which he did not do. (AOB, likely because there existed a German Naval Attaché)
2. Repatriation of Germans from Sweden.
Three parties of Germans have now been repatriated from Sweden to Germany. They are as follows:-
18.8.45 Officials and semi-officials.
27.8.45 Officials, semi-officials and Germans against whom the Swedes have issued deportation orders.
5.9.45 The "Drottingholm" (Swedish transport passengers ship for displaced people) group of women and children, deserters and civilians who have been deported, technically refused admission to Sweden, or invited to return to Germany.
Other parties are to follow. The Swedes, although cooperating (with British wishes) to a certain extent, are trying to prevent repatriation of some of the German officials who we wish we (the British) sent back to Germany.
3. In July 1945 the Swedish Police arrested Wilhelm Josef Berreth, director of Berreth & Holfeld A/B., Arsenalsgatan 4, Stockholm. In May 1944 Berreth had been paid 35,000 Kr. by Hans Schumann from Dr. Wagner's office on behalf of K.O. Schweden, the money having been sent to Wagner from Ast Prague (AOB: by then Prague was covered by the Germans as "Protektorat Böhmen und Mahren"; and considered being legally part of Germany). During his visit to Stockholm in May/June 1944, Arno Kleyenstüber (then Leiter I L Berlin) Wagner to pay the money to Berreth in order to form a company dealing in chemicals. The chief purpose of this company appears to have been to provide suitable cover for visits from an agent of Ast Prague named Wollmann. The company was formed, the directors being Rudolf Koci, German born 26.3.1897, living at Surbrunnsgatan 56, Stockholm, lawyer to the German Legation, and Werner Gyllenkreutz, who before the war delivered arms to the Swedish Nazis with the aid of Pflug-Hartung, head of a German espionage ring in Denmark.
Ast Prague's intention was for Wollmann to visit Sweden regularly to contact a Russian acquaintance (identity not known) with a view to obtaining intelligence about Russia. Wollmann's application for a Swedish visa in 1942 was refused. In 1944 he applied again and the visa was granted and he was in Sweden for one week.
Berreth is known to have visited Prague on many occasions during the war and to have met an officer of the Ast Prague, named Hptm. Loeschner, and to have travelled frequently to Norway. So far Berreth has not admitted anything except the receipt of the money.
4. The interrogation of the German Intelligence officer, Obladen (KV 2/521, PF 46805) indicates that the firm of Barlach A/B., is closely connected with G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) activities and that its managing director, Bruno John Barlach, was a personal friend of Obladen (a rather intelligent personality, and a most successful business man). In spite of these German connections the firm was able to maintain extensive commercial connections with the U.K. and U.S.A. throughout the war.
Barlach is a Swedish subject and had not previously come to our notice.
5. Suspect German agent: Dr. Phil. Georg Weydling.
Two German Unteroffiziere (N.C.O.), Georg Weydling, born Leipzig 13.10.1911 and Friedrich Franz Rath, reached Sweden from Halden in Norway in December 1944 and were later interned. Both these men belonged to Group I of the S.D. (??) in Halden, speak perfect Swedish and had been monitoring Swedish transmissions.
They were said to have been very well received by the Swedish authorities after 19.12.44, the frequencies and times of transmission of the Swedish teleprinter (FS) services were altered, It was reported that Major Wenzlau, German assistant Air Attaché in Stockholm and an important Abwehr I Luft Officer (military intelligence on air matters), was extremely nervous about these men being in Sweden and was heard to remark to Hptm. Thiemann, assistant to the German Air Attaché in Stockholm, that they were dangerous to his work than the Swedes as they knew the German codes.
Weydling was repatriated to Lübeck on 25.9.45 and is to be interrogated.
6. Suspect German Agent: Richard Odlozil.
Odlozil, Austrian by birth, Swedish by naturalisation, is the owner of the firm A/B. Reonit, Mäster Samelsgatan 18, Stockholm. Since May 1945, he has lived at Thorsvägen 15, Igelboda, near Saltsjöbaden. He was born about 1909 and came to Sweden in 1933. His firm sells office equipment and the total business is only a small scale. He had no money when he came to Sweden, but has now paid over 50,000 Kr. for his house and he owns a yacht and car.
In his office Odlozil almost invariably asks his visitors to leave before answering the telephone. He tells his tennis friends that he is anti-Nazi, but in spite of this he associated openly with members of the German military Attaché's staff until 1942. His behaviour in the Rengågan Restaurant attracted attention. He continually received notes from persons sitting at other tables or from certain of the waitresses, and he replied with similar notes.
His particular associate, Hptm. Horst Albrecht, former Assistant Military Attaché, German Legation Stockholm, was recalled to Berlin towards the end of 1943,. Albrecht was reported to be Leiter I, K.O. Schweden.
Paul Borkowsky, formerly of the German Military Attaché's office, Stockholm, confirmed during interrogation that Odlozil used to go to the Intendent department, which he supplied with paper and metals.
7. A certain Siegfried Ascher, journalist of German Jewish origin was recruited in the summer of 1941 by Dr. Wagner, former (wartime) K.O. Leiter Schweden, to undertake am espionage mission to Italy. Ascher's task was to discover who was responsible for a suspected leakage of information from the Vatican. On completion of his task he returned to Sweden where Wagner made further offers which Ascher declares he refused. Wagner is reported to have disappeared at the time of the German collapse and to be probably in Spain or Portugal.
(28) (since 8 April 2023)
KV 2/153-1, page 140c
8. Guenter Alfred Wilhelm Puls and Paul Liebfried.
Puls, German born 1918 in Chile, naturalised Swede since 1936m was arrested in Malmö in Mid July (1945). He has admitted that since 1941 he had been procuring information for the Germans on anti-Nazi persons and also reported on Swedish troops in Malmö and had given the German Consulate-General (General-Konsulat) copies of maps and keys to a code believed to be dropped by an Allied airman attempting an emergency landing in Skåne.
Liebefried, a German citizen born 1913, representative of several German firms, was also arrested as he had collaborated with Puls. He consented to engage in espionage activities so as to evade military service and continue his business activities in Sweden.
On 4.9.45 Puls's appeal against sentence of two years' imprisonment was allowed and he was set free. The verdict on Liebefried is to be announced later and he was retained under arrest.
9. The following sentences were passed in Stockholm on 22.8.45:-
(a) Hermann Mattias Johansson, secretary of the Swedish Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper "Folkets Dagblad", - 20 month for accepting funds from the German Legation, and for helping the Germans in arranging illegal communications from Sweden to Norway and Finland.
(b) Johan Agathon Blom, on the committee of the Swedish Socialist Party - 10 months for preparations for illegal intelligence.
(c) August Adolf Andersson, treasurer of "Folkets Dagblad", - 12 months for accepting sums of money.
These three are to surrender 428,915 Kr. to the State which the German Legation had paid to Johansson for the use of "Folkets Dagblad" and the Socialist Party between January 1943 and May 1945.
(d) Bertil Ragnar Anzen, legal representative of the Socialist party, was acquitted on the charge of preparing for illegal intelligence.
Three other people in this case have already been sentenced. They are:-
(1) Bo Erik Gjorvell, sentenced to 12 months' hard labour on 7.6.45 for illegal intelligence activity and possession of radio apparatus and arms.
(2) & (3) Stig Gustav Westborg, sentenced to 18 months' hard labour, and Sten Börje Thorwald Appelberg to 14 months' on 20.6.45, Johansson arranged for these two to be sent to Berlin, trained there and on their return to Stockholm had acted as contact between them and their German employers.
10. In early July 1945, the German subject Hanswolf Gottfried von Herder, alias Dr. Heller, was arrested in Värmland, Sweden, for espionage against Sweden. He was born in Saxony in 1908, lived in Sweden 1920-27, and then mainly in Germany until 1943 when he was called up and sent to Norway where, under the name dr. Heller, he obtained information from Norwegians and Swedes about Sweden's frontier defences in Värmland. After the capitulation of Norway von Herder came to Sweden and was interned. In August 1945 he was sentenced to 2½ years' hard labour. Notice of appeal has been given.
11. Olof Einar Anderssen, a Swedish carpenter, was sentenced to 3 years penal servitude on 22.8.45 at Årjäng, Värmland, Sweden, for espionage against Sweden on behalf of Germany.
12. German Intelligence in Sweden and Teleprinter (FS) Communications.
Gefreiter Harald Geissler posted to the staff of the German Military Attaché in Stockholm in September 1942 as a teleprinter (FS) operator, has given the following information during interrogation in Stockholm:-
KV 2/153-1, page 141d
The departments which sent messages over his teleprinter (FS) were:-
(a) Military Attaché's Office.
(b) Naval Attaché's Office.
(c) the Intendant
(d) Dr. Hans Wagner's (K.O.) Office.
(e) Dr. August Hermann Finke's office.
Of these messages, only those under (e) above reached the teleprinter in cipher (quite unlikely as Swedish services manually deciphered German Geheimschreiber communications (SFM T62a/b or c) were regularly commenced up towards the end of the year 1942. It is also highly unlikely that the K.O. did not operate G-Schreiber as their communications with Berlin contained very delicate information) Perhaps twice a month cipher messages were received from the Naval Attaché and Dr. Wagner('s K.O.)
In the Military Attaché's Office, the Military Attaché himself, Major Rudolf Watzdorf, Sdf. Wolfgang Ernst and Rittmeister (Captain) Harald von Koenigsberg were entitled to draft and sign messages. The Military Attaché's and Watzdorf's messages were mainly politico-military reports. (AOB: what might have been practiced was that messages text had, foregoing, been ciphered by means of an Enigma machine) After the Military Attaché had been visited by the Japanese Military Attaché. General Onodera, telegrams were sent off concerning order of battle in the U.K., U.S.A. and Russia. Ernst's messages concerned press and propaganda, and von Koenigsberg's general administration and information on the Swedish order of battle and defences. (AOB: an indication of non-coherent notices on behalf of Gefr. Harald Geissler is that all these sort of secret messages based upon intelligence information were always conveyed in a covered/secret way)
Korvetten-Kapt. Paul von Wahlert, the Naval Attaché, and Kapt-Lt. Gotthard Walter Raehmer were the officers entitled to send messages on behalf of the Naval Attaché's department. These massages were described as being Marine-technisch.
Dr. Wagner and Hptm. Albert Utermark went messages on behalf of the Bureau (K.O.) Wagner. These two were working together until July 1944 and after that Wagner was reporting to R.S.H.A., →
(AOB: Amt Mil (Mil Amt) as K.O. originated from "OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr" it logically should have gone over to Amt Mil (Milamt). The core reason was Hitler's decision of 12 February 1944, that OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr should merge with (S.S. controlled) R.S.H.A. Amt VI; later it was agreed between Dr. Schellenberg and Obst. Hansen to create a more military orientated Amt Mil (Milamt).
→ whilst Utermark's message went to VI-Z (likely at Milamt) which, according to source, had taken over the former functions of (Referat) III-F (counter espionage). The Bureau was concerned mainly with counter-espionage, but when Wagner received information concerning enemy operational activity or dispositions, he passed these to the Military Attaché. The exceptions were information about:
(a) Convoys of Allied ships moving to Murmansk,
(b) British Schnellboot (MTB) traffic.
These were dealt with by Wagner himself. As well as sending such telegrams to Germany, Wagner gave Luftflotte 5 Norway, Luftflotte Finland and to Marine Oberkommando in Norway and Denmark.
Dr. August Hermann Finke himself and Hans Schiller were the two officers who originated from Finke's office. As these were in cipher, source could not say nothing of the activities of this office.
The teleprinter (FS) lines of the Military Attaché's Office were connected with the Swedish Postal network. The Military Attaché had lines to:-
(a) Berlin, O.K.W.
(b) Zossen (Zeppelin!) Attaché Abteilung Heer (Army) (the huge bunker complex; used in post war days by the Russians)
(c) Befehlshaber Norway (and thence Denmark)
(d) Befehlshaber Finland (The German cable interconnecting Helsinki with Germany crossed Swedish territory where the Swedes intercepted and later decrypted German early SFM T 52 communications; this continued up to the introduction of the SFM T52d (https://cryptocellar.org/pubs/sturgeon.pdf)
The Luftwaffe also had its teleprinter (FS) lines and these went to:-
(a) Berlin, O.K.L. (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe)
(b) Luftflotte, Norway (later from Oslo there existed a LV 1000 wireless link between Oslo and Bechtesgaden)
(c) Hoehere Polizei Führer, Norway (Sipo S.D.)
13. Former activities of Johannes Michael Sander.
Sander, radio technician to Dr. Heinz Thorner, was employed in the Kultur Department of the German Legation, Stockholm. He had his own room for W/T and R/T reception. None of the other employees knew what he was doing. His job actually was as follows:- In every German Legation abroad there was a secret representative of Ribbentrop. (AOB: all Legations obeyed to Ribbentrop, as he was Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs: Auswärtiges Amt; abbreviated A.A.). These men had nothing to do with the ordinary Legation work (Seehaus Dienst) and did not communicate with Ribbentrop either per (Diplomatic) bag of by any known cipher →
KV 2/153-1, page 142
telegram through the Legation. The reason for this was that anything they told their Chief Ribbentrop ('s Amt) was secret, even from the Minister (Mr. Thomsen was in charge of the Legation in Stockholm)
No one in Stockholm, except Dr. Thorner who was Ribbentrop's representative (nonsense: as Ribbentrop was the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, thus in charge of almost all German Legations and Embassies abroad), knew how they sent their messages to Germany. They knew in advance that in a certain German radio programme from Königsberg, Berlin, Hamburg or any of the big German (shortwave stations controlled by "der Seehausdienst"), there would be a message at a certain time (like were the Kamaradschaftsdienst short wave transmissions directed to certain areas in the world →) (Z1064 Z1064return)
Both Sander and Thorner were repatriated to Germany on 18.8.45 and should be able to give further information on interrogation (neglecting the very fact that Germany by then had been divided in occupied Zones, such as the British - American - French and Russian zone, where effectively did not existed a workable feedback).
14. Fräulein Ilse Edith Rietzler.
The above, formerly employed by the Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier, Stockholm, is a fanatical Nazi and to avoid repatriation to Germany, she claimed she was born in Chile and has given a Chilean passport by the Chilean Legation in Stockholm. She lives with here stepfather (anti-Nazi) at Orsavägen 36, Nockeby.
15. Angela Hartmann, formerly employed as a shorthand typist at the German Military Attaché's office in Stockholm, has avoid expulsion by marrying a Swedish Nazi named Allan Eugen Tellström on 26.8.45.
16. Ingeniör Karl Gustav Thorsson Eimquist, a Swede, a member of the Inventor's Association who worked for Telefunken throughout the war, is reported to have obtained access to Sir George Binney's freighter by subterfuge in 1944 with a view to obtaining information of British "Radar" development.
17. Illegal courier route between Sweden and Germany.
It is reported that since July 1944 couriers from Germany have been bringing jewellery and precious objects d'art to Haga Palace, Stockholm. Princess Sibylla, who is generally reported to be extremely pro-German, has assisted these couriers and has helped them to "hide away" their precious goods.
18. Jan O. Berson.
Berson, suspected Japanese agent, a Pole, is the correspondent of the Polish Telegraph (London) and has been in Stockholm throughout the war. He is extremely anti-Russian and has numerous contacts in the Axis Legations (Germany, Italy and Japan). It is not definite whether he is anti-British and whether his Axis contacts were made for the benefit of the Allies or as a result of his extreme anti-Russian bias.
The former Polish Minister (head of the, non Russian occupied, Polish Legation in Stockholm), Sokolinicki, was reported to be very much under the influence of Berson, to whom he confided a great many confidential reports.
Berson was also the correspondent for the Japanese Agency Saki, and was reported in 1942 as being in contact of the Japanese I.S. (Intelligence Service).
KV 2/153-1, page 144a (minute 513b)
Extract for File 66365 Name: Kraemer
Original in file No: PF 603039 Wenzlau H.F.K. Serial 10b Dated 16.10.45
7. Cooperation with Kraemer:
In order to understand the full significance of prisoner's mission with regard to Kraemer, it is necessary to give a brief description of events prior to his arrival in Stockholm.
Until the end of 1942, Kraemer had conducted his intelligence organisation in Stockholm from Munich (München), but as his information and contacts were considered very valuable, he was moved to Stockholm at the end of that year and was appointed Legationssekretär at the Embassy (Legation). In Jan 43 Major Busch, who had for years worked in the Abwehr Amt/Ausland as Länderreferent England and Amerika, succeeded in obtaining a foreign appointment for himself and took up the post of Assistant Air Attaché in Stockholm in Mar 43. Busch, an ambitious man, had handled Kraemer's reports and was very anxious that Kraemer whose work was highly valued, should work for him, in order that he might share some of the credit. (Making Busch a future enemy, of Kraemer's!)
