A forensic Survey
on Johannes Jebsen
Double Cross name
As he was also acting as a German Abwehr agent
he did get also a German cover-name
Johnny also known as Jonny.
This Survey has been initiated
after a search on the internet
where I found an highly annoying
where apparently the
editor might have
some popular books,
without sound knowledge of the real circumstances.
I first would like to start with what, in my perception is 'incorrect' in the current Wikipedia contribution on the web.
When searching for names or other means, PC users can open a search window by activating (combining) at the same time
Ctr + F
Please: enter where you are searching for, and look whether your term is matching.
Page being initiated
on 2 April 2020.
Current status: 2 July 2020
Neglecting the file references, which after all did not supply information considering our current forensic Survey on Jebsen.
Part_I Introduction: Wikipedia nonsense contributing on Johannes Jebsen (normally I admire Wikipedia) KV 2/560 on Dr. Joachim Wrede
Part_II Obstlt. Kuebart KV 2/410 He was the one who had to give the orders to bring Jebsen back under German military jurisdiction
Part_III Kuebart's detailed explanations KV 2/410
Part_IV Hans Brandes (alias Ballhorn) in respect to Jebsen KV 2/3294 and KV 2/3295 RSS decrypted intercepts selected on Brandes particularly
Part_V Werner Unversagt. A most significant finding - as it proves that Brandes indeed confessed on his double-crossing KV 2/91 and KV 2/90 RSS decrypted intercepts
Part_VI Julius Hagemann. Also from Brussels/Paris KV 2/322 KV 2/323 KV 2/324 Also significant findings
Part_VII Walter Schueddekopf (Schüddekopf) Most significant Berlin RSHA Amt VI-D KV 2/2646 - KV 2/2647 - KV 2/2648
Part_VIII Adolf Cecil Nassenstein Lisbon Legation, representing RSHA Referat Amt VI KV 2/1326
Part_IX Erich Emil Schroeder Head Amt IV representative at the Lisbon Legation KV 2/399
Part_X Fritz Cramer Referat Leiter III KO Portugal (KOP) KV 2/1742
Part_XI Puppet-Hamlet KV 2/327; 1 photo of Alfred Naujocks KV 2/279 - KV 2/280; Karl Konrad at I M Referat KOP KV 2/1930
Part_XII Kraatz August Fredrich KV 2/1172; Balzer Hermann KV 2/2299-KV 2/2300; Grosskopf Edmunt KV 2/3162; Eitel Karl KV 2/382 - KV 2/383 - KV 2/384 _ KV 2/385
Part_XIII Elfrink KV 2/202; KV 2/2454 Grimm; KV 2/858-1 Disko Popov @ Tricycle Most striking findings!
Part_XIV KV 2/858-2 and KV 2/859 Disko Popov @ Tricycle Very relevant file! (12 May 2020)
Part_XV KV 2/ 860 went through it entirely Sensational findings! (13 May 2020)
Part_XVI KV 2/861 among it the interrogation of Baroness Marie Luise von Gronau; providing most interesting information! (16 May 2020)
Part_XVII KV 2/862 ; KV 2/863; KV 2/864 Quite interesting also on Popov's financial aspects. However, also implemented my critical note on the exorbitant finances. (17 May 2020)
Part XVIII KV 3426 Grosskopf; KV 2/269 ...KV 2/274 Kaltenbrunner; KV 2/972 Maywald; KV 2/3159 Koschnick; KV 2/1957 Koehler; KV 2/1975 von Bohlen (AOB, most files have brought us nothing; however, on the other hand gave me much information regarding my extensive notes. (24 May 2020)
Part XIX KV 2/203; KV 2/203; KV 2/204; KV 2/205 and KV 2/206 Merz; KV 2/104 Jost; KV 2/106 Ohletz; KV 2/964 and KV 2/965 Marcus (30 May 2020)
Part XX My final summary and Reflections (30 May 2020)
This on the other hand, is forcing me to re-approach quite many documents, which I,
Deo volente, would like to deal with together with the readers.
Let us first consider where it all started with. Next you will find first the direct link onto the English language version by Wikipedia on the web.
For it I used the complete text, but, disconnected all internal links; though, now added my comments and corrections.
When you neglect my coloured comments you will get the genuine text, albeit without the additional hyperlinks.
The above shown link is the base of the text below. Though, I will add in blue or red colours, what apparently is incorrect and/or incomplete, in my perception.
Jebsen was born in Hamburg in 1917 (Johann-Nielsen Jebsen; in February), heir to the shipping firm Jebsen & Jebsen. His parents, who both died while Jebsen was still a child, were of Danish origin but held German citizenship after they had moved the company to the country. Early in his life, Jebsen considered his citizenship a convenience, with deep roots remaining in his Danish ancestry. During childhood, he visited England and became enamoured with the country, adopting the mannerisms and the language.
Jebsen attended the University of Freiburg during the 1930s, where he became close friends with Dusko Popov. During this time, both showed distaste for the Nazi regime that was emerging in Germany. After graduation, Jebsen moved to England, intending to study at Oxford University, although it appears he never did this. Over the next few years he moved amongst the London social set, befriending P.G. Woodhouse amongst others.
At the outset of the Second World War, Jebsen joined the German military intelligence agency, the , largely to avoid compulsory service in the army. He was given a vague brief as an independent "researcher" and assigned the rank of private. In reality, it meant he could continue his normal activities as an international businessman, so long as he was available to help the Abwehr when it required.
In 1940, Jebsen arranged an introduction between a senior Abwehr officer in Belgrade and Duško Popov, whom the Germans hoped to recruit as an agent. The meeting led to Popov's recruitment, upon which he instantly offered his services to the Allies as a double (Cross) agent. It is likely that Jebsen knew this early on and often passed information to Popov, who believed it was intended for Allied hands.
During the war, Jebsen travelled freely on business although it was not clear what he did. He married Eleonore Bothilde Peterson, an actress from Frankfurt, but had a string of mistresses across Europe. Jebsen's anti-Nazi stance led to clashes with the SS and its intelligence office, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) (AOB, lacking the evidence).
Through 1943, Jebsen, Popov and his brother Ivo (also an agent, codenamed Dreadnought (the latter in or around Brussels) ran an operation to recruit double agents from Yugoslavia. Ivo Popov identified potential candidates who were told they would be working for the British. First, they were sent to Berlin, under the care of Jebsen, for training in the spy school, before ultimately ending up in Britain (via Spain and Portugal) to work for MI5.
29 April 1944, Jebsen was abducted from Lisbon,
Portugal, and driven overnight to France. Aloys Schreiber, the head of German
counter-intelligence (I H) in Lisbon, had
invited Jebsen to his office on the pretext of discussing his pending War
Kriegsverdienstkreuz II class). After a brief
struggle, Jebsen and his friend (Heinz Moldenhauer) were overpowered and bundled
into a car.
Jebsen's disappearance was a serious concern for the Allies. He had been privy to a great deal of information, including knowledge of Popov's double agent role and that Agent Garbo's network of subagents was a fiction. He also, most importantly, had familiarity with many details of Operation Fortitude. If he talked, the entire cover plan for the Normandy landings was at risk. After much analysis, the intelligence services decided that Jebsen had been snatched because the Abwehr believed he was planning to defect, rather than that he had already turned. It is possible that Jebsen was abducted to protect Popov, whom the Germans considered one of their most important agents. As a precaution, the Allies suspended Popov's network of fictional subagents and his transmissions to his German handlers.
Jebsen was first taken to the
Gestapo headquarters in Berlin where his torture and
interrogation began. After a few weeks, the Allies
were encouraged, intercepts of German communications showed the Germans were
interested in Jebsen's finances (he had been defrauding a number of SS officers)
(if this is really
true, where is the proof?), and there was no mention of his activities as
an agent. As time progressed, it appeared that agent Artist had not cracked
under pressure and the Fortitude deception was safe. (AOB,
Why should the German SD (Amt IV) be thinking that he
knew about the pending invasion, as this had happened in between the moment of
his kidnapping and the moment he was caught by Amt IV about late July 1944? And,
more significant - should have been: an agent like Jebsen have been considered
essential to be informed about the so essential invasion of the European
Continent by M.I.5 civil servants, like was Mr. Masterman? When we consider the
actual raw after Ostro’s information on the precise landing area had caused such
a turmoil within the XX Committee, it is most unlikely that Jebsen/Artist
seriously had been informed!)(His
fatal capture was also due to real amateurism on behalf of M.I.5; where they
asked, via Jebsen’s channel (Hans Brandes, then Known as: Ballhorn, whether he
could get information on the M.I. 5’s menace Ostro (Paul
After July 1944, Jebsen was moved to Sachsenhausen concentration camp. When he
arrived there, he had broken ribs and was malnourished, but still harboured
thoughts of escape. He told Allied soldiers, also held in the camp that he had
been accused of helping the British and
when he had refused to talk (the
main reason of this contribution, is: to confirm that he did talk,
to what extend is not given, but at least we know that he acknowledged: that he
was once in touch with the British Secret Service. And M.I.5 Major J.C.
Masterman, at least had been informed on 24 July 1945!) his
financial fraud had been investigated (also not
according the facts; he was already under suspicion by the RSHA, and by the
Leiter I Obstlt. Hansen
from late 1943 or very early 1944, and likely being a Double Cross agent of the
British Secret Service). Eventually, he got a message to London via
British Commando Jack Churchill, but the War Office had no record of Jebsen's
name and so the plea for help was ignored. In February 1945, Gestapo (SD?)
agent(s) removed Jebsen from Sachsenhausen, the last sighting of him, and he is
presumed to have been murdered soon after. Several attempts to find him after
the war were unsuccessful and he was legally declared dead on
17 February 1950.
(AOB, basically, I would like to counter the ideological ferry tails from the very facts of Jebsen’s actual doings in Portugal and elswhere. It became apparent to the Germans, that he was heavily engaged in dubious financial transactions, often together with Popov (Tricycle). For instance, the endeavour on getting an oil-tanker kept by the Swedes; though where German permission to move this ship to Portugal was essential. But many more irregular deals.) (A second point of nonsense, is: that it was the Gestapo who caught him from the beginning in Berlin . See therefore: KV 2/410 on behalf of Obstlt. Kuebart, who between February/March up to 22 July 1944 was the Head of Ausland/Abwehr in the context of Amt Mil; though still guided by Obst. i.G. Hansen. In a discussion, in March 1944 held in Biarritz, between Kuebart and Obstlt. Aloys Schreiber - was the strategy decided to keep it a legal matter inside the Wehrmacht, as to prevent intervention of the SD)(It was, nevertheless, the intervention on behalf of, fearful, Heinrich Müller known as: Gestapo Müller; who - after the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944, -took his chance to overrule the O.K.W. and catching Johann Jebsen; as mediator Keitel was forced to order that Jebsen had to be hand-over to the SD) (AOB, additional nonsense, is, that the British services should be informed; there exist clear evidence in: KV 2/90 – KV 2/91, that they had been informed already in the early days of May 1944) The real problem encountered in the Wikipedia contributions on Johann Jebsen, is, that the editor(s) is/are lacking solid study of the quite many KV 2/xxx file series, now available! Hampering, maybe, is, that you have to study rather many files, as only by this means one get knowledge of whom else have to approached as well. Currently I possess > 92,500 file pages!
AOB: I consider sadly, this Wikipedia contribution on Jebsen, not of the regular “Wikipedia quality standards”.
I would like to start with Joachim Wrede's file
KV 2/560 in respect to Johann Jebsen's doom.
From there successively
we will approached many different files as well, in due course.
After you have digested this latter contribution, I would like to
confront you with British RSS (Radio Security Service) intercepts.
These M.S.S. intercepts belonged to Britain's most valuable wartime assets; maybe even more essential than the introduction of the "magnetron"!
KV 2/560 Wrede's collected decrypted RSS intercepts (status 16-4'20)
The first two pages provide briefly the explanations of the various cover-words and related matters.
The purpose of digesting these intercepts, is, that it provides what the Secret Services knew via W/T intercepts; which stood on the basis of many
of their analyses.
The KV 2/... serials are the file designations, and indicating what, among other materials, has, Deo volente, to be considered during the course of this Survey.
Understanding these files isn't always easy, as one need some experience, which might take considerable reading time.
I yet doubt, whether I first should approach Kuebart (KV 2/410) or the file series on Unversagt (KV 2/90 & KV 2/91).
In respect to better understanding of the incorrect assessments on behalf of the Wikipedia editor, I tend to re-approach Kuebart's file first.
As Obstlt. Kuebart was in charge of the operation versus Jebsen, and it should be again noticed what laid behind it.
The period we deal with, are the first 7 months of 1944, during which the German Abwehr was in a transition process, from a purely OKW controlled Ausland/Abwehr - into a RSHA controlled, thus in the SS environment, of Amt Mil (Mil Amt).
Albeit, that very many former Abwehr personnel, never really saw the difference, as most stood still under the Wehrmacht personnel organisation, but were no longer guided by the OKW.
I have straight away accessed Kuebart's files again.
Resulting in an exceptional document, which instantly counters the misinformation on the web about Johann Jebsen's doom.
Kuebart is a first-hand source, rather trustworthy, as his statements originate from a few weeks after the German had surrendered, in May 1945.
Wilhelm Kuebart, photo taken summer 1945
Preparing Kuebart's file in respect to the case Johannes Jebsen in 1944
KV 410 selections
Kuebart's integral Files:
From Kuebart's genuine file KV 2/410-2, page 53
Wrede Summoned to Berlin:
At about the same period in the beginning of middle of May, Sdf. Wrede was summoned to Berlin and interrogated by Sdf Weiss (Kuebart's assistent), who taxed Wrede with his failure to admit Jebsen's attempt to bribe him.
Wrede confessed that he had not revealed this, and after a certain amount of discussion with Obst. Hansen, who whished to avoid any further trouble over this whole question, Wrede was sent back to Paris.
(As will be seen later, Kuebart's failure to have Wrede arrested, was brought before the People's Court (Volksgerichtshof) with the events of July 20 1944) (notice on Wrede also: Part_I + Ia)
KV 2/410-1, page 49
Sonderführer Weiss (Kuebart's assistant), of Abwehr Eins, being an astute business man himself, discovered that in reality Ivan (Iwan, Popov) and Jebsen intended to sell the navicorts to the oil firm for a large sum without the knowledge of the Germans, and that Jebsen was the one of the two who had connected the scheme. This information was subsequently confirmed by a report from Brandes (Jebsen knew only his alias Ballhorn) in Portugal.
Some time in March 1944, Brandes visited Weiss and Kuebart in Berlin, reporting that Jebsen had arranged to bribe both himself (Brandes) and Wrede with a share of the profits of the scheme, were it to be successful.
KV 2/410-1, page 49
Kuebart now became alive to Jebsen's whole scheme. in which even Wrede now appeared to be implicated, for he had failed to reveal to Kuebart, Jebsen's attempt to bribe him.
At the beginning of April 1944m Jebsen was ordered by the Abwehr to report to Biarritz, but the latter replied that he was unwilling to do this on account of "cover difficulties" asserting that if he went to Biarritz his contact with the Abwehr might receive undue publicity. (Kuebart's claim that this was ridiculous as, of course, Jebsen was already known in Lisbon to have had Abwehr contacts.)
Brandes then reported that Jebsen had told him (AOB, Jebsen apparently was not aware of Ballhorn's backgrounds. He was of half Jewish background, and behaved not to loose his "machine-tool factory" in Germany, he kept close contacts with the Abwehr, allowing him to travel at will in- and out of German Reich territories) that he Jebsen had not the intention of going to Biarritz, and on the contrary intended to desert (leaving for England). The receipt of this news provoked considerable excitement in Abwehr circles and the situation was discussed with Obst. Hansen. The latter said that Jebsen's desertion had to be prevented at all costs, for were it to take place, the S.D. (the SS controlled Sicherheidsdienst) would "pounce" (jump) on the Abwehr as they had done after the Vermehren incident. (AOB, Husband and wife Vermehren, changed over to the Britain's on 10 February 1944 in Istanbul (Istambul). Hitler got knowledge and ordered: that from the 12th February '44 onwards: the Abwehr should merge with the SS controlled Amt VI)
Moreover, Hansen told Kuebart that such action by the S.D. might put an end to schemes he had already concocting for the liquidation of Hitler and Himmler, and the ultimate overthrow of the Nazi party (which schemes finally culminated in the events of July 20 ....)
KV 2/410-1, page 50
It was now decided that Kuebart should proceed to Biaritz to meet there Major Schreiber of Eins Heer (Military Intelligence) Lisbon and discuss the situation with regard to Jebsen, since both Schreiber and the K.O. were completely ignorant of the real situation.
Before leaving for Biaritz, Hansen instructed Kuebart to look into the matter of any possible difficulties arising out of Canaris' order to the K.O. Madrid to vacate their offices in their Embassy premises and to set up elsewhere on their own (AOB, Not entirely correct, as the Embassy was and still is controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was the Ambassador who forced the KO Spain to leave the Embassy premises. This caused enormous troubles, as all KO employees lost their quasi-diplomatic status, and they even necessitated a working permit. After some time this had been solved)
KV 2/410-1, page 50
Trip to Spain.
In the beginning of April 1944, Kuebart and Weiss (his assistant) left by air for Biarritz, where they put Major Schreiber of K.O. Lisbon in the picture as to Jebsen and his confederates.
Schreiber was very surprised as he had no idea of the real situation. Kuebart then passed on to Schreiber Hansen's order that Jebsen was to be arrested and abducted forthwith. Schreiber, however, did not know how this action could be taken and was in great doubt concerning the difficulties of transporting Jebsen out of Spain. It was therefore decided to continue the discussions with the K.O. Madrid.
KV 2/410-1, page 50
Further Visit to Madrid.
After spending one day in Biarritz the three, Kuebart. Weiss and Schreiber, set off for Madrid to see the K.O. there (such trips were always managed by car). Here they had discussions with Obstlt. Kiekenbusch, Leiter I, and Obstlt. von Rohrscheidt, Leiter III (counter-espionage). Kuebart asked the latter if he thought that Jebsen really intended to to desert. Rohrscheidt at first replied in negative but then came round to Kuebart's opinion that he might undertake this course. They were still unable to decide on the means by which Jebsen was to be arrested and abducted, but agreed to send Hansen a wire asking whether he would accept full responsibility in case the abduction caused difficulties with the Portuguese authorities and further asking him to absolve Schreiber in writing from all such responsibility. Hansen replied at once accepting full responsibility and Schreiber returned to Lisbon.
