KV-2/1496-Kauder-Klatt

Please bear always in mind: The purpose of this historical contribution is for studying purposes only, therefore, do not multiply it, as still Crown Copyrights being valid, partially!

24.10.46 From S.S.U. (Strategic Services Unit) re Klatt special interrogation report No. 1. 80a.

Please see at 82a a letter from S.SU. to say that Klatt is to be released. (AOB: after the war the U.S. "ruled the waves" no longer Britain) In my view this constitutes a potential security menace, and although, presumably, it will be impossible to alter this American decision, would it not be advisable for the authorities on a high level both in the British and American Zones of Germany to be warned by the Security Service of the dangers in releasing such an able, young and successful agent. Commander Scott has confirmed that all but a special handful of persons in the American Zones of Germany are under guard of other Germans, and that the ruling at Nürnberg about Abwehr is being put into force immediately. Whilst we cannot criticise the wholesale release of this category of internee, I think you will agree that a special case could be made out of the detaining Klatt.

(AOB: Mss Chenhalls might have forgotten: that Richard Kauder was a born Austrian, and likely would return to Austria instantly; and that Klatt was by far not a candidate for a Nürnberg trial category)

(1) Commander Scott said that Klatt had been released from ?? custody on 11th March (1947) to C.I.C. Salzburg. One C.I.C. officer has been ?? made personally responsible for the surveillance of Klatt, but it is? doubtful how stringent a check will be maintained.

(2) Mr. Serpell (M.I.5) asked if he would expect further reports on Klatt's various interrogations. Commander Scott undertook to obtain reports on the interrogation conducted by Mr. Johnson (in the presence of Mr. Silver) on 27th and 28th of January (, which) terminated with Klatt's confrontation with Ira (). He also undertook to find out whether the points raised in Mr. Serpell's letter of the 13th February (1947) had been answered. (These concerned the flow of Max messages and OKW reactions to, and evaluation of, the messages.) Commander Scott further agreed to find out whether the Panda line of enquiry is being pursued.

(3) Mr. Serpell referred to the following points arising from Mr. Johnson's last interrogation of Klatt:-

(i) Klatt's account of his first meeting with, and subsequent recruitment of, Ira, which is not regarded as convincing or straightforward.

(ii) Klatt's pre-war record as revealed by Willi Goetz (Wigo). This item had been unsatisfactory handled at the interrogation.

(iii) Klatt's attempted suicide and its significance. Mr. Hanson is under the impression that Klatt had made two previous attempts. He will check on this.

(iv) The confrontation Klatt with Ira. Mr. Serpell suggested that Klatt's opening words showed Ira clearly that he had not been betrayed.

(vi) Klatt's claim to have voiced to von Wahl (guiding officer at Ast Wien) his suspicious of the source of Ira's reports in December 1941 and subsequently. This, Mr. Serpell suggested, might be regarded as a precaution measure for his own protection should the Abwehr become aware of Ira's Soviet agency.

We undertook to supply Commander Scott with a copy of the process verbales of the above interrogation.

(4) Mr. Hanson undertook to arrange for a search for Dr. Deutsch of the Klatt Meldekopf (LMK = Luftmeldekopf), whom we think sufficiently knowledgeable to merit interrogation if he can be located.

(5) Mr. Serpell referred to the report on Franz Bergler and to S.S.U. comments of the 14th February (1947). He did not think Bergler's ignorance of Natasha's surname was significant, nor did he feel that Bergler was worth interrogating further. It was decided that paragraph three of S.S.U.''s letter should be referred to Mr. Bossard (who is paying short visit to London at the beginning of next week) since we were not of ??? reports to the allegedly given by him to ???

(6) The Wagner report (AOB: alias Dr. Delius; the Leiter of K.O. Bulgaria. There existed a great deal of animosity between Kauder alias Klatt and Obstlt. Otto Wagner. The main reasons were, certainly two-fold: jealousy an Obstlt. of the Wehrmacht versus a civilian and thereupon being a Jew too. What also counted was: that Kauder/Klatt was highly regarded up to the Highest Echelons of the Wehrmacht even Hitler knew of him. The question quasi exploded, after Obstlt. Wagner discovered that Kauder/Klatt had even got, for his Luftmeldekopf office, an telephone connection directly linked onto the Europe-wide Wehrmacht telephone exchange system!) (Commander Scott's letter of 5th March 1947 (4 days before Richard Kauder was released from captivity) was discussed and Mr. Serpell said he found it convincing and of considerable interest. He thought that the relationship between Klatt and Otto Hatz (Hungarian Colonel) ?? bed therein should be investigated, and the commented on the passage //ting to Schellenberg, which provided a reasonable explanation of Schellenberg's own statement at Camp 020 (KV 2/94 .. KV 2/99; PF 600561)that the OKW applied the Klatt ??enstelle with "Spielmaterial".

Mr. Hanson said he though it certain that Mr. Johnson was in possession ? Wagner's information (KV 2/284, PF 601320; quite some is French language because Otto Wagner was made P.o.W. when he was stationed in Stuttgart and thus felt in French captivity) at the time of his interrogation of Klatt.

(7) Commander Scott stated that Turkul and Ira were still in custody; that Ira would in all probability be treated in the same way as Klatt, but that in view of Turkul's importance in White Russian circles, his disposal would present an embarrassing problem for USFET (United States Forces European Theater).

(8) Mr. Serpell stated that it had been decided that deception experts should be asked to examine the Max material for the possibility that large-scale deception had been practised by the Soviet through Klatt's organisation. (completely unaware of that the Russian NKWD was actually the source of information and not reverse)

(1) Commander Scott referred to the following incident described in Flicke's book. The Germans successfully intercepted W/T traffic from the U.S. Military Attaché (Mr. Feller) in Cairo in Autumn and Winter of 1942. (AOB: should be Winter/Springtime 1942. The Germans possessed a copy of the American Diplomatic 'Black Code' book. They obtained it from the Italian Secret Service SIM. The British Services could notice in their decrypts of German Communication that they possessed knowledge which they only could have been obtained from inside. Rommel called this secret source my "golden Egg". The interception took place in the Überwachungsstelle in Lauf a/d Pegnitz (vicinity of Nürnberg); where Fricke (Flicke) was engaged in some respect) This traffic contained operational intelligence on the African campaign including details of the British O.B ? Flicke claims that Guenther Weisenborn wrote a play which was broadcast in December 1942 on the Deutschlandsender and whom revealed to the American the fact that their traffic was being broken, whereupon transmission ceased. (AOB: Feller had been removed from the Middle East. Delicate on the British side was to inform the Americans without having to admit that they possessed all the knowledge). Commander Scott suggested that this story might be checked. (AOB: In the 1990s with the support of Louis Brown - a censored version saw daylight in the US: War Secrets in the Ether Story of German Code Breaking)

(2) Mr. Serpell then mentioned certain features of the book which were of exceptional interest:-

(i) Information regarding the R.I.S. in Bulgaria which might throw light on the connection which we suspected to have existed during the war between the Klatt/Ira () organisation and the Rote Drei https://www.cdvandt.org/rote_drei_espionage.htm) and which we know to have existed between the R.I.S. (Russian Intelligence Service??) in Bulgaria and the Rote Kapelle, Rote Drei and Robinson networks respectively. It was agreed that this line of investigation should be exploited as far as possible.

(ii) The Polish network operating in Western Europe. and Flicke's speculations on the use by the Russians of the "Enigma" machine in this connection & also in the Rote Drei operations in Switzerland. Mr. Serpell referred to Flicke's believe that the R.D. (Rote Drei) material was obtained largely through interception of OKW traffic, and his opinion that the Rote Drei was the most important R.I.S. organisation in the war. (AOB: for those going really into for it - please consider also: https://www.cdvandt.org/german_intelligence_switzerland.htm and Hans Pescatore KV 2/1329 PF 602116.) This thesis could only be assessed by experts.

3) It was agreed that the bilk of Flicke's book ought to be reproduced and Mr. Serpell thought it might be possible for this to be done in M.I.5 (where Mr. Serpell himself was engaged) It was agreed that both S.I.S. and LSIC should receive a copy.

4) Commander Scott authorised as complete an exploitation of Flicke's material as were able and willing to undertake and he was anxious that an expert evaluation should be made, agreeing that specialist organisations such as LSIC should be consulted. Mr. Serpell himself undertook to attempt a preliminary evaluation of the material from a non-technical point of view within the next fortnight. This evaluation would be welcomed by USFET.

5) Finally, it was agreed that the meeting had served a very useful purpose and that similar meetings should be arranged in the future to eliminate lengthy correspondence and to cover the ground more fully than was possible on paper.

"Subject were interrogated by an agent of CIC Salzburg, who had been carefully briefed to obtain all information possible from Bergler and his fiancée needed to clarify the identity and location of Tanya Balkanowa (KV 2/2125) and her relationship to Ira . Bergler was first taken to CIC headquarters for questioning, at which time he identified the two female companions who accompanied from Pressburg (Preßburg) to Leogang in May 1945. One was Irima (undoubtedly Irina Christenko. Ira's niece who was reported to be employed as a dentist by UNRRA (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Relief_and_Rehabilitation_Administration) in Munich in 1946) (U.S. Zone), and the second, "an attractive blond woman" with the first name Natascha.

It is the opinion of our local representatives that the "attractive blond woman" described by Bergler is identical with the woman described by Kauder (Klatt) whom Ibyola Kalmann remembered as Tanya. It is possible that the name 'Natasha" known to subjects may have been an alias of Tanya Balkanowa, and it is equally possible that subjects were briefed by not to disclose the true name or identify of Tanya Balkanova. Therefore, a notional character Natascha (Bergler alleges to have forgotten her family name) may have been created for us by Bergler and his fiancée, should they ever be questioned on this subject. Attention is also called to the discrepancy between Kalman's statement that Tanya said she had known for years, and Augusti's statement that Natascha had met Ira only in Pressburg (Preßburg).

This interpretation of Bergler's statements would also explain the additional information volunteered by him concerning 's system of obtaining intelligence information from the Soviet Union, which is identical with the original false version given by concerning his sources and methods.

CIC has been requested to gather further information from Bergler and Augusti concerning the full name and present whereabouts of Natascha. Bergler will be available in the future for any further questioning concerning this case."

London comment: The best reason for assuming that Tanya and Natascha are identical would seem to come from the curious similarity in the false information commented upon in para 3. If it can be proved that Bergler was to such an extent in Ira's confidence that he had deliberately sheltering Tanya under the name Natascha, this investigation of Bergler may develop several interesting facets, particularly if it will lead to the location of Natascha. Therefore, at the risk of being led off on yet another side track, we are encouraging the action in papa 4.

Interrogation in German (language) (a great exception in the British Secret Services, as they, generally, were incapable to speak nor understand sufficiently the German language)

J. We have read all the information and reports on you, studied your own statements and made ourselves a (necessarily translated) picture of the ideas you wanted to convey. However, since your last interrogation, we have found hundreds of documents ←→(AOB: Almost certain a lie, as did Mr. Johnson also in the Fidrmuc-Ostro interrogation! See N2116 N2116return) (AOB: It is almost certain that the German Secret Service branches have destroyed almost all of their secret documents; as it was clearly foreseeable, for months, that the Russians were approaching; and the latter did not share documents with their Western Allies) and carried out interrogation of people who know you and whom you know - do you understand?

J. You know that many people who know all about Klatt are now in our hands, from Schellenberg down, ~~all~~ (many) the Abwehr officers, an your particular friends, Turkul, Ira and Romanov (Romanoff) they have all had the opportunity to talk about your case; and now we are going to start on a complete new basis - is that clear?

J. Right. And we will now question you, and it is your last chance to answer. As an Abwehr man you do not interest us; as a man who worked against Russia in the Abwehr you are of no interest, as such are of interest only to the Russians. Do you understand that? ← ↑ (O2118 O2118return)

J. We will start from the beginning. I do not want you, in your own interest, to repeat things that you have already said once when they are not true.