Relations between Busch and Kraemer were strained from the start and did not improve when Busch formal request that Kraemer should become subordinate to him was refused bt the Abwehr Central Office (meant: Abwehr I Berlin, headed by Obstlt. Hansen). Matters came to a head in the spring of 1944, when Busch openly accused Kraemer of playing a double game. Kraemer in due course hear of this and demanded Busch's transfer. The Amtschef Obst. i.G. Hansen took the matter up himself and authorised Prisoner's appointment in Busch's place. (AOB: Wenzlau arrived about December 1944, in Stockholm)
Kraemer, an old acquaintance of the Prisoner, greeted him with delight and the two became firm friends. In due course the Prisoner ascertained that Kraemer exchanged information with the Japanese military attaché General Onodera. He also discovered that Kraemer received reports from the Hungarian military attaché, Major Voeckoendy, but learned later that the information supplied by the Hungarian had come from the Japanese source (think of Okamoto in Bern), thereby proving that the Japanese were playing a double game.
On the occasion when Lufthansa plane crashed into the sea and all occupants lost their lives, the Prisoner pointed out to Kraemer that if anything should happen to the latter (Kraemer), all his valuable contacts would be lost as nobody else would know his other sources. Kraemer agreed with him but was still reluctant to take the Prisoner (Wenzlau) into his full confidence. However, However, on Prisoner's suggestion, they divided the fields of work. Prisoner was to deal with with the Eastern section, i.e. Sweden, Finland and Russia, while Kraemer looked after the Western Zone. All relevant messages which Kraemer received from his special sources concerning Eastern countries were passed on to Prisoner. This division of work did not entail Prisoner's taking over any agent; Kraemer still attended to his agents personally,, although the two used to visit together the Japanese and Hungarian military attachés.
Prisoner paid a visit to Berlin in January 1945 and discussed Kraemer's case with the new Amtschef, Brigadeführer Schellenberg, who authorised Prisoner to carry on with his mission, but not to arouse Kraemer's suspicions. During his visit, Prisoner ascertained that Kraemer's expenses amounted to Kr. 20,000 and U$ 1,000 per month. He saw the monthly receipts - all bearing an illegible signature - for Kr. 12,000 and one for US 1,000 all of which were considered very reasonable for the information Krämer received. It was thought by the Berlin office that Kraemer was running his intelligence service in an economic manner. (AOB: among all the expenses, some went in some way or another towards the Japanese, as they were in Sweden and Switzerland, entirely without sources of income; it is likely that some of the value had been transferred onto the German Legation in Tokyo, equally without financial resources)
KV 2/153-1, page 145b
Prisoner returned to Stockholm and the situation remained the same as before, prisoner being unable to penetrate the identities of Kraemer's other sources.
8. Identification of Symbols:
3579: This was the symbol for the agent Swalling, a Swede aged about 38, who was head of the freight section of the Swedish Luftverkehrsgesellschaft ABA. Every four to six weeks, Kramer received details of goods which had been freighted to England and the USA, particularly iron ore and raw steel ingots. Swalling was very well informed about his firm, and knew the intentions of the director-general, Carl Florman, which regard to expansion. May 1945, Swalling was arrested by the Swedish (were it Section V whom was responsible for it?) police, accused of treason, and Prisoner thinks he was sentenced to 14 months' hard labour.
3572: This was the symbol for Schaefer, German representative of the Lufthansa AG. in Stockholm; aged about 34. He was arrested in April 1945 by the Swedish police, and together with another German, Müller, was sentenced to a long term of hard labour for treason. Through Müller, who was employed on the Bromma airfield (Stockholm Airport), Schaefer obtained information concerning the aircraft which operated the courier service between England and Sweden.
(P1080 ↓↓ P1080return)
Eierkopf and Source 26: All messages from Onodera were known as Source 26. If the messages were called Source 26 (Eierkopf) it meant that Onodera had himself obtained the information from the Finnish Hallamaa. Message called Source 26 (Haifisch) were received by Onodera direct from Tokyo.
Swedish-Finnish Source: These were the messages received by Kraemer from the special source, believed by Prisoner to be the Swedish Foreign Office, and which were concerned with the Eastern section, which was Prisoner's task to cover.
Sybille: This was the cover name of Busch's secretary, Freifrau von Schlotheim, who was in the service of OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr until 15 Jul 44, when she was transferred to the Air Attaché's office Berlin on his arrival in Stockholm that his own secretary, Frau Reichenbach, would use the same cover name.
Anke: This was the cover name used by Hptm. Uetermark, who had been active with K.O. Sweden for many years and who had to leave the country at the end of Feb 1945.
Gipfel: This was the cover name of Oblt. Berg who worked in the central Office in Berlin. berg received all incoming teleprint (FS) messages from Wenzlau @ Pandur and Kraemer @ Hasso, and was responsible for their distribution within the central office.
A further list of all symbols and cover names known to prisoner will be included in the next interrogation report on Prisoner (Wenzlau).
9. Prisoner knows nothing more certain Kraemer's organisation than as already been given in para 7 above.
Prisoner states that Kraemer would never divulge the names of his agents but went so far as to say that they were employed by the (Swedish) Foreign Office. Prisoner cannot therefore give any information concerning Josephine, Hector or Source 10. He states that he has neither heard of Count Wilhelm Douglass (C.i.C. of the Swedish Army) nor of his family. He has heard the name Grafstrom, but does not know the man personally. Kraemer once mentioned his name during a conversation, and Prisoner understood that he worked in the (Swedish) Foreign Office.
KV 2/153-1, page 160 (minute 506a)
Stockholm to Berlin
153 b.O. Subject: Intelligence work Sweden. The closing down of Finke and Wagner office which was decreed by orders of Senior (Schellenberg: Chef Amt VI as well as Milamt) w.e.f. 1/4 has not yet been made known to appropriate Stellen here by superior Dienststellen (Bear please in mind, that Berlin was on the 14th already (encircled) by the Russians) at your end. I presume the delay is due to bad communications. Although statement was handed over to A by PF (Pfeiderer, former Consul General in Stockholm) is anxious because he feels responsibility towards A. and has given him his words. The Swedes will, in any case, compel the cessation of III (counter intelligence) activity. For this reason it is requested that immediate notification of Senior (Schellenberg) order be made to Finke and Wagner office.
KV 2/153-1, page 164a (minute 504a)
Statement handed in by Kraemer on
Comment on my statement about the Connection of Grundboeck (Grundböck).
A. General remark concerning Grundboeck (Grundböck).
1) As already stated before Grundboeck (Grundböck) was always endeavoured and had claimed it from the beginning that his "Abwehr" activities were kept as secret as possible also among my German fellows S.I.S. (German Secret Intelligence Service) Officers. He had claimed this in in connection of his business and of his Swedish family. That is why there are also no Abwehr Officers, who actually know everything about Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) intelligence-relations. In the course of of time it was naturally impossible to avoid that with certain limits-it became known to Berlin what sort of contact I had with Grundboeck (Grundböck) and in what of direction he worked for me. But the knowledge of the single members of the Berlin-Staff is different in its size.
2) Witnesses in Stockholm.
b) Voeczkoendy (Vöczköndy).
ad a) Swallving, forwarding agent of the ABA-Company and agent of mine was on very good terms with Grundboeck (Grundböck) . He knows about the close personal relations between Grundboeck (Grundböck) and me including the fact that Grundboeck (Grundböck) furnished me with intelligence. he was not informed by me about the details.
ad b) Voeczkoendy (Vöczköndy): he came to Stockholm a short time before Grundboeck (Grundböck) death (about 29 March 1944). He does not know details about Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) and my activities, but he can confirm the fact that I closely cooperated with Grundboeck (Grundböck) →
KV 2/153-1, page 165b
3) The knowledge Berlin etc. had about the source.
a) Col. Hansen (before 19 July 1944)
b) Obstlt. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber)
d) Lt. Berg
e) Capt Berchtold (Bechthold?) - I-H Ast Vienna (Wien)
ad a) Hansen knew that Grundboeck (Grundböck) has been one of my main sources in Stockholm with excellent relations to official Swedish and Finnish authorities' furthermore that Grundboeck (Grundböck) was the intermediary in the Fullep (Hector) (Hektor) set-up.
ad b) Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) knew that Grundboeck (Grundböck) was my Chief-agent in Sweden with very valuable relations to official Swedish and Finnish sources.
ad c) v. Bentheim knew Grundboeck (Grundböck) very well since the time before the war., He was quite aware of my friendship and cooperation with Grundboeck (Grundböck); details I did not tell him.
ad d) Berg knows that I closely cooperated with Grundboeck (Grundböck), but he did not know any details. But Berg will remember that I teleprint (FS) several times to Berlin to get Visas. tickets for passenger planes etc, furthermore that I sometimes sent to him Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) messages for his brother in Budapest to pass him on by special-teleprinter (FS).
ad e) Berchthold (Bechthold?) I H Vienna (Wien) is a friend of Grundboeck (Grundböck) and knows about Grundboeck's relations with Ast Vienna (Wien) before and into the beginning of the war.
B. Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) Swedish Connections.
KV 2/153-1, page 166c
1) Witness in Stockholm: Swallving.
Swallving, who did much business with Grundboeck (Grundböck), knows probably fairly well the extent of Grundboek's (Grundböck's) business-relations. This may be of interest because Grundboeck (Grundböck) got many of his informtions from these sources.
2) The knowledge Berlin had.
a) Col. Hansen (< 19 July 1944).
b) Obstlt. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber).
c) Obstlt. von Dewitz.
d) Major von Bentheim.
e) Obstlt. Ohletz (KV 2/106)
ad a) Hansen knew about Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) relations with the Swedish Foreign Office (Count Douglas) and the Swedish General Staff (no names).
ad b) Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) same as ?
ad c, d.) Dewitz and Bentheim knew that I had connections to the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish General Staff; they did not know how this contact was maintained. As I stated. Bentheim knew generally about my cooperation with Grundboeck (Grundböck), but nothing of more concrete facts. I have mentioned as a source Count Douglass' name in 1943 to Bentheim and Dewitz, but I did not give further details, especially concerning the part, Grundboeck (Grundböck) acted.
ad e) Ohletz. I did not inform Ohletz about b). But it is possible that Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber), his predecessor, or von Dewitz have told him, what they knew about it.
C. Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) Finnish Connections.
KV 2/153-1, page 167d
1) Witness in Stockholm. Obstlt. Kobor, Hungarian Military Attaché in Stockholm and Helsinki. He was an intimate friend of Grundboeck (Grundböck) and will certainly know about some of Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) Finnish connections.
2) The knowledge Berlin had:
a) The is repeating what already had been dealt with befor.
D. Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) Fullep-Hector-Connections.
1) Witness in Stockholm: none.
2) The knowledge Berlin had:
a) Obst. Hansen. (AOB: < 19 July 1944)
b) Obst. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber)
c) Major von Bentheim
d) Obstlt. von Dewitz
e) Lt. Berg
f. Obstlt. Ohletz
as a) Hansen: I have stated already the reasons, which compelled me to the utmost cautiousness concerning Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) Fullep (Hector)-organisation. Hansen knew the facts; he ordered the strict →
KV 2/153-1, page 168e
secrecy about it and forbade me to tell anybody else including members of the Abwehr. (AOB: and Milamt ; Amt Mil)
knows that I had a connection I got British production-reports from, which
generally was called the "MAP" - source and had the cover designation -
"Hector". He neither knew intermediaries nor any details except the fact
that the reports came via Madrid (Fullep)
by diplomatic-mail. In autumn 1944 Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber)
and I had appointed mutual cooperation he would settled definitely in Madrid.
Kleyenstüber changed from Berlin
to become Leiter K.O.
Fregatten-Kapitän Ernst Wilhelm Leissner
not return to Germany,
but remained in Madrid at a lower function)
it had been decided than that Kleyenstueber ( Kleyenstüber )
had to go to as deputy Air Attaché to the German Legation in Madrid.)
... But I did not meet Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber)
(AOB: By the way: the Fullep aspect will be discussed later more in details; but basically it was an Hungarian endeavour and handled in Berlin by Mr. Janos Horvath at the Hungarian Legation, in Berlin)
again, he could keep his appointment for a Berlin spring 1945 rendezvous (March 1945 was Kraemer's last and quite brief, visit to Berlin, during his wartime engagement) ......
ad c, d) Both von Bentheim and von Dewitz, do not know about the Fullep-organisation. They only know that I got informations via Spain from a source which connected the MAP. von Dewitz , do not know about the Fullep-organisation. They only knew that I got informations via Spain from a source which connected the MAP. Dewitz and perhaps Bentheim will know too that the reports were forwarded from Madrid by diplomatic-mail. At the end of 1944 the plan came up in Berlin to remove me from Stockholm to the German Embassy in Madrid. I thought that I could overcome some of the difficulties in my contact to the Fullep - Hector (Hektor)-organisation. But the whole suggestion was too late, the general development the situation made it impossible.
ad e) Berg. will know that I got the "Hector"-reports via Spain and that their source had relations to the M.A.P. He will not know further details, besides the plan of my change from Stockholm to Madrid. →
KV 2/153-2, page 1
ad f) Ohletz. I never gave any information covering? Fullep (Hector) to Ohletz. He was the Chief of Milamt C and had nothing to do with the Western countries (AOB: as Stockholm was actually dealt with as being in section "Ost"). It is possible that Ohletz has got to know something by Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) or von Dewitz.
KV 2/153-2, page 6a (minute 501b)
Statement handed in by Krämer (Kraemer)
Supplement concerning "Bergmann".
I remember now that Onodera has mentioned to me once that either he come into contact with "Bergmann" or "the Estonian Military Attaché" through Hptm. (Cpt.) Cellarius, (Horn + Cellarius KV 2/2304? PF 602864) chief of the K.O. Finland as intermediary., chief of K.O. Finland as intermediary. (According: https://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php?thread/64748-deutsche-wehrmacht-luftwaffe-vor-1940-in-finnland/ Fregatten-Kapitän Alexander Cellarius)
or both, Cellarius and Onodera know "Bergmann" (the Estonian Military Attaché) and the three of them have met each other once.
So Cellarius will be able to contribute to the clarification of "Bergmann".
Comments on my Statements.
My former position in Stockholm has been characterised by the fact that I worked singly and self dependent, whilst most of the German Abwehr Officers abroad were K.O. members etc.
My actual position here is made difficult by the fact that I, having endeavoured to protect certain persons by retaining my knowledge about their activities for me, formerly have given statements that were partially neither correct nor complete.
My own opinion: I quite see to have done the wrong thing and I am busy to repair that to my best knowledge and with the utmost sincerity.
My direct connections often were of strictly personal character, I cooperated partially with friends in intelligence matters and not with agents, if the word "agent" means "cash and carry for intelligence". Naturally, I asked some of my friends to look out for agents and these I provided with money for the agents. That means that the list of my real agents must be a relative poor one. What I know are informations, which enabled me to get intelligence.
My attitude to Berlin was determined by the endeavour to protect my S.I.S. co-operators, and especially my friends, together with their agents, if I knew them, against any possibility of being compromised.
I knew the Abwehr in Berlin very well and its dangerous talkativeness, also I was afraid that the other side possibly had already succeeded or might succeed at every moment to get inside-information concerning sources and agents. Some of my co-operators had made it a condition sine qua non that that neither their nor their sources' names ever were mentioned to Berlin.
Several incidents in Berlin justified my precautions and cautiousness; treason was done by persons had deserted. Desertion could never mean anything else for the deserter than give away everything he knew.
So Abwehr I-Luft does not know all the dates and facts about my sources.
What had been an advantage for me during my Stockholm time - not a single one of my connections was overthrown - is a disadvantage at present. No one indeed of I-Luft can completely confirm all my statements.
My contribution to do away with the difficulties to check up my →
(29) (since 14 April 2023)
KV 2/153-2, page 7b
Stockholm activities can only be to give statements, which can be depended on absolutely and furthermore to give the names of Abwehr officers and members of my Stockholm acquaintances etc. and to state in connection with every single case what these persons know.
Comment on my statement about Count Paul von Toggenburg.
1. Witness in Stockholm: None.
2. The Knowledge Abwehr I-Luft had about the source:-
b) Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber), Obstlt.
c) Berg, Lt.
d) von Dewitz, Obstlt.
e) Ohletz, Obstlt.
f) Wenzlau, Major
ad a) Wirsing (Giselher-Wirsing). (https://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm)
Count von Toggenburg had introduced me to his friend Gieselher Wirsing by the latter in the beginning of 1943. Wirsing and I became friends very soon, so that he knew about my political S.I.S. (German Secret Intelligence Service) cooperation with his friend Toggenburg. From this time I met Wirsing rather regularly once per month in Berlin or Copenhagen. Naturally I spoke to Wirsing about Toggenburg's opinions and informations concerning the actual situation, quite the normal thing between friends, furthermore Toggenburg had told me to do so.
ad b) Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber).