KV 2/410-1, page 51
Return to Berlin.
Kuebart and Weiss left Barcelona by car from Perpignan from whence they went by rail to Berlin, but owing to difficulties of the journey they did not arrive in the latter city until the end of April. Awaiting Kuebart in Berlin was a telegram from Biarritz announcing that Schreiber had at last got Jebsen there. Hansen, to whom Kuebart had reported fully on his journey, ordered Kuebart to instruct the Ast Bordeaux to send Jebsen to Berlin. This order was duly executed.
(AOB, we learn: that both Jebsen and Moldenhauer were conveyed to Bordeaux first, and from there, by aircraft, transported to Berlin)
KV 2/410-1, page 51
Kuebart claims not to know the exact details of what followed, but both Jebsen and Moldenhauer were inserted in a large box or trunks made to resemble diplomatic luggage, and driven over the frontier without incident to Biarritz.
No direct orders had been given for Moldenhauer's abduction, and owing to the latter's civilian status (AOB, actually was Moldenhauer genuinely employed at Nest Cologne (Köln) though came in some way or another in Madrid, but was frequently warned to return to Nest Cologne, though, he moved further away to Lisbon), Kuebart considered Schreiber exceeded his scope. However, Moldenhauer was understood to be in the conspiracy relating to Jebsen's desertion.
KV 2/410-1, page 52
Disposal of Jebsen and Moldenhauer:
On arrival in Berlin Jebsen and Moldenhauer were detained under military arrest at Wünsdorf, near Zossen. Hansen made arrangements for their interrogation by Z (Mil Amt?) (R) legal experts, but some ten days later under direct orders of Feldmarschall Keitel, they were handed over to the S.D. (initiated by Heinrich Müller (known as Gestapo Müller) Leiter RSHA Amt Amt IV). Kuebart claims not to know their ultimate fate, but thinks that Jebsen "had coming to him" as when he had previously worked for the S.D. he had been guilty of improperly converting S.D. monies to his own use. Kuebart claims that at the time when Keitel's orders was received, he did his best to place difficulties in the way of Jebsen being handed over, claiming that it was entirely a military matter and had nothing to do with the S.D. Hansen supported him in this. No argument was put forward for the retention of Moldenhauer.
Kuebart is at pains to point out that he was in no way responsible for the decisions taken regarding the disposal of these two men since Hansen alone could give a valid decision regarding "disciplinary matters".
(Later, in August 1944, (Kuebart himself was arrested by the S.D. & Schellenberg) because he was considered being part of the Plot against Hitler!) as will be seen, after Kuebart's arrest by the Gestapo, he was interrogated as to why he had placed difficulties in the way of the S.D. in connection with the transfer of Jebsen).
KV 2/410-1, page 54
Ivan (Iwan)(= Popov German agent name. His M.I.5. Double Cross name was Tricycle):
In the middle of May 1944, Ivan ceased making any further reports, and contact with him was severed. Kuebart considers this may be attribute to Jeben's disappearance. (AOB, he was suspected within the S.D. circles already for some time)
KV 2/3568, page 9: Quote: The Popov material was always very varied and on the surface appeared to be good and genuine,
but in the time the evaluating office in Berlin gained the impression that it was deception material.
Please consider next the selected sections derived from
the one who was responsible for Jebsen's abduction.
I had in mind another succession, but decided that Obstlt. Dr. Aloys Schreiber had been the person most engaged in this drama.
Hereafter, I would like to approach Ballhorn's file, who was the one when visiting earlier in 1944 Berlin, informed Kuebart on the bribes Jebsen was trying to manage of: Sdf. Dr. Joachim Wrede of Sonderstab, in Paris.
This, maybe other information as well, ultimately caused the death of both Wrede and Jebsen.
KV 2/3568 Dr. Aloys Schreiber and Jebsen's abduction from Lisbon
The next chapter is beyond expectation. I must admit that, when I red Brandes' files, about 2015, I did not got the impression of it
being of such a relevance. Maybe, a matter of progressing understanding.
Jebsen's case is generally dealt with from the point of perception: that he was a victim of Germany's cruelty.
Though, we should, on the other hand, acknowledge, that he himself stood at the origin of most his own fate.
Simply, nowhere really considered: is, that his dubious financial business, is laying at the nucleus of his cruel death.
We also encounter internal considerations on behalf of the fate of Johann Jebsen, by British Services.
But, do they really accept their failures made, leading to this disaster?
Apparently, also not aware where British Secret Services: that their games of deceptions versus the Germans in the course set-out of Operation Fortitude, caused failures.
They apparently were too much relying upon the perception - that they were so smart that the Germans would not become aware of.
Though, O.K.W. specialist, considered that the British materials passed on via the channel of Tricycle, constituted clearly deception material.
Jebsen's attitude and the focus upon Operation Fortitude, might have made some in England less sensitive for the real effectives of the games they were playing.
No doubt, Fortitude was essential in Allied strategies; but the stressed means under which it all had to be commenced in time, consequently caused misjudgements which hardly could be avoided.
KV 2/3295, on Hans Brandes and Jebsen
and derived from its content:
KV 2/3294 Brandes RSS decrypted intercepts
Concerning all British RSS intercepts, focussing on W/T messages in which Brandes being referred onto: received and decrypted, between mid 1942 and mid-April 1945
Status: 13 April 2020
As my good friend Phil Judkins expressed it:
A forensic Survey;
it is, indeed!
The most striking confirmation, I ever have encountered
Quoting from KV 2/91-1, page 34:
Major Masterman* 14th July 1945.
I am sending this down to you because I think you will be particularly interested in the references to Koessler (file no longer existing; or being kept at unknown place elsewhere) on page 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, XIII, XIV, XV (proving that Koessler could have passed on quite some information), and also references to Fanto (16-4'20: it proved to be Hagemann's brother Hans, also engaged at Ast Brussels) on VI, XII and XXXVI.
On Page 14 and on Page XX there are references to Neukermans (KV 2/53) who apparently wrote a number of letters in secret ink from this country (England). I do not identify him, and would be grateful if you could help.
* J.C. Masterman was the one at M.I.5, who dealt particularly with Double Cross.
** Dr. Wrede. My so often referring to: Deo volente, also in this aspect, I consider it being a real miracle. Why I don't know, but I once started first with Dr. Wrede's file KV 2/560, and thereafter (luckily) with Unversagt's KV 2/90 and KV 2/91 file series. Please reconsider now the last line of paragraph 2 of the above memo. Would you have thought that the crumbled hand-writing meant Wrede? Though, I grasp it within a few minutes, and here we have this most relevant finding.
In my perception, a sympathetic face of a young man
KV 2/91 Part II on Werner Unversagt
Please notice: that I have decided to skip Part I (KV 2/90), because it constitutes a Survey on who was Werner, a name rather often appearing within Abwehr related files. Hamlet and Puppet, both operating in Portugal are frequently noticed, but not significantly related to Werner Unversagt's case.
However, I selected nevertheless, Unversagt's related RSS intercepted decrypts
KV 2/90 RSS decrypted intercepts
Please enjoy its content
On: 15 April 2020
Studying Hagemann's file series: KV 2/322 - KV 2/323 and KV 2/324 Has resulted in the acknowledgement, that their contents aren't adding to our current:
Nevertheless, some is considered worth to be noticed on the Web directly:
Photo taken at interrogation Camp (Cage) 020, in my perception: he is full of sorrow
However, the next photo is less sad
Here we can learn that the way we are looking at a same person, that it can look quite differently
The next photo could have been taken somewhere in the 1960s, isn't it?
I suppose, it originates from Hagemann's private photos; which he might have had among his belongings, when he was arrested.
What a different perspective can do
I nevertheless would like to quote a single reference on Dr. Wrede', one of the reasons that I have initiated this forensic Survey
The next quotation makes also sense in our context:
This forensic Survey, is, Deo volente, to be proceed first by the file on:
KV 2/977 Major Walter von Sensburg; Leiter I Ast Brussels Digesting this file entirely, it proved, however, that in our forensic Survey context, it does not add enough; therefore we have to skip it.
KV 2/2133 Major Kratzer. Like the foregoing document, some interesting small bits and pieces, albeit notice in my major note-file, isn't considered or relevance. Hoewever: we know now who was:
"Onkel Karl" (Major Kratzer)
KV 2/2646... KV 2/2648 Schueddekoff (Schueddekopf?) in progress. Whether making sense we have to digest all first. (started 16-4'20)
Unexpectedly a most interesting finding on Jebsen and Disko Popov / Tricycle!
KV 2/2647-1, page 17
* (AOB, we may get the impression: - that Jebsen "couldn't keep his mouth" on aspects of what he was secretly accomplishing with British S.I.S.). In this context, as well as in respect to - what Jebsen discussed or told Ballhorn / Hans Brandes, also a member of the German Abwehr, that he was, in some way or another, trying to bribe someone (Sdf. Dr. Joachim Wrede, described above); albeit, that he did know what Ballhorn's background was. Nor did he know that Hentze was a member of the SS controlled S.D.) (The Portuguese Government did not approve the existence of German S.D. personnel being stationed in Lisbon, therefore the S.D. personnel were accredited onto the German Legation; herewith getting a diplomatic status.)
KV 2/561 (PF 600654) Gerard Nagel (17-4'20): Considered not to be of essential interest in the context of this forensic Survey
Status: 20 April 2020
KV 2/1326 (PF 307090) Nogenstein / Nassenstein Adolf Cecil, head Amt VI Referat (Branch) in Lisbon.
This file does not reveal really where we have hoped for, but it is in accordance to Schueddekopf's information. Thus, worth catching what supposedly is of relevance.
(Ober)Sturmbannführer Nassenstein was regularly engaged with Amt VI (military intelligence; thus none SD work).
Pages 20 - 23 .. 131 towards the final part of this document:
(AOB, remarks: it seems to me, that apparently the text does not represent Nassenstein's own words, though, the interpretation of it, through the understanding of a British interrogator)
Brandes went to Berlin in 1944 and brought back with him special instructions for N. (Nassenstein) and Vollbrecht. Cramer (Fritz KV 2/1742 and should be also considered in our forensic Survey) subsequently found a file with instructions regarding espionage against England signed by Schellenberg (Chief of RSHA Amt VI) and addressed to Vollbrecht and N. (Nassenstein) in Vollbrecht's desk. On that same occasion he found a large sum of money in Vollbrecht's office. (AOB, why? Cramer was employed at KOP in an attached office, whereas Nassenstein and Vollbrecht, as was Schroeder, where engaged on a diplomatic status at the German Legation).
What is shown, is, that Brandes was also engaged by Amt VI, instead of Amt Ausland/Abwehr (KOP) only. Or, this notice is of a later dated than 12th February 1944; when it already had been decided: that the Amt Ausland/Abwehr should merge with the RSHA Amt VI; since known as Mil/Amt, Leiter Schellenberg and up to 21th / 22th July 1944 shared with Obst. Hansen.
What we may derive, is, that Brandes also was to be linked onto KOP, as Obstlt. Schreiber was Leiter I H of KOP
With regard to other outstanding personalities in K.O. Portugal, (Fritz) Cramer (KV 2/1742) gives the following information:
Brandes Hans (KV 2/3295): Had good connections with the Swiss Legation in Lisbon and he obtained from them important military and political information.
Cramer, Fritz (KV 2/1742): The most able Abwehr-man in Lisbon; formerly reception-manager at Adlon Hotel, Berlin (Still a top ***** Hotel, in Berlin).
Brandes, Hans: Nassenstein met him in internment in Vizela (Place north-east of Oporto, in Portugal). Representative of the firm "Werner A.G. Waffenfabrik." (AOB, to what we know: the factory of his father / mother concerned a tools - manufacture)(his father (Jewish) had been killed in 1939/40 and his mother lived in the vicinity of Salzburg)
N. (Nassenstein) is not a trustworthy person. A man of strong sentiments and a 100% Nazi. One can credit his statements with very little truth.
(AOB, from experience for quite many years, this statement is not only touching Nassenstein, but also is reflecting the general post-war mood - of the one who compiled this report)
Schroeder told Cramer once that Nassenstein gave him some good reports re England. Brandes is supposed to have helped him in that work.
Pages 117 +
At least we learn that there most likely existed also a contact onto the Amt VI and SD controlled officials, accredited at the German Legation, in Lisbon.
Please notice the date of this recording!
Again a Popov intermediary statement
Erich Schroeder is chief not only of Amt IV (Ausland SD, headed by fead Heinrich Müller "Gestapo Müller" but also of Amt VI (military intelligence). Nassenstein is the head man in Amt VI (military intelligence) and Vollbrecht is No.2.
Particularly of interest for Balkan historians:
General Mihajlović was the opponent to Tito, the Western Powers favoured more Mihajlović
Please notice: that exact references being implemented within the photo hyperlinks.
On 25 April 2020
KV 2/399 Schroeder Erich Emil; head Amt IV (incorrectly described Gestapo; should be SD) in Lisbon.
(AOB, at least we notice that in some-way-or-another there existed (also) a link between Jebsen (Popov) with the RSHA Amt VI (and Amt IV). It isn't yet clear to what extent Jebsen knew about the background of the Germans in Lisbon with whom he had some personal contact. What is quite confusing, was, that since 12th February 1944, there was building up influence of the SS controlled RSHA Am VI, in respect to the merging of Amt Ausland/Abwehr within RSHA Amt VI (Amt/Mil). (AOB, the curiosity was: that albeit that Abwehr personnel merged with the SS controlled RSHA Amt VI (Mil/Amt), their former Abwehr personnel were still be paid for by the OKW (Wehrmacht). Some personnel weren't even aware whom were really in charge of them) (The main reason was: that personnel should not be changed in their Wehrmacht ranking, which often was the result of a longer lasting (career) planning or other means; the SS maintained instead their own ranking system)
KV 2/399-2, page 39.
British S.I.S. (M.I.6) records:
31.3.44. According to Artist (Johannes Jebsen), Schroeder (Leiter representative of RSHA Amt IV in Lisbon) was arrested on arrival in Berlin. Schroeder now cleared and released.
14.44. Artist reports that Schroeder recently returned from Berlin.
19.4.44. According to Tricycle (Diško Popov; Artist's friend), Schroeder, Police Attaché in Lisbon and local head of Amt. IV and VI, personally took Tricycle's S.D. report to Berlin. When Schroeder arrived in Berlin, for some unknown reason, he was arrested for a few days and the report went straight to Kaltenbrunner, although it was intended that it should be delivered to Schellenberg.
The reason for this all:
Jebsen and Tricycle were already, for some months, distrusted by the Germans; as OKW annalists had already concluded that the documents brought in from England by "Mandarin" Popov's German agent cover-name, actually proved to be deception materials.
This aspect have been dealt with in the previous forensic Survey Parts.
Jebsen refused to meet Obstlt. Kuebart (Abwehr I) in Biarritz, in late March 1944.
Abwehr and Mil/Amt (formerly Amt VI) and OKW knew that Jebsen was, most likely, a double-cross agent.
There was no other way then abducting Jebsen in Lisbon;
and to bring him under German military jurisdiction again.
Kaltenbrunner (KV 2/269 - KV 2/274 PF 65732) was the Leiter of the RSHA.
For this reason, it is quite understandable: that a courier of the deception messages will be interrogated by the highest one in charge, as Kaltenbrunner was the head of the RSHA (neglecting Himmler himself). But also Schroeder Sturmbannführer (Major) a section Leiter isn't someone to neglect when suspicion arises.
Please notice that: apparently - the British S.I.S. (M.I.6) haven't been sufficiently informed about the very suspicions arising against both: Jebsen and Popov.
Bear in mind: Jebsen was a German citizen; though Popov was a Yugoslav, and therefore abroad hardly touchable.
However, S.I.S. (M.I.6) on 31.1.44:
Commenting on local developments in Lisbon, Artist (Jebsen) reports that it is definite that von Karsthof will be recalled.
Among others, Schroeder's name has been put forward as successor. He has gone to Berlin, and probably will not return except for a few days to wind up his affairs.
AOB: How did Jebsen know these details, which no one in KOP will have discussed it with him?
Jebsen was quite a womanizer, and managed to get Marie Luise von Gronau as his mistress.
Fräulein von Gronau was a secretary at the KOP offices, this was the way Jebsen got this information from!
Ludovico von Karsthof, an alias of Major Ludwig Kremer von Auenrode, was Leiter since quite some time, but Kuebart (and Obstlt. Hansen) concluded during foregoing visits, that Ludovico wasn't running the KOP sufficiently; and had to be replaced.
We may consider that this did not effect before mid May 1944, and due to airline transport problems (think of the intervening Allied invasion of France) that he did not leave (materially) before mid August 1944; returning to Ast Vienna (Ast XVII).
KV 2/201-1, dealt with before, shows the implications of the engagements between Frl. Craas(s) (indirectly) and Frl. von Gronau with Johannes Jebsen; and proving that the Germans were rather well aware of these aspects.
Selected British RSS decrypted intercepts, especially in regard to Sturmbannführer Erich Schroeder, in respect to his Portuguese engagements.
KV 2/399 RSS W/T intercepted decrypts
(Please notice the explanation of the used abbreviations and cover-words at the first page)
Its content content might give you a broader understanding of the surrounding wartime context.
In this chapter Part_IX, I have selected what, in my perception, is relevant in respect to our current: forensic Survey on Johannes Jebsen.
I would like to approach: Fritz Cramer's file KV 2/1742 (PF 602496), his main alias was: Ciro; engaged at KOP, in Lisbon.
Superb finding, showing how British S.I.S. (M.I.6) had been euphoric about Jebsen's (Artist) painted stories
Let us follow this process according the genuine transcripts found in Cramer's KV 2/1742-2, pp 20 ..
However some might be disappointed by noticing its content and the consequences not well appreciated.
This extract originates from Diško Popov's (Tricycle) PF 55032 file series. Date of origin 5.5.44
KV 2/1742-2, page 20 pp
2/1742-2, page 21
KV 2/201-1, page 43: this message refers to the intercepted telegram noticed above
14.4.44 2115 (ISK or ISBA, decryption serial number)
Lisbon - Berlin.