J. Your friend Ira () has also stated that he can not take W/T either. Do you believe that?

J. Your first statement was based on the assumption that you and Ira together received W/T information.

J. We'll come back on that. You have no further interest in lying Say at once that your whole story of the wireless system was all swindle. The Bulgarian Police -

J. On the 17th July 1946 you were interrogated by an officer, and you told him that you had a receiving station with the Bulgarian Police in Burgos, who received from Tiflis.

K. One moment. I had an apparatus with the Bulgarian Police who listened in for me.

J. I will tell you. Ira () confirmed it. It depends on the statement that you had agents in Russia.

K. Oh no, do not confuse that. I was in Sofia, independent of Ira, who was in Budapest. And in Sofia I received from the Bulgarian Police. (AOB: maybe significant is to know, is, that the Bulgarian language has quite familiarities with the Russian language and therefore Bulgarians were likely capable of copying Russian language W/T messages) I said "Is there any possibility of communicating with Russia?" and this arrangement was fixed with Tiflis. At that time Ira () was in Budapest and said that he had people who crossed the frontier from Carpatho-Russia.

J. Ira () has told us that he never once had a single agent, and that you know very well. (AOB: seemingly a poor British language translator)

J. You are a clever man, and for years your whole Klatt service was founded on the existence, or supposed existence, of up to 6 agents providing Ira () with reports, and during the whole time from '41 till '44 you can tell me that you believed in these agents?

K. Excuse me. Ira () had information from Russia before the war. These messages were sent from Vienna (Wien) to Berlin, and there checked and found good. Quite separate from all this I went to Sofia and tried to arrange communications. These efforts led to the Tiflis link.

K. It is not so, my communications lasted about six weeks. This can be confirmed. A report was received about a ship, and I did not know the name of this ship, which I reported.

J. You have invented this swindle about Tiflis from the beginning to the end. An I now tell you you have one chance left to say it is nonsense, and if you do not admit it, you do your self more harm than good. (AOB: Oh, ?? how then?) The whole edifice you have built up on the bases that Ira () received the information from Russia is rotten.

K. No, it was later that I was asked by Graf Marogna-Redwitz to pass Ira's messages, and whether he swindled or not I do not know.

J. Oh come, you were years with Ira, and when Delius (AOB: alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner, Leiter KO Bulgaria) asked you about his information, you said his sources did not interest you. (AOB: touching the essence: between Richard Kauder/Klatt and Obstlt. Otto Wagner there existed a strong animosity: An Obstlt. in the German Wehrmacht versus a civilian and a Jew as well, whom was highly regarded in the highest circles in the OKW and Government, that was un-sustainable for a man like Obstlt. Otto Wagner)

K. I twice sent people after Ira () in order to find out where he got his messages, and at that moment, when Ira () discovered he was being watched, he said "I see you are having me watched, which means that from tomorrow no more messages; and if Ira () today states that all those years he swindled -

K. I have asked to be told concretely, with facts, where I have lied. If I can be told facts, I might be able to help. I don't know what he was doing. I only know that I passed on his reports as they were received by me. All that Ira () told me I reported back to Graf Marogna, and he said that up to 80% of the information was true.

J. We know all that. But we do not think Klatt was so stupid for four years to take this information without, in his won interests. Trying to find out where it came from.

K. Do you think I would have risked knowingly to forward false information? That I would make myself a party to that?

K. Ira () asked it. I said to Graf Marogna that I could not investigate. It you want it, investigated I said to him, please do it yourself.

J. I will give you one more chance. You told the story to the gentleman in July (1946) the story that that you and Ira () decrypted the messages. I have your own handwriting for that. You said you know not not one word of Russian. I know Ira's German, as you do too, and it is very bad. And that two people, one halt and the other blind, should translate Max and Moritz messages from the text - that I cannot believe.

K. There were three men, Dr. Deutsch, Colonel (Obst) - and - all three read the messages with Ira (), and none of them speak Russian - so I don't see why I need to know Russian either.

J. Let us return to Sofia. I spoke to ~~Romanov~~ Romanoff (relative of the Turkul family), who lived with Ira () for three weeks.

J. And he told me - he has no interest in disguising the truth because he is free and content - he told me a lot. He was 3 weeks with Ira () in the street of 3 September No. 6, and Ira () 's activities there - Ira () had no receiving apparatus, but he did have a radio.

K. I asked Ira () as I thought he got the information from the radio and so asked him if he had a radio; and he said he had none.

J. Well, Ira () had one and Romanoff said he never listened to it. Romanoff did not leave the house for 3 weeks, because he did not wish to be seen, and he told me exactly how Ira got his Max and Moritz messages. He told me every day - and you know that too, and Ira () told us - that Ira () went to Tania. (likely in Sofia).

J. Every morning Ira () and returned with a packet of messages and said "Now I'm going to Klatt." You must have known of such a simple manual system.

(AOB: Mr. Johnson's reconstructions shows a very poor understanding of the historical contexts. We have already dealt with, albeit briefly, that it is almost certain the Russian NKWD had been involved, and they supplied the core of the Max-, maybe also the Moritz messages. But the NKWD (NKVD) could only operate regularly on daily bases, in locations where a Russian representation existed. This did not exist in late 1944, for example in Preßbrug; but it did exist in Bulgaria and what Romanoff was explaining took place there and not elsewhere. In a later stadium, due to lack of direct Russian means, it is to be expected that the NKWD contact took, in some-way-or-another, via means of the Japanese, as they possessed a representation in Hungary, thus Budapest, and Preßburg was the capital (?) of the Republic Slovakia (Tiso?); just where the final stages of the war happened. Japan and Russian became at war to one-another later in 1945.)

K. Because that is not true. He told me that he received the information between 12 and 1, sat down and transcribed it, put the messages in his book and gave this book to me.

J. In any case, he brought the messages. You never had any proof how he received them.

K. Ira () told me he had received these messages from Turkey - and there they were.

J. How did he receive them? How was he able to get them so quickly because some of them were very "hot" - they could have been sent by no other way than wireless.

K. I was of the opinion that Ira () had people in a neutral Consulate. I believed that it was in the Japanese Consulate in or something.

J. As you know very well, the Max messages were very highly regarded as headquarters. You must have realised that the Russian tactical messages were mainly true. (AOB: they only knew this due to the constant stream of decrypted R.S.S. messages. But these M.S.S. secrets they could not ventilate; thus a cover-show had to be played) And you want to make me think that the Japanese Consulate in Turkey got those true messages? (AOB: true or not-true, these messages most likely still had been in Russian language, thus Ira 's intermediate was necessary)

K. No, I knew that the messages did not come by W/T, that is why I did not believe it. I believed - and told Ira () myself - that he got it from some Consulate.

K. From '41 to '42 I did not examine the question. From '42 to '43 I had so much to do with my affairs (AOB: think of the 5th August event and Kauder's forced moving to Hungary and Budapest) that I really could not go into it. You probably do not realise quite how busy I was. I could not go into the question as far as I wanted myself.

J. But your entire existence was entirely dependent on Ira (). If you had not been "trusty" for the Max-Moritz messages, you would long ago have been in a concentration camp.

J. Therefore when you say you had no time to pay Ira's messages because of other work, it is nonsense. Ira () was the rock on which your house was built.

K. That I explained a thousand times to Graf Marogna. You must not forget that I did not go to the Abwehr willingly, in the first place, but was forced into it.

K. I swear by my parents that I am telling you the truth. Please put your questions to me and I will answer them. I was nearly a year in prison.

J. I am not angry, but please do not hinder us with noise. I know that you originally said that you got the messages from a man in Tiflis, but I tell you that story was swindle; and if you tell me again that it was so, then I will not believe one single word of what you say from now on. Was that Tiflis business swindle? You can say yes with assurance, because we know it already.

K. Matis and the Bulgarian Police sent me messages for six to seven weeks. There were Matis, Sarafov and the third was Topalov. They told me that they arranged all fixed to receive reports from a Macedonian "freedom" leader. (AOB: Please bear in mind that the Bulgarians were considering Russia as their closest ethnic relatives, see. for example Dimitrov once directing a Russian Secret Service bureau in Moscow during the war, being actually a Bulgarian citizen. Therefore I would not wonder the the Russian NKWD (NKVD) channelled delicate matters via Bulgaria).

K. How could I, during the war? The first message came with the name of an airfield and the number of a formation to which a man belonged, and that was checked in Berlin (AOB, this might have been even before the Germans invaded Russia on 22 June 1941) and was found to be correct. For six or eight weeks they came and were sent on by me to Berlin. (AOB: Maybe indirectly, as Klatt's direct superior was the Abwehrstelle Wien)

J. I don't want to hear that again. All through this you are always hiding someone else. In the Max-Moritz reports you hide behind Ira (), and now you say that freedom workers were getting the reports for you. But you never checked whether these Burgos reports did come from where they said. (AOB: how could he have accomplished this?)

J. Apart from you, no-one knows about it, and you never had any proof that there was a Bulgarian Police officer in Burgos who took the messages downm had you.

K. No, but the messages that we got from the these Bulgarian Policemen and Matis had nothing to do with ~~Lang~~ (Ira ).

J. But what interests me is that you gave the messages on to the Abwehr as reports from Macedonia.

J. Now we are coming to a point which you have talked about before. Your whole existence hung together with the continuation of Ira's ('s) information. In other words, his reports were your first care, had to be your first care.

J. Therefore you had the greatest interest in not disturbing these reports. You knew that in that case Ira would get rebellious.

J. And you never tried to discover the source of the messages, you were never anxious that they might come from a source that could bring you to the gallows?

K. Precisely the reverse. Perhaps I did not go into the question, or did not wish to disturb Ira () about it, because Berlin knew that the reports came from Ira () and not me, so that if they discovered it to be swindle, then the German Abwehr, who would investigate, would not have made me suffer. I did not share in hiding of the swindle.

J. You knew very well that Ira's ('s) story of the agents he had smuggled over the border before the war was untrue.

K. In '42 or '43 when Ira () asked for more money for the support of the families of these agents, I began to doubt it.

J. In other words, for 3 years, although you did not believe him, you continued with the transaction.

K. What has that to do with it? (AOB: please bear in mind - that the Germans regularly checked the significance of these messages and apparently they still considered them being valuable and true)

K. No. Ira () told me in Budapest that, was a result of his connections as leader of Sokol in Munkatsch ...

J. I want to hear from you that this complete network of agents in Russia did not exist. You knew it.

J. Do you know that they were invented? (AOB: nonsense, as the message passed onto Berlin (via Ast Wien) were checked on relevance) Now, I have already said that since you were last seen, many documents have been found (AOB: a apparent Lie!!), so that now the whole past is built up again, and in the files the name Klatt or Kauder, or whatever you called yourself, occurs not seldom. Do you know the name of Jakovlev? This is a very important question.

J. Yes, tell it. We are not playing chess, that you should take so long to consider your next move.

K. There is a possibility that I wrote this name some time in a report on a person whose name I did not know, and so invented it.

J. That is too complicated. I put it to you straight, do you know the name Jakovlev

J. Can you consider again, because it is of the greatest importance for you. (Bluffing) We will give you five minutes to think that over, Tell me when you are ready.

K. (after long silence) May I tell you something? I know that when I wrote reports on people whose names I did not know, in the Tiflis connection, I put in invented names, and corrected them later when I found the right ones.

J. I asked you if this was the first time you invented anything. You said you put in names that were not correct. Is this the first time you have admitted it?

J. Up until now your have never admitted that you invented a name; suddenly, the first time you invent a name, it is a name with which you do not want to be connected.

K. I state now that the name Jakovlev means nothing to me. I do not remember it nor know it, but I may have used some similar name in a report.

J. You know well that in his absence from Sofia the messages were never taken by anyone else and brought to you. In other words, in his absence the messages never came through. Did yoy never think about that?