Kleyenstueber came to Stockholm in June 1944 (AOB: considering June 1944, which was just before he, knowingly that he had to succeed Leissner, the head of K.O. Spain in Madrid, becoming Leissner's successor. Leissner, nevertheless remained staying in Madrid, albeit in a lower grade function. I therefore tend to consider Kleyenstüber's visit might have been meant as a goodbye gesture); until then he was not informed about my relations to Toggenburg. During Kleyenstueber's (Kleyenstüber's) visit; I informed him that Toggenburg was one of my best sources of political intelligence. This was contrary to my usual practice of protecting my sources even against Abwehr itself, because Toggenburg's Stockholm position had already become rather critical and I foresaw the necessity to mobilise Abwehr I-Luft in his favour. (AOB: Toggenburg was married to an American wife, and Goebbels was pressing as to get von Toggenburg out of his profession! What might have occurred, is, that in someway or another the Reichskanzlei, maybe even Bormann, had been used as to act effectively against von Toggenburg) Kleyenstüber will remember that the three of us had a lunch at my home of the 6th of June, 1944.
ad c, d, e) Berg, v. Dewitz, Ohletz.
I think I mentioned in a vague way Toggenburg to von Dewitz, at the end of 1943 or in the beginning of 1944 as one of my sources of political information. Toggenburg's name and importance as informant was clearly and practically for the first time mentioned to Berg and Ohletz and then to Dewitz again, when Toggenburg was called back to Berlin by the Ministry of Propaganda (Goebbels) and I had teleprinted (FS) several times in July, August and September 1944 to help him one of the very best political sources we had. Also Wirsing (a good friend of Schellenberg) was informed of the development of Toggenburg's situation.
ad f) Wenzlau.
Wenzlau knows that Toggenburg was one of my relations I judged later in September 1944 came to Stockholm, he told me that my efforts probably would not have any success; the Abwehr (Milamt) was too weak to carry through its intentions.
Comment on the statement about "Bergmann".
1) Witness(es) in Stockholm Major Wenzlau.
In the time from October/November 1944 - April 1945, Major Wenzlau, →
KV 2/153-2, 8c
Deputy Air Attaché at the German legation in Stockholm was present about ten times when I met Onodera giving me intelligence he had obtained from Garnier. Onodera then referred to his intermediary "Berg.."(Bergmann), who was several times also we called him "the Estonian Military Attaché".
Major Wenzlau will remember from these conversations, that "Bergmann" (the Estonian Attaché) had offered to Onodera two Estonian subjects, one of them an engineer, and had suggested to send them to the USA as agents. They should work with wireless transmitters. The suggestion was dropped after Wenzlau and I had at the numerous difficulties of preparation and execution of these agents' task under the present circumstances (March 1945).
2) The Knowledge Berlin had about "Bergmann".
Obstlt. von Dewitz and Lt. berg, perhaps Obstlt. Ohletz knew that I got informations by Onodera, which he had obtained from Garnier. They knew nothing about Onodera's intermediary.
Comment on my statement concerning Aari. (No life has remained to exist)
3) Witness in Stockholm.
a) Persons. Hepp, Press Attaché of the German Legation in Stockholm. Wenzlau, Major and Deputy Air Attaché of the german Legation in Stockholm.
b) Their Knowledge.
ad Hepp. As I have said already in my former statements, I owe to Hepp my contact with Aari. Hepp knows that I was very interested in Aari for both my reports to the German Foreign Office (one of Kraemer's main employer!) and my reports to the Abwehr (Kraemer's second employer). He knows that I got political informations and intelligence from Aari concerning in particular Finland, but as well the Western Allies.
ad Wenzlau. After Wenzlau was settled in Stockholm (think of mid December 1944) and had taken over with our mutual consent the evaluation and transmission of intelligence concerning Finland, Soviet Russia and Sweden (regarding to Sweden mostly political reports) in October 1944, I passed over to him all my Aari informations concerning these countries. He knew Aari by name and I had told him that my informant was one of the leading Finnish journalists with the best official connections. Wenzlau did not know Aari personally. I did not introduce him to Aari, because the latter one was very careful.
Finland was at war with Germany (after the Russians had occupied Finland and their mutual armistice) and Aari did not want further German contacts besides Hepp and me. When with the beginning of 1945 the German situation became more and more serious and hopeless, the idea to bring Aari and Wenzlau into mutual contact was dropped.
Wenzlau forwarded the Aari reports under the heading "From Finnish journalistic source" or "From Finnish diplomatic source" or "Out of Finnish Swedish collaboration". I think I have told Wenzlau that I had lent some money to Aari.
2) The Knowledge Berlin had about Aari.
Lt. Berg and I are very good friends. I think I have mentioned Aari once to Berg as one of my best Finnish sources.
Aari was not mentioned by name in my official reports.
Sgd. Krämer (Kraemer)
Copied Camp 020.
KV 2/153-2, page 10a (minute 501a)
Statement handed in by Kraemer on 27.9.45.
Comment on my statement concerning
1) Witness in Stockholm: none.
2) The knowledge Berlin had about the source:
a) Major von Bentheim.
b) Obstlt. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber)
c) Lt. Berg.
d) Stabsamtsleiter Hederich and his referee Dr. XY (name forgotten)
e) Obstlt. von Dewitz.
ad a) Major von Bentheim.
In the beginning of 1944 Stabsamtsleiter Hederich from the "Kanzlei des
Führers had applied to Major von Bentheim, an acquaintance of his, and asked
him if he could possibly come in contact with Professor
the former director of the "Kaiser Wilhelm Institut" (after
the War known as the
who at that time lived in the USA. Hederich complained to von Bentheim
about Rust, German Minister of Education (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernhard_Rust)
who from a very narrow nationalistic point of view had released Prof.
in the beginning of the War, only because he was a Dutch subject.
Hederich wanted with the consent of the Government authorities in the
beginning of 1944 that Prof.
should be induced to return to his former presidency of the Institute,
especially in the interest of the Atom-Research Work. (Einstein
opposed Debeye fiercely because he once took charge of the Nazi controlled
(AOB: even in the early years of our current millennium, it was in academic circles in the Netherlands, debated whether Debeye deliberately had been once on the wrong side (Nazi sympathies) which after all was concluded he was did no so)
Prof. von Euler should be asked to be the intermediary between the "Kanzlei des Führers and Prof. Debeye.
Bentheim was aware that I knew Prof. von Euler in Stockholm socially, so he consented to Hederich's request.
As a matter of fact it was quite unusual and very surprising that the "Kanzlei des Führers" applied to the Abwehr at all; it must be looked at as a personal request of Hederich to von Bentheim.
According to my orders I addressed myself to Euler. His endeavours concerning Debeye were in vain. Out of all this a friendly contact originated between Euler and me. Bentheim knows that I tried to get informations from Euler and his scientific circle concerning the development and condition of neutral and Anglo-American science generally, but particularly concerning the splitting of atom.
ad b) Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber)
Kleyenstüber in his capacity as chief of Abwehr I-Luft was informed about the contact by von Bentheim. I myself have had several conversations about it with Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber).
ad c) Berg.
Part of my teleprinted (FS) reports to Bentheim passed through Berg's hands, so he will remember the Euler-contact.
KV 2/153-2, page 11b
ad d) Stabsamtsleiter Hederich and his referee Dr. XY (name forgotten, but perhaps Berg will remember the referee).
I met in Berlin in 1944 and discussed with both of them the problem Debeye/Euler. It was further appointed that Prof. von Euler should be invited to visit Germany for discussions with German scientists. I think to know that von Euler, Hederich and his referee later actually have met in Berlin for scientific discussions.
ad f) von Dewitz.
Von Bentheim will have informed von Dewitz about my cooperation with Euler. I myself have shortly mentioned my Euler contact to von Dewitz. But I mainly discussed with von Dewitz the possibility to get via Euler informations about about the USA aircraft-industry by Prof. Velander, Euler's colleague, who had then just returned from the States, Von Dewitz gave orders what sort of informations I should try to obtain from Velander via Euler. I remember that Berlin was chiefly interested in informations about the American research-laboratories.
Comment on my statement about
1) Witness in Stockholm: None.
2) The knowledge Berlin had:
a) Obstlt. von Dewitz.
b) Obstlt. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber).
c) Lt. Berg.
ad a, b.) In conversations I have had in Berlin in spring 1944 with Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) and von Dewitz, it was established that "Zuckerhut" comprised all information coming from the Swiss General Staff's intelligence. Furthermore it was arranged between us that the single countries respectively capitals, where the Swiss General Staff-reports came from, additionally got special figures as cover designation. Both officers knew that my chief sources of this sort of information was a relation in the Swedish Legation in Bern. Because of the fact that I did not now any details about the new source of Grundboeck (Grundböck) (AOB: before 29th March 1944 as on this day the latter person did pass away) I could not give concrete reports concerning what amount of intelligence might be expected.
With Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) death "Zuckerhut" naturally slackened down; there may have been 20-30 "Zuckerhut"-reports until April 1945. Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) and Dewitz were not informed about the later partners of this organisation, who furnished me with intelligence concerning the Swiss General Staff: Okamoto, Onodera (both men were Japanese Military Attachés), Hallamaa (Finland), Kobor (Hungary), who started this partnership late in 1944. I have been in Berlin in October 1944, that meant before the real revival of "Zuckerhut"; when I came to Berlin in March 1945 for one day, I have seen Dewitz only for a very short time (mid April the Russians besieges Berlin; and almost all offices/bureaus had moved out of the Berlin area).
As already reported, I had not given Berlin written reports about my sources.
as c) Lt. Berg will be informed about the fact, that Zuckerhut" comprised all information coming from the Swiss General Staff's intelligence.
Camp 020 27.9.45/
KV 2/153-2, page 15a (minute 498a) (H1072 ↓↓↓↓↓↓↓ H1072return)
Statement handed in by Krämer (Kraemer)
Concerning "The Arnheim-Report."
A. 1. My information, given to I-Luft, Berlin at the Saturday before the actual landing of airborne-divisions in Holland, which took place on Sunday (approximately 16.9.45), I called in my former statements "The Arnheim-Report". I confirm my former statements.
2. Approximate contents of the report.
The Allied Supreme command intends airborne-operations in the environments of Arnheim, Tilburg and Eindhoven. (Note: I am not quite sure if Eindhoven was mentioned).
Aim of the operation is to enforce the crossing of the Rhine.
The Allied units consists of the 1st British, 82nd and 101st USA Airborne Division, all of them will start from England.
The operation will be carried through between Sunday and Thursday. (Note: In the information the figures of the dates of the two days were mentioned).
3. Source of the report.
I had got the report sub 2 from Fullep in the form form given above without further comment and without further reference to the original source. (D1066 ↓↓ D1066return) The report was sent to me by diplomatic-mail, which arrived at a Friday night (the mail did arrive: from Madrid by Hungarian diplomatic bag towards Berlin and there received by Mr. Horvath at the Hungarian Legation, in Berlin. Here the message-letter was put into a new envelope and sent by German/Hungarian? (diplomatic) mailbag towards the German Legation in Stockholm) (Sept. 14th?). I had a look on the (microdot) mail the same night and found that the mail consisted of 16 or 17 microdphotos; in the night and the following morning, Saturday, I read through the reports and found on one of the microphotos the "Arnheim" information. Immediately I gave the information to the Air Attaché's teleprinter-office (FS) with the order to forward it to Berlin I-Luft as "KR-Blitz" (Kriegsentscheidend), the signification for the most urgent importance of the message. (AOB: please bear in mind - that Kraemer firstly was employed as a Sekretär of the Legation, and therefore on behalf of the German Foreign Office (A.A.); secondly from there the message should have, immediately, to have be transferred onto the Milamt in charge of matters of I-Luft. The delay might have been caused in this quite long chain of directions). Conform to the original message and as usual in the case of Fullep-intelligence, which dealt with strategical matters, I chose the cover designation "Zuverlässiger V-Mann" (Reliable agent).
By several mishaps, interrupted of communication-lines (maybe first at: Das Auswärtiges Amt, and from there internally in Berlin to "das Milamt"), delay by coding and decoding etc. the telegram was received by Abwehr I-Luft only after the actual landing-operation had already begun. Obstlt. Ohletz and Lt. Berg were probably - Schellenberg (then Leiter Amt VI as well as das Mil Amt)- immediately called to account for the delayed deliverance. But it could only be found that several unfortunate circumstances had caused the delay; also it was stated that the report had been forwarded by me correctly and in good time. When I came to Berlin in November (1944), Schellenberg mentioned the affair only briefly and confirmed that there was no fault of mine.
As I stated before I had chosen the collective cover designation "Zuverlässiger V-Mann" (Reliable agent), because the report concerned strategical intelligence. I may repeat that the collective cover designation "Zuverlässiger V-Mann" composed numerous sources, a.e. the different individual sources of Grundboeck (Grundböck) before his death (29 March 1944), parts of the Fullep-intelligence, Toggenburg's, Aari's, Onodera's, Euler's information reports. It naturally meant that the information is coming from an in itself reliable, but not specially mentioned source as, a.e. (O1079 O1079return →) "Quelle 10"= Swedish General Staff (official opinion), "Zuckerhut" is Swiss General Staff", "Quelle 27" = Garnier (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm), French Military Attaché, Stockholm, French General Staff.
As a matter of fact, the designation for the special sources were →
KV 2/153-2, page 16b
created with the aim to separate distinctly informations coming from official authorities and expressing their views from the others, which came from individuals. As it must be well known the bulk of the "Zuverlässiger V-Mann" reports came from Swedish sources (geographically); therefore, von Dewitz, Ohletz and Berg could have assumed in this case too, that the report came from a pure Swedish source.
B. Another report about the Airborne Operation (code name: Market Garden).
About 2 or 3 days before the actual Arnheim-operation, Onodera told me to have received from the Swedish general Staff, in exchange to other intelligence, the dislocation report that the 1st British, the 82nd and 101st USA Airborne-Division were now in England since about a month. Together with this he had got other dislocation reports concerning the Western front. The whole dislocation report was handed over to me by Onodera. I remember that we wondered about the new dislocation of the Airborne Divisions, which were supposed to be in France.
Onodera added verbally that:
the Swedish General Staff expected a big Anglo-American Airborne operation in Holland as immediately imminent; it was further reported that the 1st British Airborne Division was in sealed camps.
(AOB: a downside of British safety precautions - to seal off sites where troops were kept for direct operations, that they blocked all sorts of possible communications. Knowing that British troops were there, and communications, of all sorts being cut-off, this was a clear sign that an operation/action was truly imminent!)
I knew what it meant to keep Airborne-units in "sealed camps" and reported this very important information to Berlin as quickly as possible und the cover designation "Quelle 10" (Source 10). This announced that the report based on the official opinion of the Swedish General staff.
This report of mine arrived in Berlin in due time.
Sgd. Krämer (Kraemer)
Copied Camp 020.
KV 2/153-2, page 26a (minute 492b)
Extract from C.S.D.I.C. (UK) interrogation of Obstlt. i.G. Ohletz, OC (Leiter) Mil Amt C, RSHA.
64. Worked by the K.O. Sweden, commander Obst. Dr. Wagner. Wagner was camouflaged as assistant Military Attaché, and had his office in the same building as the Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier.
65. A more important source, however, was Major Wenzlau (whom settled in Stockholm December 1944), camouflaged as assistant Air Attaché in the Embassy, who controlled Lt. Dr. Kraemer. (AOB: actually this might have been administrative, but in reality, Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer was intellectually far ahead above Major Wenzlau. These two men knew each other since about 1941, when they operated both on behalf of Ast Hamburg. The common sense was the operated mutually in agreement on a friendly basis). Wenzlau worked independently of the K.O., but came under under it for pay, etc.
66. Wenzlau took over from a Major Busch (KV 2/529, PF 602057), whom PW (Ohletz) recalled. Busch saw the hand in of the Allied IS (Intelligence Service) behind every report brought by the German agents, and in particular was suspicious of Krämer (Kraemer). As his attitude was only playing into the hands of the SD, who were on the lookout for sticks with which to beat the Mil Amt, Busch had to be dispensed with. He was taken on to the staff of Obst. Wodrag, who was equally lacking in confidence in German agents. (AOB: Wodrag did even initiated a military accusation upon Kraemer, which finally had been block by Schellenberg and high ranked others)
got information principally on the Western-Front, and Mil Amt C (considering
passed these reports on to Mil Amt B (Western
for evaluation and dissemination. Later PW (Ohletz)
was able to obtain information from Krämer (Kraemer)
on Russia, which is believed to have obtained from Finnish and Japanese sources.
reports were sent back over the teleprinter (FS) from the Air Attaché to OKL (Oberkommando
"Kurfürst". He sent an extremely detailed warning of the airborne landing in
area Arnhem (Arnheim)
and another East of the (
Reine) Rhine, in the area
. This report arrived in OKL "Kurfürst" in time for counter measures to
have been taken, but it got mislaid for 24 hours, and reached Mil Amt C only
after the landing had taken place (AOB:
might be in abuse).