676. To HIOB (Heer I
Senior (Obst. Hansen)
through HIOB I reference our W/T of 13/4 (of
the day before) (above. According to a
communication from Jonny to Ballhorn (Hans Brandes) on morning of 14/4 Jonny (Jebsen)
has learnt from Gronau (his mistress)
and the letter on her turn from Craass, that Ostro (Paul
Fidrmuc M.I.5's menace) has been the
country for to days and has also resumed in activity in Berlin. Jonny (Artist)
asked (via Ballhorn)
whether the Ostro connections with England could be ascertained.
Jonny also knew that Hion Senior (Kuebart?)
had given permission to Ostro concerning connection of Ostro to KO
Jonny is equally au fait already with Harry's (Aloys
Schreiber's) orders to Craass
concerning ban on (her)
further relations with Ostro**
and remarked in this connection that Craass has no thought of confirming to this
order but was adhering to the instructions of HIOB
via Ostro. A KOP cannot continue to work in
such circumstances it is urgently requested that Craass and Gronau be
immediately recalled, giving routine reduction of staff as justification in
order not to give Jonny (Jebsen)
Lucovico (Leiter KOP)
DIA SZ = Ii and Harry (=
KV 2/1742-2, page 22
PF 55032 Popov d.d. 7.3.44
Extract from a report forwarded by S.I.S. (M.I.6)
VIII Alexander (PF 65005)
16. Artist (Jebsen) that he had heard from von Gronau (his mistress engaged as secretary at KOP) that Cramer, after his success in using Alexander @ August against the British, and then the Americans, was now trying to plant him (Alexander (PF 65005) on the Russians. Artist (Jebsen) suspected that this was a paper scheme evolved for the benefit of Cramer's prestige in Berlin and doubted whether Cramer had really got anywhere with it.
(AOB, I get the strong impression that Jebsen is over-estimating his abilities by far)
17. Artist (Jebsen) stated that Cramer was in direct contact with one heads of the Polish Intelligence in Lisbon working against communists in Poland. Von Gronau (Jebsen's mistress) had said that this was done with London's permission; Artist did not know if that meant with permission of the Polish Government in England, or whether the British knew about it. The contact had originally been through a Roumanian Jew who had been Minister for King Carol's Government and who had been a regular V-Mann of Cramer's, on his pay-roll at a rate of 50 contos per month, of which however, (Jebsen's imaginations) Cramer probably took a cut for himself. Cramer contacts the Pole at the Pole's house which is near Bianchi's house, and (Jebsen's mistress) von Gronau is nervous that one of her visits to Bianchi might coincide with one of Cramer's visit to the Pole. (AOB, was Jebsen's flat perhaps in Bianchi's premises?) (24000 (S.I.S. agent number) told me (Major Foley of M.I.6?) that this story relates to Kowalkwsky) (KV 2/327-1, page 70: August Waldemar von Kotlliarewski?)
KV 2/1742-2, page 23
Artist (Jebsen) gave the following additional information about Hanke. His reports to Cramer consisted in the main in descriptions of the type of work being done by different American Officials in Lisbon. Among other things he stated that the Paramount Film Co. was largely used as a cover by the American Secret Service.
Hanke got from Cramer 8,000 escudos a month, which was supposed to present expenses rather than salary. The place where Cramer contacted Hanke changed from time to time; sometimes he was picked up by a car at a quinta near near the lighthouse at Carvavelos, but, according to von Gronau (Jebsen's mistress), the last meeting took place on 28th February (1944) when he was picked up somewhere between Estoril and St. Joso.
Artist (Jebsen) is nervous that if any action is taken to watch Hanke through von Gronau (Jebsen's mistress) and this might react upon Artiist's own position. Artist thinks, on the other hand, that there is very little risk indeed of Hanke reporting back to Cramer if he is approaching directly by the Americans, and told that they know he is working with Cramer but, that he must in future do so under their (the American's?) control.
KV 2/1742-2, page 25
Extract from a report by S.I.S. forwarding information from Artist (Johannes Jebsen).
2.The improvement in the Artist situation is due to prompt action by Schreiber, Rohrscheidt (Leiter III-F Madrid) and Brandes (Ballhorn). Schreiber urged Cramer not to lay a watch on Artist's activities (oh, dreamers) as he said that if Artist discovered that this was going on, it would be quite in his character to chuck up the whole game, and to go to the front. (bullshit, from the first moment he did everything possible to prevent himself from being called up for military service!) Cramer therefore telegraphed to Berlin to say that he considered a ??tch unnecessary, or words to that effect, and did not in fact carry out plans to watch Artist, except that a servant whome Cramer had planted on him at the Villa Golfinho handed in some reports.
In a later report it is noted that Cramer is said to be still suspicious of Tricycle on general grounds without having any proof against him, but he no longer mentions his suspicions since Karsthof (alias of Leiter KOP) and Berlin feel satisfied.
AOB: This report smells childish; truly Infantile!
Apparently not aware, that the OKW, the addressee of Tricycle's reports from England, came to the conclusion, after analyses - that (Popov's) Tricycle's reports actually contained deception information!
In a report dated 16.4.45 it is reported that Cramer considered Tricycle's (Popov) dossier over the last three years was against him, and ...
(no further information available)
KV 2/1742-2, page 27
Extract from a letter from S.I.S. forwarding information given by Artist (Jebsen)
Our Lisbon representative (Major Foley) reported to us as follows on 4.2.44.
Cramer has been ordered by Berlin to give the names of Abwehr members who are believed to be in touch with the British.
Cramer is of the opinion that Werner Stubbs (KV 2/2120 PF 601659; W/T trainer trainer) is almost certainly a British agent. Brandes (@ Ballhorn, KV 2/3295 PF 307718) and Deussen are probably British agents; Artist (Jebsen) possibly.
Karsthof has promised to assist Artist and has threatened to stop Cramer's report from going to Berlin. (AOB, nonsense, as since late 1943, the Abwehr had been informed by OKW - that Tricycle's information was deception material) (but it might have been, that S.I.S. did not know this, what after all - is quite likely!)
I would like to challenge you to draw your preliminary conclusion.
Please notice my brief points:
Comparing what we just have been confronted with, and Jebsen's actual abduction on 29 April 1944;
and the disagreements about Jebsen's orders to meet Kuebart (and Schreiber) in Biarritz, about the end of March 1944; and his pertinent refusing to obey to these German orders.
Comparing the results of Jebsen's a bit childish optimism, with his managed abduction from Lisbon; only a few weeks later.
And - S.I.S. (M.I.6) representative Major Foley, likely the editor of these report sections, who in some-way-or-another brought
everything on paper, which arrived in England.
At least in my perception: both S.I.S. (whoever reported) and Jebsen's ignorance of a rising conflict with the Germans;
at least should have been less optimistic in assessing the real circumstances.
On the other hand, the Germans well aware of the deception materials brought in by Tricycle (Popov) (by the way: obtained for high sums of money) and the measures to prevent Jebsen's deserting.
That Jebsen's major informant, Frl. von Gronau his mistress (to a lesser extent Frl. Craass), on the other hand working as secretaries in the KOP offices, was deliberately kept out of all measures against Jebsen;
is a proof of a set-up - as to catch Jebsen.
Astonishingly: S.I.S. actually did not grasped the dangerous implications of their involvements!
British intelligence generally - did not caught the facts: of the existence of a second agenda which the German Secret Services, at least for this time, maintained in Portugal!
KV 2/1458 Alexander alias Wilhelm Gessmann None relevance!
Why not approaching the Puppet - Hamlet Case (Ender, Austrian)
KV 2/327 (PF 65730)
KV 2/327-1, page 52
Major F. Foley, C.M.G. (S.I.S. (M.I.6) representative in Portugal)
(AOB, Kohlenklau was the project name given by the Germans, for abducting Jebsen (Artist). In German language Klauen = stealing (taking something illegally away) - that is just what its aim intended!)
(AOB, just a guess: Kohle is also known in some circles (colloquial) as "Money" and money Jebsen inherited in a great extent; he was incredible rich. Herewith we might have a full clue of the clever word - Kohlenklau) (AOB, discussing this aspect with Rudolf Staritz the same day, he brought to my attention: that "Kohlen" in Germany also stood for: "New-rich people". Jebsen's father was the owner of a great Danish/German shipping company; in the Far East)
AOB: what this letter makes clear, is - that S.I.S. in Portugal (and England) lacked (missed) the long-planned German set-up to remove Jebsen (Artist) from Portugal!
Nothing further of interest in KV 2/327
KV 2/3299 Johannes Ferdinand Hagemann (PF 600392) Not supplying any information.
KV 2/2099 - KV 2/2100 - KV 2/2101 Selected papers "Washout" AOB, I don't know yet what his real name was. This is a worthless file series, poor reproductions quality and to a great extent being blanked by M.I.6's usual practices.
KV 2/1930 Weltzien (likely Welzien) Kuno PF 65284 Interesting - as I never heard of Weltzien, the rest does not contributes to our forensic Survey on Jebsen
KV 2/955 Mayer Otto (PF 66190) Not of interest in respect to our current forensic Survey on Jebsen.
KV 2/309 - KV 2/310 Lorenz Fritz Wilhelm (PF 600313) He was mainly operating as a radio reporter in France and some time in Russia. No sense.
KV 2/279 - KV 2/280
a rather dubious and frightening SS related person.
According to what have been noticed, Naujocks never operated from the Iberian Peninsula, thus also excluding Portugal.
Therefore we skip his files.
Actually this file is a spin-off of the Weltzien's (Welzien) file
I cannot predict whether this file will bring us information on our forensic Survey.
KV 2/1963-1, page 29 Proving that Karl Konrad, at least, acted in Abwehr matters in Lisbon. Maybe a nice example how matters were sometimes decided.
Had that day learned that the Admiral himself (Admiral Canaris Chief of the entire Ausland/Abwehr) has decided he should go down to Krumholz. He - the Admiral - has said that the work down there (Portugal) is more important than here (Ast Niederlande in the Hague). Counted as promotion to be transferred there. The Major had fought hard against the transfer. Conrad had told even the Obstlt. that he did not want to move, but the Obstlt. said everything possible had been done to retain him, but nothing could be done in view of the Admiral's decision. His successor, a Oblt., comes in the following week. Conrad after handing over will have several days in Köln.
He thinks that in Lisbon he will be attached to the Legation or the Consulate (AOB, KOP attached to the Legation). He has no idea what goes on there, but imagines he has to interrogate seamen who come ashore from the ships in port. The work should be very interesting, but he wishes it were not so far from home (Köln) (Cologne), and Krumholz were not there.
KV 2/1963-1, page 29 - 30
from Lisbon that he has now been away from home for a week. He is living in a
hotel on the front from the town. Office hours 10 - 4 o'clock. Work very
slack and he cannot understand why Krumholz did not manage alone. Krumholz
seems to have made himself very disliked and does not appear to get on with
Kraemer (Fritz Cramer KV 2/1742 PF 602496;
Part_X). Conrad (Konrad)
does not know which of them is in the right, but knowing Krumholz ...
Konrad is going to await Cramer's return before moving from his hotel. From his room can see all ships going in and out. Sends his wife good wishes for her 50th birthday on the following Sunday (2.3.41)
(AOB, at least we notice Konrad's arrival at KOP III, in Lisbon.
KV 2/1963-1, page 30
Conrad is going to move from his hotel on the following week; his present hotel too expensive. He has a residence permit for one year. Krumholz has gone to Oporto for three days. Konrad is going there (Oporto) in the following month.
Page 37 ending on 28.3.42 and proceeding on page 38 on 10.3.44.
Thus leaving a gap.
The cover-names used could only be understand by the forgoing noticed files: KV 2/1930 Weltzien (Welzien) and KV 1742 on Fritz Cramer.
KV 2/1963-2, page 47
The red text just tells us that it concerned once Britain's most valuable secret; also known as MSS!
Please digest its content yourself, but consider the explanations below
Exceptional document showing British decrypted RSS intercepts, selection criterium: Konrad @ Lopez
For your convenience some brief explanations of the cover-words used:
Ast = Abwehrstelle
Bismarck = Germany AOB, more likely Ribbentrop's Auswertiges Amt (A.A.)
Carlos = likely Sdf. Kuehlenthal, in Madrid
Ii Portugal Bendixen
Dom Stelle = Köln (Cologne)
Erbe = Abwehr Berlin
G.F.P = Geheimefeldpolizei
I M = Abwehr Referat I Marine
Irun = Spanish western border (town/bridge) between Henday (France)
Kaserei = Holland
Lago = Oblt. Wilhelm von Carnap (Skarupa) Berlin. But operated also in Portugal as he was the handling officer of famous "Ostro" (Paul Georg Fidrmuc)
Lopez = Konrad Karl, the main subject of this RSS decrypt selection
Ludovico = von Karsthof(f) alias of: Obstlt. Ludwig Kraemer von Auenrode, Leiter KO Portugal (KOP) up to ca. mid May 1944
Martin = Someone of I M KOSp. (KO Spanien) (Spain)
Martin = when directed onto Berlin it stood for I M
Mago = alias of Fregattenkapitän Gudde
Porto = Portugal
Sommer = an alias of Leiter KOSp. in Madrid; real name Leissner
Schubert = Obstlt. Schubert @ Seubert
W/T = Wireless telegraphy
AOB, what can we derive from these intercepts? First that in contrast to what is suggested within the reproduced private diary on behalf of Karl Konrad - that he was longer engaged on the Iberian Peninsula.
Not shown, but RSS decrypt page 2 ends on 29.10.42; when he still is engaged in the region of Algerciras, Tetuan, Tanger (Tangier).
Albeit that that a message is recorded on 13.7.42: Berlin - Madrid For Lago. Lopez (Konrad) is posted to Ast Netherlands. He is to take up his post as soon as possible. Wire date. Sommer (alias of Leiter KO Spain)
I could have shown many more examples, though not on Jebsen and Tricycle.
Therefore we quit this file, which started so promising.
On 7 May 2020
Oblt. August Friedrich Franz Kraatz
Albeit in respect to our forensic Survey on Jebsen very fruitful, I have learned quite allot on background details regarding KOP.
KV 2/1172-1, page 36 + 37 recording date 31.7.45 Interrogation report Name: Kraatz, August
?Identical with Sonderführer Bucher or Buchner, who worked in Major Munzinger's office, the referent for I.H. Süd-Ost. The latter no filing system in his office, and relied on Buchner's memory. He was known to Artist, who says that he did all Munzinger's, he possibly suspected that Artist was not genuine in his work for the Abwehr, but would be personally loyal to him. At his request Buchner extracted from the Abwehr files in Belgrade the adverse police report on Meteor (Sostaric - Piscacic) which resulted later in his arrest in Greece 1942. He also intercepted a message from Mihalovic's (opponent to Tito) local HQ in Belgrade, to the effect that although Meteor, was being sent out to work for the Germans, he would in fact no do so. According to Meteor, he was introduced to Buchner by Artist (Johannes Jebsen) in Berlin, just before the latter left for Athens on the 8th February 1943. Buchner was in charge of him, while he was there, staying at the Adlon Hotel (Berlin), he was given a telephone number to ring in case of need 21749 (? in Berlin? if so, than the number is faulty because Berlin telephone number counted six digits) (or, did he have to dial first a Wehrmacht exchange and covered it a name within the OKW internal exchange system?) Meteor was instructed by Bucher in secret writing, but he did not seem very expert, and was unable to answer technical questions, without first finding out the answer, probably from a Fräulein Doktor, who was an expert in Secret Writing, and was introduced to Meteor, by Buchner, just before he left berlin in March. According to Artistm but apparently of equal importance.
AOB, a query: the Adlon Hotel in Berlin an ***** Hotel of Berlin and thus expensive. But Jebsen himself a rich man could easily afford to life this way. But, may we derive from this, that Jebsen (Artist) was employed before he went to Portugal, at the Abwehr offices in Berlin?)
AOB: another curious matter - using the word Artist was only known to the British, but not directly Kraatz. Implementing this word in the text, likely implies that the matter had been pre-cooked before. Consequently, the text is quite confusing as the real sequence of matters told during interrogation might no longer being reliable, since have been typed on paper!
We might draw a conclusion that also this office concerned had their doubts on the reliability of Jebsen (Artist).
KV 2/1172-2, page 65
10.7.42 Lisbon - Berlin. To Theodor (Abwehr Berlin Referat I T/Lw). Sardine requests that on the occasion of Kraatz' much desired visit he should bring with him theodolite, sextant and Mino for Jonny (likely Johann Jensen / Artist). Also bromide of quinine, because Sardine cannot stomach chloride of genuine. Krais (= Kraatz) Ludovico (von Karsthof)(Leiter KO Portugal)
KV 2/1172 concluded.
It brought not much, but a lot of side information which have been added onto my extensive digital notes.
KV 2/2299 - KV 2/2300
Baltzer (Balzer) Hermann
Very interesting, but in respect to Jebsen of no relevance.
99% are RSS intercepted decrypts. But more taking place in regard to Baltzer's engagements in Italy; thus also in our current context not of relevance.
KV 2/382; KV 2/383; KV 2/384; KV 2/385
Eitel Karl @ Eberle Karl
KV 2/382-1, page 2
1.5.44 Extract from S.I.S. (M.I.6) report on meeting with Artist on 28.4.44, mentioning Eberle (Eitel).
KV 2/382-2, page 2
Second day in Lisbon (Oct 43) went to American Embassy and was contacted next day by our agent.
4. Contact with OSS.
Brought to attention of OSS Lisbon in December 1943 by an informer in whose home he was living. January - April 1944 he was contacted through a cut-out and gave information on Abwehr organisation and personalities. He expressed willingness to act as a double-agent and in cooperation with the British, was given chicken-feed to pass to Germans.
During May he continued to report to OSS and to transmit chicken-feed. On 18 may he received orders to leave Lisbon on 27 May and proceed via Paris to Bremen for re-assignment. Arrangements were made for him to contact a representative of OSS in Paris and to report to a cover address in Lisbon.
KV 2/382-3, page 13!
Allianca Propaganda (Artist
+?) is packed into a trunk and taken
away in a automobile leaving the garage in the rear of the Buenos Aires
building. As to the reports I gave to E. (Eitel)
he is now trying to obtain sources which he can credit for this information.