J. If the transmissions had been by W/T, in his absence Ira () would have had to have somebody there to pick them up, or otherwise all the messages would have been wasted.

K. No, Ira () did not say he wanted to be in Bulgaria, and he said he had no-one.

K. Yes, and he had no-one else. He asked me that when Romanov (relative of Turkul) came I should tell him nothing of it.

K. No, but I thought he had someone in the (Russian) Consulate who forwarded it.

J. Look here, as an Abwehr man, as a German, you are of no interest to us, only to the Russian. For us you are on interest only in one direction - what is that?

K. In 1940 before the Soviets came into it, Delius (= Obstlt. Otto Wager Leiter K.O. Bulgaria) suggested it.

J. You never believed it was Soviet chicken food (AOB: this is too simple as the true relevance coming out of the Russian material was by far to much true).

K. I asked the gentlemen in Vienna (von Wahl and Marogna-Redwitz) in Vienna (Wien) to investigate that might be so. That was '42, '43 and '44.

K. The reproach that I have worked with the Soviets can not affect me, because - I have no words for it. It is so incongruous that I cannot put into words.

J. But you do not come into that - you know that if it were true you would be much more interesting than as a member of the Abwehr.

K. I have no proof for it, that is my misfortune, to make that clear, that it is so absurd that Ira () or I worked on behalf of the Soviets that it is impossible to consider.

J. You say that goes for both Ira and you. You are well aware of the fact that you and Ira () worked so closely, like twins. Ira () did not want to have anything to do with the Abwehr, it had to go through you; And you said all your side had to go through Ira () -

J. One thing we have settled with you, that you can not yourself state definitely that a radio-man existed at all in Tiflis.

J. You said to the gentlemen (von Wahl and the Leiter of the Ast Wien Marogna-Redwitz) who came in July that you helped the Bulgarian Police to decypher. You told him that you used letters, not figures.

K. No, you misunderstand. The gentlemen (von Wahl and Marogna-Redwitz) asked "In what language do the messages come?". I said I didn't know, it was either Turkish or Russian; This question of ???hers - Ira () told me that he decyphered his own that way. (AOB: by the way - the Russians on Western European Continent used in their OMS (Komintern) communications German language generally)

J. You said (reading from report) "Klatt believed these reports came to the Bulgarian Police in Russian. He did not ask the Bulgarian police.

K. Yes, but do not get the connection confused. Matis telephone the messages to me in cypher. The Bulgarian police decyphered it. Over the question of the ship I telephoned to the Bulgarian Police in cypher. That is the origin of the error. It was used only with the telephone traffic between Sofia and Burgos.

J. I have heard what Matis?? you said. According to you Ira () brought you all the Max-Moritz reports in Russian.

J. Let us have a few more words of Russian. What is the Russian for "war" or for "regiment"?

J. What did you do in Vienna (Wien) in your youth: What was your profession? What did you do?

J. Did you never have any connection with Workers' Parties; amongst the Vienna (Wiener) food workers I had some connection.

J. You know that the Ira () today knows exactly and holds back nothing, and does not deny to us that he never sent an agent into Russia. Is there anything surprising about that?

J. With what result to yourself? In other words, I mean that you would have saved yourself from the situation which had been suspected before by people like Dr. Delius (AOB: the alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner the Leiter KO Bulgaria. There plaid much more things, Klatt's success and favour versus an Obstlt. versus a civilian and of Jewish origin also!)

K. I would, as a trusted man, have repprted to Graf Margogna and asked him to investigate it. When Ira () said he was a Life Guards officer and I heard that his father was a Czech emigrant, I told them in Vienna (Wien) that I had heard this.

J. Tell me; you had a big station for the Abwehr, why did it never occur to you to save a great deal of money and save a lot of questions y taking the messages from Russia yourself?

K. Oh yes, we often talked about that, even with Ira (), and Ira () strictly forbade it.

K. I talked it over with Stumm and Stimmermeyer (?) and we said if we had the frequency, we could try it out.

K. No, there was an Obstlt. (Hötzel Ii - Fulei of the Ast Wien W/T station Wera) in wireless who was often with , who talked it over with me.

K. No, because whenever the officers discussed it, they said so long as the messages are true, we are not interested in where the come from.

(AOB: please do bear in mind: Klatt's gathered intelligence was not dealing with information gathered afterwards, but the bulk were of the predicting nature; thus predicting where and when tactical- and even strategic matters were to be expected!)

J. You said it would surprise you to day to hear that Ira () was a Soviet agent. (AOB: indirectly maybe, but Mr. Johnson cannot proof without any doubt that the NKWD did not play their own agenda)

K. Yes. That I can not believe. We have talked that over before, and I have said I can not believe it.

J. Why? During the whole war you were a German agent, and in your particular situation. -

J. I know you were one, and if you were no Russian agent, you must have been pro-German. (AOB: here Mr. Johnson is clearly showing that his mind and intelligence is being hampered by the circumstances but leaving out the dramatic fate of Richard Kauder's mother; the Jewish elderly woman mostly slaughtered in Concentration Camps)

K. I could say anything which I was forced to say, but I could not be forced to be a Soviet agent. I was forced to work for the German Abwehr. I had to do it, because they could have arrested me and deported my mother;

J. If Ira () is a Soviet agent, then you are the same. (Still Mr Johnson is possessing a distorted mind and lacking clearly intelligence)

J. Because you supported each other - I say this in order that you shall see the situation as we see it. (Möge Gott ihm behüten) It is definite that Ira () played his game - it was a game and a wonderful game - could not have been played without your active support. And Turkul lent his name to it. The way you took such care of Turkul and shouted loud that he was the whitest of the White Russians shows it:

J. I will tell you what Romanov said. (AOB: Please bear in mind that this Mr. Johnson was representing and taking this interview on behalf of the British M.I.5.; and not being sent on behalf of a group of instable minds) I asked him how it was Turkul was fetched from Rome, and Romaniov answered Klatt. Klatt Klatt. And he is the only one who pronounces your name correctly, incidentally, the others pronounce it as if it were a Russian name.

K. It was quite simple. Lang (= Ira ) came to me perhaps four of six weeks before the question was precipitated and asked that Turkul could be taken to Switzerland. I said I did not think it would be allowed. I can not say otherwise.

K. Kleyenstüber (KV 2/1494; PF 601503) said that he that he had so long promised to fetch (in Rome) Turkul to Budapest ... (However, it went first to Wien instead)

J. But you had the greatest interest not to anger Lang (Lang was Ira 's name on Lang's German passport).

K. I say I am not interested in hiding Ira , but I had the greatest interest in keeping Ira quiet.

J. To the extent of protecting a Soviet agent. (Klatt did not know the game the Russian NKWD played with them. But the game of the Russian NKWD, was often not in favour of the Russian military operations)

K. That I would have reported. If you do not believe my sworn word, then you can hang me. It is all the same to me what you do with my life.

J. You say that if Ira () were a Soviet agent you, so to say, throughout the whole war, hid a Soviet agent?

J. And you, as yourself have stated, from '41 onwards, had doubts of his messages.

K. Not on the source but on the channel. (AOB: Mr Johnson is pushing, but never put in the discussion the option that the NKWD source - did cover himself as a White Russian or as someone opposing the Soviets. I will not say that this actually was true, but scientifically such a circumstance should at least have been taken notice of. But Mr. Johnson wasn't approaching the case scientifically)

J. There is true chicken-food and half-true chicken-food - (AOB: bluff! As in Britain they knew damn well the potential and relevance of the messages conveyed through the Klatt channel)

K. If you tell me he received chicken-food, that I can understand; but if you tell me that for 4 years he received half-true chicken-food that is impossible. (AOB: Please, bear constantly in mind: that the NKWD - Max information concerned mostly matters which were due to happen soon!)

K. I did not believe it was chicken-food. I think Ira () had some connection with Russia. There might have been agents or through a neutral.

J. But if Ira () says it was all swindle? (AOB: Ira did not possess the means for himself to check whether the information passed on by him was relevant!)

K. How can I convince you? I want to give you in some form proof that I did not know more than I have told you. I admit that sometimes I made more of the business vis-a-vis the Germans, because I wanted to maintain my position until the end of the war. But more than I tell you I did not do. And I had the opportunity - I could have made arrangements with Ira ().

J. Ira () is not the type of man to make arrangements with you. Your suggestion only shows how little you know him, and how well he judges you. You said yourself that if you came to the conclusion that Ira () was working for the Soviet, you would have told your headquarters, Therefore Ira () was right, because he knew that if necessary you would safe yourself.

J. There would. If for three years you had hidden a man, and then suddenly came to the Abwehr to say "I have found that Ira () is a Soviet agent", they would not have said "Thank you, Herr Klatt, here is $10,000", they would have investigated how it came about that you had protected a Soviet agent for 3 years; and so you would still have to come to the gallows.

J. And you knew well that the only thing you are not telling us - and we are coming to itm you are not so independent as you believe is that you helped him (Ira ?), and you know why you helped him.

K. I never suspected Ira () of being a Soviet agent. If you had told me that the messages were not truem or something - yes. But that he was a Soviet agent - the thought never occurred to me up to the time when I arrived here.

J. You never heard that from Delius? (AOB: Dr. Leiter KO-Bulgaria, whom was an opponent, being mixed-up with quite some jealousy; as Kauder/Klatt was regarded more significant within the Abwehr than was an Obstlt. versus a Jewish civilian!)

K. That is not true. He wrote a letter in Russian that Ira () was a liar. I got that letter from Gavrilov and he translated it. It said that he, Romanov, had cut off from Turkul, because he did not want to take part in an organisation which existed of the efforts of a liar.

J. He wrote a letter to Turkul in which he wrote - that we have from Ira () and Turkul and we asked if Klatt knew it and they said yes - it said that Ira () was a liar and that he must be a Soviet agent.

K. No, I do not know that letter. It was not to Turkul, the letter I know. I only know that it stated him to be a liar. I asked for Romanov to come to me and Romanov said in the letter that he did not want to have any connection with Ira ().

K. He asked me to intervene with Turkul to have the question dropped, and that was done. I believe Romanov was the most decent of the whole lot.

J. But to return to yourself; you say that you protect Ira () the whole time? You never did anything to hurt his set-up and always did all you could to ensure his future work.

K. I must tell you that it devoted from the beginning. Lang was the one who said to Marogna that he did not want to get to know anyone else in the Abwehr, but would work only with me for transmission of the messages to Vienna (Wien). Graf Marogna told me that I had the duty of protecting the man, hiding him and doing all he asked to achieve the aim which was that the messages got to Vienna. That was the beginning.

J. Yes, Marogna is dead, isn't it? (AOB: Marogna was murdered in the aftermath of the failed assassination on Hitler on 20^th July 1944)

K. Unfortunately, for he would confirm me. Then I sent the messages in both parts to Vienna. And when he came to me and said "I want money" and this and that, then I told Vienna (Ast Wien) Then I made the mistake of putting the Macedonia business off to Lang (= the name on his German passport; real name Ira )

K. I saw him once or twice in a restaurant with a fair-haired girl. I asked who she was, and he said it was the daughter of the priest.

K. From December 1939 until February 1940 (in Budapest), and Ira () was already there when I arrived. He had been there for months.

K. Yes. (AOB: please notice - that Kauder's delicate situation in a jail in Budapest was known to the Abwehr in Wien. And they might even have managed to get Richard Kauder in such a position; as to smooth him and gain him for an Abwehr engagement)

K. No. Ira () said "Klatt, things are going badly with me." I said perhaps I can help you, and he said Please, I might be able to do something with my Sokol people in Munkatsch. I told this in Vienna (Ast Wien) and Leutnant Seitel talked with Ira (), and told him to come to Vienna (Ast Wien).

J. When you were in prison together, did you never - Ira () is a man who had long ago sent agents into Russia - did you never talk about Abwehr?

K. Yes. The only time we spoke of intelligence matters in the Budapest prison was when he asked me whether I might be in Hungary for other reasons than I gave. Another man who was in the prison said perhaps I was engaged in espionage against Hungary.