(AOB: as to prevent the disappointments of Arnhem, Montgomery decided to wipe-out the entire area around Wesel. Photos taken shortly after their tremendous bombardments, the landscape was like a picture of the "moon". Comparable with, landscapes encountered, after the huge shell firings during the battles during the First World War.)
69. Regierungsrat Fricke of the SD, who worked in the Embassy in Stockholm, camouflaged as Press Attaché, was an embarrassing interloper in the German IS (Intelligence Service). Well-known as a "Gestapo man", he tried to queer the pitch of the Wehrmacht officers by letting it be under-stood that they too were "Gestapo men". Wagner asked PW (Ohletz) to come to Stockholm to discuss matters with Ambassador (Minister) Thomsen and generally pour oil on the troubled Swedish waters. Permission to travel was, however, refused. Fricke was particularly hostile to both Wagner and Kraemer. After Fricke had been expelled from Sweden he tried to have both these officers recalled. Kaltenbrunner was in favour of supporting Fricke, but Schellenberg (AOB: Kaltenbrunner was in charge of the entire R.S.H.A. whereas Schellenberg was 'only' Leiter of Amt VI and after July 1944 also Leiter of the Mil Amt (Amt Mil). Albeit, that Schellenberg had personal friendship with - and access to the entire S.S. complex Heinrich Himmler) protected Krämer (Kraemer), though in the meantime Wanger (Wagner?) had also been expelled.
70. PW (Ohletz) believes Schellenberg took up this attitude less from IS reasons than for the reason that he already (Jan'45) knew of Himmler's approaches to (Swedish Count) Bernadotte and contemplated using Kraemer in this connection.
71. Krämer (Kraemer) was still working up to mid Jan'45. (actually late April 1945 in Stockholm).
Details on Sources.
Krämer (Kraemer) Lt. Dr.
78. A young man, of more than average intelligence, who openly and accurately criticised the German war effort and foreign policy. Self-confident and rather conceited. Spent a great deal of money, but believed to be a good "family man". Was personally very friendly with PW (Ohletz), particularly when he saw how the latter was protecting him from the S.D.
79. Wenzlau told PW (Ohletz) that Krämer (Kraemer), two or three times a week, had meetings at night with unknown persons in Stockholm. Meeting places were always kept secret, and never took place at Krämer's (Kraemer's) house, although he put a very heavy expense account for household expenses (AOB: please bear in mind, that Kramer possessed two jobs; one being employed in a diplomatic role on behalf (and the according additional payments) of the German Foreign Office (A.A.); as well as secondly serving the Abwehr (I-L). These meetings usually lasted till the early morning, when Krämer returned to the office and wrote his reports, partially from memory and partly from dirty little bits of paper. Krämer (Kraemer) lived in a grand manner and spent a lot of money. His financial transactions were very muddled (scrambled).
KV 2/153-2, page 27b
80. On several occasions Krämer (Kraemer) made clear to PW (Ohletz) that he considered intelligence work as his military service only, and intended after the war to revert to his career in the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). An opponent of Ribbentrop's foreign policy, he found this the only point of mutual agreement with Ambassador (Minister) Thomson, and generally not in good terms with the other members of the German Embassy, who resented the tain of the IS (Intelligence Service).
81. Opinions on Krämer (Kraemer) reports were very divergent, varying from "invaluable" to "obvious controlled material". The Generalstab des Heeres (Army) considered them worthless, or even as Allied-controlled. The Luftwaffe Führungsstab at first considered them extremely good, but towards the end changed their opinion and accused Krämer (Kraemer) of making up his reports, and reported him to the S.D. (E1067 E1067return) (Amt IV) (Ausland Sipo S.D.) Major Busch (the nucleus of much troubles) was also of the opinion that Krämer (Kraemer) barted information with the Russians. The Foreign Office, however, valued his reports highly and refused to give up this source. Obst. Wodrag (see foregoing E1067 reference) took the accuracy of his report on Arnhem (Arnheim) landing as a sing (hum) that Krämer (Kraemer) was being "fed, the Allies being to sure of their supremacy that they could afford to pass on accurate material. PW himself tends to believe Krämer's (Kraemer's) own sources were genuine, but that he allowed himself to add some colouring based on his own intelligent appreciation of the situation.
82. Krämer (Kraemer) was soon able to get the upper hand of Wenzlau, who was supposed to be controlling him, but who had not the ability for the job. (academically educated versus military career prognoses)
83. Krämer (Kraemer) was very reserved as to his sources (for good reasons), but mentioned the following:
84. Josephine (Josefine, German spelling).
A contact in England, the line going by W/T via a Swedish Count Douglas, supposed to be in the Swedish Foreign Office (AOB: Graf Douglas actually was the C.i.C. of the Swedish Army!) Krämer (Kraemer) intended for money to be paid to this source under another code name (forgotten).
(AOB: rubbish! The information Kraemer gathered he derived from his personal friend Baron Paul von Toggenburg; whom was on personal very friendly means with Graf Douglas. Thus the information was only gathered verbally via private conversations with Kraemer's friend von Toggenburg!)
suggests that Major Elting, or Krämer's (Kraemer's)
could provide further details if required. Krämer (Kraemer)
never mentioned the name Douglas, but PW learnt this from Obst. Freund of Amt VI
who was watching Krämer (Kraemer).
Reports from Josefine (German
were mostly on RAF and USAAF, giving movements, strength, losses and intentions,
also information of O of B and locations of airborne troops. The report on
came from this (Hungarian
F1068return) Further reports were received on the
British aircraft industry, some rather general army information and political
news regarding possible inter-Allied developments.
85. Hektor (German spelling) (Hector).
Supposedly a second source, also from England. PW (Ohletz) can only say that, in general, reports were more concerned with aircraft production than those from Josefine. He (Ohletz) believes that Obstlt. von Dewitz and Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber) (old Abwehr Leiter I-L in Berlin) could give better appreciation (the latter might still have remained in Madrid in September 1945) of both of both these sources, as they both have handled the reports in Mil Amt B. In Jan 45, when Krämer (Kraemer) was in Berlin, he wanted to return after a day, as he said that Hektor (Hector) (or his contact) was then in Stockholm, and if he did not meet him personally, he was afraid of the contact going sour (AOB: maybe Kraemer preferred to stay Stockholm than in the heavily bombarded Berlin). However, Krämer (Kraemer) was unable to leave for Stockholm for five of six days, and PW (Ohletz) that in the meantime the contact had departed(?).
Operated only from end 44 or early 45, stated by Krämer (Kraemer) to be in Switzerland,. sent general (mostly political) reports on situation in Mediterranean area. PW believes Wenzlau or Berg could give more details. Krämer (Kraemer) made several journeys to Switzerland, but PW thought that this business there was more private - smuggling of currency and precious stones.
87. Pan Dur. (Pandur)
The cover name for reports sent by Wenzlau, but the information was doubtless got by Krämer (Kraemer). Believed to have been a line through the Japanese General Onodera (Military Attaché), and probably came originally via Finland. Covered news of varying importance from Russia. In exchange, Krämer (Kraemer) fed Onodera, via Wenzlau (after, say, mid December 1944), with Josefine material concerning the Pacific, one example being the report on the attack of Leyte. This source had only just started up.
KV 2/153-2, page 35a (minute 490a)
Concerning "The Fullep-Organisation".
A.) General view.
By my 2-years-experience of cooperation with the Hungarian Intelligence Service during my Ast-Hamburg activity 1939-1941, I judged the Hungarians as born intelligence-officers. (Please take a look in the huge number of visas Kraemer carried in his passport: G1070 G1070return) (quite some bore connections in the Balkans as well as Hungary and their neighbours) But the aim of the Hungarian Intelligence Service was one of a short-distance, its objects being Rumania, Jugoslavia and Soviet-Russia. In fact the Hungarians everywhere outside Hungary formed in themselves an excellent potential-in-being for real long-distance S.I.S. (Secret Intelligence Service; do not confuse with the British M.I.6 S.I.S. Services) It is natural that the Abwehr was by far more voluminous, its aims much bigger in numbers and kind than those of the Hungarian Intelligence Service. It was a matter of course that these remarkable possibilities of the Hungarians abroad were to be made use of.
This mutual understanding and joint opinion between the German and the Hungarian I.S. prevailed already before Hungary entered the war; it resulted in the closest cooperation. It became obvious very soon that this cooperation was less fertile in the circles of the highest representatives of both the Services (the reason probably formal political rivalries and difficulties), but most efficient in the joint work of some Abwehrstellen and branches of the Hungarian I.S. For examples I refer to Ast Vienna in its close cooperation with the the Hungarian Army-I.S. and to Ast Hamburg I-Luft (Major Ritter (≈ 1936 .. January 1941, after Major Ritter left the Ast Hamburg for becoming engaged in Rommel's North African intelligence endeavours with Laszlo Almásy) →
KV 2/153-2, page 36b
and Major Wenzlau) with the Hungarian Air-I.S. →
(AOB: please bear in mind: - that the Donau-Monachie (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habsburgermonarchie) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habsburg_monarchy) was resolved after the devastating end of World War One; also known as the Great War. Thus - both Hungary and the Austrians had a quite close mutual history)
The Hungarians perfectly agreed with the idea to cooperate with us systematically on the biggest possible scale to tackle all the numerous and difficult problems of the German I.S. I mention this expressly and repeatedly, because it must be understood that there was no secrecy between us; it would be very wrong indeed. to assume that the German I.S. managed to put itself in the possession of Hungarian intelligence by tricky means, i.e. buying it or agents from Hungarian officers behind Budapest's back. The cooperation simply meant that with mutual consent and successfully energies were activated, which otherwise would remained passive.
The Hungarian gentleman, and especially the officer, is of very sensitive chivalry; this makes it difficult, if not impossible to ask him a blunt (dull) question. It would have been bad manners, because it hints distrust, to ask with emphasis for his special sources of intelligence. This is chiefly the reason of my limited knowledge of Hungarian agents, who worked for the Hungarian Intelligence service and for us too.
I not only was on very good terms with Obst. (Col.) Uszaczy, the C.i.C. of the Hungarian I.S., but also had become friends with various of his Air-Force Intelligence-Officers. (AOB: I suppose conversations, logically, went in German language, as most senior officers had been educated also in German language during Hungarian/Austrian Monarchy days, up to late 1918) So I had many chances to build up Secret-Service contacts with the Hungarians. It was a matter of course that I enjoyed Col. Usczczy and his officers aid in my endeavours also after I had left (Ast) Hamburg. Furthermore Usczaczy was a fellow cadet of Grundboeck (Grundböck) (born Austrian but decided after the split the Monarchy to become an Hungarian citizen) and a close friend of him.
KV 2/153-2, page 37c
B.) The Fullep-organisation.
1) Concerning the structure of the organisation I refer to my former statements.
a) In my former statement I had not mentioned the results of Toggenburg's, Aari's, Swallving's and Euler's (Verlander's) activities. I wanted to protect them and had transformed their share of intelligence to the fullep-organisation. This concerns:
aa) the political informations I received from Toggenburg in 1944 (the latter was forced by fears pressure from Berlin to quite his journalistic engagements in Stockholm, and return to Germany; all due to the fact that he refused to join the Nazis as he was married to an American wife).
bb) the political informations I received from Aari in 1944/45.
cc) the sporadic reports on production and on the structure of war-plants in GB and USA, I got from Swallving in 1942 - 1945.
dd) the numerous reports concerning USA production, I got from Euler/Velander) in 1944/45.
ee) the tactical, strategical and political reports and informations I got Grundboeck (Gundböck) (before 29th of March 1944, as on this date by Grundboeck (Gundböck) did pass away after a serious illness) by his Finnish connections from 1942 to spring 1944.
b) Supplement and rectifications concerning persons connected with the Fullep-organisation.
. . . .
In one of my former statements I have mentioned already my opinion, that the Hungarian subject Fuelloepp is a member →
KV 2/153-2, page 38d
of the Fullep-organisation, though this supposition of mine was never confirmed by Grundboeck (Grundböck). I repeat that I know (i.e. I made his acquaintance and saw him at this one occasion) the Hungarian Cpt. (Hptm.) Fuelloepp. (AOB: Isn't Kraemer here misleading and confusing the history, and his Camp 020 interrogators?) →
(30) (since 19 April 2023)
→ I met him in July 1942 when I was in Lissabon. I had met Mr. Sandel, formerly I-Luft Hamburg, an acquaintance of mine since the time in 1939/40. Sandel (cover name Stohrbeck (Stöhrback?) was one of the I-Luft representatives of Berlin for Portugal. He left Lisboa at the end of 19422 for Dulag-Luft (Dulag = Durchganslager) Oberursel (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durchgangslager_(Kriegsgefangenenlager)) (Only the German language Wikipedia provides relevant information, as the English language Wikipedia is referring to Leyte in East Asia). Sandel invited me me to a party in his house, there I met Major Wenzlau, at that time deputy Air Attaché of the German Legation in Portugal, and Fuelloep. Knowing that Sandel and Fuelloep cooperated, I did not try to contact him concerning intelligence-activity; he was taboo for me.
Things get a somewhat complicated appearance, because the name Fuelloepp very nearly coincides with Fullep. I happen to know that Fuelloepp is a very common name in Hungary, something like the English name Black or the German name Mueller (Müller). The little difference in the spelling (Fuelloepp and Fullep) normally indicates two different persons. As the number of Hungarians abroad is rather limited and in Secret-Service-Affairs frequently something looking quite normally is used to cover something peculiar, I formed the theory, that in our context only one person exists: Mr. Fuellooepp, who signed his intelligence-reports by "Fullep". In other words, for reasons of his own, which seem a bit funny, Mr. Black signs his intelligence-reports by "Blake".
Sandel (cover name Stohrbeck) (Stöhrbeck?), whom I asked about Fuelloep, fellow-guest of mine in Sandel's house, told me:
KV 2/153-2, page 39e
Fuelloep is an engineer by profession; for several years in the early thirties he had worked in USA. In 1937 he returned to Hungary and stayed there until 1939. During this time he became reactivated and joined the Hungarian Army. (As a young man Fuelloepp had volunteered for the Army to fight against Communism under Bela Khun). At the end he became Captain (Hptm.) in the Army and was appointed assistant Military Attaché at the Hungarian Legation in Washington in 1940. When in 1941 the diplomatic relations between USA and Hungary had been broken, Fuelloepp came in 1942 with all the other Hungarian diplomats to Lisbon. The Hungarian Government wanted then-n the middle of 1942 to appoint him assistant Military Attaché at the Hungarian Legation in Lisbon. I do not know, if this was actually done or if Fuelloepp stayed on in Lisboa (Lisbon) resp. Madrid as a private person. In any case, I surely know that Fuelloepp stayed in the Iberian Peninsula at least until the middle of 1944. In the beginning of 1945 this was confirmed by Lt. Bagyoni,, member of the Hungarian IS, who came on German-Hungarian order in autumn 1944 to Stockholm. There is no proof that Fuelloepp was still living in Portugal or Spain in 1945. Personally I suppose that Fuelloepp left the Peninsula about mid 1944, but his organisation went on-headed by someone else. (AOB: remember the ominous Market Garden airborne message on Arnheim and Eindhoven, in the Netherlands. (H1072 H1072return)
Grundboeck (Grundböck) knew this man "Fullep" very well since more than 20 years. He told me that Fullep" had been an engineer and business-man and had stayed for several years in the USA. After spending two years in the thirties in Budapest "Fullep" went out again to USA and later to Portugal and Spain. Grundboeck (Grundböck) did not like to speak about his personal relations in Intelligence-affairs and furthermore had told me, when once I asked him: the less you know the better, as Jews are partners of the Fullep-organisation and your Berlin-regulations are very strict in this respect." (AOB: Grundboeck (Grundböck) is actually pointing at an Hitler Order dated on 5th August 1943; also known as the Klaus affair, which actually happened in Stockholm; in which the German Services were no longer entitled to operate together with Jews)
KV 2/153-2, page 40f
Personal description of Fuelloep:
age 48 years. Eyes brown
Built tall. Profession engineer, business man.