He will hand the material referring to the convoys (AOB,
did the leave for Biarritz with two cars?)
to Bendixen, whereas he will hold the other two facts until the return of
E asked me who the
y two gentleman were who desired to speak
with him. I answered that they were both gentlemen and that I could
say nothing further. He asked me whether one of them would be a Navy man,
as this was his line or field. I replied that I could not answer his
question but if he had information of this nature to reveal, he could well give
it to me as I had some knowledge of the subject myself.
(AOB, in my perception "Allianca Propaganda" may well point at the couple: Jebsen and Moldenhauer; whom both had been abducted at the office of KOP which was situated annex the Legation at Rua Buenos Aires, in Lisbon. They were transported in trunks that same night (29th April 1944) to Biarritz, via Spain. Interesting to consider that maybe two cars have got on their way to Biarritz).
KV 2/382-3, page 44
Original in Popov's PF 55032 Vol 14 date 1.5.44 (Jebsen might have arrived in Biarritz)
Extract taken from S.I.S. (M.I.6) Report on meeting with Artist (Johan Jebsen) on 28.4.44 (the day before Jebsen had been abducted)
Baumann (Dr. Rudolf).
19. In view of Eberle's (Eitel's) assertion that Baumann was working for I Wi, I asked Artist what he was doing at present. Artist said that he (Baumann) was still officially head of II (Abwehr Referat II; sabotage), but was deputising for Koschnick (KV 2/3159), who was on holiday ..
KV 2/384-3, page 15
Eitel Karl @ Eberle Karl
KV 2/385-1, page 45
With reference to B.1.W (Mr. Milmo's) memorandum of 30.4.45, Eitel has been questioned and has no further information to add to that contained in the paragraph of the report referred to.
Eitel has never heard the name Fidrmuc in connection with espionage in the Middle east or in any other connection.
Photographs of Fidrmuc (OSTRO), his wife, and Paul Falus were shown to Eitel, but failed to recognise any of them.
(AOB, a good proof that the special circumstances in which Fidrmuc (Ostro) operated, worked-out perfectly well)
(AOB, please bear in mind: that Jebsen had been asked: whether he could provide information on Ostro, the alias of Paul Georg Fidrmuc; this circumstance and his not being aware that Ballhorn (Hans Brandes albeit half-Jewish, was also a member of the KO in Portugal), was ultimately lethal)
These files ending with KV 2/385-2
without any relevant result.
I get the strong impression, that also Eitel's interrogators were lacking sparkling drives than repeating matters time and again.
Dr. Lambertus Elfrink Dutch, however, arrived from South Africa, staying there in touch with Trompke and Dr. Rensburg (Ossewa Brandwag)
Planned British Double Cross name Hamlet
This case is in our current context of no relevance.
Only of interest is: that the British Secret Services apparently maintained the Double Cross name Hamlet twice.
See KV 202 versus KV 2/327
Hans Friedrich Grimm @ Grasshoff Harold
My primary selection criterium being his connection with Portugal
Terminated without relevant information.
Please notice, that the entire files series are in numbers exceeding 4900 pages!
Popov Dusan Miladoroff
KV 2/858-1, page 9
Source Junior (Dr. Ruser, Estoril Porugal)
Jebsen must be careful with Moldenhauer as Moldenhauer and Pepe are on intimate terms. I remember that Jebsen told Moldenhauer too many things. And I have warned him before I left when I last saw him as I never considered Moldenhauer discret. now my mother tells me that she warned Moldenhauer to be careful with Pepe and break off with him. He replied that he could not as Pepe knew already too much about him.
KV 2/858-1, page 13 (E)
The meeting between S.I.S. (Major Foley M.I.6) and Artist (Jebsen) on 28.4.44 (the day before Jebsen's abduction) was referred to in my previous note. A written report has now been received which slightly amplifies the information previously available. The written report states that Moldenhauer was in Lisbon on 28.4.44 staying with Artist. Artist had also reported that there was a chance of Brandes (Ballhorn) being recalled of his failure to produce his agents. (rumours only) According to Artist, Brandes was worried that Tricycle should be so good an agent as Brandes was afraid that Tricycle would report the date and place of invasion and this prolong the war. Artist informed S.I.S. that although he was convinced that Brandes was not trying to trap him into any admission. Artist acted as though Brandes was so trying and therefore always reacted to Brandes' suggestions as a good German should.
KV 2/858-1, page 13
On 30.4.44 Berlin, on behalf of (Nest) Cologne (Köln), (to which place Abwehrstelle Moldenhauer's control seems to have been moved back from Brussels), sent a message to Lisbon which seems to indicate that Cologne did not at that date suspect anything unusual had happened to Moldenhauer. On 8.5.44
KV 2/858-1, page 14
On 8.5.44 there
was a rather corrupt message from Lisbon to Berlin referring to Schreiber's
previous message from Biarritz in which he reported the success of the
undertaking Dora. (apparently
like Kohlenklau the cover-name for the abduction and conveying both captured men
Jebsen and not expected Moldenhauer too)
The corrupt message of 8.5.44 twice refers to two people by the initials J (Jebsen
= Artist) and M (Moldenhauer),
and goes on to to say that the S.D. was beginning investigations regarding their
whereabouts. The sense of the rest of the message is not absolutely clear
but probably means that Schreiber advised his superiors in Berlin to tell the
S.D. in berlin about the position, presumably so that the S.D. would stop making
enquiries, and Schreiber seems to have asked to be told the story the Abwehr in
Berlin intended to tell the S.D., presumably so that the Abwehr in Lisbon could
stick to the same story. (The initial M in the message, coupled with the
fact that Moldenhauer was staying with Artist, seems to indicate that
Moldenhauer was taken to Biarritz by Schreiber with Artist. This would fit
the earlier message about sending on J and
W M from Biarritz to
Berlin, because one of Moldenhauer cover-names was Waldmann.
KV 2/858-1, page 14
On 9.5.44 Kuebart told Schreiber in Lisbon that so far no report on the execution (abduction) of undertaking Dora had arrived in Berlin and asked for it to be sent as quickly as possible.
(AOB: we may draw the conclusion that at least Schreiber was among the convoy from the garage in the rear of Rua Buenos Aires 25 consisted of two cars; not unlikely to what was being noticed as: Allianca Propaganda at Eitel's KV 2/382-3, page 13, where they spoke of convoys and I already noticed the the word implied at least two cars)
(AOB: I sometimes have the feeling that Major Foley (S.I.S.) was a bit naive. Jebsen was heavily engaged in all sorts of financial manipulations, also doing business with the SS; however, one shouldn't dare to cheat these men!)
KV 2/858-1, page 23
9.5.44 Berlin to Lisbon. For Ludovico (Leiter KOP) for Harry (Schreiber). So far no report on execution of undertaking Dora (abduction of Jebsen; also known as Kohlenklau) has arrived. (likely meant in Biarritz) Please sent it as quickly as possible. HION I (likely Obst. Hansen, or a subordinate) 7761/44 Secret.
(AOB, by this time Jebsen and Moldenhauer must have arrived by aircraft in Berlin already)
KV 2/858-1, page 49 (J)
I had a long talk with Tricycle yesterday evening. It is of course impossible to tell him that we know Artist is in Germany*; as far as facts go he only knows that Artist failed to keep an appointment with our representative (likely pointing at Major Foley) on 5.5.44 and that our people in Lisbon have ascertained that Artist has not been home since 29.4.44. Tricycle (Disko Popov) also knows that at the meeting on 28.4.44, when Artist sent him a letter, everything appeared to Artist to be in good order.
Tricycle realises that there is a possibility that Artist may have been kidnapped by the Germans, particularly because Artist himself suggested (as has been made known to Tricycle) that the request for Artist (Jebsen) to attend the meeting at Biarritz on 21.4.44** was in Artist's opinion a possible trap to get Artist to occupied territory***.
# Essential lessons:
* This sentence shows clearly - that British Secret Services played games with their (double-cross) agents. Therefore, is the Wikipedia story on Jebsen such a rubbish - that Jebsen did not give away the information passed onto him by the British, concerning D-Day. They considered painfully every word what their agents should be informed of; quote: of course impossible to tell.
** 21st April might indicate that the the meeting date in Biarritz has been changed (postponed) several times; as to match to the fact that Jebsen would respond on ultimatums set by Berlin I.
*** All were aware of the danger. Though, nowhere expressed being the fact that British Secret Services feared the danger that Jebsen could pass-on essential D-Day (Overlord) information. Simply, because they (Jebsen and Popov/Tricycle) weren't informed!
KV 2/858-1, page 51 + 52
Attention is also drawn to paragraph 6, which shows that it is clear that the other man who has been taken to Germany is Moldenhauer. There could hardly have been a worse coincidence than that Moldenhauer was staying with Artist at this time in view of the partial knowledge Moldenhauer has of the true position owing to Artist's (Jebens's) earlier folly in discussing his fake suicide letter with Moldenhauer*. The initial M in the message first quoted above only fits to Moldenhauer but he is also known by the code names Mannwald and Waldmann, This may account for the reference to W in the earlier message about taking people from Biarritz to Berlin. It is also likely that when Schreiber referred to undertaking Dora (= abduction or kidnapping of Jebsen (Artist) and Compagnion (his friend/colleague Moldenhauer) he was meaning that he had picked up Moldenhauer as well as Artist (Jebsen) because he had found them together. (actually Jebsen took Moldenhauer with him as to stand stronger in any case)
Signed D.I. Wilson B.1.a date 10.5.44
KV 2/858-1, page 57 (H)
We cannot expect to get any concrete reactions from MSS as to the extent to which Garbo (Spanish; Juan Pujol Garcia, likely Britain's the most important double cross agent!) is compromised. We were still speculating as to the fate of Artist (Jebsen) as late as the evening of the 6.5.44 in spite of the fact that there was evidence on M.S.S. as early as 30.4.44 that Artist had been kidnapped and had passed through Madrid at 2 p.m.* that day en route to Berlin. Similarly on the 29.4.44 were convinced, as was Artist himself, that both his position and that of Tricycle (Disko Popov) had never been more secure.** This in spite of the fact that there was evidence on M.S.S. (though in a form unintelligible at the time) that Artist's kidnapping (Dora or Kohlenklau) had been planned and was imminent on the 25.4.44.*** It was put in operation the same night that our confidence in him was at its height. M.S.S. appeared to support Artist's believe that Schreiber was his ally and was fighting his battles against the suspicions of the High Command (Mil Amt Berlin), the Abwehr and the S.D. whereas Schreiber was in fact the man chosen to carry out his kidnapping.
(AOB: don't forget: that the Abwehr by then was part of the SS controlled RSHA; and that not only the Abwehr played their games - but also Schroeder's Amt IV representative in Lisbon)
KV 2/858-1, page 57
It is difficult to speculate as to the causes of Artist's arrest****. One can only say that this case being dealt with on the highest level by the Germans and there is every likelihood that the S.D. (both S.D. and Abwehr obeyed to the SS controlled R.S.H.A.) will, as is already shown, endeavour to discredit Artist and through him the Abwehr******. If the Tricycle organisation (a great word for merely nothing) which has has for several years been suspect, could finally be proved to be controlled there is the possibility that having won the day they will be satisfied with their success without attempting to discredit and investigate the Garbo organisation which in itself would be an enormous task. Any investigation would be handicapped by the necessity of first having to convince Felipe (Sdf Kuehlenthal KO Spain) that Garbo was controlled, as task which in view of Felipe's implicit confidence in Garbo would immensely difficult. The S.D. may, or may not, be aware of this set of facts. (AOB, they really became aware after the event of D-Day cover-name Overlord, on 6th June 1944, where the Germans realised the misleading games played by British Secret Services) So far we know they have to date shown no interest whatsoever in Garbo's activities.
# Lesson two to be drawn
* This fact actually is to what we know: A car convoy left the garage in the back-yard of Rua Buenos Aires one car carrying the trunks carrying Jebsen and Moldenhauer; new is the fact that also Schreiber joined the convoy heading for Biarritz taking the shortest route possible via San Sebastian - Irun and Hendaye which is situated quite near to Biarritz; arriving on 1st May 1944 in Biarritz.
** The chicken-feed provided by British Secret Service - had been already recognised by analysts of the OKW, and considered deception materials. In other words, Jebsen and Popov (Artist and Tricycle) both were distrusted already for several months; think of late 1943.
*** Considering the forgoing conclusions, that at some state the Abwehr had been ordered to take, careful, but decisive, counter-actions; what ultimately happened was the consequence of misconduct conceptions on the Allied side.
**** They weren't aware of it, because they have relied too much upon Artist's, quite, childish assessments. Jebsen once gained a Law degree at Freiburg University, in the 1930s; but he actually stayed to be totally weird individual.
***** It actually didn't work out this way as being forecasted by those losing a "game set".
KV 2/858-1, page 61 (F)
# Lesson three drawn
****** AOB, for the first time British Secret Service recognise the dubious dealing (manipulations) Jebsen (their Artist) had been engaged. The latter considerations painting a quite dubious acting person. Did he really necessitate money? Not at all - he was from himself incredible riche!
On 9 May 2020 afternoon
KV 2/858-2, page 1
15. This time alone makes me believe that we ought not to close down the agents, however suspect, until at the earliest shortly before D-Day. I do not myself think that it is at all likely that we shall have to consider seriously the advisability of closing them down, though I do think that we shall very likely have to switch over from the policy of the definite cover plan to that of "confusion".
16. My recommendations therefore are:-
i. That we continue to run the Tricycle traffic in the same style as before and with a little change as possible - but that no Fortitude deception is put over on it.
ii. The the other agents continue for the time being exactly as at present.
iii. That if we get information that the situation has deteriorated, the agents are used to fill the German mind with confusion instead of passing over complete cover plan.
iv. That if and only if the blowing of Tricycle and Garbo is certain, we close down all agents shortly before D-Day and deny all information to the enemy.
B.1.a. 9.5.44 Signed J.C Masterman (Major) (AOB, he was responsible for Double-Cross at M.I.5.)
KV 2/858-2, page 4
Tricycle left Lisbon on 12.4.44, and there is ample evidence, even if we exclude statements made by Artist (Jebsen) by Brandes (Ballhorn) that at that time all who were handling the German end of this case were completely satisfied with him. Since then events have been taking place rapidly which require careful consideration of all available material. It is clear that he had persuaded those he met to agree to somewhat outrageous financial proposals, and that Wiegand (alias of Sdf. Dr. Joachim Wrede, KV 2/560, stationed in Paris) (He sadly became due to Jebsen's financial dealings engaged in these dubious matters and ultimately was also hung on 10 December 1944; the execution date of Jebsen isn't known to me) had omitted himself to do his best to get these proposals accepted.
(AOB, Now I tend to consider: that the latter proposals on behalf of Jebsen, finally leading to Dr. Wrede's death)
KV 2/858-2, page 4
On 13.4.44 Schreiber (KV 2/3568, Obstlt. Dr. Aloys; Leiter I H KOP) reported to Berlin that according to a communication from Brandes of 11.4.44 Artist (Jebsen) was notionably trying to find out about OSTRO (Paul Georg Fidrmuc the ominous spy) and his connections. In order to avoid accidents, the secretary, Lily Craas(s) (Schreiber's shorthand secretary), had forthwith been forbidden any contact with Ostro. (AOB, quite difficult as Lily was a girl-friend of Ostro's wife), because through her connection with Baroness Marie Luise von Gronau (Fritz Cramer's secretary) Artist learnt everything. Berlin's attention was drawn to a previous communication, presumably by letter, referring to oral reports made by Brandes to Kuebart concerning Lilly Craass at a conference in Berlin. There also been an earlier reference to a, presumably written, memorandum by Brandes on the subject of Artist.
KV/201-1, page 43 (Ostro's / Fidrmuc's file series) Exceptionally showing you the genuine content of the fore called message of 13.4.44.
664. to HIOB (Heer
I. According to a Ballhorn (Brandes)
communication of 11/4 Jonny is openly trying to find out about Ostro and
his connections. In order to avoid accidents Angestellte Craass
has forthwith been forbidden any contact with Ostro (hardly
realistic as Lilly was a girlfriend of Ostro's wife),
because through her connection with Angestellte von Gronau Jonny (Jebsen), as
proved, again learns everything. Forwarding of all Ostro's reports and
letters is still assured and will be discussed with Erbprinz (Wolff
Otto von Amerongen)
before he leaves by air. If Berlin discussion with Ostro should go against
the above ruling owing to the latest event not having, become known there, it is
requested that the prohibition be confirmed by FS (Fernschreiber
= telex) Your
attention is drawn to our No. 394 Leiter I of 11/4 concerning Craass
at the last conference in Berlin.
Karsthof(f) Leiter KO Portugal)
Harry (= Dr. Aloys
Schreiber, Leiter I H KOP)
KV 2/858-2, page 4
On 17.4.44 Schroeder (KV 2/399, Emil Erich Schroeder Leiter Amt IV in Portugal Legation) the head of the S.D. in Lisbon, sent a long telegram to Berlin for Enzer? (believed to be Schellenberg head Amt VI (Mill Amt) and for the head of Amt IV, for Quitting?, who is the head of the counter espionage section of Amt IV, about Artist?. The telegram stated that according to information from Spain it had become known that Artist possessed a German and British diplomatic passports, and also a letter of recommendation from Rotsschil's English headquarters to the British Embassy Madrid requesting that Artist should be given every assistance in case of difficulties with Amt IV. (AOB, by this time SS controlled RSHA Amt IV. In Berlin Ausland S.D.) (AOB, Rothschild was mainly concerned with sabotage aspects) Artist was said to have planned to buy up French funds through nominees for the Rothschild banks; to smuggle 30 million Swiss francs from German occupied territories and to conclude further shady (covered) deals S.D. Lisbon added that as regards Artist's (Jebsen's) relationship with Rothschild they knew from Chaker??, head of Abt. III of the Abwehr in Lisbon, that a relationship existed with the Abwehr's agreement for reason of camouflage. The S.D. Lisbon suggested that elucidation with Artist on that matter should be postponed until Guetting? visited Lisbon. The Abwehr in Lisbon had not been informed, and the S.D. in Berlin were requested not to inform the Abwehr in Berlin. (AOB, meant Mil Amt?) (A mythical correspondence between Artist (Jebsen) and Rothschild has existed for some time with the knowledge of the Abwehr, its supposed being to explore the the possibility of Artist getting to England, apparently as a refugee but actually to run Tricycle group of agents on the spot. There is no foundation for the suggestion that Artist is indulging?? in financial deals with Rothschild.)