J. We have found various things. (derived from former interrogations) We have settled that you can not do Morse.

J. So that if you do not know what Army is or Regiment is, it does not help to know numbers.

K. In the last two years Ira () spoke quite good German, but in the early days we did it with a dictionary.

J. A strange company. Have you ever thought about it? You did not know where the messages came from and translated with a dictionary.

K. The messages were well regarded by the OKW and on all sides. It was their business whether it was chicken-food or genuine.

J. I have read your life, that you have written yourself - do you remember what I mean? You made here, yourself, in typewriting.

J. Have you ever heard of the Free Russian Movement? (AOB: during the war in Germany known as the Vlassow Armee?)

J. He had something to do with the Abwehr in Belgrade. It is the first time you have heard of him?

J. Why, on the 15th July 1942 did you want to be sent two Russian typewriters? (AOB: this information, most likely had been intercepted by British RSS; we might later come across this actual message)

J. Do not forget that your whole correspondence is in the files in Berlin (AOB: Mr. Johnson is bluffing and lying!!!!!; there was no material left in Berlin, as almost all had been destroyed) Now I ask you - on the 26th 1943 Turkul wanted to go to Spain.

J. You yourself got a telegram which is now in the files in Berlin (AOB: bluffing and a pure lie), in which you were told that the Minister in Ankara regretted that he could do nothing for Turkul to sent him to Spain.

K. I don't know about that. I only know- on that date is shows that Turkul had thought of leaving Rome. (AOB: it was Kauder/Klatt whom managed to get Turkul and Romanov out of Rome by means of an aircraft in the possession of I-L Kleyenstüber, and the group was first heading for Wien)

J. No, that was a reply reply to a question of yours. You interested yourself in his leaving Rome.

K. I do not know now, what I had to do with Kalix. Perhaps some connection with Hungarian visas.

J. A telegram in the ~~Berlin~~ (British) files of the 13th January 1944, Stroh telegraphs you "Nothing functions here except Selmer. Will go ahead here so long as there is a generator. Ira () is flying tomorrow. Three of his people dead. Contact partly established. Kalix alleged to be dead" That is the telegram.

K. Yes, that was after the bombardment perhaps. For two or three days connection was broken because of the bombardment. Then first there came a letter from him, and then over the phone. I remember that I asked him which of his men were dead, because I did not know about them, and he said they all were alive.

J. Why did he give Kalix as dead if you didn't know him before, why should he tell you the name?

K. Perhaps it was Kalix sat in the W/T room and he wanted to let me know that the Hungarian Legation in Sofia had been hit.

K. Then please ask Dr. Deutsch (we do not possess any file reference upon him), he will tell you why.

K. I don't know. Last I heard of him he was in Budapest with the Hungarian Abwehr. I had no other connection with him than friendship. (AOB: It becomes clear that Klatt was anticipating upon the type of queries. Hatz .. I don't know .. than friendship. In other words: he knew him likely from Otto Hatz's stating at the Hungarian Embassy in Sofia. But he had no "dienstliche" connection with Hatz in Budapest)

J. We will now return to the earlier questions. Shenshin - does that mean anything to you? (KV 2/369 - 2/370; PF 66726) (AOB: this low PF serial number 66726 (5 digits versus 6 digits files) is pointing at the very fact that already in an earlier stage the British Secret Services took some interest in Mr. Shenshin)

K. The reports that came from Shenshin were given to Dr. Goetz (alias Wigo; operating mainly in Turkey) (Willi Goetz; KV 2/387; PF 600802) in Istambul (Istanbul) and then to Sofia. They were forwarded to Vienna (Wien). Apart from these reports, Shenshin sent letters to Turkul - I think there were 4 - 6 letters that went through me.

J. Would you be surprised if I told you that there was a close connection between the information that Shenshin forwarded and the Max-Moritz messages?

K. No. Romanov told me he did not want me to contact Shenshin, and I asked him why, and he said Lang (Ira Longin) would be angry.

J. Now return to Tiflis. What would you say was the organisation which operated through Tiflis?

K. Sarapov and Mattis were in Burgos (Bulgaria). Topalov was with them. They were Police officers.

K. I came to know the policemen - that is, I got to know them through the Police Headquarters in Sofia.

J. And when you arrived, they said that they had an organisation running with Macedonians.

K. No, we arranged it. That was in '41. (AOB: please bear in mind that the Bulgarian language and feeling was quite well connect with the Russians)

K. No, that was after (the German invasion on Russia broke out on 22 June 1941) I told him that we had succeeded in establishing a line from Macedonia. I showed him the messages.

K. It happened that they both happened to go together for a time, and one stopped and the other continued.

J. You know very well that if anyone had tried to send from Russia he would not have lasted long. Every operator had a couple of men from the Russian III-F (AOB: used here was the German designation for "counter-intelligence") looking over his shoulder.

(Here Mr. Johnson and Klatt continued to talk (in German language) unrecorded, and Mr. Johnson then dictated:

Klatt thinks it is absolutely out of the question that Ira should have invented these messages. If Ira () should have invented these messages. If Ira (Longin) said today "I never had an agent in Soviet Russia "Klatt would find it hard to believe.) (AOB: again - the most likely route went - from the Russian NKWD through someone of a diplomatic representation. Please bear again in mind: that most of the achieved information was of the sort of "predicting tactical and strategic military moves; thus information that due was to happen in the near future" thus quite contrary from where spies were obtaining information based upon matters currently already running) (The NKWD might have gathered their own unique sources of information)

J. How is Ira (Longin) can take the responsibility of saying it, but you take the responsibility of disbelieving it?

J. You worked against the Allies? You worked honestly for the Germans? I have talked with many people who were on the German side, and are now in our hands. But I have seen people who for years have lied, and people who have told the truth. I today it was 1943 and I as a member of the Abwehr and Marogna said "Come and look at Klatt", do you know what I would have said? I would have said at once "I do not believe a word that the man says. I can see it in his eyes!"

K. I am not looking normal because I am like a beaten dog. (AOB: Well tried, but neglecting: - that the Germans could take no other conclusion than that the passed-on information contained mostly true relevance; and in Britain the knew that a great deal of the intercepted German W/T traffic on behalf of Klatt was appropriate!)

J. It has nothing to do with the impression you give, and you have enough energy to lie.

J. You will be reminded of that statement. (AOB: meaningless words, after all; as Klatt will be set free some weeks hereafter)

K. You must believe that I wrote numbers of letters to Vienna (Ast Wien), asking that the question of Ira's ('s) source be investigated. I asked that I should be released from the responsibility of a thing that looked like a swindle. (AOB: in my opinion it wasn't mainly fake information, but no-one, also not the British in 1943, believed that a legal Russian entity (NKWD) would have provided it to their enemy)

J. If you were so anxious that you wanted to be released from this responsibility, you can not say that you do not believe in Ira's ('s) own statement that he had no agents in Russia (AOB: but Ira was actually an agent of the Russian NKWD, open remains, whether Ira knew what the real game the NKWD played in this context) You must have mistrusted him. You say that three times you told the Abwehr (AST Wien) you did not like the business - lots of times.

K. Ira (Longin) often lied in other matters, and therefore I simply mistrusted him.

J. You say that in spite of the known worth of his messages, you remained mistrustful of him? And yet now you say that you can not believe that he had no agent in Russia?

K. I cannot see how he can have got these messages all those years if he had none.

K. No, because I had nothing to do with Dr. Delius. There was no love lost between us. (= an Obstlt. Otto Wagner Head of K.O. Bulgaria; and the latter was furious against Klatt, though mainly because Klatt was more regarded at the O.K.W in Berlin, than was Obstlt Otto Wagner; and Klatt being a civilian and of Jewish descent) He had an obsession about Ira (Longin) working for the Soviets.

J. And you would not admit, because you dare not. You and Ira (Longin) stand or fall together. Have you ever offered Delius your services?

J. Does the mean that Delius tried to win you for himself and take you away from von Wahl?

J. And you never tried to approach Delius, in order to get away from Vienna (AST Wien)?

K. No, because my interest was to stay with Vienna (Wien). (the Wiener sphere differs quite much from the Prussian attitudes)

J. You are lying again. You have a particular expression when you are not telling the truth. There will come a day when you will have to tell the truth. (AOB, again purely intimidation, as some weeks later the Americans released Richard Kauder; maybe against British expectations, but they - the US - ruled the world, and no longer Britain)

K. But Graf Marogna was the person who protected my (Jewish) mother. Delius would not have been able to do that.

K. No, not that he was working for the Soviets, only that he was giving his channel of information falsely. (AOB: maybe protecting his NKWD source inside the Russian Embassy/Consulate, in Sofia or elsewhere) That I declared from the first day, and in writing.

K. The first time I asked in December '41, and Major von Wahl came, and I said I wanted to hand over to von Wahl, and had them to a meal together. Graf Marogna sent for Ira (Longin) in Vienna (Wien) and talked to him alone, without me, so that I could not influence it. Wahl talked with Lang (= Ira Longin) many times alone. I always was said Please see whether the reports are correct. That was what I requested. So long as the messages were true, Berlin was not interested any further.

J. You have time to think over what you are saying. We will see you again tomorrow morning.

(AOB: as I already noticed, held just five and a half week before Richard Kauder (alias Klatt) was to be released by the Americans)

J. Today we will talk very slowly, in order that every word may be recorded. Have you though over what we talked about yesterday.

K. Yes. I have made some notes. You said yesterday that Romanov stated that Ira went away to fetch messages and brought them in a package, and then he came to me. That means that he got the messages from somewhere in Sofia. I am not clear where the point is reached at which Ira (Longin) at which Ira (Longin) must have been a Soviet agent. Because he could not have fetched the papers from the Soviets. I am convinced that Delius watched him most carefully, even as he did me.

K. Then Vienna (Ast Wien) often asked questions on various reports, which were mostly answered.

K. Some kind of return line, or at least that there was some proof in the fact for me and for Vienna (Ast Wien) that the connection was not suspicious.

K. No, of this outstation, my station (Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost). If there was a false game being played, that is the counter-proof.

K. In Vienna (Ast Wien) they asked for photographs of Lang (= Ira Longin), Turkul and me.

K. If Lang (= Ira Longin) had been a Soviet agent, the would not have asked for his picture. (AOB: I would like to add: that we may rightly consider that Ira Longin, unknowingly, was a kind of agent on behalf of the Russian NKWD, but this was of a different (entity) organisation within the Russian Communist State) And in Salzburg, the first thing they did when they came into my flat was to ask for a big photograph of me.

K. Lang (the surname name on his German passport) never brought messages from the Consulate. Then yesterday you asked whether I received messages from Hatz in May '44. So far as I remember, Hatz was recalled at the end of of April and came to Budapest (where Klatt already lived since, say, and or August/early September 1943). Fourteen days later he was arrested by the Gestapo and remained so for six weeks. Could I possibly have → received messages from him?

received messages from him? I have thought that he might have talked about me, but it was physically impossible for me to have received anything from Hhatz then. He could not have functioned as a provider of information from 15th October.

J. Is that all on your list? I will begin when you have finished. On your first point I will say the following. You know, as all of us know, that the best III-F (= counter intelligence) people can not watch a good agent all the time. If Ira (Longin) had any contact with the Soviets he would not have put himself in a position to be photographed in front of the Legation. If Ira (Longin) had intended to evade Delius's control, he would never had visited any official place. He would have gone to middlemen, who, is the case of the Soviets are often women, and on some quite different pretext. As you know, we are not concerned to discover from whom Ira (Longin) fetched messages, but what the channel was. Yesterday I asked you if the name of Jakovlev meant anything to you. I thought you would remember something, but that apparently is not the case?