Languages: English, French, German, Hungarian, Spain, Serbic, Croatic
Special remarks --.
bb) Doebler (file no longer existing)
The name Doebler was mentioned several times in the Fullep-reports, especially in September and November 1944 as a source. As I had never heard his name before, I asked for details. Fullep answered that "Doebler" (no Christian name was given) is an Argentine subject, was settled in Madrid since the beginning of 1944 and enjoyed the most intimate relations with both the authorities of the Spanish of the Spanish Foreign Office and South-American diplomatic circles, essentially of course with the Argentine Embassy. I asked a friend of mine, an official of the "Deutsche Lufthansa", Breitenbach, who very often went to Spain and who had very good relations to South-American circles in Madrid and Lisbon, to make inquiries, if possible, for Doebler. When I met Breitenbach in the end of October 1944 (perhaps the first of November), he confirmed that according to this Argentine friends Doebler was a business-man known to them. The exact address of Doebler I have forgotten.
Fullep wrote in one of his reports that he owed to Doebler various connections. I think, Doebler was perhaps both, agent, who furnished Fullep with intelligence and intermediary, who furnished him with new connections. In any case Fullep →
KV 2/153-2, page 41g
got by Doebler and his circle in Madrid informations of tactical, strategical and political kind:
Dislocation of Anglo-American ground and air-forces.
Numbers of Divisions and of other units.
Troop-movements in France.
Strategical plan of the Anglo-American Armies.
Troops-movements in France.
Strategical plan of the Anglo-American Armies.
V-damages in Londoin.
Political informations concerning all events of international importance.
As sources of these political comments Doebler frequently pointed to South-American and Spanish diplomatic circles. Upon the whole: style dictation and make-up of the Doebler-reports strongly suggested first-class diplomatic sources, i.e. the reports gave a detailed diagnosis and prognosis; whilst reports out of military circles are generally shorter more decisive and more up to the point-never mind they are rumour or not in the end. Diplomatic reports usually have the tendency to leave the final conclusion very often to the reader.
cc) Col. Usczaczy.
Col. Usczaczy, Chief of the Hungarian Intelligence Service, was a very close friend of Grundboeck (Grundböck). He had consented to Fullep's cooperation with Grundboeck (Grundböck) and had discussed with the latter one the way of forwarding Fullep's intelligence; a.e. he had granted him to make use of the Hungarian diplomatic mail-bag.
dd) Janos L. Horvath.
Horvath was in 1944/45 attached to the Hungarian Legation in Berlin.
KV 2/153-2, page 42h
I confirm my former statements.
ee) Bela von Gundboeck (Grundböck).
Bela von Grundboeck (Grundböck) is the brother of the in Stockholm Anton Grundboeck. He came to Stockholm in the end of 1943 or in the beginning of 1944 to see his brother. Grundboeck (Grundböck)-Stockholm has told me that his brother knew Fullep and Horvath very well. Bela von Grundboeck (Grundböck) had nothing to do with me concerning intelligence-activity, may be that he was in connection with Ast Vienna or the K.O. Budapest. I especially mention Bela von Grundboeck (Grundböck), because he cam be helpful in finding details about the where about of Fullep and Horvath. B von Grundboeck (Grundböck) is an engineer and business-man by profession, He was settled at Budapest, the address I don't know. I did not meet Bela von Grundboeck (Grundböck) since January 1944, when he was in Stockholm; I heard about him for the last time in September 1944; he still was in Budapest at the time.
Age 53 years Languages Hungarian, German French.
Built tall Profession Engineer and business-man.
Height 178 cm Address: Budapest.
C. The reports of the Fullep-Organisation.
I. 1) Concerning British Aircraft-Industry.
a) General review and current informations about the number of persons employed in this industry,
figures concerning consumption and import of all sorts of material.
KV 2/153-2, page 43i
b) Structure of several aircraft-concerns and reports about separate aircraft-production works,
c) Figures of the total output, subdivided into the separate types.
d) New developments of the British aircraft-industry.
2) Concerning the USA Aircraft-Industry.
a) General review and current informations about the numbers of persons employed in this industry,
figures concerning consumption of all sorts of raw-material,
development of social and political movements among the employees, influence on the production (a.e. strikes),
policy of the WPB (= War Production Board).
b) Structure of the Aircraft-Concerns and the corresponding distribution of governmental orders.
c) Figures of the total output, subdivides into the separate types.
d) New developments of the USA aircraft-industry.
3) Tactical and Strategical Intelligence.
a) The set-up and general distribution of the Anglo-American Army-and Air-Forces. Single informations about the dislocation of the Anglo-American Forces, esp. Airborne-Divisions.
b) The organisation of the RAF and USAAF, strength and number of units.
4) Political Intelligence.
a) Political aims of the allied Great Powers and their mutual relation.
b) Descriptions of and comments on the big Allied conferences. (for example: Casablanca, Teheran, Yalta ...)
KV 2/153-1, page 44
c) Interior politics and interior political situation of GB (Great Britain) USA.
D. Ways of Transmission.
1) Way of transmission from Fullep to Kraemer.
a) Before Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) death (29th March 1944).
Fullep forwarded his reports by letter containing microphoto; (K1075 K1075return) the letters were addressed to Grundboeck (Grundböck) Stockholm. Fullep delivered them at the Hungarian Legation in Madrid, which sent them by diplomatic-mail via Berlin (where Mr. Horvath in the Legation changed the envelopes) and then it was again conveyed by means of a Hungarian diplomatic-bag to Stockholm. Here it was given to Grundboeck (Grundböck) ; from him I received the microphotic message. (AOB: what happened exactly after Grundböck's death on 29th March 1944?) I used the same way in reciprocal orders for my own message to Fullep.
(Grundböck's) death. (April 1944 - March 1945)
A connection-link was fitted in the person of a Hungarian subject in Berlin, Mr. Janos L. Horvath, who was attached to the Hungarian Legation at Berlin. Fullep's microphoto-messages were sent to Berlin as before by diplomatic-bag; but the letters now were addressed to Horvath. Either he delivered them to me personally, if I just happened to be in Berlin at the time (mostly once a month) or forwarded them to me via the German Foreign Office by German diplomatic-mail from Berlin to Stockholm. I used the same way in reciprocal order for my messages to Fullep.
II. Way of \transmission from Kraemer to Abwehr I-Luft.
1) ad C.I. cyphers 1,2, ...
These reports were passed on by me to I-Luft Berlin under →
KV 2/153-2, page 45k
the conversation "Hector" (Hektor).
Originally I had not intended to apply the expression "Hector" (Hector) as a collective cover-designation to every kind of production-reports; I had meant to use it exclusively in connection with Fullep-information concerning Anglo-American aircraft-industry. But by the abundance of reports not only coming in from Fullep, but as well from other sources (reports, which by their contents ought to resort under the same heading) it became necessary very soon to change the meaning of the expression "Hector" (Hektor). So "Hector" (Hektor) was no longer a certain person's cover name, but became a collective cover-designation for all sorts of reports concerning all the production of the Anglo-American aircraft-industry.
It is to be added that possibly certain I-Luft Berlin referees either were not aware of this wider interpretation of the expression "Hector" (Hektor) or declined it. The perpetual change of persons and organisation-systems in Berlin was an obstacle for every kind of stability. I suppose Lt. Berg will be informed about the actual development of the "Hector" (Hektor) signification.
2) ad C.I. 3, 4, ...
These reports were forwarded, under the collective cover-designation "Josephine" (Josefine), later "Zuverlässiger V-Mann" The reasons were the same as described above.
Note: it may be sufficient just to mention that in the very first beginning until about June 1943 I also used the cover-designation "Siegfried A" and "Siegfried B".
KV 2/153-2, page 46L
E. Berlin's Judgement of the Fullep - Reports.
ad C I) 1., 2. ...
I have mentioned already in former statements that the reports concerning the British and later the American aircraft-industry have been somewhat changing in quality. In 1943 and in the beginning of 1944 the reports were judged to be good and reliable. Since March 1944 part of them was judged as not correct and unreliable. Sometimes the impression prevailed, that intentionally or unintentionally we were supplied with false informations. Personally I think that since Germany's situation turned from bad to worse many agents thought to have a big chance for selling every sort of the most urgently wanted intelligence at fancy-prices. In fact the reports frequently improved in quality, after a part of them had been rejected. On account of the perpetual up and down of the quality I suggested to Obst. Hansen (thus prior to 19 July 1944) as well as to Schellenberg to drop the Fullep-(the main "Hector" (Hektor) connection. Both (Hansen and Schellenberg) of them refused; saying that every connection gets its crises anyway and that in fact there were always reports, coming of this source, which were of excellent quality besides some trash.
ad C I., 3. 4. ...
The tactical, strategical and political informations also were varying in quality, but much lesser than the aircraft-production reports. Tactical and strategical nonsense could vary often be discerned at first sight. The bulk of the reports were judged to be very good or rather good.
The political informations were judged as good and reliable, nearly without any exceptions at all.
KV 2/153-2, page 47m.
F. Special Sources of the Fullep-Organisation.
When I speak about the sources of the "Fullep"-organisation, which frequently and uncorrectly was called "Hector" (Hektor)-organisation, I wholly depend on what Fullep wrote in his reports. I will try to summarize these remarks and give them as completely as possible:
1) Grundboeck (Gundböck) had told me that Fullep had relations to the Jugoslav colony in Portugal and to the Jugoslav Legation in Lisboa. Also I myself was told by Fuelloep in July 1942, that he had very good relations to the Balkan-people in Lisboa, when I met him with Sandel's. He spoke them? too "about excellent relations to the Jugoslav and Greek Legation in Lisboa". No names were either given by Grundboeck (Grundböck) nor by Fuelloepp. I think that they said was correct, because in 2 or 3 cases their political reports agreed word by word with informations I had received from Hallamaa decoded Jugoslav wireless messages) I have already mentioned that sporadically reports and newspaper-cuttings contained marginal-notes in Serbian and croatic.
So I am convinced that the Fullep-organisation cooperated with the Jugoslav Legation in Lisboa and the Exile Government in London. The tenor of these informations proved that these Jugoslavian London-circles must have had relations to British political and military circles. But we distrusted our informant since the middle of 1944, when he boasted with famous or important names of Chief-Officers or politicians.
3) At the end of 1943 Fullep mentioned in one of his reports concerning aircraft-production a new source connected with the MAP. Berlin was very interested and insisted to get dates about this source. I never excepted to get an answer when I asked Fullep for further →
KV 2/153-2, page 58n
details. But in fact he reported, without giving any names, his sources were British subjects of Irish origin, connected with the MAP. On the repeated questions of mine for names, I did not get any answer. because of the fact that lots of the reports were confirmed and their style and make-up strongly hinted an efficient source competent in aircraft-production matters, I for a long time had no doubt that his source in England really had close connections to the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Later in 1944, when the reports became more and more unreliable, I thought that the source had ceased to work.
4) Many political, tactical and strategical Fullep-reports had their origin in diplomatic circles in Lisboa and particularly in Madrid. Frequently the heading of some Fullep-Reports referred to official statements of the legations of the ABC-States to their home governments or they were marked as opinion of officious circles. A source of special importance was the connection to the Argentine Embassy in Madrid and the legation in Lisboa, the intermediary was Doebler. Further details I don't know.
1) As long as Grundboeck (Grundböck) lived, from Nov. 1942 until April 1944 (29th March 1944) he received the money for Fullep's payment; I gave it to him together with the money for his Finnish organisation. I cannot give separate details but only the total monthly amount of both the payments combined. It is to be understood that the Finnish organisation got about our third of it, the other two thirds were used for Fullep.
KV 2/153-2, page 49o
The combined figures are:
November and December 1942 ca. skr 1000,-
January until August 1943 " skr 3000,-
September 1943 until Febr.1944 " skr 5000,- Dollar 1000.-
March and April 1944 " skr 10 000 " 1000,-
Grundboeck (Grundböck) signed by the name "Siegfried". He sent the money to Madrid by the same means as my intelligence orders.
2) After Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) death from May* until November 1944, I sent via Horvath (of pagelo) for Fullep as monthly post numerando payment:
* After Grundböck did pass away on 29th March 1944 in Stockholm, Kraemer himself had to find-out first the means as to get his money to Fullep and maintain this information channel; because Kraemer did hardly know how the financial aspects contacts were actually handled.
skr. 10 000- and USA Dollar 1 000,- from May until October 1944 in total:
6 x 10 000,- skr = 60 000,- skr.
6 x 1000,- Dollar = 6 000,- Dollar.
Anticipating the possibility of an endangered communication or the complete out-off the communication-line between Germany and Spain I put via Horvath in November 1944 to Fuller's disposal the sum of about skr. 70 000,- to 80 000 ? and USA Dollar 5000,-. The money was not only meant for agent's payment, but also for the set-up of a wireless-transmitter in Spain. In fact we received Fullep's last reports in March 1945, they came over as usually*.
* The German Lufthansa airline maintained, even in April 1945, more or less regular airline connection, at least to Barcelona.
KV 2/154-1, page 1
Kraemer Karl Heinz
Siemsen, Nina Anna (Kraemer's secretary in Stockholm)
KV 2/154-1, page 5
20.10.45 To Camp 020 enclosing C.S.D.I.C* Interrogation Report on Major Brede (Gruppenleiter Referat I-L Berlin, was in spring 1943 succeeded by Obstlt. Kleyenstüber). 515a
* Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre
25.10.45 From Section V with further queries to be put to Kraemer 517z
26.10.45 From Camp 020 notifying return of Kraemer to B.A.O.R. (British Army over the Rhine)
KV 2/154-1, page 8
22.1.46 Extract from CSDIC (WEA) FIR (U.S. Final Interrogation Report) report on Karl Georg Pfleiderer* mentioning Kraemer 543b
* AOB: to what I remember Pfleiderer was a diplomat and in the final days of the German Legation in Stockholm, maybe, replacing Thomsen as a Minister
KV 2/154-1, page 12
1947: List of property belongings to Kraemer 575b
1.4.47 To B.A.O.R. re release of Kraemer 576a (AOB: he arrived on 17 May 1945 at Camp 020 and was kept just not yet two years in captivity)
KV 2/154-1, page 17 + 18 + 20
On the left-hand side their boy Carl Heinz and on the right-hand side is being noticed on the page 19
But according KV 2/151-1, page 16 Kramer's two children were noticed during interrogation in 1945 at Camp 020:
Girl: Heide aged 3
Boy: Jens Peter age 1
Let us now view the second photo series
I suppose, that we encounter here Karl Heinz Kraemer and his son Jens Peter
This photograph is a contra dictio to the fore last photograph
Please compare first the face of the above woman and the one on our first photo on page 17.
One thing is evident, both woman are of different age;
Whether a relative, or someone else?
I also do not understand the next text:
Grosser und kleiner Carl Heinz
as Carl Heinz on the foregoing photo looks older than 1 year.
It is highly unlikely - that another occasion would have existed, as the time has been fixed during Kraemer's interrogation somewhere in 1945; whilst he was since 17th May 1945 kept in Camp 020 captivity.
Then the woman; might she be the household maid: Helen Fiedler? (see: L1076 L1076return)
As her age seemingly does not match to the about "28 years old wife" of Kraemer.
Another option might be, that this photograph concerns someone else, likely a relative.
Because: these photos were retained during Kraemer's captivity at Camp 020 (May 45 April 1947)
KV 2/151-1, p 16 quoting:
Maiden name Pontow
Age 28 (in 1945)
Residence Essinestraker 39, Stockholm
Heide Kraemer aged 3 (girl)
Jens Peter Kraemer, aged 1 (son)
(32) (since 24 April 2023)
KV 2/154-1, page 40 (minutes 584a)
Allied Commission for Austria (BE)
British Troops in Austria.
Subject: Kraemer Karl Heinz Ib/II.SF/1236
born 24 Dec 1914.
To : M.I.5, The War Office, Acabit Ext. 391
1. A request was recently received from the Office of the Director of Intelligence, HQ, USFA, for information on the above former secretary of the German Legation in Stockholm, including his present location.
2. Int. Div., 70 HQ, CCG, to whom we wrote that they no longer have the final (Camp) 020 Interrogation Report, but that you informed them in a letter dated 13 March 48 that K. (Kraemer) was an inveterate (chronic /confirmed) liar. They further mentioned that subject was released from interment on 29 August 1947 to Goettingen, Friendländerweg 50, bei Dr. Pontow (AOB: Kraemer's Father-in-Law).
3. The American officer who approached us verbally in this matter, appeared somewhat dubious about the possibility of our allowing the Americans to see any interrogation report we may hold on Kraemer. He did not state why this opinion was held.
4. If you do held any further information on Kraemer and providing there is no objection to its passing into American hands, it would be appreciated if it could be forwarded to this Organisation.
April 1948 ↕
Please be also aware, that all KV 2/xxxx serials are running - with progressing PDF page numbers - reversed in time (thus backwards).
Whereas the minute serials are running in a correct succession - as the flow of events were recorded and responded upon in the increasing minute numbers (serials). ↕
KV 2/154-1, page 41 (minute 583a)
13th March 1948
PF 66365/B.1.d.(M.I.5)/Joan Chenhalls
HQ. Intelligence Division,
70 HQ. C.C.G.,
B.A.O.R. 15 KV
- - - -
Karl Heinz Kraemer.