KV 2/858-2, page 5 + 6
In the meantime a meeting took place between Artist and S.I.S. (M.I.6. likely Major Foley) on 18.4.44. Artist was warned not to trust Brandes but the only ground which could be given him for this advice was that we did not trust reports Artist had previously given us for which Artist's source was Brandes. (this is the downside of not really informing agents) Artist reported that Brandes own position was weak because he had had difficulty in explaining why his mystical agent could not be reproduced. Artist was aware of the recall of the secretaries (Von Gronau and Craass), but was unaware of the real reasons for their recall, although by 25.4.44 he had learnt that Schreiber had von Gronau (Jebsen's mistress) recalled in view of the investigations in progress and Gronau's intimacy with Artist.
(AOB, both, von Gronau and Lilly Craass were still in Portugal on 30 April 1944; as in one of Ostro's files Fidrmuc mentioned: that on 30 April during the day Lilly Craass came in great panic to Ostro's house and told them that her girlfriend von Gronau found Jebsen's apartment (apparently she possessed an apartment/house key) found everything turned upside-down and no sign of Jebsen)(I tend to suppose: that Schroeder's men might have cleared the job)
KV 2/858-2, page 6 Maybe of secondary relevance, but it explains the wider context quite well
* This might indicate that the Germans played their game quite professionally, in contrast to the British Services in this respect.
** "Summons" might rightly indicate - that Jebsen had been ordered several times previously to present himself in Biarritz. Please bear in mind: Tricycle and therefore also Jebsen /Artist, were suspected of working for the British Intelligence Services. We may fairly consider this was initiated about late 1943; as Tricycle's materials proved by OKW annalists to be clear deception materials. Since the Vermehren disaster, of early February 1944, all alarm bells rung! According to Kuebart's statements (KV 2/410) indicate already since late March 1944.
KV 2/858-2, page 6
* Albeit warned several times on behalf of British Secret Services, Jebsen proved to be ignorant for their arguments. What might have counted: was, that the Top Secrecy of MSS forced them to express themselves so indefinitely that Jebsen did not grasp the implications of their warnings.
** Lilly Craass was the shorthand secretary to Schreiber Leiter I H in KOP. Maybe not known, she was directed directly by Admiral Canaris himself, therefore: not a simple Frl. to make a mistress.
*** Time-and-again is stated: that both women left Lisbon shortly after the intercepted W/T messages of 13/14 April 1944. This isn't in accordance to Ostro's (Fidrmuc's)(KV 2/196 ... KV 2/201) statement during his interrogations by the Americans (G-2) in Germany 1946/47. Craass was a friend of Ostro/Fidrmuc's family, in particular his wife. According Ostro/Fidrmuc: on 30 April 44 - she came in great hurry as von Gronau approached her in panic, and told her that she went to Jebsen's apartment (apparently she possessed a key) and discovered that the flat had been turned upside-down. We may safely assume, the Germans had thoroughly searched the flat. Therefore; both Frl. must have left somewhere in May 1944. I even can imagine that both women had been interrogated as well, before they left Portugal.
KV 2/858-2, page 7
* Schreiber's version being well covered within his KV 2/3568. The whole matter originated from: that Schreiber insisted before his taking action against Jebsen (Artist) - that be got a confirmation from the highest in charge in casu Obst. Hansen; his reason was that when matters went wrong that he is cleared from impropriated acting also against the Portuguese authorities. It is also here clear that MSS provided much intelligence, but sometimes just lacking essential facts.
** Kuebart's plan was to proceed after Biarritz on to Madrid, anyway. Schreiber joined him, as KO Spain in Madrid possessed excellent facilities to communicate with Berlin Mil/Amt directly.
KV 2/858-2, page 8
* Here we may draw an interesting picture: first the Abwehr's interests. On 12 February 44 (just two-and-a-half months before, Hitler had been informed of the desertion of the couple Vermehren whom went over to the British side in Turkey. Hitler's furious response was: that from now on the Abwehr should be solved and merging within RSHA Mil/Amt; Canaris was dismissed and in March 44 he was proceeded by Obst. Hansen, who was becoming part of Mil/Amt headed by Schellenberg. Hansen was also heavily engaged in the preparations for eliminating Hitler. There were clear signs in conversations between Jebsen (Artist) and Brandes; in which Jebsen had indicated that when necessary he easily could desert to the British side. This information "rung alarm-bells" as when this happened, what might be Hitler's response? Would it jeopardise all preparation for eliminating Hitler's clan? Which attempts failed on 20 July 1944.
KV 2/858-2, page 37
* She had been his mistress, this often implies sexual dependency.
** Again, both ladies (Frl.) were for whatever circumstance in Lisbon free to move! According Ostro's (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) statements, he recalled that on 30 April 44, Frl. Craass came to his private home in Estoril and told him and his wife, that her girlfriend Frl. von Gronau came to Jebsen's apartment and found everything turned upside-down.
Please bear in mind, that these kinds of file reproductions reflect only what was know and/or understood by the Secret Services in England; not necessarily need to be true.
KV 858 series.
only for checking whether the next file series providing some of interest as well
KV 2/859-2, page 8 !
Extract from letter from Junior (Dr. Ruser in Estoril Portuga)l to Major Masterman (responsible to Double Croos) dated 8.11.44.
Dear Major Masterman,
Both my mother and myself, are convinced that Jebsen cannot have gone back to Germany of his free will. He might have been extremely sporadic in his past movements and appearances, that is to say, before he ever met him through Moldenhauer in the summer of 1941. But, since then, things have changed radically for him. Something, unknown to me, had turned up just before I met him, which made it impossible for him to go back to Germany. Moldenhauer had already referred to that before introducing me to Jebsen. And Jebsen had left France in such a hurry, before he came to Spain, that he despatched someone to Paris at great costs, to fetch his personal things and arrange some urgent affairs of his. And Jebsen had, then, always showed himself genuinely terrified at the idea of a possible order by the Nazis to go back to Germany. He was, indeed, seriously contemplating all sorts of back-outs to meet such an event. If he has now disappeared from the peninsular without previously contacting you we must assume that he has been kidnapped.
The odds against me are, therefore, worse than ever. You will remember that I have always expressed a very uncomfortable feeling at the aspect of Jebsen carrying the knowledge of my present whereabouts around with him, especially while engaged on so dangerous missions in Spain and Portugal. As Pepe knew that Jebsen had frequently visited me in my hotel room just before he fled Madrid, the Gestapo (likely S.D.) will surely have interrogated Jebsen on his relations to me, for whatever other reason he might have been kidnapped. And I must say that the fact that the Nazis have no more been searching for me, after this event, might be rather evil foreboding. My mother is convinced that the Nazis actually did believe that I stayed in Spain, and they have at least, until she left, always been searching for my whereabouts. That they should have stopped that, could be taken as an indication that Jebsen has told them where I really am (AOB, living in Estoril Portugal)
Therefore I am more keen to go back to Spain as quickly as possible. For only through an open reappearance in Madrid, in good time before the war has come to a close, will be able to disprove all that what Jebsen might have said under 'third degree' pressure.
KV 2/859-2, page 9 !
Major Foley (S.I.S. (M.I.6) mainly stationed in Lisbon) and I (Major J.C. Masterman) interviewed Junior (Dr. Ruser, living in Estoril Portugal) on 7.11.44
In order that he (Dr. Ruser) might the better understand the difficulties of the position, Foley, at my (Masterman's) suggestion, told him rather more about the fate of Jebsen. Foley told him that Jebsen had disappeared and that we had no longer any connection with him and did not know what had happened to him. We concluded that he was in Germany and thought that he might be in trouble over his (quite dubious) financial dealings. This meant, of course, that he might tell the Germans a good deal about Junior (Dr. Ruser) Junior said that Jebsen, who was mine of information, had always talked too much, and had indeed dealt very extensively on the black market, into which he had also dragged Moldenhauer. If he were caught, in Junior's view, Jebsen would tell the Germans everything.
KV 2/859-2, page 19
* From what is known it may well have concerned S.D. related entities (Please don't think of Gestapo, because they had in France no jurisdiction!)
** Just sharing the benefit is a quite continuous factor in Jebsen's doings.
*** I tend to believe more in individuals or a group of, than in institutions.
**** Extravagance were rather negative aspects of both Jebsen (Artist) and Popov (Tricycle) as can be found in these file series. Popov's expenditure, when staying in Brittan, became so disgusting generally, that they were pleased that he left Britain (I have skipped the according references) (AOB, In my perception: There exists an apparent difference, generally speaking, in so-called: New-rich people, and "old money" attitudes.
KV 2/859-2, page 105
In April (1943) Tricycle had received a letter complaining, not without justification, that his information was inadequate and pleading for him to work better. He was also told that the money which should have been paid, and in fact his account was credited with 187,500 escudos at the end of April (1943). Tricycles was warned off further use of the cover addresses:- Jose Carvallo, and (again) Artur Soares.
(AOB, we cannot expect that Tricycle possessed a "blanco" credit in the German perception) (Please remember, that the zenith of information brought in from England was Tricycle's)
KV 2/859-3, page 15
* Bear again-and-again in mind please: that the OKW thus Amt Ausland/Abwehr; distrusted both - Tricycle and Jebsen - as the latter was an intermediate. OKW analysts had already concluded in late 1943, that the Tricycle's documents contained deception materials.
KV 2/859-3, pages 15 (D)
The most careful consideration was given to whether we should inform Artist that Brandes was reporting on his thirst for information, and it was accepted by all numerous officers here who considered the position that we could not run the risk to the source (AOB, MSS!) that would be involved in warning Artist (Jebsen) that we had knowledge that Brandes (Ballhorn) was reporting on Artist's activities.
We had considered putting this over to Artist by attributing the information to some other agent, but had to be reject this plan because although Artist would undoubtedly have believed that we obtained our knowledge from an agent, should he ever be forced to confess that he had had the warning, or should he attempt to confront Brandes, it might well have become apparent to others what our real source was. (AOB, a major dilemma)
KV 2/859-3, page 15 + 16
It must be remembered that the action taken about Artist was kept on a most
secret level, so much that after Artist was removed from Lisbon neither the S.D.
in Lisbon, nor Bendixen (no
file on him remained),
then acting Leiter
I M) Portugal, knew
what was happening, and both reported with some alarm that Artist had
disappeared. (AOB, the
entire "Dora or Kohlenklau" case had been accomplished astonishingly sound)
KV 2/859-3, pages 16 + 17
I should like to add that the fact that kidnapping was anticipated was not known to us until after the event had taken place. There was a message, not mentioning Artist by name, which, had we at the time sufficient knowledge to link up with Artist, we would indicated about the day before the event took place that he was in danger of some sort. Again because of the source (MSS), even if we had realised that this related to Artist, we could not, because of the source (MSS), having taken the risk of giving him any additional warning.
How Schreiber tricked Artist into going to Germany we do know, but the proposed trip to Oporto with Henss of the S.D. clearly had nothing to do with it, because Henss knew nothing of Artist's disappearance until long after it had taken place.
I have naturally given a great deal of thought to this matter and I am satisfied that we went as far as we possibly could in protecting Artist in the light of such information as we had on the relevant dates.
19 June 1944 Signed by T.A. Robertson (TAR) (M.I.5)
Directed to: Major Foley, S.I.S. (M.I.6) Foley was mainly stationed at Lisbon, and he maintained the main contacts with Popov and Jebsen.
KV 2/859-3, page 38
61. Artist was born at Hamburg of Danish parents. All four grandparents were Danish. When Artist was twelve years old his father became a naturalised German and and Jebsen acquired German nationality at the same time. He states that as a youth he was inevitably caught up in the Nazi movement but lost all regard for the party when as a University student he began to think for himself and made friends with other students from other countries.
62. Artist has not suggested that he should receive any financial rewards (he was himself very rich) for his cooperation with us. Conditionally on our being satisfied, when we have full information after the war, that Artist has assisted us to the best of his ability we have assured him that, should he desire it, we will use our best endeavours to assist him in regaining Danish nationality; that so far as practicable he would have freedom of travel for business purposes after the war and that, assuming the account he had given us of his part in the dealings in forged notes was accurate, he would be protected in any charges that might arise after the war against those responsible for the dealings. Artist was also assured that if any genuine German agents, (not British subjects), were caught exclusively on reports given by him, the death penalty would not be exacted, and that should anything happen to him we would do our best to look after his wife's interests. Artist did not ask for financial provision for his wife as she had already taken steps to look after her financial future.
KV 2/859-3, page 50
Another of Artist's (Jebsen's) Madrid contacts was Franzbach (= Paymaster of KO Spain also known as: Pago and/or ZF). On 16.5.44 Madrid telegraphed Berlin that Franzbach was going to Berlin for consultation by order of Obst. Heinrich. On 25.5.44 Berlin informed Madrid that Franzbach would probably leave Berlin that evening with important courier luggage, and on 26.5.44 Madrid was informed that Franzbach's departure from Berlin had been delayed for a week. Whether presence of first Rohrscheidt (Obstlt. Leiter III Madrid) and Franzbach in Berlin was connected with Artist is a matter of conjunction. It is not unlikely that they might have required for consultation in Berlin upon matters of general re-organisation arising out of the inclusion of the Abwehr in R.S.H.A. (Mil/Amt) (AOB: It is damm sure that Jebsen needed Franzbach as Paymaster of KO Spain, for his many dubious financial transactions) Date 10.6.44 Signed by Mr. Wilson (M.I.5)
KV 2/859-3, page 53
Portuguese Registration Card
Name: Marie Luise von Gronau
Born 20 May 1920
Dactilógrafa (Shorthand secretary) Steno-typist
Estado Soleira (Single)
For some time she was Jebsen's mistress; at the same time engaged as a secretary at the KOP Office, in Fritz Cramer's bureau (Referatsleiter III)
Closure of KV 2/859
Continued on 12 May 2020
KV 2/860-1, page 25 Date: 18.8.45
still concerned at the lack of definite news about the fate of Artist. I have
given Noakes all available leads in case he has the chance of making local
enquiries. Tricycle is himself going to try and seek information from
friends of Artist known to him. There is a possibility that Artist was
early this year (1945)
I have asked Hamer of Section V (M.I.6)
to ascertain from Best (among
those captured by the Germans, due to the Venlo incident, in Autumn 1939, in The
who was also at one time in Oranienburg (AOB,
wasn't it Sachsenhausen?),
whether he has any news but Best was then away on indefinite leave and Hamer
could not ascertain his whereabouts (AOB,
thus after Germany had
might be worth while reminding Hamer and asking him to take steps to question
KV 2/860-1, page 32: derived from the interrogation of Unversagt's file (KV 2/90 - KV 2/91) (Part_V) Jebsen's manipulations bring Dr. Joachim Wrede and himself in high danger!
* I suppose during there processes after both had been in captivity in Germany
** Reason for intercept not yet known, was it coincidental?
*** Stupid borrowing money!
**** Where did they got this knowledge from? Further down the document, but not showed here, he expressed that his knowledge originated from Wrede himself; he lacked further information.
KV 2/860-1, page 36 Significant, as it noticed some of the reasons to caught Jebsen.
KV 2/860-1, page 37 Dated 2nd August, 1945
Steimle (KV 2/966) knows all about Jebsen, while Quetting was in charge of the investigation into his financial transactions. Apparently neither Steimle nor Quetting have yet been located although both are very much wanted for general interrogation purposes. If either of them come to light they could no doubt tell us what happened to Jebsen. (AOB, why not considering also Kaltenbrunner head of the entire RSHA!)
KV 2/860-1, page 44 Derived from Kuebart's interrogation, not directly equal to Kuebart's KV 2/410 file series.
Jebsen @ Johnny (Jonny)
According to Kuebart, Jebsen used to work for the S.D. in Berlin before the war, chiefly in connection with currency matters, Jebsen had been subsequently transferred to Abwehr I H (Certainly not on behalf of the SD!) to work under a certain Obstlt. Thoering, and, later, Thoering's successor Munzinger (Muenzinger). In autumn of 1943, Muenzinger had dispatched Jebsen to operate in Lisbon, top deal with currency matters and the smuggling of Jugoslav agents to England via Spain and Portugal in connection with a certain Ivan (= Popov @ Tricycle by the Britain's), whose activities are described below.
Jebsen was attached for certain administrative purposes only to K.O. Lisbon (KOP).
His cover employment was with the
an organisation connected with the O.K.W. (OKW) which probably had something to
do with raw materials (among: Wolfram,
Tungsten), but Kuebart
is ignorant of the meaning of the abbreviation "H.W.K." and its precise
KV 2/860-1, page 45
Although Muenzinger trusted Iwan (Ivan I), Kuebart put little reliance on this time and states that the man "gave him an uncomfortable feeling".
KV 2/860-1, page 48 navicerts
Sonderführer (Sdf.) Weiss (Kuebart's assistant), of Abwehr Eins, however, being an astute business man himself (most Sonderführer possess a non-military skill), discovered that in reality Iwan I (Ivan) (Tricycle / Popov) and Jebsen intended to sell the navicerts (Nautical Certificates) to the oil firm for a large sum without knowledge of the Germans, and that Jebsen was the one of the two who had connected the scheme.
KV 2/860-1, page 48
Kuebart instead sent Sdf. Wrede (KV 2/560 top)
down to Portugal, briefed as follows:
1) That there was to be no question of Iwan I (Ivan) receiving any advanced payment.
2) That the navicerts could not be obtained.
3) That they would pay Iwan I (Ivan) after the receipt of his reports, 150,000 dollars (even nowadays a great sum of money).
4) That they would, in addition, pay Iwan I 1,000 Swiss francs every month for a duration of three years by way of compensation, instead of and for Iwan's inability to set himself up on the board of his oil firm.
Wrede duly went down to Portugal and carried out his instructions having long talks with Jebsen and Iwan, who refused to accept Kuebart's counter-proposals. As a result of this, frequent reports were interchanged between Berlin and Lisbon on this subject. Kuebart held out, however. Iwan then announced that unless his demands were fulfilled, he would abandon his work, and a deadlock arose.