J. One thing I must tell you. You, Klatt, who worked against Russia ostensibly during the war, will never make me believe there are things that are impossible - you will never make me believe that for years you were in Sofia and worked against Russia without knowing the names of the members of the Soviet Legation. (AOB: Mr. Johnson cannot imagine / understand that there do exist people not bothering what is not their direct aim. Mr. Johnson comes as a representative of M.I.5 and Klatt remaining in Sofia because he was sent there and also as to safe the fate of his Jewish mother; that he actually being a civilian employed by a German Military entity (he was even not entitled to wear a uniform) - that he might not be interested whom being employed in a Russian Legation. This shows that not Klatt is to be blamed, but Mr. Johnson whom is considering Klatt being a member of an Ast or K.O organisation, as a kind of being their middleman)

J. Not at all, you know every name. (an example of being a narrow-minded brains versus someone simply not of his necessary interest /duty)

J. You have said that before. You will never make me believe that, and I think it the most foolish way to inspire trust.

K. Do try, please to trust me. I am not lying. What you now say, That I knew the people in the Soviet Legation (in Sofia), is certainly not true. The personnel of the Legation did not go about freely, they were always under immediate surveillance by the Bulgarian Police.

J. There is this one man who was in the Soviet Legation in Sofia throughout the war, Military Attaché, and that is Jakovlev; and further, we have found information with a Russian if Sofia whe received messages from Jakovlev, and on these documents is written "Für Ira Lang (Ira Longin) - Klatt".

K. This is the first time I have heard of it, and I tell you I know nothing of this connection. (AOB: in case Mr. Jakovlev represented the NKWD channel - it is quite logical that Ira Longin did not share this information with Richard Klatt; why should he?)

J. It was therefore known the Ira Lang (= Longin) passed the messages on to you. You will not convince me that this was not known on the Soviet side.

J. So it is not surprising that these things for Ira (Longin) were intended to be passed on to you. (AOB: when now Ira Longin refused to expose his Russian channel; in my perception, for quite evident reasons) And it is now clear the Ira (Longin) collected his messages regularly through a woman. Furthermore, it → implies that military reports were regularly transmitted to to Ira (Longin) by the Soviet authorities with des-information : Klatt.

implies that military reports were regularly transmitted to to Ira (Longin) by the Soviet authorities with des-information : Klatt. It implies also that the people who gave the chicken-food were clever enough to insert sufficient correct information to maintain the interest of the OKW. (AOB: this was not directly a mixing up, thought at selected very crucial /essential moments to put in false information, as to allow to gain crucial tactical and strategic advantages; although; rather often a costly endeavour)

J. Well, you ask me to trust you, I ask you to trust me, when I say that it is better for you, in the circumstances, to tell us that it was clear to you that Ira got his messages from the Soviet side; in other words, that you completely understood where these messages came from, and, as you say, where the answers came from. I know it is difficult, after one has stuck to one story for a long time, to abandon it.

K. The possibility that Ira (Longin) is a Soviet agent and played this chicken-food into my hand never occurred to me. In view of the attitude of the German Abwehr it never suggested itself to me.

J. You know that Delius suggested it. (AOB: Mr. Johnson is simply jumping over the real source of discrepancy: Dr. Delius real name Obstlt. Otto Wagner Head of K.O.-Bulgaria, was vehemently opposing the Jewish born civilian - gaining far more appreciation of the O.K.W. in Berlin - than attracted Dr. Delius. This was the main source of the ongoing disagreement between Klatt and Dr. Delius)

K. If I had ever thought of the possibility that he was a Soviet agent I would certainly tell you - because what importance has it for me.

J. It has the following importance for you. I have already told you that as an Abwehr agent you are of no interest to me, and the question is seriously to be faced, if you were only and Abwehr agent, what is to be done with you? But we will not settle that now.

(AOB: Mr. Johnson is succeeding his competence, as the British Services were only granted some kind of "interrogation slots" think of when they are entitled to arrive and when they have to return to England on their own cost and behalf. They have further no jurisdiction at all. It was already known when the US would set Richard Kauder free. Only because of the latter facts, their former British Ally were granted a chance to at least have a chance of interrogating Klatt briefly)

K. You asked yesterday - you threatened me yesterday with handing me over to the Russians. Please notice: (O2118 O2118return)

J. I did not not go so far. I only said that you interested the Russians as an Abwehr agent pure and simple. (Mr. Johnson was without possessing a legal mandate)

K. The situation as regards myself is like this - I did not go freely to the German Abwehr).

J. I will tell you how I see that. (AOB: I will explain afterwards what factually appeared with quite many German Abwehr personnel. They were in a show process (tribunals) simply confected to death and thereafter being executed) The Russian method is to interest themselves only in their agents who begin to go soft. They leave in peace people who, in their eyes, are secure and in whom they has complete trust, (Mr. Johnson here explained that the Russian had requested a small agent of theirs who had begun to spill the beans to be handed over to them from Switzerland. (AOB: apparently is Mr. Johnson fit with a childish brain; producing simply - untrue - "baby talk")

K. Looked at it logically, your view appears justified. As for the fact that I must realise that Turkul and Lang (Ira Longin) were Soviet agents - that I do not know. I can not convince you of it, but it is so. If you said now that you were going to hand me over to the Russians, still I could say no differently.

J. It is the least we can think - if we assumed less we would be taking you for a fool. Since '43 Turkul has been → convinced that Ira (Longin) was a Soviet agent.

→ convinced that Ira (Longin) was a Soviet agent. He shut his eyes and allowed Ira (Longin) to go ahead. Now if Turkul, who is no genius (neither was Mr Johnson, by the way), saw it, how is it that much cleverer and more experienced Mr. Klatt never came to the same conclusion? If today (spring 1947) had a revolver, now that he knows everything, at the first opportunity he would shoot Ira ((Longin), so convinced is he after all he knows that Ira (Longin) is a Soviet agent. It is perhaps in order to put himself in a good light that he says it, but that does not not change his conviction. And the only person who can see nothing is Klatt. (AOB: my personal perception: Mr. Johnson's summary has something in common with that of a "psychopath speaking about is recent sweet dreams")

K. I can only repeat the same words. The original messages that Lang (Ira Longin) brought from Budapest were examined and found to be good.

K. I sent the name of Ira (Longin) to Graf Marogna and said he was regarded by the Bulgarian as a Pan-Slavist. Later it was understood that he was trustworthy, and that I could go ahead with him. Then we came to Sofia. There Lang (Longin) handed over the messages to me. These again were checked. Once in 1941 I sat with Ira (Longin) ...

J. That has nothing to do with the question. If the messages were checked and found correct, the only conclusion to which Klatt, who was possibly the cleverest of the lot, could come, was that they were so correct that they could only have come from the Soviet side. That is the inevitable conclusion.

AOB: Dear dreaming Mr Johnson: - maybe too simple: The British suffered in the fifties and early sixties the scandal of "the Cambridge Five". Also in this respect the British Services and their controlling bodies proved to be clearly incapable of recognising the many counter indications: - that matters were quite wrong for a long time!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five

AOB: would like to skip these endless discussions between someone sitting at a regular desk in England, whereas other were being confronted with the danger of their existences.

KV 2/1496-1, page 53ab + page 54ac, both partially Klatt now being a bit more exited expressing himself in his native German language:

AOB: For what ever reason - the next interrogation statement is being worded in its genuine (German) language; what actually always should have been done, as translations never do reach the genuine emphasises of the maintained language and their expressions.

K. Ich habe die Ira (Longin) Meldungen nach dem eingegangenen Werturteil beurteilt, habe, wenn mir etwas auffallend gewesen ist, mich darüber mit der vorgesetzten Dienststelle unterhalten, und gebeten um Überprüfung. Ich habe dort, wo ich über Ira (Longin) persönlich gehört habe, dass seine Angaben bezüglich seiner Person nicht stimmen, nach Wien berichtet, und auch da um Überprüfung gebeten. Ich habe öfters gebeten die Meldungen daraufhin zu untersuchen, ob sie ein Ira (Longin) in die Hand gespieltes Spielmaterial sind - daran dass Ira (Longin) Soviet Agent ist, habe ich nie gedacht, und es wurde mir gegenüber auch nie von irgend einer Seite ein derartige Verdacht ausgesprochen, mit Ausnahme in Oktober 1940, wo, durch Delius nach Wien eine Anzeige kam dass Ira (Longin) mit Dr. Deutsch zusammen in den Garten des Soviet Botschaft gesehen wurde. Diese Anzeige wurde bei Graf Marogna überprüft, und mir mitgeteilt dass sie auf Unrichtigen Angaben basieren -

Essentially, it does not make sense to reproduce the few irruptions of Mr. Johnson.

AOB: In my personal perception: - I feel sometimes quite irritated, when British Secret Services personnel, like was Mr. Johnson, establishes opinions about someone's doings - whereas most of them never have been in the true-, often, rather dangerous situations of the real war. These Crown servants lived - at their homes with their relatives quite peacefully. Commuted during daytime between their homes to their offices by means of public transportations and returned vice versa towards the end of their working days to their homes again.

These men sat in their offices and at desks; and enjoyed their regular luncheons and that like. And, liked their unvarying family lives.

But, sometimes, shamelessly are judging the lives and doings of their opponents; whom did not have had the chance to choose their own way of living.

AOB: The cover-words Rote Kapelle and Rote Drei actually both were coined words on behalf of the German Gestapo (rather feared German Secret Police); both groups were driven purely on Communist basis.

AOB: The Rote Drei was a Communist orientated spying group operating from Switzerland.

It touches the Rado case - the latter was a Russian spy being in communications with Moscow on very regular bases.

Rado's channel passed also most mysterious fresh "Top Secret" information - directly coming from the German Military High Command gatherings.

It was never discovered whom this was, inparticular, behind it; albeit that the Germans decrypted almost all communications between Rado's group and Moscow.

One of Rado's W/T operators was the British - Alexander Foote (KV 2/1611; PF 66965)

1. The recent interrogation of Hauptman (Captain) Piepe in the Rote Kapelle enquiry has produced evidence:

a) that the initial playback of the Rote Kapelle wireless communications by the Germans was compromised by a warning "telegram" sent from Bulgaria to Moscow;

b) that, on the testimony of Trepper (= KV 2/2074; PF 68258), Sofia was rallying-point for agents escaping from German penetration of the Rote Kapelle, and that Sofia such agents were given money and instructions.

2. It has been known for some time that through Koropkin, a leading member of the White Russian colony in Switzerland, there existed a war-time link between Ira (Longin), Klatt's right-hand man in the Max service, and Tscherniak, a member, if not leader of the Rote Drei.

3. Wilhelm Flicke, who claims to have served in the OKW - Wehrmachtsnachrichtenverbindungen (WNV), has now produced a quantity of new information on the Rote Drei. Flicke's claims and his material are being investigated, but it is fair to say that his material at least bears up the initial examination. Apart from a general account of German discoveries on the Rote Drei, Flicke has produced several specimen of Rote Drei wireless traffic intercepted and broken by the WNV/FU III (OKW/Chi). These specimens tend to bear out his general account of the Rote Drei achievement which is a good deal more detailed, and sensational than the story we had from Pescatore (Hans von; KV 2/1329; PF 602116). Briefly, Flicke reports that from 1941 to 1944 (the end of 1943), throughout the Eastern offensive, the Rote Drei transmitters were providing Moscow with up-to-date and accurate information on German operations against the Red Army. (According to Flicke the intercepted traffic was not broken in any quantity until the summer of 1944 (in contrary to Hans von Pescatore's KV 2/1329 file), but according the documentary evidence in our possession some of it was being read as already as Spring, 1943 (this is in line with Hans von Pescatore's statements in his KV 2/1329 file).

Information on German dispositions, strength and intentions was so detailed that the German intelligence Service deduced the existence of Rote Drei sources in the highest quarters of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), Foreign Office, Air Ministry and German Intelligence Headquarters. (von Pescatore has already told us that there appeared to be highly-placed sources for the Rote Drei but not to this extent.) Flicke reports that "hundreds" of people were suspected and shadowed in the departments concerned. Rather oddly for an alleged member of the Funkabwehr, he seems so far to have said nothing on the search of communications between the Rote Drei and their agents in Germany. von Pescatore produced speculations on a courier line through the embassy of a neutral power, but this seems an inadequate channel for the volume and currency of the traffic described by Flicke. Flicke states for example that in October 1943 the Rote Drei produced eight eight hundred transmissions.