We are unfortunately unable to accede to your request for a copy of the Camp 020 report on this man, your reference HQ. Int.Div.B4/PF201 of 4.3.48, as the case officer's summary was never distributed owing to the fact that Kraemer was found to be an inveterate liar and most of the information proved to be untrue. Warning that Kraemer is a most convincing (considerable) liar and a totally unreliable source of information (from the British intelligence perspective) is placed in a prominent position on all our records concerning this man, and we are always careful to assess and qualify information coming from this source.
Joan Chenhalls (AOB: whom was often quite a bitch)
AOB: The (Mss) McCallum Report, to be dealt with later in this Survey; will come to quite a bit more nuanced conclusion, in the mid of the 1970s. (KV 2/157-3, >p.36)
KV 154-1, page 58 (minute 575a)
S.I.S. CX/12736/28/R.5.C. of 26th March 1947.
Dear Miss Chenhalls
Karl Heinz Kraemer.
Reference your No. (M.I.5) PF 66365 of 15th January 1947.
I very regret that we have not answered earlier, but further enquiries were being made.
It has been decided that Kraemer is of no further interest, and we have no objection to his immediate release.
For C.D. Roberts
KV 2/154-1, pages 58a + 59b (AOB: as a curiosity, without transcription this time, but a good example of Kraemer's rather wealthy outfit; particularly in respect to the just post-war circumstances)
Astonishing isn't it?
Kraemer possessed these pieces when he had been arrested about mid of May 1945, in Flensburg Northern Germany.
KV 2/154-1, page 63 (minute 572a)
Ref: Int.Div/A1(a)/PF.201/2 HQ. Intelligence Division
70 HQ. CCG(BE)
To: Box 500 2 January 1947
Parliament St. B.O.
Subject: Kraemer Karl Heinz.
Reference your PF.66365/B.2.b (= M.I.5)/Joan Chenhalls of 28 Nov 46.
1. Memorandum from DIC in reply to the above brief is forwarded herewith in duplicate.
2. It is hoped that this case may now finally be considered closed.
Chief, Intelligence Division.
KV 2/154-1, page 67a (minute 571a)
PF. 66365/B.2.b(= M.I.5)/JC (= Miss Joan Chenhalls) 28th November 1946
HQ. Int. Div.,
70 HQ. C.C.G.,
In answer to your Int. Div./A1(a)/PF.201 of 26th October 1946 on Karl Heinz Kraemer, we have now received comments from S.I.S. (= M.I.6.) on this report, and as it may involve further interrogation we quote them verbatim:
Unfortunately, the interrogation of Fullop did not provide the clue to the problem that I had expected. When I saw Kraemer in Germany, he, among other things, swore black and blue that he had never run any agents in Sweden and had merely used Sweden as a kind of post-box. However, I noticed a telegram that has just come to light sent by Kraemer to Berlin on 26.2.43 requesting transit visas to be issued to V-Mann K travelling on German instructions. V-Mann K's name had already been reported to Berlin on 16.2.43 and also resided in Stockholm. He was travelling on passport no: D 7841 issued in Stockholm.
This was followed up by a further telegram on 3.3.43: Quote "Reference Journey of V-Mann K to South America. Information to hand that resumption of Gotenburg traffic uncertain, therefore to travel via Lisa (= Lisbon). V-Mann will pay passage Gotenburg /Buenos Aires, Kr. 2100. Journey via Lisa (Lisbon) only comes under consideration if we pay additional cost of Kr. 2500 of $900, otherwise he will →
KV 2/154-1, page 68b + 69c
wait for Gotenburg route to open. In view of uncertainty I agreed to V-Mann's suggestion, as he can travel as an official Swedish courier, and as departure is urgent, request Chef I (Obstlt. i.G. Hansen Leiter I, in Berlin) supply Kr. 2500 or U$ 900". Unquote.
I also find that Kraemer has been very evasive about his information from Switzerland and in this connection I notice another two telegrams of 30.3.44 and 12.5.44: Quote: "30.3.44. Abwehr I Luft Wi? to Auswärtiges Amt (= German Foreign Office). In pursuance of Dr. Kraemer's (Stockholm) political/ military intelligence activities, it has been necessary to establish a Collecting Centre in Southern Switzerland, as immediate communications between England/Sweden have been curtailed, it is necessary to divert a part of the information traffic to Switzerland.
"The Collecting centre to be the Consulate General Geneva an Abwehr man to be attached to the staff. But as three Abwehr men are there already, Abwehr suggest that Auswärtiges Amt (A.A.) man could do this work". Unquote.
12.5.44 Quote: "Consul-General Siegfried, Geneva informed of plan, and that Consul Nostitz could do this work". Unquote. A further telegram states that before a decision could be reached Auswärtiges Amt (A.A.) required to know how it was intended to pass such information to the Consul, taking into account that the inclusion of Auswärtiges Amt (A.A.) personnel in Abwehr work was forbidden. By 24.5.44 the proposal appears not to have come into effect, as Grote in a letter to Dr. Kraemer stated that further discussions were necessary.
In reference to the above telegrams I suggest Kraemer be asked:-
(a) Who V-Mann K was, and why he has not given us this information before?
(b) What the Collecting Centre in Southern Switzerland was?
(c) What were the communications between England and Sweden that were curtailed?
Doubtless Kraemer will be able to produce an excuse for these telegrams as he has been able to do for most of other things, but it is worth seeing what he has to say.
Sgd. J. Chenhalls
KV 2/154-1, page 72 (minute 569a)
4th November 1946
Dear Mr. Hanson,
I attach herewith five copies of the CSDIC (WEA) report S.I.R. 47 (Special Interrogation Report: typically an US interrogation document) on Karl Heinz Kraemer. In May 1946 M.I.6 asked if Kraemer could be shown the complete series of teleprints and asked to state exactly the source of each one, as it was apparent that his designation "Zuverlässiger V-Mann" covered information derived from the Grundboeck (Grundböck), Toggenburg and Aari net works. S.I.S. were anxious to know, for example, which of the Fuellop reports came from Fuellop and which came from other Hungarian sources in Spain.
This attached report sets out the answers to this brief.
J.T. Hanson, Esq.
(AOB: the following listing might seemingly to be ridiculous, but it apparently contains the "key (clue) to the German messages communicated between the German Legation in Stockholm and the German Foreign Ministry known as: Das Auswärtiges Amt, as well as, the successive German Abwehr organisations in Berlin. Up to about mid Spring 1944 the OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr and thereafter das R.S.H.A. "Mil Amt"; (quite confusing was that some sections remained OKW controlled, but most of them became engaged with das Milamt.)
KV 2/154-1, pages 75a ++ (minute 567a) AOB: I prefer to copy the according documents without transcribing them.
Messages 1592 ..486 (Zuverlässiger V-Mann)
522 (Z-Mann) Onodera
523 (Zuckerhut I) Onodera (From Swiss General Staff via Mil. Att. Bern (Okamoto?)
585 (ZV-Mann) Source forgotten
586 (Hektor) Horvath (From Fullep Org. ...
631a (ZV-Mann) Onodera (Presumably from Garnier ...)
632 (Zuckerhut II) Onodera (From the Swiss General Staff via either Okamoto or Hallamaa ...
688 (ZV-Mann) Hallamaa (Probably from the Swedish General Staff)
KV 2/154-1, page 79e
689 (ZV-Mann) Horvath (From the Fullep Org.)
748 Zuckerhut) Onodera (From the Swiss Milt. Att. in Stockholm)
KV 2/154-1, page 80f
749 (ZV-Mann) Aari
804 (ZV-Mann) Onodera (probably from Japanese diplomatic staff Ankara)
KV 2/154-1, page 81g (N1078 1078return) (U1088 ↓notice 834↓ U1088return)
805 Source forgotten
KV 2/154-1, page 82h
Pandur (= Wenzlau 378) Swallving
888-897 (ZV-Mann) These messages ... Onodera ...
KV 2/154-1, page 83i (V1089 ↓ notice 917W AARI = a Finnish source↓ V1089return)
898 (ZV-Mann) Source forgotten
945-948 (Quelle 28) Onodera (from Estonian agent in Garnier's office ...)
KV 2/154-1, page 84j
(Q1082 Q1082return) Please view below at 989 as to notice about the background of the according message/query)
(R1083 R1083return) Please notice below also 994 which is pointing Garnier and some interactions)
949-950 (Quelle 26 - Haifisch) Onodera (From Japanese General Staff in Tokyo)
997 (2)-998 (ZV-Mann) Aari (From journalistic circles in Stockholm)
KV 2/154-1, page 85k
999-1004/a (Hektor) Horvath (From the Fullep Org.)
Pandur (Wenzlau) Telegram 484 Onodera (From Hallamaa or Aulo)
Pandur Telegram 482 Press report
(33) (since 1 May 2023)
KV 2/154-1, page 93a + 94b (partially)
3. Channel of Transmission.
The reports were received from Grundböck once or twice monthly; at first they were typewritten; later they were in the form of Leicastats (AOB: likely meant Microdot technology). Krämer supplied Grundböck with assignments and cash, and knew that these were regularly transmitted by the Hungarian diplomatic bag. Grundböck's health seriously declined towards the end of 1943 and Krämer (Kraemer), fearing that Grundböck would be unable to continue his work, asked him to arrange for a successor. In Dec 43, Grundböck told him that a certain Janos Horvath would be available and advised Krämer (Kraemer) to arrange a meeting with Horvath in Berlin as soon as possible. This meeting took place on Dec 43 in the Hotel Esplanade, Berlin. Horvath told him that he could be found at any time through the Hungarian Legation in Berlin. Krämer (Kraemer) states that he is not certain of Horvath's exact position, other than he was some kind of liaison official with the German authorities handling industry and armaments. Grundböck died in April-May 44 and Horvath took over as intermediary. It was at the same time that the standard of the reports from Fullep source fell seriously. Whereas, until then, the reports had been in the main of excellent quality, some were now completely false. Krämer (Kraemer) seriously thought of abandoning the source altogether. He had a conversation with Obst. Hansen (before 19 July 1944) in which this question was discussed, but Hansen persuaded him to carry on as before. Krämer (Kraemer) arranged with Horvath that he should deliver the Fullep direct to him on his monthly visits to Berlin. If this was not possible, he was to send the reports to Stockholm by the German Foreign Office courier. (AOB: quite dangerous as the German A.A. could access these mails themselves) Krämer (Kraemer) gathered from Horvath the reports came direct from Spain and Portugal.
Closure of the latter reference, being of no special interest in our current Survey.
KV 2/155-1, page 1
Kraemer Karl Heinz
Volume 1 (Main File)
KV 2/155-1, page 5
This War Room file contains material derived from delicate sources.
Refer to the Appropriate Officer before using any information marked with or described as any of the following:
Isos, Pair,, Ryder St. Traces, MSS (Most Secret Source) Traces, Top Secret "U", Hart's Material, Sniff & Snoop, "Form (SIS) most secret and delicate source".
RIS (Radio Intelligence Service) or RSS (Radio Security Service Summaries or Reports. RSIC minutes.
This Card is to retain uppermost on the right-hand side of the file.
S. Form 317/2000/6.50. This is an interesting notice for us: it points, likely, at the vary fact that we may consider that the new file series, thus the reshuffling old PF ... series and its conversion into the currently (still maintained) KV 2/xxxx series. I came already to the conclusion, that somewhere in the 1950, they had started up these reshuffling processes. But now we find the indication that since about mid 1950s, this endeavour being taking place.
KV 2/155-1, page 6a (minute 240a)
This relates to the list visible at: (N1078 N1078return) please consider this en the directly above messages as to obtain a better understanding of what it successively constitutes.
813 W Floating Dock for Alexandria
Iceberg reports on assignment, 22/2/45. According to former reports, mainly from Cairo, the floating dock for Alexandria, on which information was required, is definite. Reports from the same source in Cairo, report the dock is prepared to hold war ships up to 27,000 BRT.
Petterson - Liang (AOB: = Kraemer)
814 W English paratroopers in Italy
Iceberg 6 reports on assignment, 22/2/45. There are no British paratroop units working in Rome; apparently it was about paratroopers who were on vacation or on their way back to England. Units of paratroopers on the Italian front also are not planned.
Petterson - Hasso
815 W English air-borne units in Greece
Zuckerhut 9 reports, 22/2/45. British paratroopers originally stationed in Greece will be exchanged, it is planned, in February or March. In Athens, it is ascertained, that there are English paratroopers, Bat. No. 15, Salonika, and No. 16, in Piraeus.
Petterson - Günther
816 W Containing questions about an assignment received here but not understood.
817 W British radio-technicians (Strahl-Jäger) (Jetfighters) in Biserte (Bizerta)
Iceberg 4 reports on assignment,, 22/2/45. No British radio technicians are reported in Biserte. In No North Africa there are no experiments carried out by radio technicians either. Inquiry into French positions reveals that nothing is known about British radio technicians un Biserte.
Petterson - Hasso
818 W B-29 units in Italy
Iceberg 6 reports on assignment, 22/2/45. It was planned in the middle of 1944 that B-29 formations would be used against Germany from Foggia. This was planned for the winter and spring 1945. So far there are no preparations, and according to English reports, none intended.
AOB: please reconsider every time again the, foregoing, N 1078 - N1078return (bookmark) references; as to increase your understanding of what the various messages actually did imply.
We, maybe, will encounter later some genuine German texts. A translation always is possessing the disadvantage of the translation from one sphere into another sphere; as is, of course, the case in translating genuine German messages into English language. However, these file series are also covering (most rarely) quite some genuine German language messages. Maybe, the Kraemer related series are likely remaining - the great exception - within the entire KV 2/xxxx serials.
KV 2/155-1, page 95 (minute 118a) Genuine German language FS message. These kind of messages being covered as: Early ISTOC.
Early ISTOC Incoming messages from Berlin
A. SSD (Dringende operative und taktische Nachrichten Befehle der Obersten und oberen Führung) SWAS (?) 26678 29/11/44 (29th November 1944) 1900 (time of the preparation/transmission)
HKW/LBKW (AOB: likely the transmission key; in Geman language: die Schlüsselangaben)
Luftattache Stockholm für Hasso (= Kraemer)sollen
(LT. (Laut / according to) News Chronicle vom 2.11 (1944) soll ein unter Leitung des Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) stehendes Flugrüstungswerk im Juli 1945 geschlossen werden. Hiergegen
sollen am 1.11 (1944) Arbeiter vor dem Unterhaus (Common) demonstriert haben. Um welche Werke handelt es sich? (Query) Ist die Schliessung weiterer Werke vorgesehen?
Wann ist mit Ausbringungszahlen September Oktober zu rechnen?
Es wird an Erkundungsauftrag vom 20.10 Frage Roem (Latin number) 6.6 (= VI.VI) erinnert.
Ludwig (= I-Luft) SK (Schluss, end of message) 2 Nr. 23 060/11/44
B. SSD SWAS 30675 11/12 2030 (Hrs)
Luftattache Stockholm für Hasso-Patterson (Andersson or Patterson denoted that the subject was of interest to the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) (A.A.)
1. U.S.A. LLD (Luftlande Division) 82 und 101 werden im Raum Chalons für Marne-Reims angenommen.
Es interessiert Stand der Einsatzbereitschaft. (Für Josefine. Quelle 27 und Eisberg)
2. Ist etwas bekannt über Aufstellung Französischer und Polnischer (Polish) Fallschrirm und Luftlandeeinheiten in Frankreich? Wieviel Fallschirmjäger bzw. LL (Luftlande) Regimenter wollen die Franzosen im ganzen aufstellen?
3. In der Nacht von 26/27 September ging Lufhansas Spanienflugzeug wahrscheinlich über französisches Gebiet verloren. Schicksal bisher völlig unbekannt. Versucht über 27 zu erkunden wo dasselbe abgeschossen oder abgestürzt.
Schicksal der Besatzung und Landung unbekannt.
4. Nach Pressemeldung soll Rolls Royce sich mit Jetpropulsion befassen. Nähere Nähere Angaben vordringlich.'
Ludwig (I-L) Mil Amt (Amt Mil) S.K. (= message ending) Nr. 21 176/12/44
C. SSD SWAS Nr. 32418 19/12/44 0940.
Luftattache Stockholm für Hasso (= Kraemer).
In Farnborough (experimental 'air related site' in southern England) eine 10 Gruppe der RAF befinden.
Um was für eine Einheit handelt es sich?
Unterstehen ihr fliegende Verbände?
Wenn ja, welche?
Wie heisst der Kommandör?