(AOB, again keep in mind, that OKW and Hansen and Kuebart knew for months that Popov (Tricycle) was supplying deception materials!)
KV 2/860-1, page 49
Some time in march 1944, Brandes visited Weiss and Kuebart in berlin, reporting that Jebsen had arranged to bribe both himself (Brandes) and Wrede with a share of the profit of the scheme, were it to be successful.
Kuebart now became alive to Jebsen's whole scheme, in which eveb Wrede now appeared to be implicated, for he had failed to reveal to Kuebart, Jebsen's attempt to bribe him.
(Both Jebsen and Wrede were assassinated late 1944 and Jebsen in 1945)
KV 2/860-1, page 50 Trip to Biarritz early April 1944
Trip to Spain.
In the beginning of April 1944, Kuebart and Sdf. Weiss left by air for Biarritz, where they put Major Schreiber of K.O. Lisbon in the picture as to Jebsen and his confederates. (Popov @ Iwan @ Tricycle)
Schreiber was very surprised as he had no idea of the real situation, Kuebart then passed on to Schreiber, Hansen's order that Jebsen was to be arrested and abducted forthwith. Schreiber, however, did not know how this action could be taken and was in great doubt concerning the difficulties of transporting Jebsen out of Spain. (consider, for instance, the political implications) It was therefore decided to continue the discussion with K.O. Madrid.
(AOB, Schreiber wanted in case matters went wrong, and the political implications, at least a telegram confirming that Hansen gave the orders)
(Foregoing, we have already dealt with it in greater details)
(Kuebart's statements do conflict with matters like that Schreiber met Kuebart again in Biarritz delivering Jebsen and Moldenhauer in a trunk. But also Kuebart's being in Lisbon later.)
KV 2/860-1, page 52 (G)
During this period (Kuebart had been arrested on 22 July in the early morning at the Belinde barracks; as he was in direct contact with Obst. Hansen; who was directly engaged in the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944), Kuebart was frequently interrogated by two Gestapo (correct) officers, Sturmbannführer Guenther and Kriminalkommissar Baumer. (AOB, the latter was likely also involved within Kuebart's trial)
He was also interrogated by an unknown Hauptsturmführer. During these interrogations he was asked why he had not arrested Sdf. Wrede (KV 2/560) his failure to reveal Jebsen's attempt to bribe him (KV 2/860-1, page 49). Kuebart replied that he was not in charge of Wrede and considered such arrest to be unnecessary since Wrede's omission ?coined? to be actuated by stupidity rather than malice. He was also asked why he had made difficulties in handing over Jebsen to the S.D. (correctly used) after their demand therefore. He replied that as Jebsen was a soldier he regarded it as a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Abwehr (correctly Wehrmacht) (With regard to Moldenhauer Kuebart admits that Schreiber exceeded his scope in arresting this man, since Moldenhauer was merely concerned with Jebsen's plans to desert, and enjoyed civilian status. (AOB, incorrect: Moldenhauer was already in 1941 engaged in the Abwehr. Administratively he belonged to Nest Cologne (Köln). Both Moldenhauer and Jebsen were keen not get to be caught for service in the Army. Madrid was no longer secure for Moldenhauer and he had moved next to Lisbon. Both Jebsen and Moldenhauer knew each other already in 1941, maybe already earlier)
KV 2/860-1, page 52
Jebsen @ Johnny (Jebsen)
Probably worked for the S.D. before the war in currency matters, in connection with which he is alleged to have swindled them. Subsequently transferred to Abwehr I H to work under Obstlt. Thoering and, later, his successor Muenzinger.
KV 2/860-1, page 53
Details of K.O. Madrid Paymaster, Pago (known also as ZF, real name Franzbach, he remained until after the war)
Believed by Kuebart to have belonged to Legion Condor (German Legion fighting in favour of Franco in the 1930s); was in very close contact with Jebsen (Jebsen necessitated him as an undesirable aid for his dubious financial transactions) and carried on currency business with him (Jebsen). In connection with the "Jebsen affair", Pago was called to Berlin, as it was suspected he also might try to escape. He was not particularly interrogated, as the S.D. (Amt IV) had taken the matter over. After this, he was sent back to Madrid.
KV 2/860-2, page 6 Interrogation of Schellenberg Leiter Mil/Amt. Information more from hear-say.
94. Jebsen was kidnapped at the Portuguese-Spanish frontier in
a trunk, by Obstlt.
Huebarth (Kuebarth) and another officer
whose name Schellenberg has forgotten. Hansen had given the order for the
kidnapping. Schroeder (KV
at the Legation of RSHA Amt IV, SD)
in Lisbon aided and abetted the scheme. (I
doubt, but might have know about it)
Jebsen fell under suspicion because he sent conflicting reports to different
departments, amongst them (dangerous)
Amt IV. Jebsen was handed over to Müller (known
Müller) and was
accused of working for Britain (KV 2/91-1,
page 34 on this website: confirms that
Jebsen indeed acknowledged that he was also a British agent!)
KV 2/860-2, page 20
Wherever possible I have been making enquiries about Johnny himself but so far I have got no further than the fact that he was lodged in a Military Prison at the Lehrterstrasse in Berlin after having been tricked back from Lisbon. I fear that his chances of survival are probably not very high. On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate that whatever may have happened to him he was forced to disclose facts which we wanted kept secret. (AOB, indeed this just what had happened)
KV 2/860-3, page 41 abstracted from Popov's RSS decrypted W/T message (translated)
Lisbon-Berlin. 99. For Ludovico (alias of Leiter KOP) Harry (alias of Obstlt. Dr. Schreiber Leiter I H). As the agreement made with Ivan (German word IWAN I) cannot at present be upheld, personal negotiation essential on 1(?)/5 (May). Major Bohlen (KV 2/1975), with full powers, is arriving in Biarritz for the purpose on 21/4. Request that Harry (Obstlt. Schreiber KOP) and Jonny (German alias for Jebsen) who understands Ivan's (Iwan I's) mentality best, be in Biarritz (small beach-town not too far from the French-Spanish border) on 21st. In this connection take special care with regard to Jonny's (Jebsen's). Recommended illegal crossing of frontier (often managed and arranged by Uffz. Furch alias Fuente of San Sebastian). Time of rendez-vous must be adhered without fail, as affair cannot be brought off at a later date. HIOB I (Heer I Ost Berlin) (main Abwehr W/T station-channel).
This radioed W/T message provoked a chain of events,
KV 2/860-3, page 41 RSS decrypted intercepts (translated)
Lisbon-Berlin. No.707. To HIOB I. On the 17th Jonny (Jebsen) told me (Ballhorn, alias of Hans Brandes) that he had been ordered together with Harry (Obstlt. Dr. Schreiber Leiter I H KOP) by an FS (Fernschreiben /telex; actually it concerned a W/T message) and was certain that his immediate arrest was intended (this indeed was planned for) was intended in Biarritz. In this connection even Madrid seemed too dangerous as a rendezvous, because according to his information 2 Germans had only recently been arrested in Madrid for treason, in collaboration with the Spanish police (there existed a treaty between the German and Spanish Police, in cases of criminal affairs) Jonny (Jebsen) added that if on the part of Berlin are to be observed, he intends to draw his own conclusions in the very next week and will inform Iwan (Popov/Tricycle) and Guttmann (no file available) in good time. Ballhorn (real name Hans Brandes) Ludovico (alias of Leiter KOP) Harry (Obstlt. Dr. Aloys Schreiber Leiter I H both guiding Jebsen as well as Brandes!)
KV 2/860-3, page 42 RSS decrypt, translated:
Lisbon-Berlin. 773. Ludovico (alias of Leiter KOP) DIAZ (Bendixen Leiter I M) Harry (alias of Schreiber Leiter I H) to HIOB (Heer I Ost Berlin) I. Ballhorn (alias of V-Mann Hans Brandes) has learnt from Jonny that the latter intends to utilise Lilly Craass (shorthand secretary to Schreiber) to a greater extent (making her also a mistress?) for getting his information from the Dienststelle (KOP), since Gronau has dropped out through being seconded to other duties. In order to take precautions against further leakage Craass was sent to Berlin on 21.4.44 by Lufthansa. (AOB, whatever the reasons: Craass and Gronau were in Lisbon about say 30 April 1944. Why? Because in Ostro's (Fidrmuc's) interrogations in 1946 he states: that Lilly Craass arrived in quite panic and told Ostro's wife that Marie Luise (von Gronau) found Jebsen's apartment turned upside-down, without a trace of Jebsen). It is not necessary to provide a substitute.4.5.44
KV 2/860-3, page 44
4.5.44 2314 (ISBA Intelligence Service British Agent)
Berlin-Biarritz. To ANST (Abwehrnebenstelle) Biarritz III-F (Referat Counter-Espionage) Most secret. Ref our message of 4.5.44. As special machine cannot be provided to pick up J (Jonny = Jebsen) and W (Waldmann = Moldenhauer), they are to be sent to Berlin immediately under the closest supervision and with all measures for security. Responsible officer in charge is instructed to report time of arrival promptly so that they can be met at station in Berlin. Abwehr I H No. 1644/44 Most secret of 4.5.55. Signature as signed.
(AOB, in my perception this points at, at least, partially, by means of railways)
On 16 May 2020
KV 2/861-1, page 52 !
Date 24th February 1947
Subject: Jebsen, Johnny.
I report that on 24th February 1947 I visited Frau Petra Vermehren, Harvesterhudeweg 24. She supplied me with the following additional information regarding the trial of Jebsen, Jonny.
Jebsen was taken to Berlin from Oranienburg Concentration Camp and was brought before Sturmbannführer Schmitz. He (Jebsen) was accused by Schmitz of having betrayed the work of the SS to the Abwehr. Schmitz is described as being a fat and overbearing in manner./ He is said to have been aid to Schellenberg who was Himmler's adjutant. (incorrect, this was Dr. Brandt)
Jebsen according to Frau Vermehren (Jebsen's mother), had two enemies, who were Kriminalrat Hofmeister, Martin Lutherstrasse; Berlin, who was responsible for everything that happened to Jebsen, and Lengeling, an SS man who was arrested in 1943 and later released. Lengeling was at first friendly with Jebsen and later betrayed him.
Jebsen had a friend, a Jugoslav, Michael Glouchwitsch, Frankwiedel 15, Paris, deuxieme arrondissement. It is thought that this man can supply further information concerning Jebsen.
The above information was supplied to Frau Vermehren by a former member of the Abwehr, Otto Kurrer (KV 2/1962), bei Graf Gotz (Götz?), Brinkensen, Kreis Ahfeld and der Leine, Province Hannover.
Signed J. Flinn
KV 2/861-1, page 58 Interrogation of Frau Petra Vermehren.
I report on the 16.1.47 I interrogated Frau Petra Vermehren at 25 Harvesterhudeweg Hbg. (Hamburg) ...She stated that:-
(a) She believes that Johnny Jebsen is dead. She is emphatic, however, that he did not die in Oranienburg Concentration Camp. (wasn't it Sachsenhausen?)
(b) She confirms the fact that she was the last person to see Jebsen alive, apart from his interrogators (and related SS personnel).
(c) She believes one of the interrogators to be a man called Lange.
(d) An escort was sent from Berlin to Oranienburg. Jebsen and another prisoner called Moldenhauer were taken away. Moldenhauer returned on 12th April to Oranienburg and
was surprises to hear that Jebsen had not returned.
(e) When a prisoner died in Oranienburg, his personal
belongings were taken away a few days after his death and disposed of. In
this way the inmates knew if one of their comrades had died. Jebsen had no
belongings as he had been smuggled by
(f) The address of the wife/widow of Jebsen is as ... (AOB, she was thereafter brought by British Service to an address in Krefeld)
KV 2/861-1, page 58
In Oranienburg the prisoners were not allowed to shave themselves. Frau
Vermehren who says she was the only woman in the camp (Sippenhaft*?)
at the time received word from her son who was in solitary confinement (Sippenhaft?)
through the camp barber, that Jebsen had arrived in the camp. She
thereupon found the cell where he was and every day threw a stone against the
window until she attracted his attention. She first saw Jebsen in
September, though she believes that he came first to the camp in July, but that
as one of his ribs had been broken during an interrogation he lay on his bed for
the first month or two. He told her that the
had been abducted him and smuggled him out out of Spain (nonsense,
he was abducted in Lisbon and from there convey in a trunk to Biarritz)
in a box because had divulged (disclosed)
information to the British. Mauldenhauer
who was also a friend of Jebsen's in Spain (since
1941) arrived in the
camp. In Feb. 1945 she saw Jebsen for the last time. An escort was
sent from Berlin and both he and Moldenhauer were taken away. Though she
made discreet enquiries through the camp staff she was unable to obtain any
information as to his fate. On the 12th April, Moldenhauer returned
to the camp. He seemed surprised that Jebsen had not returned. (AOB,
bear in mind:
that on 9th April
Pfarrer Bonhoeffer and Admiral Canaris, among other, had been in a fake trial
convicted to death and shortly thereafter been hung in a cruel manner at
He said he thought it possible that he may have been sent to Sachsenhausen.
On the 15th April owing to the advance of the Russians the inmates of the camp
were marched away. Those prisoners who were left behind were shot.
Frau Vermehren and her husband who were only held as hostage (Sippenhaft)
were not. It is thought that Moldenhauer was shot. (?) Frau Vermehren
eventually escaped and made her way first to Lübeck and finally to Hamburg,
where the husband is working as a solicitor and the wife for the Red Cross (Vermehrens).
5. Schreiber's Plans for Abduction.
* Sippenhaft was that, for instance, in case of desertion to the enemy or other reasons - it was quite possible that the rest of the family and sometimes even relatives had been caught and kept in confinement, often with restrictions; without being legally trailed.
KV 2/861-1, page 80
5. Schreiber's Plans for Abduction.
Schreiber decided to call
both Jebsen and Moldenhauer
Jebsen to his office (Rua
Buenos Aires 25)
for a meeting in the late afternoon of 30
incorrect: Jebsen had been invited to come to the KOP office at Rua Buenos Aires
Moldenhauer lodged by him anyway. To appear with Moldenhauer he might have
thought as to stand more strong, in any case of events. Thus: Moldenhauer
appeared unexpectedly joining Jebsen. He therefore had to be abducted too,
as to keep the entire operation secret.
All calculations worked out
that time the office would be completely deserted. They had to be
would knocked out and while unconscious placed in two large trunks in
which they could be shipped by the car the same evening over the Portuguese-Spanish
and Spanish-French border to Biarritz. (AOB,
herewith making the former statements that they first had been brought to Madrid
To guard against possible surprise at the borders, Schreiber also decided to
drug them by injections.
Two assistants would be necessary to carry out the action. Schreiber chose Bleil fnu signal officer fnu, signal officer of KO Portugal, in whose name the car was registered and who, according to Portuguese law, had to accompany the car on a trip across the border and Karl Meier civilian motor officer of KO, who was thoroughly familiar with the car and and if necessary could repair it.
Schreiber sent a wire to Hansen in Berlin to the effect that the sudden appearance of Moldenhauer supported their suspicions and necessitated his inclusion in the affair and the planned action would be initiated without delay.
(AOB, I am astonished, time-and-again, that the nonsense in the first paragraph compared with the last paragraph reflected in the word: 'sudden appearance', has not lead to an internal correction. I personally drew the conclusion for a long time, is:, that hardly a (British) document had critically been reviewed! The inconsistency in printing correctly names, were even in a single paragraph several spellings can be encountered for the same name!)
KV 2/861-1, page 80 Corrections
At noon 30 April (29 April) he (Schreiber) and Meier purchased the two trunks, which Schreiber claims were large enough for a grown person and were fitted with adequately large openings for ventilation. The sleeping drug for the injections? Schreiber obtained in a Lisbon pharmacy.
Upon his return from Lisbon Schreiber had asked Jebsen to call at his office on
the afternoon of
30 April, using as a pretext his intention of
giving him detailed information about a decoration which Berlin wished to bestow
on Jebsen. He had also asked him to bring along his friend
Moldenhauer, ostensibly to question him on missions.
Nonsense, remember the notice
6. The Abduction.
29) April 44 at 1800
hrs, Jebsen and Moldenhauer arrived together at Schreiber's office.
Schreiber carried on a general conversation with both of them for a short while
and then called Jebsen into another room. There he (Schreiber)
claims to have informed him of the true outcome of the discussions in Biarritz
and of Hansen's order to have him brought to Berlin by force, since he would not
go of his own free will. Jebsen made a move for the door and Schreiber
knocked him out. Meanwhile Meier had also overpowered Moldenhauer in the
KV 2/861-1, page 81
According to Schreiber, he then informed both Jebsen and Moldenhauer, after they had recovered in the presence of Bleil and Meier, how he intended to get across the border and both of them submitted to the injections.
The Party started out about 2100 hrs (leaving the garage at the back of the builing at Rua Buenos Aires) to Badajoz with the two drugged victims in the trunks and Schreiber, Bleil and Meier as the other occupants of the Studebaker sedan. The Portuguese-Spanish border was crossed without incident between midnight and 0200 hrs, since Bleil and Meier knew border conditions and officials personally from previous trips both here and the Spanish-French border in Irun (passing the bridge).
The trip through Spain was only interrupted by a few rests in the open and the Spanish-French border at Irun (crossing the Bridge entering France) border was crossed at about 2400 hrs of the following night without incident. In Biarritz Jebsen and Moldenhauer were immediately turned over to the local Stellenleiter Obstlt Fuchs.
A motor defect kept Schreiber and his two assistants in Biarritz until 4 May, when the returned to Lisbon, Jebsen and Moldenhauer, Schreiber claims, were transported a few day later to Berlin in Hansen's personal plane. (AOB, nonsense: not in accordance to the message KV 2/860-3, page 44, quote as shown before: As special machine cannot be provided to pick up J (Jonny = Jebsen) and W (Waldmann = Moldenhauer), they are to be sent to Berlin immediately under the closest supervision and with all measures for security. Responsible officer in charge is instructed to report time of arrival promptly so that they can be met at station in Berlin. Abwehr I H No. 1644/44 Most secret of 4.5.55. Signature as signed)
KV 2/861-1, page 81
On the return journey Schreiber stopped off in Madrid to report by W/T to Hansen in Berlin. Shortly after his arrival in Lisbon he received an answer from Hansen expressing his thanks for the accomplishment of the mission.