4. The intercepts of Rote Drei (in Switzerland) traffic so far produced by Flicke do not contradict his story. So far as new-traffic is concerned, however, he has only produced messages from Moscow to Switzerland; his specimens of two-way traffic are all concerned with Rote Drei administration. They very few examples of outward Switzerland-Moscow traffic which we possess in captured documents suggest detailed information on German dispositions but we have no means of judging their accuracy or currency.

5. Flicke's account of the Rote Drei in operation against Germany offers remarkable parallel to Klatt's account of his Max organisation in operation against the USSR. In the Klatt story we have the same date-context, the same widely-spread and highly-placed network....

AOB: We have to skip the rest as this is not really related to our Klatt Survey.

Obstlt Otto Wagner @ Dr. Delius has been encountered rather often; now we will deal a bit more with his backgrounds before the start of the 'Second World War'

In May 1937 Wagner left Saarbrücken for Berlin where he was posted to Abwehr Abteilung III F (counter espionage). The head of this section (then) was Hptm. Protzes and and his immediate superior was Major Hammler. Wagner was given the job of creating an intelligence net covering the whole of central, south east and north eastern Europe wit Russia as its objective. Having organised his net he was to collect the information and prepare a synthesis for Admiral Canaris (= the head of the entire German Military Amt Ausland/Abwehr) who would then forward it to the O.K.W. (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) He made numerous journeys to Lithuania, Latvia, Rumania, Hungary and also undertook investigations into the causes of the frequent sabotage of German vessels.

In 1940 he went to Sofia where he had to organise an intelligence net and then did the same in Greece and Rumania. He overstepped the limits of his mission when, through intermediary of Dr. Walther Dieter, director of an armament factory and friend of Bordosakis, he exerted pressure on the entourage of Metaxas and obtained an assurance that Greece would stay our of conflict. Later he was severely reprimanded by his chiefs for this action.

Whenever he went he left flourishing Aussenstellen in his trail. The white Russians were his best agents in central Europe. He attempted to do the same in Turkey where he established special groups in Istambul (Istanbul) wit Dr. (Paul) Leverkühn in charge. He was a kind of technical adviser on the intelligence services in eastern Europe.

(During his stay in Rumania he came into contact with Critescu, who wished to have his opinion on the situation with regard to the communists who were forming new cells.)

1943: Bulgaria (Where he, at least since late 1940 headed K.O.-Bulgaria) and Hungary.

From May-October 1944 he was stationed at Budapest as head of Kommando Meldegebiet (K.d.M. effected after the merging of the Abwehr into the Amt Mil) in Hungary, under the command of General → von Greifenberg Military head.

von Greifenberg Military head. Kdo Meldegebiet Hungary with Meldekopf Bulgaria came under Mil Amt, as the Abwehr had just been reorganised (ca. Aug. 1944) He made Sofia his H.Q. (AOB: in 1940!)

In October 1944 he went to Vienna where he was appointed Chief of Sonderstab Sued-Ost (AOB: there wasn't much left by Oct. 1944). He had to organise and control any intelligence services possible in his district. His work was made more difficult by the increase of disagreements with the SS who, day by day, were gradually assuming control of the military organisations. He was ordered to Berlin to present himself to von Taysen, Major im Generalstab Head of Section I West (AOB: officially in the Amt VI / Amt Mil period there existed a total new organisation system) working under Dr. Steimle https://www.cdvandt.org/steimle-eugen-kv2-966.htm who was at the same time head of the political section of the SS (Amt VI).

Von Taysen instructed him to be ready for work in the West. It should be remembered that Taysen's adjutant was von Bohlen (KV 2/1975; PF 602800 towards late 1944 he got the Mil Amt alias, Mate) whose sphere covered France, Spain, and South America. Bohlen worked in Chile about 1936-1937)

Wagner was sent to Stuttgart (in fact: Sigmaringen) where he took over from Colonel (Obst.) Ohlendorf, Head of Kdo. Meldegebiet (K.d.M.), on 16.2.45. Ohlendorf returned to Berlin. ...

AOB: In a quite comprehensive reflection in respect to the Klatt Survey, it might be necessary to take notice of a quite significant person: Obstlt. Ernst Kleyenstüber and (Fregatten-Kapitän Ernst) Wilhelm Leissner (the latter was, for some years passed, Leiter of K.O. Spain and he was succeeded about July/August 1944, by Obstlt. Kleyenstüber)

1. The two prisoners (Kleyenstüber and apparently Leissner) personify the two different phases of the Abwehr in general. Leissner is a typical member of the "Canaris Familie GmbH" (AOB: Admiral Canaris was Head of the Military Amt Ausland/Abwehr, between 1935 and February 1944), a regular Kriegsmarine officer, conscientious but completely unthinking, with no conception of the work he was supposed to do; even at this stage, he is without any clear idea of why he was unsuccessful in Spain (AOB: did he spoke the Spanish language sufficiently?). He is methodical and unimaginative, whilst Kleyenstüber, who was sent to replace him in (July/August) 1944, is fully aware of the causes of Leissner's and of the failure of the whole Canaris policy.

(AOB: in my own perception, this wasn't a single minded failure, but was caused by various reasons: Canaris' resignation versus the growing Nazi dominance; Canaris had a penchant for Spain going back to his fliying from Valparaiso (Chile) in late 1914 as an interned member of the crew of the MS Dresden. He flew via de Andes mountain chain and Buenos Aires on a Spanish or Dutch cargo ship to Europe. Where he passed through, unnoticed by the British, via Spain to a harbour in the Netherlands. There he left the ship and went to Germany. He became a famous U-boat commander in the Mediterranean and frequently visited Spain. In some way or another he was also involved in the Kondor operations (German Forces Supporting Franco's side in the Civil war in Spain 1936-1939), where Nazi Germany supported Franco-Spain. Consequently, he got very good friendship with leading military commanders. When during the war, due to British political pressure upon the Spanish Government, did cause severe problem, time and again Canaris intervened successfully) https://www.cdvandt.org/canaris-intercepts.htm He (Kleyenstüber) (= KV 2/1494) is young, keen, mentally alert, of proved intelligence and initiative. Just as in the wider sphere, the reformation in the Abwehr came too late to be of any value, so in Spain Kleyenstüber came too late to achieve anything worthwhile. He realised from the start that KO Spain, from an int point of view, would need to be thoroughly reorganised that it was penetrated through and through, that its security was nil, and, being faced with such a colossal task at so late date as autumn 44, and at the same time having a clear knowledge of the outcome of the war, his efforts at reorganisation were half-hearted and vitiated by his conviction of their futility.

2. It is IO's (interrogation officer's) belief that Kleyenstüber replaced Leissner at an earlier date, the history of KO Spain might have been very different. (AOB: in my perception quite curiously, is that Freg-Kpt. Wilhelm Leissner remained at KO Spain office up to the bitter end in May 1945, albeit, down graded in his competence)

Kleyenstüber can give little information on prominent personalities, for two reasons: first, his comparatively brief residence in Spain before the collapse, and secondly, his deliberate policy of endeavouring to reconstitute the K.O. as a secure org involved his holding himself as 'aloof as possible from outside contacts. A further reason is also the colder attitude of the Spanish government to the German orgs after the fall of Canaris (AOB: whom they appreciated very much), and after the probable defeat of Germany became more certain.

Gen. Vigon's attitude to Germany was conditioned by his friendship with Canaris and with von Richthofen, and originated from the help given by Germany to Franco during the Civil War. Both Prisoners give Vigon a character of complete honesty, of farsightedness and ultra-patriotism. His political views are monarchist; he holds them both by conviction and by tradition. Leissner states that throughout the war Vigon was critical of Germany's prospects, and told him on one occasion that as long as the British Fleet was in being, Germany could not win. He states that Canaris spoke quite openly to Vigon, and the latter's personal convictions, reinforced by Canaris' revelations, enabled Vigon to assert his personal influence with Franco against closer ties with Germany.

Leissner goes so far as to state that it was the personal influence of Vigon more than anything else which was the reason for Spain's neutrality.

Vigon is anti-Fascist, very contemptuous of the Falange, hopes for a return of the monarchy, and is suspicious - if not incredulous (sceptical) - as to the possibility of a democracy in Spain. He was sharply critical of the NSDAP (German Nazi Party) and of Italian Fascism; he took no trouble to hide his feelings from Canaris, but towards other than his personal friends, he adopted an attitude of deceptive optimism as to the outcome of the war, especially towards these whom he knew to be fervent supporters of the Axis, such as General? Krahmer(?). Leissner and Kleyenstüber both say that his attitude did not represent his true feelings, but was merely indicative of his courtesy. Leissner believes that Vigon would oppose a democracy in Spain not only on personal, but also on traditional and ideological grounds. Vigon has told him that his greatest fear is of another Civil War; he could be expected to go to any lengths to avoid this.

AOB: I would like to skip the rest of this section, as it provides us nothing of interest in respect to Richard Kauder/ Richard Klatt.

I. Kleyenstüber's information regarding the Turkul Flight (from Rome in 1943 towards Wien, in Kleyenstüber's aircraft to his disposal, I suppose)

1. Prisoner states that at the time Badoglio (Italian General whom was in charge to let change-over to the Allied side of the Italian preliminary Government) affair, he was on official duty in Sofia, having flown there for a conference with Klatt. (AOB: by then Kleyenstüber was Leiter I-L in Berlin) When the news of the Badoglio affair came through, Klatt told Prisoner (Kleyenstüber) that he was concerned with getting Turkul out of Rome immediately.

2. Prisoner then suggested that they should use the aircraft in which he had come to Sofia, fly to Rome to contact Turkul, and if possible, fetch him out. Klatt agreed to the suggestion and Prisoner, Klatt and Lt. (Dr.) Thiemann of I-L Ost, flew down the following day. (AOB: The latter was the man whom arrested Richard/Kauder on 12 February 1945; maybe the latter was in some way responsible for the loss of Kauder's private stamp collection and other valuables) The aircraft was a He 111 with full crew. On arrival in Rome, Klatt and Thiemann went to locate Turkul, whilst Prisoner got in touch by teleprinter (AOB: likely located at the German Legation in Rome) with (then still) Obstlt. Hansen (Head of Abwehr I in Berlin) in Berlin, to whom he gave details of the reasons for his being there. He also asked for confirmation that no difficulties would be placed in Turkul's way by the SD on the re-entering German-occupied territory. This was necessary, because Turkul (KV 2/1591 - KV 2/1592; PFR 4394 ; PFR = Russia / Russian?) was believed to have been expelled from Germany at the instance of the Sipo / S.D. Prisoner is not sure of the reason for his expulsion other than it had some connection with Vlassov (AOB: I do not think so, because Vlassov (Vlassow) was made P.o.W. on 12 July 1942; but Turkul had been expelled from Germany in pre-war days). Prisoner did not get an absolutely satisfactory reply, and therefore flew back with Klatt and Thiemann. (who had contacted Turkul and ascertained that he was willing to return to Budapest.

3. In Budapest (AOB: according Klatt and [1] Dr. Winfried Meyer's book on Klatt, Ast Wien insisted that first they should approach Wien. Causing quite a raw and after tense discussions Turkul accepted to land first at Wien and accepted the assurance that he should soon be brought to Budapest), Prisoner discussed the matter with Referatsleiter Obstlt. von Wahl, and had telephone conversations with Obst. Marogna (Leiter Ast Wien), which resulted in permission being given for Turkul to return to Budapest. At this point, Prisoner had an attack of tonsillitis (Angina); Lt Dr. Thiemann was then sent down to Rome (again) in Prisoner's (Kleyenstüber's) aircraft, and returned with Turkul, Turkul's wife and possibly his daughter. Prisoner himself never met Turkul personally; he did not see him on the return from Rome as Turkul was taken directly to Graf Marogna, who at first accommodated him in Vienna (Wien) and later in Budapest.