Ludwig (Milamt I-L) SK (finish of message) 2 Nr. 217??/44
KV 2/155-1, page 107b + 108c (minute 105a)
SWAS 23097 15.11 1120 (hrs)
An Fernschreibstelle Kurfürst (Command Centre about Oberursel, in the vicinty of Frankfurt).
Bitte folgendes Ausgeben für Hasso (Kraemer):
Auswertende Stelle gibt folgende Werturteile
1. Bezug dort Nr. 93/44 vom 11.11.44
Äusserst interessant, deckt sich im grossen und ganzen mit vorliegende Erkenntnissen.
B. Luftarmee aber wahrscheinlich noch in Estland Stärke von 1500 zu hoch. Weitere Einzelheiten sehr erwünscht.
Ludwig (I-L, at the Milamt) SK 2 Nr. 21603
SSD - Woka 90 141 15.11 1944.
SSD - SWAS Nr. 23203 15.11.44. 1845 (hrs) D.G. WA-EN.
FS (Fernschreib) Stelle Kurfürst mit der Bitte um Weitergabe an Hasso (Kraemer)
Betrifft 9 Fallschirmjäger Batl. (Battalion)
Bezug FS-343.44 W.V. 14/11.
Bitte Meldung überprüfen. Einschluss in Sealed Camp bisher nur für die Dauer von etwa 14 Tagen erkannt (corellated to expected soon operations). Sind sämtliche Verbände der 6 LLD (Luftlandedivisionen) in Saeled Camps und wo? (AOB:, I suppose, that these English words have been implemented due to British copying/transcribing typists)
Ludwig (I-L) SK (closure of message) 2 Nr. 21238/11.44 KLG (likely someone's signature)
SSD - SWAS Nr. 3157 15.11 2300 (hrs)
Für Hasso (Kraemer)
Geheime Kommandosache (= gKdos xxxxx/year in two digits, such as 44).
Betrifft dort FS. 97 AV 13/11 2198/44
Besprechung mit Senior (= Walter Schellenberg Leiter Amt IV as well as Mil Amt im R.S.H.A.) und Roem. (Latin) 3 F (III-F) Chef zwecks Abstimmung mit letzterem laufen Heutiges FS betrifft Vöszköndy (Hungarian Legation).
Aus Budapest eintraf, ausgeführt soeben folgende Nachricht vom 6.11 von für Bagyoni (KV 2/3646) mit (der) Bitte um Vermittlung.
Bin wohlauf, Übersiedele nach Westungarn Szombathely.
Falls Regierung anerkannt wird komme nach dort.
Sophie soll dort bleiben.
Ludwig (I-L) SK 2 Nr. 26226/44
SSD - WOKA. 90248 16.11 0030
SSS - SWAS. Nr. 23259-15.11.44 2330 (hrs) WOG.
Luftattache für Hasso (Kraemer)
1. Bezug dort FS.341/44 WV 14/11
Es interessiert der genannten Ort.
2. Betrifft. Treff Hektor mit Mittelsmann. Folgende Fragen sind vordringlich:
(a) Ausbringung der brit. Flugzeugindustrie, Aufgegliedert nach Werken und Mustern nach neuesten Stand, so dass mögliche Fehler bei Plus/Minus/Berichterstattung der letzten Monate berichtigt werden.
(b) Liste der bereits fliegenden neuen Flugzeugmuster mit Angabe über Serienbau - Absichten und der wichtigsten Taten.
(c) Das gleiche wie zu 1. und 2. für die amerikanische Flugzeugindustrie.
(d) Anmahnung noch offener dort noch befindlicher Erkundungsfragen.
Ludwig (I-L Milamt) SK 2 Nr. 21405/11.44
Bitte ohne VSGHR absetzen zwecks Geheimhaltung.
KV 2/155-1, page 115e (minute 104b)
+ SSD WABA C 20618 21/8 (21st August) 1730 (hrs)
Luftattache Stockholm für Hasso (Kraemer) über Schlüsselstelle (pass on via cypher system only) nicht über AA. (not to be conveyed via the A.A.). Geheim (Secret).
Bei Untersuchung der Geräte auf folgende Punkte achten. Vollständige Beschriftung der Typenschilder, Aufbau der Antenne und Skizze eines wahrscheinlich vorhandenen mit "Indicator" gezeichneten Geräts. Nach möglichkeit Beschreibung, oder andere Unterlagen beschaffen. Angaben der Typenschilder nach hier mitteilen. Nach Rücksprache mit Gipfel entfällt Entsendung eines Sachverständigen.
Ludwig (I-L Milamt, Berlin) SK (finish of message) Nr. 22380/44
gezeichnet Berg (Lt. Berg)
B. Berlin Auswärtiges Amt 23/8 (23rd August) 1800 (hrs)
Luftattache Stockholm für Hasso (Kraemer).
Nr. 692 SSD WBEA 0129 23/8 0950 (hrs)
D.G. WABA 0 2178 Geheim (Secret).
Es interessiert vordringlich.
Wieviel Lastensegler und Transportflugzeuge in England für ein Grosseinsatz bereit gestellt werden können. (eventuell unter vorübergehender Einschränkung des sonstigen Transportraumbedarfs?), sind Anzeichen vorhanden dass eine derartige Konzentration vorbereitet wird?
Nach "Äroplane" vom 14/7 befinden sich französische Luftwaffenverbände im fernen Osten.
Was ist hierüber bekannt.
Ludwig (I-L Milamt, Berlin) SK (end of message) Nr. 22454/844
Gezeichnet Lt. Berg
C. + SSD WABA 02062 12/8 1730 QEM
Luftattache Stockholm für Hasso (Kraemer) über Schlüsselstelle (to be cyphered) nicht über AA. (not to be conveyed via the German Foreign Office (A.A.)) Geheim (Secret).
1. Derzeitiges KDO (Kommandierenden Offizier) des Air Air Marshall Frew? (AOB: the very fact that FREW has been spelled in capitals, is pointing at a British transcription!) Aufgaben der ihm unterstellten Verbänden.
2. Wohin wird die Londoner Bevölkerung Schwerpunktmässig Evakuiert, oder sind keine Schwerpunkte feststellbar?
3. Was ist über Verlegung Wirtschaftlicher Betriebe aus dem Londoner Raum bekannt.
4. Welche Aufgaben hat die Balkan Air Force?
Welche Verbände sind ihr unterstellt?
Ludwig (I-L Milamt Berlin) SK (end of message) Nr. 2208/844
G.V. 21.8.44 I.A. (Im Auftrag)
Gezeichnet Lt. Berg
KV 2/155-1, page 117h + 118i (minute 102a)
C. SSDGHZPH 06113 27/5 1740.
Luftattache Stockholm für Liang (Kraemer).
Erkundet genaue Lage Erzeugungsprogramm und Beschäftigtenzahl der während des Kriieges im Gebiet Cardiff neuerichtete Anlage der Imperial Chemical Industries.
Ludwig (I-L Milamt Berlin) 30 308 15 706/1 + (signed Lt. Berg?)
D. SSDGHZPH 06355 3/6 1230 (hrs).
Luftattaché Stockholm für Liang (Kraemer).
In der Nacht zum 3/6 hat Daventry (Radio station) die Verlegung amerikanischer Kampfverbände nach Angriff auf Ziele in Siebenbürgen nach Russland bekannt gegeben. Die Flugzeuge sind aus dem Raum Foggia (Italy) gestartet. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich (um) 300 - 400 Flugzeuge. Es ist vordringlich zu erkunden:
1) Sollen die Verbände in Russland bleiben oder ist ihre Rückverlegung in Pendeleinsatz geplant?
2) Wo sind die Verbände in Russland eingefallen (AOB: gelandet)?
3) Ist auf diesen Plätzen amerikanisches Bodenpersonal vorhanden?
4) Handelt es sich um Verbände er 15. USAAF oder um neuzugeführte Einheiten?
5) Wurden auch Begleitjäger mitverlegt?
6) Wann und aus welchen Gründen hat Russland seinen bisherigen Wiederstand gegen die Verlegung alliierter Verbände nach Russland aufgegeben?
Ludwig (I-L Milamt, Berlin)
Nr. 30 349/44
This is a most significant message, hardly known in Anglosaxon countries and beyond, because it went ultimately in to a desaster, and wasn't ending gloriously!
Because, exceptionally, the concerned Luftwaffe Sector Command (especially their long-range radar (Funkmeß) control /monitoring) instantly recognised the enormous strategical implications.
After the USAAF aircrafts had landed safely on Russian soil, they got rather drunk together with their Russian comrades, later that day.
During this occurred - German Airforces (the Luftwaffe) attacked the quasi-unprotected US Aircrafts - resulting in the revision of their aims, as to maintain an alternating flight-route: Italy - Russia - Germany - Italy - Russia - Germany.... (vice versa)
As the German air-defence was constructed against a, likely, Western flying pattern (think of mainly West and later South and West Europe) and not in expanding into an advanced Eastern approaching flying zone.
(9th May 2023: My very good friend Phil Judkins told me, that this particular operation carried the cover-name: Frantic Joe
AOB: there does exist some confusion, as the word Frantic actually had been related to wide series of operations related to support Russia; but some of the following links might provide some hints to what it is about. However, the date 3/6 44 might very well correlate to these references.
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0311poltava/ * ; https://www.worthpoint.com/worthopedia/rare-wwii-operation-frantic-frantic-joe-grouping ;
* Frantic Joe
Much had changed in the six months it took to get Operation Frantic organized and started. The Red Army advanced faster than expected, and by June was surging through the Ukraine and pushing the Germans back into Poland and Romania. That left the shuttle bases farther from the front and reduced their operational value. The Russians, more confident of victory than before, were less willing to have foreign forces based in their territory, especially in the politically unstable Ukraine.
The first mission was named “Frantic Joe.” Spaatz had intended that Eighth Air Force would fly it. The most lucrative targets were on the way from England to the Ukraine, but with the D-Day invasion imminent, Spaatz assigned the mission to Fifteenth Air Force in Italy and chose Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, commander of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, to lead it in person.
A Soviet sentry guards remains of two B-17s at Poltava. Forty-three B-17s were totally destroyed and 26 damaged by the Germans during the June 22, 1944, raid.
Eaker wanted Frantic Joe to bomb aircraft plants in Latvia and Poland, which American aircraft could not ordinarily reach, but the Russians would not clear those targets. Eaker had to settle for striking a railway yard in Hungary, as close to Italy as it was to Russia. It was not a particularly important target, but it was all that the Russians would approve.
Frantic Joe launched from Italy the morning of June 2 with 130 B-17s and 69 P-51 escort fighters. Eaker flew as copilot on one of the B-17s and led the bombers into Poltava and Mirgorod after a seven-hour flight. The fighters landed at Piryatin.
Eaker was greeted in Ukraine by a host of senior Soviet officials as well as by Harriman and Deane. The welcome was warm and duly recorded by about 20 US, British, and Russian war correspondents who were there taking notes and pictures. The arrival got worldwide publicity, which had a mixed effect. Stalin was not pleased with all the stories about how the Americans were helping him win the war in the east.
Soon after landing, Eaker flew to Moscow, where the reception and discussions lasted until 4 a.m. Eaker spent 10 days in Russia, and the D-Day invasion began while the Frantic Joe contingent was in-country. Spaatz cabled Eaker to stay in Russia for a few more days as a threat to the German rear and perhaps draw some airpower away from Normandy. On June 6, US aircraft flying from the Ukraine bases attacked an airfield in Romania. Eaker led the task force back to Italy on June 11, bombing an airfield in northeastern Romania en route.
Frantic Joe was regarded as a big success. The mission had “enormous immediate and long-term importance,” said James Parton, Eaker’s aide and Fifteenth Air Force historian, who accompanied Eaker on Frantic Joe. “For the immediate, it opened a third air front for the strategic bombardment of German war industries; for the longer future, it was America’s most dramatic effort to establish a complete, trusting relationship with Russia.”
Unfortunately, Frantic Joe was also the high point of the entire operation. Fissures, already present but unseen or disregarded, would soon tear the shuttle bombing partnership apart and call into question the initial wisdom of it. After that first Frantic mission, all of the bomber operations were flown by Eighth Air Force, although Fifteenth Air Force provided some of the fighters for subsequent missions.
Disaster at Poltava
The second mission, known as Frantic II, took off for Ukraine June 21, led by one of the stars of Eighth Air Force, Col. Archie J. Old Jr.
From the departure point off the English coast, it was 1,554 miles to Poltava, so the B-17s used auxiliary “Tokyo tanks,” which gave them considerably greater range with their combat loads. The task force, which consisted of 114 B-17s, and 70 P-51s, bombed an oil plant south of Berlin on the way East.
Beyond Warsaw, the Americans noticed a single-engine German fighter keeping pace with them. It ducked into the clouds when the P-51s went after it. It was a lone Me-109, and it had already reported the position of the bombers to the Luftwaffe. An He-177 reconnaissance aircraft followed the B-17s into Poltava and took pictures. The Russians would not allow the US fighters at Piryatin to intercept it.
The reconnaissance film was soon delivered to the Luftwaffe base at Minsk, where the Germans had sent medium bombers, He-111s and Ju-88s, to await the next US shuttle mission to Russia. They took off for Poltava at 8:45 p.m., and were joined en route by Me-109 and FW-190 fighters. As they crossed the Russian lines, they encountered several Yak fighters, shot one down, and chased the others away.
Maj. Gen. Robert Walsh (r, with cigarette) listens to a mission report at Poltava, as Capt. Henry Ware (c), a speaker of Russian on Maj. Gen. John Deane’s staff, interprets.
At 12:30 a.m. on June 22, the first German airplane swept over Poltava, dropping flares to illuminate the field. Close behind came the strike force of 150 bombers. The attack lasted for almost two hours, unhampered by anything resembling an air defense. The Luftwaffe destroyed 43 of the B-17s on the ramp and damaged another 26. Fifteen P-51s and assorted Russian aircraft were destroyed as well. The German bombs ignited 450,000 gallons of high-octane fuel, which had been brought to Poltava with grievous effort. Most of the munitions in the bomb dump were also lost. The Russians would not clear US fighters to take off and attack the Germans.
“Russian anti-aircraft and fighter defenses failed miserably,” Deane said. “Their anti-aircraft batteries fired 28,000 rounds of medium and heavy shells assisted by searchlights without bringing down a single German airplane. There were supposed to be 40 Yaks on hand as night fighters, but only four or five of them got off the ground.”
The Luftwaffe struck Mirgorod and Piryatin the next night, but the aircraft had been dispersed to other locations. Again, the attacks lasted for two hours, and again, no Soviet fighters showed up.
The surviving American aircraft departed for Italy June 26, striking an oil refinery in Poland on the way. The same day, Deane requested permission for a P-61 Black Widow night fighter squadron to deploy to Ukraine to defend the bases. The proposal was strung out and sidetracked until the Americans finally dropped it.
With fuel in short supply in the Ukraine, there were no B-17 deployments in July. However, to keep the operation from lapsing completely, Spaatz ordered two fighter-only shuttles, Frantics III and IV, from Italy in July and early August. They struck airfields in Romania and other targets but were peripheral to the basic purpose of the shuttle mission.
The American desire to continue the operation was so great that two more bomber shuttle missions were ordered. Frantics V and VI deployed from England Aug. 6 and Sept. 11, even though there had been no change in provisions for air defense.
Nose Dive in Attitude
“The German strike on Poltava cast a pall on Frantic,” said historian Mark J. Conversino, who dissected the failure of the shuttle bombing operation in Fighting With the Soviets. “By July, even transient aircrews who were on the ground for only a few days noticed that relations between the Americans and Soviets were showing signs of tension and strain,” Conversino said.
The new Soviet attitude was a sharp change from the welcome accorded to Eaker and Frantic Joe. It was seen not only in everyday encounters between Russians and members of the Eastern Command permanent party but also in official obstructionism and harassment.
A long list of factors may have contributed to the deterioration, including “fraternization” with local women, Russian resentment of Americans’ material wealth, fights and other confrontations inflamed by excessive drinking on both sides, the black market trade in American products, and the general Soviet dislike of large numbers of foreigners in their country.
These problems, familiar from other places and other wars, do not fully explain the sudden and pervasive chill that descended on the relationships in Ukraine. Eastern Command officials concluded that the change was directed by Stalin, who had developed second thoughts about Operation Frantic.
“Stalin saw victory clearly in his hands and felt much less reason to seek American aid or be cooperative with USSTAF,” Parton said. “But, with Muscovite wile, neither he nor his spokesman simply said Eastern Command was no longer necessary. Instead, they began a deliberate campaign of delay and sabotage.”
continuing our regular transcriptions
E. KRGHZPH (KR symbols that it concerns a 'Kriegswichtig' / war decisive message) 0665610/6 1630 (hrs)
Luftattaché Stockholm für Hasso (Kraemer).