In June 1944 Schreiber again had occasion to confer with Kuebart and Sdf. Dr. Weiss in Barcelona. They assured him that both Jebsen and Moldenhauer had arrived safely in Berlin, were under military arrest, but that the investigation had not yet been completed. (AOB, untrue, as Jebsen and Moldenhauer had to be turned-over to Amt IV)
In the latter part of August 1944, during a short stay in Berlin, Schreiber received the same answer from von Bohlen (Ludwig, KV 2/1975), Chief of the Iberian Desk at that time.
KV 2/861-1, page 81
Schreiber knew Moldenhauer only slightly. He is, however, certain that
Moldenhauer was active in economic espionage for
and at times for Ast Vienna and that he worked from Madrid.
KV 2/861-2, page 7
Interrogation of Kurrer Otto (KV 2/1962) on Jebsen.
Jebsen was the son of a businessman, who had a large trade in Hongkong, Shanghai and other parts of the world. Jebsen himself was very "international man" man, well educated and had many important friends outside Germany, including Colonel Lord Rothschild (AOB, during the war he was in London, but highly interested in "sabotage' matters) with whom he maintained correspondence during the war. At the time of his first meeting with Kurrer in Berlin in 1942 he was approx 26 years old . He was also said to have been strongly anti0nazi. He spoke fluent English, French German and Danish. He was married and his wife lived in Berlin.
KV 2/861-2, page 7
Kurrer and Jebsen became good friends and one day the latter confided in Kurrer that he was afraid to return to Germany as he had been involved in some money swindle with the SS. (already dealt with this aspect before) His story was that some SS officials had been printing foreign currency and he had taken it to the respective countries and exchanged it, whenever possible in gold value. He was now suspected of having made much profit himself and also the SS wanted to remove him for knowing "too much". He therefore asked Kurrer if he could help him to prolong his stay in Lisbon. Kurrer did this and returned to Berlin.
(AOB, Kurrer was stationed at KOP between mid 1942 and somewhere in spring 1943; he was sent back to Berlin due to his dis-functioning. But, it is typical for Jebsen, that he exploited people around him. As he did with von Gronau, apparently Kurrer, but sadly also with Dr. Joachim Wrede (KV 2/560, dealt with at the begin of the Survey), who was murdered owing to financial favours asked by Jebsen. Proven in the "forensic Survey" several times - mainly based upon M.I.5 internal memos and discussions)
KV 2/861-2, page 17 (C)
Subject: report of interrogation of Gronau, Marie Louise von
Re Jebsen, "Johnny" (Johann Jebsen)
2. The following is the description of Jebsen, Johnny given by von Gronau: Approximately thirty (30) tears old of age (born 1916 or 1917 at Appenrade near the Danish (according Google.de: war von 1867 bis 1920 ein Landkreis in der preußischen Provinz Schleswig-Holstein) border (in accordance to what I understand is meant) as a Danish national); appears forty (40) years years old; however approximately 5' 9'' tall; reddish, blond hair, combed back; wears a heavy moustache from time to time; very slender; body bent forward; grey blue eyes; very pronounced cheekbones; unhealthy, pale complexion (lung disease?); smokes about 100 cigarettes per day; has brown-coloured fingers on right hand very bad teeth from frequent smoking; always wore dark Hamburg hat, dirty rain coat, umbrella and constantly unpolished shoes; wore ring with large ruby; eats little and drinks only champagne; unable to drive a car; rides horseback; studied law in Freiburg; writes philosophical books; married to a German actress named Petersen, Lore, who lived and probably still is living with her parents at Leipzig, Germany (her father was a schoolteacher. Lore is seven (7) years older than Jebsen).
3. Gronau then related that she met Jebsen in Lisbon Abwehr office in October/November 1943. Jebsen sent telegrams to Germany on three (3) separate occasions since he worked for the department of the H.W.K. (Handels und Wirtschaftskrieg - Trade and Economic Warfare). Both subjects (Gronau) and Jebsen lived at Estoril which caused Jebsen to take Subject home from the office in his car frequently. (AOB, as we formerly have learned that Jebsen was "unable to drive a car" that he must have had a chauffeur). They soon very much interested in each other for the following reasons according to Gronau: He wanted to marry her, but she was merely fascinated by his intelligence and wide knowledge, and tried → to gain more knowledge of philosophy and other subjects from him. →
KV 2/861-2, page 18
to gain more knowledge of philosophy and other subjects from him. → Jebsen also asked Subject (von Gronau) to take care of his large house at Estoril and supervise the four (4) servants there, to which subject agreed. Jebsen furthermore dictated to Subject (von Gronau) some of his business correspondence, but she can not recall any of it. Subject noted the seemingly inexhaustible funds always at the disposal of Jebsen. Subject (von Gronau) was also impressed and somewhat influenced by Jebsen's frequent ambiguous remarks about his idea of friendship, which must be international and across borders of countries, regardless of a state of war or peace".
4. In February 1944 Subject (von Gronau) received a direct order from Major Schreiber, head of her department, "not to see Mr. Jebsen, any more under any circumstances". Subject (von Gronau), as she claims, had nothing better to do than to see Jebsen the same evening warning him that he was under some kind of suspicion by the Abwehr. Jebsen ridiculed the suspicion immediately and upon Subject's direct question if he was a British agent, denied it first by ridiculing her telling her that he also could be working for the Abwehr without her knowing it (in connection with his work in the H.W.K.). Later on he made the following statement: "I am His Majesty's most loyal enemy". Jebsen, from then on, kept denying to her that he was aa British agent so frequently and in such a way as to only suggest and confirm to Subject (von Gronau) her suspicion that he actually was a British agent. Subject (von Gronau) to this day is not sure whether Jebsen was a British agent but strongly suspect that he was. When Subject went to Madrid for a week with Major Schreiber in February 1944, she also met Jebsen there. Jebsen later told Subject (von Gronau) that he met a "friend" of his at Madrid (a Yugoslav named Gluschowtz?).
5. Subject (von Gronau) continued to visit Jebsen frequently. He told her early in 1944 that he went to the British Embassy in Lisbon to send a telegram to one Rothschild, Anthony in England as well as to a woman in England whose name he did not disclose. It is known to Subject (von Gronau) that Jebsen received two (2) addresses from Rothschild, one in London and the other in Scotland. Subject also remembers Jebsen making a secret to a certain "Duschko" (Duško Popov = Tricycle). These meetings usually took place at night. "Duschko" was described by Jebsen as a Yugoslav official at the Embassy of the Yugoslav Government in London.
6. In early April 1944 Subject (von Gronau) was shown a highly classified telegram from the chief secretary in her office indicating the arrival in Lisbon of an investigative mission of the RSHA Berlin under Müller (Heinrich Müller nickname Gestapo Müller of Amt IV). This mission was to investigate Johnny Jebsen and his activities. Subject (von Gronau) claims → that she again informed Jebsen of the impending action against him.
KV 2/861-2, page 16
again ridiculed this threat by claiming that he had so much information of some
SD officers in Persia (AOB,
totally nonsense, as I have myself thoroughly investigated in the area of
Persia, and in 1944 there were not a single agent in that country. Even to
before then being Franz Mayr
Subject (von Gronau)
claims that Jebsen was also informed about the impending investigations of his
activities by the
representative in Oporto (Henss)
7. About the 18 April 1944 von Gronau received a telegram from
Berlin ordering her to leave Portugal for Berlin within forty-eight (48) hours.
Suspect, after spending her last day openly with Jebsen who even escorted to the
airport, arrived in Berlin 20 April 1944. (AOB,
something is wrong:
according Ostro, because I believe him as he had no reason for changing affairs
when interrogated by the Americans in 1946
that Frl. Lilly Craass came to Ostro's house in great panic and told them that
just von Gronau had informed her that she went to Jebsen's apartment
(seemingly being an
real estate, and she found Jebsen's location turned upside-down)
(AOB, whatever the
events and reasons - she must have been in Lisbon/Estoril legally or illegally
on 30 April 1944)
(AOB, I do not trust
the dates referred onto!)
Subject (von Gronau)
had an interview with Grosskopf (KV
2/3426), chief of her
department in Berlin, who at that time did not know anything about an order
recalling her to Berlin. Subject (von
Gronau) from then on
was frequently questioned by Grosskopf and a certain Sdf.
assistant) (Amt VI
Mil/Amt) (AOB, please
bear in mind: - that since 12 February after Vermehren's desertion the Abwehr
was forced to merge with RSHA Amt VI due to this merging known as Mil/Amt with
Obst. Hansen in charge)
concerning Jebsen. She was accused of having informed Jebsen of the
order prohibiting her from seeing him and also of having told Jebsen about the
telegram telling about the impeding investigation against him. (AOB,
I suppose that what she told must have taken place later in May - or even June
this, Subject (von
Gronau) claims, she
denied instantly but told her interrogators that the
representative from Oporto (Henss)
had informed Jebsen of the impeding action against him.
8. Meanwhile Subject (von Gronau) had received a letter from one, Scholl-Poensgen, Irmgard, secretary of the actual section in the German Embassy, Lisbon. She wrote that Jebsen, shortly before a proposed weekend trip to northern Portugal, had strangely disappeared and had not been heard of since (Moldenhauer?). Miss Scholl-Poensgen described what she knew of the incident. Jebsen wanted to tour northern Portugal with Mr. Brandes (actually one of Schreiber's V-Männer, alias Ballhorn and by this latter name Jebsen knew him); half-Jewish, working as representative for the firm Werner (was this the one owned by his mother?) and Company. Mr. Brandes last saw Jebsen at the Yugoslav Embassy in Lisbon. Jebsen claimed he had some work to do, and they made an appointment to meet again at the Yugoslav Embassy within a half hour. Thereafter Jebsen was neither seen nor heard from any more by Brandes. Miss Scholl-Poensgen, who intensively disliked and distrusted Jebsen, assumed in her letter that Jebsen had gone to England and that she was right after all in her suspicion of his (Jebsen) being a British agent (All this happened a few days before the Normandy Invasion - 6 June 1944. (Rubbish, as Jebsen had been abducted in the evening of 29 April 1944!). Brandes mysteriously turned up in Berlin also a few days after disappearance of Jebsen. Von Gronau, who was still being questioned at various intervals, was now asked by Sdf. Weiss whether she believed it possible that Jebsen had gone to England. To this she made a violent negative answer. Somewhat later Subject (von Gronau) met a finance clerk of the Madrid Abwehr Office in Berlin (Franzbach "Pago" or ZF?). Subject (von Gronau) does not recall the name of the official but maintains that he also was a friend of Jebsen. (AOB, Then it must have been Franzbach. Jebsen needed him for his many financial manipulations)
KV 2/861-2, page 20
Zahlmeister KOSp.) was
recalled to Berlin for questioning as well as on the Jebsen case. This
official told Subject (von
Gronau) that Johnny
Jebsen was under arrest in a
suburb of Berlin Zossen charged with high treason (Hochverrat),
which however could not be proven. He (Jebsen)
was sentenced instead for a "Devisen Verbrechen" in connection with some
20,000,000 French francs, not reported.
9. Subject (von Groanu) does not know where Jebsen went after his imprisonment at Zossen nor does she have any idea where he (Jebsen) is saying now or whether he is alive. After the end of the war upon Subject's (von Gronau's) request, her brother went to the firm, Jebson and Jessen at Hamburg for any information on the owner, Mr. Johann (Johnny) Jebsen. He was told that Jebsen had "died at Shanghai in 1936!" Subject (von Gronau) also wrote to a restaurant near Flensburg, Schleswig-Holstein, "G Rossadel Bylond" asking for any possible hint on the whereabouts of Jebsen. Jebsen had give Subject (von Gronau) this address (proprietor, Hans Christiansen) with the following remark: "Three days after the end of hostilities, a British pilot will report there (to the restaurant) and if you are present, he will pick you up to bring you to England" (implied to Jebsen).
10. The following is a list of people that Jebsen had frequent contact with in Portugal, Spain and France who are also known to Subject:
a. "Duschko" (Duško) (possibly Dusan as in paragraph Three of basic letter) - Yugoslav official at Yugoslav Embassy in London; his closest friend who he met only secretly.
b. Dluschowitz (?) - Yugoslav national at Madrid Yugoslav Embassy.
c. Oertzen, Baronin von - Used by Jebsen as a letter drop at Madrid.
d. "Madeleine" - Jebsen's girl-friend in Paris whom he contacted by mail through a Prince de Roan (?).
e. Brandes or Brandies (KOP V-Mann, he informed Schreiber among everything he got knowledge of concerning Jebsen!) Representative for Werner and Co. in Lisbon. (AOB, likely meant the Machinery Factory in Germany owned by his late father and, likely managed by his mother).
11. The following persons might be of assistance in locating Johnny Jebsen if he is still alive:
a. Sdf Weiss (assistant to Kuebart) - Amt VI and Mil/Amt
b. Major Grosskopf - Abwehr Berlin (KV 2/3426)
c. Schellenberg - Chief of Amt VI, SS Obergruppenführer ( KV 2/94 ... KV 2/99) (https://www.cdvandt.org/schellenberg-survey.htm)
KV 2/861-2, page 21
d. Brochaus, Hans - Wehrwirtschaftsführer-Öl, arrested by British, probably at Bad Nenndorf. (Still in 1947?)
e. Jebsen's wife, the former Lore Petersen, probably living at Leipzig (since 1946 living at Krefeld in the British zone) with her parents (father former school teacher).
f. Schreiber, Alois (Aloys) the former Obstlt. Chief I/H KOP in Lisbon, at present in Oberursel.
12. Agent's opinion: Marie Luise von Gronau probably does not know at present whereabouts of Jebsen. She seems strongly interested in what happened to he former boy-friend and, as she claims, has undertaken several inquiries since the war's end. Of course this can only be verified by interrogation of the indicated targets above. Von Gronau is well-experienced in intelligence work and is very intelligent and well-educated, making it understandable that she should have like Jebsen, who apparently was somewhat her master in experience, intelligence and education. Von Gronau does not know for certain whether Jebsen worked for the British Intelligence, but is almost ready to believe it, since he repeatedly suggested this fact to her with his ambiguous statements. Concerning Jebsen's activities for the G.I.S. von Gronau has only a small amount of information. She merely disclosed the fact that Jebsen was working for the H.W.K. and that his work, to her knowledge, involved the purchase of jewellery and precious metals only. This agent, although unable to find any flaws in Subjects (von Gronau's) statements, suggests that further inquiries be made about the truth of her disclosures in the case of Johnny Jebsen before this case is turned over to the British Authorities. There are four (4) personalities in the American zone at present, who should have information on the Jebsen case:
a. Schreiber, Alois (Aloys) - Obstlt. Chief I/H Lisbon, Technical Assistant at German Embassy , Lisbon at present at MISC Oberursel, top held until interrogated on the above case by CIC as of telephone conversation with Mr. Lierse, MISC-CI section, 24 Sept. 1946.
b. Schellenberg, fnu, SS-Oberführer, formerly Chief Amt VI and Mil-; RSHA; probably near Nürenberg as a trial witness.
c. Steimle, fnu, SS_Standartenführer, formerly Chief Amt VI B and Mil-B: last known to be at MISC Oberursel (Jan. 1946)
d. Sandberger, fnu, SS-Standartenführer, formerly Chief Amt VI A and Mil-A; last known to be in the vicinity of Nürnberg as a trial witness.
KV 2/861-2, page 61 + 62
(N) * (AOB): The according Erich Vermehren and his wife file series KV 2/956 .. KV 2/958 sadly belonging - to a scandalous and appalling chapter within the British Secret Services past. The Vermehren couple defected to the British, about 7 à 8 February 1944. In March the couple was first interrogated by S.M.I.E. in Egypt. There a servant came to the conclusion: that the "Couple Vermehren" could not be trusted. Why? They (using my own words) pointed that they were anti-Nazi but the good Germany was their country. Betraying British war-interest and hospitality? Not at all. But, they were hunted by the Secret Services as if they were traitors, since. Here the downside of Crown Civil Servants comes to light; as they themselves consider that they can decide the lives of these kind of poor individuals. You don't believe me? Please read the KV 2/956 .. KV 2/958 series yourself. M.I.5. did their best to get the couple be expelled from Britain, though only on a fears response by the Bishop of Canterbury prevented this. Both Vermehren's were very religious and humble people.
** Here in some way or another Jebsen surely did not tell the Vermehren's the truth. In this current "forensic Survey" is already dealt with the fact, that M.I.5 and M.I.6., were well informed on Jebsen's dubious financial doings. They rightly discussed whether his frequent manipulations was the cause of his disappearance. But (A) shows that Major Masterman was in Memorandum informed that Jebsen had confessed to the S.D. that he was a traitor and a British agent. Sadly pulling down the drain also Dr. Joachim Wrede in the same fatal fate: KV 2/560 in respect to Johann Jebsen's doom.
A search in my archives brought the according notice to light
KV 2/956-2, page 29
13th March, 1944
My dear Cowgill,
You will remember asking me whether we had any objection to bring Precious (= Vermehren) (and his wife) to this country as an agent of your organisation (M.I.6). I sad 'no' to your query and I still hold that there are no real security objections to this act but I may perhaps be of interest to you to know that the S.I.M.E. (Secret Intelligence Middle East) view of precious (Vermehren) is, that, while anti-Nazi he appears to retain patriotic German sentiments, and they (Vermehren including his wife) also estimate that he or his wife may later develop patriotic or religious scruples which may interfere with any genuine employment of them by you.
I imagine however, that you are looking for them too supply you with valuable intelligence already in their possession and, in these circumstances, I imagine you will not be affected by this S.I.M.E. opinion.
(AOB, they damm were, and during the many years the Vermehren couple made their life in England they did everything possible to hamper the family living. Had there ever been a second interview? No! Put to the very end of their stay in England - they were under constant surveillance! Reading correspondence, checking time-and-again their way of living far in the 1950s. Only due to this single notice!
(AOB, similarly Guy Liddell expressed also his resentments in this way, which only had been based upon: this single notice, just reproduced genuinely above!)