4. Prisoner states that he has heard of an individual named Romanov (KV 2/1453; PF 603457), who was somehow connected (related) with Turkul, but states that he was not in the aircraft when flew the first time, and he is not aware that he was in it when Turkul was brought back.

Prisoner states that "General Turkul" was a Russian émigré (White Russian) and held an important position in the Max organisation. Prisoner was told by Major Bechtle of OKW I Luft ( that Turkul controlled a political org. in the Soviet Union) that Turkul controlled a political org in the Soviet Union. Prisoner believed that members of this org were high-ranking officers on the Ukrainian GS (General Staff?). Klatt exploited Turkul's org for his purposes, in return for which Turkul is believed to have received funds for the support of émigré circles. Turkul is believed not to have known details of Klatt's other orgs. He had lived in Rome since (early?) 1943 (AOB: as about autumn 1943 Turkul had left Rome in Kleyenstüber's He 111 aircraft).

Prisoner states that Klatt's real name is Richard Kauder. He was a full Jew, born in or about ~~1910~~ (1900), the son of a military doctor in the Austrian-Hungarian army. At the time of Prisoner's appointment of Gruppenleiter I Luft (I-L) i Berlin in Jan. 43, Klatt was already installed as chief agent of Ast Vienna (Wien) Referat I Luft. His controlling officer was Obstlt. von Wahl; The Astleiter at this time was Obst. Graf Marogna-Redwitz. Klatt had an office → in Sofia well-equipped with card-indices and registration cards, and had been allotted several W/T operators by Vienna (Ast Wien).

in Sofia well-equipped with card-indices and registration cards, and had been allotted several W/T operators by Vienna (Ast Wien). He maintained relationships with the Hungarian IS, with the knowledge of Vienna (Ast Wien). (AOB: Obstlt. Kleyenstüber might not possess an integral knowledge of Klatt's story. On 5 August 1943, due to the Edgar Klaus affair, Hitler furiously decided: that from this day onwards, it was totally forbidden to engage any Jews in the German Military Abwehr. Consequently, Klatt was forced to give up Sofia and to get out of the direct picture of the OKW diehards. After tough deliberations a way out was created by a trick in cooperation of the Hungarian Secret Service. Klatt was fit with an Hungarian passport on the name of Karmany. But his intelligence was shared with the Hungarians but mainly consumed by the regular I-L channels in the Wehrmacht) Prisoner (Kleyenstüber) is not clear as to why Klatt, being Jewish, should have performed such excellent work for the Germans, but states that he known to SD Vienna (Wien) that Klatt was smuggling gold and securities across the border (?), and the question had been actually raised whether disciplinary action should be taken against him; the attitude of I-L was that his work was too valuable to be interfered with, and it was decided not to pay any attention to this smuggling. (AOB: the reality is always differently. - When Klatt had been arrested on 12 February 1945, such kind of charges were raised against him by the Gestapo. But, after some time (in February 1945!) dropped as not true or could not been proved. But, during Klatt's time in Sofia, sometimes Ast Wien applied for the delivery of goods, which were difficult to obtain in German territories; such as particular exclusive food-stuffs and cigarettes and that like. Certainly applying fore was more or less illegal. Though, on the other hand, Klatt shared legally business with Mittermayer (KV 2/1466; PF 74098 Kittel-Mittermayer). Due to the profits of this flourishing business, was Klatt capable to expand employment to quite many people, ending at about > 30 people employed at his Luftmeldekopf in Sofia!)

7. Klatt's to chief sub-agents were Ira Lang (this was the name used at Ira Longin's German passport), who is believed to have been in the Czechoslovak Legion and who hold a key position in Klatt's Ost reports (Max) organisation, and "General" Turkul, a (White) Russian émigré, resident in Rome. Klatt's reports were dividend into three groups as follows:-

These dealt with the Russian Army and Air Force. They varied in quality, but were on the whole considered to be excellent, in particular in so far as they dealt with the (Russian) Army. Prisoner states that the Army reports dealing with deployment and operations were almost invariable confirmed at a later date. (AOB: thus these later sort of reports were possessing a forecasting dimension) Occasionally they were wrong, e.g. various landings in the Black Sea were reported which did not actually materialise, but in view of the the great number of reports which were confirmed, this was unimportant. The evaluation of Army reports was carried out by Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), the head of which was Obst. Gehlen (AOB: Gehlen shortly after Germany's unconditional surrender became engaged by the US Secret Service and this became known as the "Org". In the 1950s this entity became the German Bundesnachrichtendienst situated in Pullach near to Munic (München)). ... the head of which was (before 1943) Major Kienitz, and (after 1943) Major Boie. Neither of these officers had very high opinion of the Max Air Force reports. (AOB: whether this was NKWD (NKVD) strategy or that the chain by which information was channelled did function differently - I don't know)

These were reports dealing with the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. .......

The KO Leiter at Sofia, Obstlt. Dr. Delius (= Obstlt. Otto Wagner, KV 2/284; PF 601320), and the staff of the SD Stelle in Vienna (Wien) were highly suspicious of Klatt. (AOB: Dr. Delius the Leiter KO-Bulgaria, was jealous as he - being an Obstlt. of the German Wehrmacht, Klatt the Jewish descent civilian highly regarded at the O.K.W. HQ in Berlin up to Keitel, might have been too much to accept and dealing with. The SD always were sensitive for political matters and were apparently anti-Semitic, though had been forced to "back-off"). Prisoner believes that professional jealousy played a large part in the suspicion, as Klatt's success in their own field reflected on their efficiency. Ast Wien, naturally, supported Klatt, in particular Klatt's controlling officer, Obst. von Wahl, and this led to considerable friction between Ast Vienna (Wien) and KO Bulgaria. Prisoner himself never came to a decision as to the genuineness or otherwise of Klatt. He admits that a few hints which Klatt dropped as to the nature of his organisation, i.e. W/T transmitters on ships in the Black Sea and at Trebizond, sounded improbable, and that he himself never believed a word of them, but considers it natural that Klatt should keep his organisation as secret as possible, and quite likely that after the German refused to Aryanise Klatt, the latter would cover all his connections with as thick avail as possible in order to maintain his indispensable position. There was much discussion at I-Luft on frequent occasions over the Klatt reports, but no factual proof that Klatt was an Allied agent was ever produced, and the policy of I-Luft was to treat the Max reports on Russia as reliable, and the Ibis and Moritz reports dealing with Anglo-American matters as extremely doubtful. (AOB: it is nevertheless necessary to notice - and will be dealt with in detail, in due course, that in 1943 the British secret Services put an enormous amount of work in this latter aspect. Klatt then mentioned in his Moritz reports so accurately facts on North Africa, that the Britain was highly alarmed - how was this possible? Did the Germans crack the British W/T codes? Though, after some months, they came up with the query: might it be that information had been gathered by Russian Liaison in North Africa might these have reached Klatt?) Prisoner adds that whatever the motives and irrespective of other considerations, he himself believes that the Max reports were genuine. (AOB: genuine these messages truly were, though, delivered genuinely by means of the Russian NKWD (NKVD). It might have been a curious way of passing-on "chicken-food"; but its veracity was extremely valid, though occasionally untrue; whether essentially or not is, afterwards, hard to reconstruct) They were too factual, too frequent and too valuable to be considered chicken-feed. Again: its contents were mainly in the fields of tactical and operational forecasting.)

AOB: Let us take notice of a draft supposing some of their (British) strategies about Klatt's second interrogation

Including now-and-then threatening him with matters the British possessed no legal power as to accomplish and, of course, lying about actual facts.

Manually written with a pencil: Tischerniak? ; Georgy (KV 2/130 - KV 2/131; PF 600052); Hitzigrath

Points for the Second Interrogation of Klatt. (AOB: planning and commencing incorporates a great difference, the first option is dreaming about matters thereafter comes often a disappointment)

1. Before Klatt is interrogated for the second time, we need to know whether he has knowledge of his probable release (which actually matured on 11 March 1947). We have to decide what offer we can make to Klatt in return for the information we hope to get from him. The following notes are made on the basis that Klatt doesn't know he is to be released and that the interrogator is at libertyy to give him this news if it serves the purpose of the interrogation.

2. I suggest a direct accusation to Klatt that he has acted on behalf of the Soviets. In my view there are only two possibilities about Klatt: 1) that he was wholly conscious Soviet agent; 2) that he was a "black-marketeer" of intelligence who consciously took money from any intelligence service with which he could establish successful contact. (AOB: in what kind of lunatic world were these men living?) If we attack him on the second possibility. I believe that we shall forfeit (loss) any chance of establishing the first, and I think therefore that we should put first to Klatt as our believe, leaving it to him to bring out the second himself should that be the truth. I suggest therefore that we tell Klatt we know him to be a Soviet agent for reasons set out blow, and that according to the American policy (not true as being painted here) towards Soviet agents he will be handed over to the Russians. We can offer him the following alternatives however in his handing over. If he will tell us the whole truth about his Soviet agency, together with any information about Soviet espionage his work in the Abwehr, we can arrange for his 'escape' from custody and will make no official or unofficial approach to the Russians about his disappearance from the American Zone. (AOB: a lunatic draft and plan; as Klatt was likely not informed about the way Ira Longin obtained his information. The Germans call this: Wunschdenken) If, on the other hand he refuses to tell us the truth (what they consider is their truth), we shall hand him over to the Russians officially as a detected Soviet agent, and he may like to consider what sort of a welcome the Russians are likely to give to him as an "agent brûlé". (AOB: I suppose all being bluff - and that the Americans didn't know about this quasi psychological British terror)

3. The case of Klatt has gained some fresh importance from new information obtained on the "Red Orchestra" ("Rote Kapelle") case. The interrogation of Piepe in the latter case has produced evidence that the German play-back of Rote Kapelle wireless communications was a failure because of a warning "telegram" sent from Bulgaria", (b) that Sofia was rallying point for agents escaping from German penetration of the Rote → Kapelle and a place where they received payment and instructions. (AOB: are they really so mad, - and are they linking Klatt's Luftmeldekopf with the Rote Kapelle? A purely Communist orientated resistance Organisation?) (AOB: are we currently viewing at the pre-stadia of a declining British Service, of the 1950s?)