Welche Landungsfahrzeuge liegen im Raum zwischen Yarwich und Great Yarmouth.
Ludwig (I-L, Berlin Milamt)
F. KRGHZPH 10/6 1630 (hrs)
Luftattaché Stockholm für Hasso.
Unter welchen Oberbefehl soll etwaiger Zweiter Landstoss erfolgen?
Was ist über Lieferung von Konsolidated B-24 an die Australische Luftwaffe bekannt.
Um wieviele Flugzeugen der 38, 91, 92
and und 93 Group auch
Flugzeuge des Transport Command der RAF zum Fallschirm und Luftlandeinsatz
Wieviel englische und amerikanische Lastensegler der verschiedenen Muster wurden bisher bei der Invasion eingesetzt?
Ludwig (I-L, Milamt Berlin)
G. KRGHZPH 06702 12/6 1040 (hrs)
Luftattaché Stockholm für Hasso.
Liegen Anzeichen vor, gegebenenfalls welche, dass ursprünglich Absichten beziehungsweise ursprünglicher Zeitplan durch bisheriger Invasionsverlauf Änderungen erfahren haben.
Ludwig (I-L, Milamt)
Nr. 20426/44 Geheim. (secret)
H. KRGHZPH 06884 16/6 1550 (hrs)
Luftattaché Stockholm für Hasso.
Wirkungsbericht Materiell und moralisch über neu Waffen? dringend erwünscht.
Ludwig E (I-L, Milamt?)
Nr. 30470/44 Lt. Berg?
KV 2/155-2, page 22a + 23b (minute 240a)
For Egmont (= Schellenberg's friend Gieselher-Wirsing) (https://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm): On 19/2/45 Hesse, leader of the England Committee came to Stockholm for a 10 to 14 day visit. Do you have there knowledge of the visit or the reasons for it? Do you have interest in current information?
Subject: Russo-Japanese policy.
Source 10 has the opinion, from Source 10 → (O1079 O1079return), 14, and 12, that Russian policy against Japan has altered basically. Source 11's claims are confirmed by news reports from USA and Russia. With regard to a communiqué from the White House of 20/2/45, showing that the Crimea Conference (Yalta Conference) did not deal with the war on Japan, it is pointed out by Source 10 (Please notice foregoing O1079 reference), that because of the current reporting of Source 14, it is known that before complete resumption of Lend-lease supply to Russia there was a change in Soviet-Japanese policy. This, as well as the large concessions in Europe made to Russia by Roosevelt in return for a part in the Japanese war, is clearly recognized not only in Washington but also at the Crimea Conference (Yalta Conference); so that they were affected by the same apprehensions as Source 10 and gave out the official reports, even at the risk of public opinion in the USA reacting in opposition that only in Cairo at a short get-together of Roosevelt and Churchill was the subject of the Japanese war mentioned; not before. This does not correspond completely to the facts, according to reports from Source 13 and official statements about the Malta Conference (30 Jan - 3 Feb 1945) immediately before the Yalta Conference. It is known that the British and the Americans conferred for three days in Malta about the Japanese war and proceeded with their conclusions to Crimea. According to similar telegrams from Ankara in the conference of Roosevelt and Churchill in Cairo, which, incidentally lasted for only 3 hours, the vote was the same over the Far Eastern question, as Roosevelt and Churchill had settled their differences previously.
The Tokyo (German) Embassy reports in a telegram of 16/2 that the Japanese Foreign Office does not expect a renewal of the Non-aggression pact which expires on 24/2/45. Note Hasso (Kraemer) The report of Source 10 (Swedish General Staff) appears to touch the truth, and I also think the interpretation of the explanation of the White House of 20/2 is correct. The forthcoming reports on the situation in China and the reaction to the development of Russian and American policy towards China have not yet been completely prepared. report follows soonest.
Andersson - Hasso (Kraemer) on 21/2/45
Subject: "Free Germany" Committee (Komitee Freies Deutschland)
The summary of the reports being prepared by Source 10 on the position of the three great powers towards the "Free Germany" Committee reveals that from the outset both the USA and Great Britain have been strictly opposed to the future assumption of the German Government by this Committee (AOB: I suppose the main reason being - that it was established and under Soviet Russian control). It was forbidden in Tl.747.W. of 12/2/45. In the Yalta Conference Stalin by no means brought the "Free Germany" Committee to the foreground, and of course, did not undertake to limit the effective range of the Committee, or to make a statement that Post-war Government by the "Free Germany" Committee was out of the question. Stalin feels, according to Source 10 (Swedish General Staff), that the Committee is of no more military value, but reserves the freedom to use it in case of suitable or necessary circumstances. Source 10 thinks the circumstances might be any dissention between between the Allies on the question of occupation. Different sections of the Foreign Office seem to regard just this problem just this problem of the dualism of the Armistice and Repatriation Commission as dangerous for England and the USA, and have in conversations with Zuverlässiger V-Mann stressed worries on this score. He thinks that in such a circumstance Stalin would appear with the Committee and the Germans would themselves vote for it in a "free democratic election". These critical officers of the Foreign Office (F.O.) are against the Eden foreign policy, against the cagey manoeuvrings of Churchill and criticize the open arrangements of Roosevelt and Churchill in Yalta for not being able to stand up to Stalin.
Petterson - Hasso (Kraemer) on 22/2/45
KV 2/155-2, page 30
127.0 German-Swedish relations:
Since the Gothenburg agreement expired on January 15th we are at a critical point. Since the trade agreement has not been renewed Germany is certainly at liberty to call off the Gothenburg agreement, but in the opinion of source 10 (Swedish General Staff) such a calling-off would have serious consequences both for the Legation and for individuals. In Swedish opinion the Gothenburg traffic is the important link which holds the two countries together. A denunciation would, according to the same source, not lead to any immediate breaking off of relations since Sweden would nevertheless continue the traffic. Any resultant incidents would however immediately cause a break and drive Sweden into enemy waters. The Legation and Military department have informed their headquarters accordingly. The matter is of importance since it coincides with Swedish action against GMD (Geheimer Meldedienst).
The press campaign against Doktor (?) (Wagner or Kraemer?) has now spread to the provinces. Should Doktor (AOB: I suppose meant is Dr. Hans Wagner, Leiter K.O. (or K.d.M.) Sweden) not go voluntarily there is a danger that the searchlight of the press will be turned onto all Swedish-German connections. Personalities X and Y named in the Lönnegren case represent Doktor Wagner and Uttermark: the Swedish authorities appear also to be anxious to get rid of U. (Uttermark) since he has not had returned to him his identity card which he sent to U.D. for renewal.
Andersson - Hasso (Kraemer)
KV 2/155-2, page 32
Translation of attachment to 36000's 3017 dated 13th March, 1945
Pandur 401/45 Subject: Finland.
(= Major Wenzlau)
(P1080 P1080return) → Source 26 / Eierkopf reports on 7.3.45.
The airfield at Hywinkää, north of Helsinki, which was previously used for Finnish civil traffic has been taken over by Soviet Control Commission. The airfield is now occupied by Soviet airmen and 10 fighters.
Pandur 402/45 Subject: Soviet Troop Movements in Northern Norway.
Source 26 / Eierkopf reports on 7.3.45.
1) The Russians will not advance any further from North Norway but intend to quarter their troops at present in that area on the East side of the Finnish Norwegian Frontier.
2) At the beginning of March the following ?? frontier Patrol Units were identified on the Finish Norwegian Frontier:- Nos. 1, 3, 4, 72, 73, 82, 101.
Pandur (Major Wenzlau) comments: Information in Para. 1) is forwarded with some reserve.
3) According to information received from circles connected with Eisenhower's H.Q. in spite of indications of the present offensive Eisenhower's real goal is Osnabrück and Osnabrück area.
KV 2/155-2, page 51
Top Secret U.
For information only. .....
Ultra /ZIP/ISTOC 202 - 205
204 Stockholm to Berlin
Pandur (Major Wenzlau) - Hasso (Kraemer) on 10.4.45
Ref. routing of intelligence. In the event of the cessation of Communications with the Reich arrangements have been made for passing by teleprinter (Lorenz FS type SZ 42) to Norway, from there by W/T T/P (Saegefish) to LV - 100, which was still in Bechtesgaden up to a short short time ago. If this link drops out T/P will go to AA (Auswärtiges Amt = German Foreign Office) via Legation as Diplogerma T/P (= teleprint = FS). Competent person in the A.A. is chief of the England section: Vortragender Legationsrat Weber. W/T AA - Legation Stockholm not possible.
A/1400/6/5/45 (1400 hrs/ 6th/May/1945)(?)
KV 2/155-2, page 61
For Information only. The Contents ...
I.S. Telegrams. 1/5/45
AOB: we have reached now one month before Germany surrendered to the Allies in Reims on 8 May 1945
183 Stockholm to Berlin (The telex (FS) link was broken off on 20 April 1945)
Pandur (Major Wenzlau) 472/45 of 7/4/45. Ref. re-organisation learn from the Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier with Mill Attaché that in event of his recall, which had been officially announced for 1/4, his successor of Agricultural section, now apparently Attachégruppe Heer (= Army), was considered for the post. I hear, however, that Reinecke has not yet received a visa. The post held by Rittmeister (Hptm. = Captain) von Koenigseck, who is working with Military Attaché, also recalled on 1/4 but still here, is not one on the establishment. Koenigseck is Hilfsoffzier, and this post is not considered for re-organisation as it is disappearing and moreover it carries no diplomatic status or privileges. Naturally, post of First Assistant will also have to be considered for reorganisation. In connection with the Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier I must point out that Reinecke is registered with the Swedes as Second Assistant.
184 Stockholm to Berlin
Pandur 473/45 of 8/4/45. Ref. Ludwig (I - L Milamt) Otte (?) No. 26760 of 5/4 to Hasso (= Kraemer). Ref. 5. I report that on my instructions notice to quit office premises of Doktor (Dr. Hans Wagner K.O. Leiter) by earliest permissable date, i.e. 1st October, had already been given on 1/4. When Schu(?) visited K.O. yesterday I learned that Schu had received instructions →
KV 2/155-2, page 62
184 (cont.) by teleprint (FS) from Amt VI (Freund) about 14 days previously to rent new premises for the section at once. As this is in contradiction, I have cancelled it.
185 Stockholm to Berlin
Pandur (Major Wenzlau) 474/45 of 8/4/45. reg. air traffic by ABA is being stopped as the risk too great owing to the light nights.
186 Stockholm to Berlin 152 a.O.(?)
As yet no reply to courier report of 29/3 brought to Senior's (= Walter Schellenberg Leiter Amt VI + Milamt) office (Berkaerstrasse Berlin?) by courier von Ginath. Matter is now becoming so very urgent that a most speedy decision is necessary. Request advance decision by t/p (teleprint = FS) in cover language, if possible by Sunday the 8th.
187 Stockholm to Berlin
Ref. letter Egmont (enquiry) https://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm . Letter to Egmont (Giselher-Wirsing, friend of Schellenberg) deals with passing on a memorandum by PF (Pfeiderer) to Egmont based on discussion on PF-Egmont in Berlin; of which Senior (Schellenberg) is informed. I added a few lines of private matter to it. Letter was handed in at Senior's office for Egmont by courier v. Ginath (March 1945), as courier (AOB: as to by-pass regular censorship) as courier had to go to main office (Stammhaus) immediately after his arrival for a conference. This may clear up misunderstanding at your end. 7/4/45
KV 2/155-2, page 64
For Information Only
I.S. Telegrams (genuine message-copies captured via S.I.S. Section 5 from a Czech employed at the Fernschreib Office at the German Legation in Stockholm)
Ultra ? ZIP / ISTOC 166 - 182 25/4/45
153 a. 0. Subject: Despatch link Ludwig (I - L Milamt, Berlin; Bekaerstrasse?) - Pandur (Major Wenzlau) - Hasso (Kraemer). 1) Your courier despatches of 30/3 and 3/4 arrived today. Please lok into possibilities of the dispatch by Verbindungsstelle Koenig at Kurierstelle AA (A.A. = German Foreign Office). A.A. does not send a courier, as formerly stated every Tuesday, but three times a week. As individual matters, e.g. Egmont (= Giselher-Wirsing) letter of 2/4, are very urgent, it is important that courier mail be speedily forwarded after leaving Ludwig by Stadtbüro and Koenig. Perhaps it is not known to Koenig that in addition to the normal Tuesday couriers from A.A. press and cultural Abteilungen, the A.A. sends off special couriers on the other days of the week. These regularly carry mail. 2) Where is Egmont now? How can he be reached on any chance? (AOB: somewhere in Southern Bavaria) Can Senior (Schellenberg) be reached We have to state our views on Egmont report tomorrow. Answer requested at once.
Petterson - Hasso (Kraemer) 10/4/45
KV 2/155-2, page 73 (partially)
158 Stockholm to Berlin
989 W. (please notice for background information: Q1082 Q1082return at 989)
Ref. air-transportation USA-France. Reliable V-Mann (was Garnier involved as well? https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm) reports on 3/4/45 ref. inquiry. From the British nothing could be learned about the air ferrying of USA troops in February direct from USA to France. Even AVM Brown declared that he has so far learnt nothing about any such air-ferry service.
Pettersson - Liang (Kraemer)
KV 2/155-2, page 74a + 75b (R1083 R1083return)
163 Stockholm to Berlin
Subject: French Foreign Policy. A French diplomat (Garnier?) who has returned from France reports that two tendencies are beginning to show in French Foreign policy. De Gaulle is trying to pursue a certain independent Foreign Policy if possible without identifying it with a System or orientation to the West or to the East. Therefore on one side there is a certain collaboration with Russia with the ulterior motive of playing off the Great Powers against each other. but on the other there is also a clear Syria policy directed against England. A decision was also taken about the Fortress of Dakar without previously ventilating the question with the USA which lays certain claims there. In proposals proposals of pacts of mutual assistance outside the Dumbarton Oaks pact a foreign policy is revealed which is trying to steer as much as possible between the two groups of great powers, the Anglo-Americans and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's attitude to French supplementary suggestions has disappointed De Gaulle. This is the reason for brusque refusal to act as sponsor at the San Francisco Conference (establishing the forerunner of the United Nations). The Rhine problem and the question of security from the basis problem of French Foreign Policy. It was therefore a heavy blow for France that French Rhine state (this could have been the nucleus of a Third World War; - what France occupied with the plan to keep it, was "Saarland" which population voted, two times, in 1935 and 1955 to unify with Germany) was vetoed at Crimea (Yalta Conference). The communists supported De Gaulle in demand for creation of a Rhine State completely under French aegis. In opposition to De Gaulle's policy the Socialists are in favour of rough rapprochement with the West and prefer a system of collective security along the lines of the American proposals rather than a system of bilateral agreements. The socialists and also the communist party are gradually coming more into the foreground. Under influence from many quarters French Foreign Policy at present lacks uniformity.
AOB: luckily, was Charles de Gaulle later a wise man in the 1950s, and opened a mutual friendship with the first German Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer. German language → (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konrad_Adenauer) English language → (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konrad_Adenauer)
KV 2/155-2, page 78
146 Berlin to Stockholm
Luftwaffebführungsstab IC/L (= I C / Luftwaffe)
Signed Bula Hptm (= Hauptmann, Captain)
Subject: FW 189 (Focke-Wulf type 189)* which made a forced landing on 8/4/45. The a/c (aircraft) took off from Karlshager (AOB: Karlshagen near to Peenemünde?). Feldwebel (N.C.O.) Ehmert was pilot, Oberfeldwebel Schilling observer (Beobachter), and Obergefreiter (Ogfr) Klaas gunner. Formation: JG (Jagdgeschwader) 54. Orders: to fly to Cirava in Courland (Kurland)†. Please confirm again that it is a definite case of desertion, so that steps for arrest of relatives (parents, brothers and sisters; and that like) can be taken at once. Note Stockholm 9/4/45.
An apparently reliable Volks German (Volksdeutscher) quarters states that the deserted SS Officer Filip Mehling, born in Mainz, is working on the farm of Anders Brondin at Tärna near Gölja (Gølja?) in the vicinity of Gävle.
About 9 to 12 months ago he deserted from Norway, where he served last, to Sweden allegedly owing to personal differences with RFSS (Reichsführer SS = Heinrich Himmler, the highest man in charge of the entire SS complex). he was interned in Sweden for 6 months and then received permission to work for the farmer named. It is said that Mehling intends to get in touch with the German Legation, as he said, he had important information to give. (AOB: I do not grasp these apparently two cases: Mehling deserted as an SS man, and then returning which should be considered suicidal, what have these two cases in common, as to combine them into a single message?)
* German language → https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Fw_189 ; English language → https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Fw_189_Uhu
† German language: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurland-Kessel English language: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Courland_Pocket
This page being continued: at KV 2/156
By Arthur O. Bauer