Kapelle and a place where they received payment and instructions. It appears from the Canadian case that a Soviet espionage network cut off from its supports during the war might make an appeal to a place (in the Canadian case - Ottawa) where a network was known to be in successful operation and in touch with Moscow headquarters. It is conceivable that the same sort of remedy may have been used in the application of the Rote Kapelle refugees to Sofia. (AOB: The Russians possessed a fully operational Legation in Sofia)

4. I suggest that we should accuse Klatt of being a Soviet agent on the following basis:

(a) We should say that since we last interrogated him we have been able to see a great many captured documents and we have been able to interrogate a number of important characters concerned in the work of the Klatt Dienststelle. (AOB: all lies!! Though, what should people worry - is the total absence of intelligence of this draft editor) In particular we refer to conversations we have had with Turkul (KV 2/1591 - KV 2/1592 - KV 2/1593; PFR 4394), Ira (Longin) (KV 2/1630 - KV 2/1631; PF 602370), Romanov (KV 2/1453; PF 603457) and Shenshin (KV 2/369 - KV 2/370; PF 66726). It is abundantly clear to us that Klatt was lying at his first interrogation;

(b) We know that Turkul's name was used as an umbrella for certain of Klatt's intelligence operations. Turkul himself was kept in the dark about Ira's activities;

(c) We know that there was no substance in the story of information passed to General Turkul and his organisation by White Russian contacts in the U.S.S.R., either by wireless or by couriers. On the contrary we know that the information passed on this pretence was Soviet deception ~~and propaganda material~~: (AOB: the veracity for the Army Max message were rather high and the British knew this, so from evident chickenfeed was not the question as the bulk was actually most relevant. Let us skip the side aspects what Turkul knew or not, or that the latter's name was used as a cover or camouflage doesn't matter; what counted was that the majority of the tactical and strategic information was relevant (thus valid))

(d) We know that Klatt ran two lines of intelligence based on the Turkul legend; the business end of one was Shenshin and of the other was Ira (Longin). From specimens (British RSS intercepts) of information obtained on both these lines, it is clear that Ira's (Longin's) information was high-grade deception material (thus, material mostly valid, and on special occasion deliberately false), while Shenshin dealt with low-grade deception, (AOB: such as Moritz messages. But in 1943 for quite an episode these type of messages were very true, upsetting the British Secret Services for quite a while! This aspect will be dealt with in due course) It is obvious that any loyal servant of the Abwehr who duplicated his source in the way that Klatt did on the Turkul legend must be seen from a comparison of the material that ~~the~~ he claims of Turkul or his representatives were false.

and we have no doubts about the Power to whom this information went. (Russia? AOB: ridiculous)

5. Confronted with this detailed accusation and with the offer described above, it is possible that Klatt, if he is a Soviet agent, will decide to tell us all. (AOB: this did not happen at all) If, on the other possibility, he is "the black-marketeer of intelligence" he will at least have a good deal of explaining to do. (To safeguard our source (André Gross KV 2/131; PF 600052) I suggest that Schellenberg might be quoted as an authority for Max material and for the material from Shenshin. AOB: was he really? We should doubt these infantile thoughts, as the Leader (Leiter/Head) of R.S.H.A. Amt VI incorporating Amt Mil constitutes a person on such high level he is never an expert in great details) I feel it is important to cover Klatt's lines of retreat as far as possible. He has already been exploited for his Abwehr information and we should make it plain that we are now concerned with an entirely different side of his activities. If he likes to tell us of the other Soviet penetration in the Abwehr so much the better, but it is no good his expatiating on the technicalities of his Dienststelle operations. I do not think it would be useful to set down here any lines of interrogation for Klatt should he confess to being a Soviet agent. If he makes such a confession, then further counsel would have to be taken on the basis of what he admits. If he merely confess to the black-market (AOB: he was concerned on Black-market - but this was related to food-stuff and alcoholic products and that like) and satisfies the interrogator on his plea then it seems likely that he should be able to provide us with a clearer information on the functions of Ira (Longin) and of own means of communications with the Russians. (AOB: simply a lunatic mind is putting this on paper) One card we may keep up our sleeves is the approach made by ~~Andre Gyorgy~~ Mirko Rot (KV 2/1712 ... KV 2/1714; PF 65653) (also a Jewish person), apparently on Klatt's behalf to the British Intelligence in Istanbul (Istambul), suggesting that Klatt tried to take out an insurance with the British, as well as the Russians and the Americans, against the possibilities of German defeat. (Nonsense, as Mirko Rot escaped already in 1943 from German occupied territories; he wasn't a quite reliable chap either)

Special Interrogation Report No. 2 on Richard Kauder @ Klatt @ Karmany (← when in Hungary since ca. September 1943)

1. This report concerns the relationship between Kauder and his principle agent, Ira Longin @ Ilja Lang (← The name Lang was used on his German passport), and contains an account of the latter's activities as a member of the German Intelligence Service. (AOB: whether Ira Longin considered himself being a member of the German Abwehr, I highly doubt)

2. Kauder's acquaintanceship with Longin dates from December 1939, when Kauder was arrested by the Hungarian police for travelling without the necessary papers. (Interrogator's note: It is doubtful that this was the real reason for his arrest; more likely he had been engaged in illegal financial dealings) He found that his cell-mate was a Dr. Longin, who had been arrested for having spread pan-Slavic propaganda after the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraina by the Hungarians. Longin related that he had been a 1st lieutenant in the Czarist Army, had fought against the Red Army during the Russian Revolution, had been imprisoned by the GPU, and had finally moved to Czechoslovakia, where he studied law.

3. After a few weeks Kauder was released, and his next meeting with Longin was an accidental on in Budapest in June 1940. Longin stated at that time that he had just been released from prison and had been forbidden to resume his law practice; he was living with a Russian friend named Kischkin. Kauder revealed that he was then in the employ of Ast Wien under Graf Marogna-Redwitz →

(AOB: In my perception the following might have occurred: For what ever reason, the Ast was informed about the existence of Klatt in a prison in Budapest. Whether he was arrested on information supplied from that very Ast Wien stays open. But at least we may consider that in someway or another, there had been a mutual Hungarian - German-Austrian agreement that Richard Kauder should be expelled from Hungary and (anschließend) especially being handed over to the German authorities. They collected Kauder and offered Kauder a deal of which the entire Kauder/Klatt complex is resulting)

→ and promised to do what he could to obtain similar employment his ex-cellmate (and preventing Kauder's Jewish mother from anti-Semitic repercussions on behalf of the German Reich). In July 1940, Kauder was sent by Obstlt. von Wahl-Weiskirch. Chief I-Luft in Ast Wien, with Obstlt. Seidl to Budapest to discuss the matter with Longin. The latter declared that he had recognised the Germans as the one European barrier against Bolshevism and was willing to engage in Espionage against the Reds but would first have to obtain the permission of his chief in Rome (General Turkul) Shortly after this initial meeting, a conference took place in Wien between Graf Marogna-Redwitz, Obstlt. Seidl, Longin, and Kauder. Although Longin refused to reveal the name of his chief, he was granted a pass (on the name of Lang) to Rome and returned in two weeks with his chief's permission. However, two conditions had been attached by the mysterious chief (later discovered to be Turkul): Longin was not to reveal the source of any information gathered by him, and he was to work under Kauder only. (Interrogator's not: It is more probably that Kauder himself arranged this latter condition with Longin in order to secure his own position in the Abwehr.) Marogna-Redwitz was at first extremely enthusiastic, about Longin, but his enthusiasm declined as the latter's demands especially for money increased.

(AOB: an important question should be considered: Couldn't it have been that the entire context had been, in someway or another, arranged by the Russian NKWD (NKVD)? Or, was it all simply engendered by coincidental circumstances?)

4. At this time, through investigations conducted by Ast Wien, Kauder learned the truth about Longin's background: His Christian name is Longin, his family name Ira; Turkul called him Longin Fedorowitsch. His father had been a Czech whose opposition to the Austrian monarchy had prompted him to emigrate to Russia. Longin was born in 1899 or 1900 (AOB: we may consider both Longin and Kauder being of about similar age, as Kauder was born in 1900), and on the basis of age could not have been a 1st Lieutenant in 1917. It was established that he had been called out of a cavalry school to fight in Wrangki? Army in 1917. He had never been granted a law degree, but acted as a solicitor.

5. Kauder was commissioned by Ast Wien to obtain permission from the Hungarian Abwehr for Longin to remain in Budapest (AOB: Hungary was not yet at war with Russia and therefore it is likely that a Russian Legation existed in Budapest, which as we know, was the key contact as to obtain NKWD (NKVD) intelligence materials) under the alias of Ilja Lang. In granting the papers, Obstlt. Hajnocskay? of the Hungarian gendarmerie stated that he could not understand why the German Abwehr was using Longin, since the latter was not free of suspicion of being closer to the Reds than his statements led people to believe. (AOB: I suppose that the essential key was the fact that at least up to 22 June 1941, there existed a Russian Legation in Budapest; there might well have existed Russian Legation within the German Reich, but these premises might have been under strict German observations)

6. For a few weeks Longin remained in Budapest and submitted some reports concerning Russian weapons and technical matters. In October 1940 he (Ira Longin) went to Sofia, at his own request, to establish new contacts; he was accompanied by Kauder and Dr. Deutsch (also possessing a Jewish background), one of Kauder's right-hand men. Upon Kauder's return to Wien, he was informed by von Wahl-Weiskirch that Dr. Wagner @ Dr. Delius had sent a note stating that Longin and Deutsch had been seen leaving the Soviet Embassy in Sofia. Delius (AOB: later Kauder's great opponent, greatly based upon jealousy) Delius asserted that Longin was in active contact with the Embassy. Inasmuch as the Russian Orthodox Church in Sofia is near the Soviet Embassy, the entire matter was regarded as a result of confusion and was dropped.

7. The trip to Sofia brought no immediate results, and for the time Longin's reports continued to reach Ast Wien from Budapest, whither they had been brought by border-crossers. Marogna-Redwitz expressed the suspicion that these reports were deriving from the same source as other reports from agents acting under his personal supervision. Yet, this remained nothing moved? than a suspicion. One report submitted by Longin is worthy to note: It stated that the Russian Air Force had 55,000 planes, of which 40,000 could be used in combat. Berlin rejected the report and labelled it as nonsense, but in September 1941 Ast Wien was requested to re-submit the same report, since further information had confirmed the figures approximately.

8. In December 1940, Longin began to increase his demands, for re???eration to such an extent that Kauder was forced, according to his own story, to use his own financial resources to retain the services of his principal agent. (Interrogator's note: Kauder is not considered to be the type of person who would thus use his money without receiving some greater return. (AOB: because he is of Jewish descent?)

9. On 15 June 1941, shortly before the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR, Kauder was called from Sofia by Longin, then in Budapest, who stated that he had been arrested by the Hungarian Abwehr and that all his intelligence paraphernalia and personal documents had been seized. Kauder contacted Marogna-Redwitz in Wien, and Maj. Pfannenstiel was sent to Budapest to investigate the matter. Allegedly the Hungarians had been in error in arresting Longin, and his materials and reports were returned to him. Investigation revealed the following facts, which were related to Kauder by von Wahl-Weiskrich: About two weeks before the incident, Longin had received a letter from the Anti-Komintern Union in Switzerland informing him that he would soon be visited by a representative of this Union for the purpose of discussing some intelligence matters. In the letter was one half of a postage stamp; the other half was to be used by the visitor to identify himself. The unidentified visitor approached Longin in a coffee shop in Budapest at the time specific in the letter. The buying and selling of information was discussed, but Kauder is uninformed as to the details of whatever arrangements resulted from the conversation. A second meeting was arranged resulted from the conversation. A second meeting was arranged by the two to take place within a few days. As Longin and his new partner were about to leave the shop after his second meeting, they were approached by three men who carried papers identifying them as Hungarian police officials. One placed the Anti-Komintern representative under arrest; the other two accompanied Longin to his home, where all the papers were confiscated. It was the opinion of von Wahl-Weiskirch (Welskirch?) that the three alleged Hungarian officials were not Hungarians but were members of the Abwehr Abteilung III-F (counter-espionage) in Budapest under the leadership of Korda (AOB: the latter likely an Hungarian). Longin explained that it had been his intention to obtain political intelligence from the Anti-Komintern representative, whereupon he was instructed to confine himself in the future to intelligence of interest to the military. Some time later, Kauder learned that the representative from Switzerland was Dr. Willi Goetz (@ Wigo) (KV 2/387; PF 600802) who was still later to become Kauder's main agent in Turkey.

10 During all this time, Longin was careful not to mention the name of of his chief in Rome, although Marogna-Redwitz frequently ventured to identify him as General Turkul, an identification denied by Longin. He admitted, however, that he had known his chief since 1920 (Longin was then 20 or 21 years of age), when White Russians had gathered by the thousands in Gallipoli. In 1944, Romanov, who in that year left Turkul's organisation because of differences of opinion, stated to Kauder that Longin had met Turkul for the first time in the summer of 1940, when he had been granted permission to visit Rome to consult with his chief. Romanov explained that during that visit Longin had subordinated himself to Turkul in order to gain the contacts necessary for successful intelligence activities.

11. From the summer of 1940 until the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR, Longin submitted approximately twenty rather long reports, which he asserted had been brought to him → from the Carpatho-Ukraine by border-crossers.