KV 2/861-2, page 64
Toeppen. was not shot at Belgrad(o). His family lives near Hannover and he is alive but actually in a working (Arbeitslager) in the Russian zone. Up to Popov's arrest he was all right, then he was arrested too and taken to Berlin. When the Russians occupied Berlin they freed him. If he gets back he will certainly contact Vermehren who will advise me.
Brandes (@ Ballhorn, at the end Feder) he was ex-patriated from Portugal with the last lot and is now in the American zone. As he was mixed up a lot with the kidnapping of Johnny I think it would be a good idea to lay hands on him for questioning (again) (AOB, to what I remember they couldn't trace him, since).
KV 2/861-3, page 83 as not to forget his black market engagements.
was employed by the Abwehr (since
or before 1940) and
ran an important agent in Jugoslavia (Popov/Tricycle,
Iwan I) and another
who carried on espionage in Great Britain under our (British)
control. He travelled extensively in Europe and engaged, on his won
account, in Black Market activities which caused him to come in conflict with
or Sipo) on more than
one occasion. Towards the end of 1944 (1942/1943),
while he was in touch with S.I.S. and for several months provided him with
valuable information about other German agents and officers.
of KV 2/861
KV 2/862-1, page 11 (K)
Minute 1251 continued rest missing
to get her pension (Lore Petersen - Jebsen's widow?) I think also that the same considerations apply to any action which might be taken by Ian Wilson, who was in fact the officer who ran the Jebsen case and I believe met him from time to time. Subject to your approval, therefore, I propose to reply to Ian Wilson that there is nothing, that we can do and which in our opinion he should do either. It does not, incidentally, seem to me to be very meritorious (commendable) case you will observe that the lady is proposing to marry again. (AOB, was Jebsen once not a very valuable friend in 1944?)
B.1. 17.8.1951 J.H. Marriott.
KV 2/862-1, page 11.
I am not aware of the details of this case and I do not know therefore whether we should as a department do what we can to assist Mrs. Jebsen in getting a pension from the German Government, but even if the services rendered by Jonny Jebsen to the department were such that we are under some moral obligation to assist his widow, I still agree with the views expressed by you, that we as a department should not give any certificate to Mrs. Jebsen, and Ian Wilson should be so informed.
If we are to assist Mrs. Jebsen in any way, we should I think take the appropriate action through the Foreign Office, who could in turn approach the Bonn Government.
20.8.1951 B.A. Hill
(AOB, time passes away, so do your friends)
KV 2/862-1, page 12 .
With reference to Minute 1255, I have summarised the relevant points and my summary is at 1256a. I must apologise for the unconscionable length of summary but it has necessitated wading through some 18 volumes.
In brief my conclusions are that we have no financial and very little moral responsibility for Mrs. Jebsen. However, if it is considered that our slight moral responsibility is such as to make it right that we should ask the Foreign Office to approach the Bonn Government, then this approach should be in the terms of penultimate (last but one) paragraph of my note at 1256a.
You may wish to pass the file to S.L.B., for his comments.
3.9.1951 Courtenay Young (M.I.6.)
KV 2/862-1, page 12
Reference minute 1257, I should like you(r) opinion on this point. My own agrees with Courtenay Young's as expressed above. to my mind there is no objection to writing to the Bonn Government on Mrs. Jebsen's behalf, providing we do not thereby invite the retort (reply) that, if Jebsen worked for us (has his mind already deteriorated so much?), we should bear the cost of his widow's maintenance.
D.B. D.G. White
KV 2/862-1, page 13 Very significant!
I have considered Courtenay Young's able summary at 1256a. My view of this matter is that if we are not very careful, any action we may now take might react to Mrs. Jebsen's detriment rather than to her benefit. you will see that her letter of the 8th July, annexed to serial 1250a, she states -"... I have applied for a widow's pension. As Jonny, however, was not killed in action but perished in a conzentration camp, a 'Sonderhilfsrente' (Special rent) can be considered only".
The Bonn Government are under an obligation under International Law to make some kind of retribution to persons who died in concentration camps. They are not, however, under any obligation under International Law to pay a pension to the widow of a traitor. If we take the action suggested in your Minute 1258 it will result in the Bonn Government being fully aware of Jebsen's activities, and they would be justified if they felt so inclined to refuse to pay Mrs. Jebsen even the lower pension which they are at present apparently considering paying her.
What I would suggest therefore is that Courtenay Young and I should call on the Foreign Office and put the facts to them, and that we be guided by the Foreign office as to whether any such approach should be made.
My own opinion, having read Courtenay Young's note, is that we have fulfilled in every way the moral obligation which we assumed in 1943. We then merely said that we would do our best to look after the welfare of the wife and made it quite clear at the time that we have done and in addition have done may other things to rehabilitate her.
I have discussed this minute with Courtenay Young who agrees in substance with what I have said above.
S.L.B. B.A. Hill
(AOB, were those once your great friends? Jebsen's fate was also due to TAR's query put forward on to Jebsen - whether he could provide information upon Ostro; M.I.5- and M.I.6's menace!)
KV 2/862-1, page 14
D.B. through S.L.B.
Mr. Hill and I saw Mr. Reilly at the Foreign Office this morning. We explained the Jebsen case to him and asked him whether the Foreign office would be prepared to make an approach to Bonn Government regarding Mrs. Jebsen. Reilly said that the Foreign Office would not be prepared to make such an approach. He also pointed out, as did S.L.B., that any approach might well do more harm than good.
Please see at 1262a a draft letter to Ian Wilson. I suggest that this is somewhat revealing it might be better if it did not go through the open post and that I should telephone to him and ask him to come round here when I could hand it to him. If he wishes, I will then show him the summary at 1256a, so as to satisfy his conscience (ethics). I should be grateful for your views on this procedure.
B.1. C.T. Young
(we still don't know how matters were executed)
(AOB, maybe we should consider: that Britain's glory was long passed, and the country lived in a recession. But still, it is quite painful know - how short-lasting their commitments against their former agents - actually were; a Great Nation?) (On the other hand, these file series concerning actually Popov's files. When we notice how childish this person behaved, once noticed: living a "Playboy" life (please see the document reproduced when this Survey has come to an ultimate closure), which it was; both Jebsen and Pop were behaving rather childish and spending great amounts of money:
(No more - no less: "Nouveaux Riches")
KV 2/862-2, page 7
Accidentally I came across a reasonable copy of Popov's passport Popov Douchan
Aliens Order, 1920
Certificate of Registration
Name Popov Duchan
KV 2/862-2, page 73
In the same file we find a quite poor photograph, but as it is the only genuine one we have access to we should use it.
we apologise for the quite poor photo quality, but we have to the accept way it is.
KV 2/863-2, page 60 Message sent on behalf of Popov
9th September, 1942.
Message sent 2105 GMT.
No. 117: No money has yet come. Will probably able arrange journey London over Lisbon as courier but my situation regarding money desperate. leaving here without regulating main debts put in danger my return. All material I possess I will bring with me because radio man refuses send long message. Could I meet Johnny at Lisbon?
(AOB, this message indicates that Jebsen was in Lisbon in 1942; whether staying in the two place Lisbon and Madrid I cannot judge)
KV 2/863-2, page 67 $ 10,000
26th August, 1942.
No. 116: I have not received the 10,000 dollars*. Last money received was in April by bank transfer. Nothing since. What has gone wrong with the plan about expert without hairs? Nobody has come to me. You should take not carefully of what I said about radioman. (see previous message) Most urgent you explain about money if he is to collaborate as before.
* AOB: According Books.Google: In 1941 a technician with three years' experience earned seventy-three dollars a month in the Saint John Laboratory, with no meals. Making annually $ 876. We must consider that the apparent difference: is mainly the consequence of Popov's exorbitant life-style; considering the payments to the radioman might have exceeding the salary of a US Laboratory technician.)
KV 2/864-2, page 35
i) Original German Text of Special Questions given to Tricycle (S.I.S. alias of Popov)
ii) Original German text of S.D. Questionnaire given to Tricycle (Popov) in Lisbon in January, 1944.
My only aim is, in this case, to point at the very fact that since the couple Vermehren's defection, the S.D. and likely Amt VI Mil/Amt was gaining significance.
KV 2.864-4, page 11 showing the chicken-feed was not always accepted:
Criticism for Ivan I (Iwan )(Popov).
The report about "Spartan Exercise" was not considered to be good. What Iwan reported was also in the press. The divisional numbers and/or the names of the commanders, commanding these divisions, should be reported.
I would like to terminate the chapters dedicate to Artist / Jebsen derived from Popov's large series of files which accumulated op to ca 4800 pages.
KV 2/861-1, page 4 (B)
Dusan 'Dusko' Popov was the playboy son of a wealthy industrialist from Dubrovnik. After graduating in law at Freiburg University in the mid-thirties he returned to Dubrovnik and opened his own law firm. In 1940 an old University friend friend invited him to Belgrade, told him he joined the Abwehr and persuaded him to work for German intelligence. Popov however was not convinced, contrived a meeting with a member of M.I.6. The Germans instructed him to travel to Britain via neutral Portugal in the guise of a businessman exporting raw material from Yugoslavia to Britain. Popov reported everything to M.I.6. and on arrival in Britain in December 1940 was met by B.1.a's (M.I.5.) driver and taken to the Savoy Hotel where he was introduced to
'Tar' Robertson. 'Tar' was favourably impressed
have here an agent of high quality". Originally codenamed
(Skoot) by 'TAR' (who thought he might!) he was soon renamed Tricycle as a more
fitting name of this most promising of agents!
Tricycle became the centre of a considerable network of agents, some imaginary (invented by B1a (Ian Wilson).
After the war he was given British citizenship and presented with the OBE (in 1947) by 'TAR' at an informal ceremony in the Ritz bar. He continued his flamboyant, playboy life and died in 1981 aged sixty nine.
(AOB, a critical note is, in my perception, necessary: The greatest part of the huge Popov file series are dealing with all sorts of money matters. I becomes quite evident - this he wasn't at the end so selfish; he had cost them huge sums of money. Also all sorts of difficulties which Popov left behind, in the many countries that were visited by Popov. His staying in the U.S. included!)
Popo's file series
KV 2/3426 Grosskopf
in our current context.
Obstlt. von Bohlen, Ludwig
Very very interesting file, though, by no means covering the Jebsen or Popov cases.
It touched a few time on Artist and Popov, though of no relevance.
most concerns his visa application about 1953!
Maywald (Maiwald) Martin
Worthless, the Germans have a valuable notice: Außer Spesen nichts gewesen! (Nothing except expenses; and these poor servants weren't aware of it!)
KV 2/269 - KV 2/270 - KV 2/271 - KV 2/272 - KV 2/273 - KV 2/274
A dark but essential document, which we have to take into account; whether we like it or not.
KV 2/269-2, page 32
Reorganisation of the Abwehr.*
22. Tricycle (Popov) report to Henss (SD representative in Oporto). It will be remembered that it was Artist's intention that this report should reach the hands of Kaltenbrunner. Unfortunately, Henss gave the report to Schroeder (Leiter representative of Amt IV (SD) at the Embassy in Lisbon) who has taken it with him to Berlin and has handed it to Schellenberg (Senior Leiter Amt VI Mil/Amt RSHA). Artist (Jebsen) had advised Henss to telegraph Kaltenbrunner (AOB, I doubt that his post possessed the facilities; as this was maintained in Lisbon) to the effect that the report intended for him has been taken by Schroeder to Schellenberg. In any case, Artist fears the desired effect of obtaining Kaltenbrunner's support for Tricycle has been destroyed.
* The date of extraction 30.4.44, is coincidental the day just after Jebsen's abduction.
I went through all the according KV 2/... files related to Kaltenbrunner directly.
Disappointing, the British Secret Services chose not to raze the query onto Kaltenbrunner's commitment in signing the order that Jebsen had to be handed over to Amt IV.
The picture pained time-and-again, was that his main concern covered Amt III (SD- Gestapo), Amt V (Kriminalpolizei) and Amt VI (actually Schellenberg's business).
After have digested the entire file series, I tend to suppose - that in someway or another fanatic Heinrich Müller directly could have approached Keitel allegedly on behalf of Himmler; with whom Müller handled mainly business.
As not to disappoint you too much I have selected the following rare photo:
Car registration Pol - 4
Pol = Polizei (Police)
Please take a careful look at the front, just between the head-lights, and the engine section; we clearly recognise a V shaped plate. In the first half of the 1960s I (AOB) drove old Mercedes type cars, and I am well acquainted with the view in front.
I suppose since the assassination of Heydrich in June 1942 in Prague, it had become evident that leaders at such high level should use protected cars.
Albeit, that in the file we also might have noticed his private Mercedes cabriolet.
The photos were among his possessions when he was arrested in Austria, by the Americans.
On 24 May 2020
I will give it again a try - whether some SD related file series may be more fruitful.
on Heinrich Müller (Mueller)
also known by the threatening nickname:
I has to be noticed that it concerns a quite brief file, as it consists of 29 pages only.
Mueller (Müller) Heinrich
AOB, this quite high Personal File serial number,
in my perception, points at the very fact that they haven't monitored him from the beginning.
He his career started with the regular police, thought he was most of the war heading the most feared Amt IV, including Sipo, SD, Gestapa and Gestapo.
Please notice also the many times, this file had been taken out of R 5's storage.
I must admit, that I have no idea what we are expecting; as this file had been downloaded on 7 December 2018, but I have not yet looked at it.
KV 2/2655, page 3
Name: Mueller (Müller), Heinrich. SS Obergruppenführer General der Polizei Source: statement by Ledebur
Address (part of Berlin where he lived: Berlin-Steglitz Source: statement by Kaltenbrunner
Age/Birth Date: 1894-1898 Source Merz (KV 203 - KV 2/206) to be considered next
28.4.1900 Source Ledebur
Politics: 1942. Was in S.D. (SD) in 1938. Originally with Stapo (Staatspolizei) München (Munich), expert on communism. Protégé of Heydrich. "Direktor Gen" (General) of the Gestapo (geheime Staatspolizei) Berlin in 1940. August 1941, went to Madrid. Jan. 42 Police Attaché at Lisbon (AOB, the proceeded by Schroeder; dealt with in this document). In 1943 Head of Amt IV of RSHA (R.S.H.A.),
KV 2/2655, page 4
Appearance: very active, gives impression of great intelligence. Source: Ledebur
(AOB, In one of Kaltenbrunner's file series, he explained that Müller had a poor marriage, and additionally two of his children were handicapped, of whom one even possessed mongoloid tendencies, and was to be kept hidden from the outside environment)
KV 2/2655, page 5
Head of Amt IV, rank of Gruppenführer General-Major der Polizei Regierungsrat. report on disturbances in France was sent to him. Visited Madrid and Lisbon end of Sept. 1942.
Source B.1.Reg. Folder No. 33 6a (M.I.5)
KV 2/2655, page 9
Subject: SS Obergruppenführer Müller (Muller) Alias Dr. Leo Lange.
1. Reference your PF 602698 / B.2.a / JC (M.I.5) dated 3 August 1949
2. This Head Quarters has no information to establish that Müller dies in the Chancellery Bunker with Hitler. Various investigations have been made from time to time since 1946 with a view of tracing Müller's whereabouts, if alive, but without success.
3. As regards the sinister Dr. Leo Lange we have no likely trace of anyone of the name. (AOB, I consider it not unlikely that he managed to hide somewhere, but he wouldn't be so stupid using a formerly used alias as before; by the way, by no means proving this assessment!)
4. Enquiries are now being made on the strength of your above mentioned letter and you will be informed of any further developments. (AOB, why not started it much earlier?)
Signed by: R.G. Hodges Capt.
For Major-General Chief, Intelligence Division Müller
KV 2/2655, page 19
KV 2/2655, page 20
"He was, however, polite, 'korrekt' , but perhaps too modest. He behaved in the typical manner of those who do not know how to act in a superior position, giving evidence of his inferiority-complex of a 'small man' at every opportunity. He was extremely servile towards his superiors, but seemed very hard and severe towards his subordinates. All those men, who came from the same narrow-minded burocratic atmosphere, especially those who were members of the Bayrische Landes-Polizei, such as Huber, Piffrader, and Meisner (he stayed as Police Attaché the entire wartime in Tokyo, be was an extremely bad man, that even Himmler advised to simply shoot him), enjoyed favoured positions with him.
Müller had a remarkable memory and knew every person who ever crossed his path, and all events. He was a living encyclopaedia for Himmler. I cannot imagine that he ever contradicted an order emanating from Himmler or Heydrich even it was against his own convictions. He always wanted to do everything himself, and gave his associates no chance for independent development; in fact, this bad habit had been criticized even by Himmler.
KV 2/22655, page 21
20th July attempt. All the important officials of Amt IV were engaged in these investigations. Huppenköthen handled the major cases, among them Fromm (Ersatzheer, Bendlerstrasse, Berlin) and probably Canaris (indeed, he headed the ultimate trial on the night between 8 and 9th April 1945 in which: Pfarrer Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Ludwig Gehre, General-Major Oster, Dr. Friedrich von Rabenau, Generalsstabsrichter Karl Sack and Dr. Theodor Strünck - had been convicted to death by hanging. The trial was a "Profisorium" not worth to be called a trial. All men were hung cruelly by means of music string-threats!) Huppenköthen, for instance kept in close touch with Kaltenbrunner in the investigation of from since that case involved the most delicate relations with the Wehrmacht. Amt III was able to furnish Amt IV considerable information about the 20 July affair.
KV 2/2655, page 8
Seemingly this page ends on 19.8.49
But when you look closely, you can recognise that below minute 10a the page have been covered by another blank page.
KV 2/2655, page 28
This page should concern minute 12 - but considering the manipulated previous page, we notice that the reference to minutes 11a and 12a have been made invisible!
What do they have to hide? Such practice mostly originated from M.I.6 interventions.
Please look carefully to the particulars of this page. We may see signs of various staples holes.
May these have previously concerned photo's or other kind of references?
We have sadly to terminate here, as the file does not provide more evidence.
I still regret again, that we haven't encountered references on Jebsen's fate.
On 25 May 2020
KV 2/202; KV 2/203; KV 2/204; KV 2/205 and KV 2/206
Hans Hermann Alwin Merz
The very file concerns police, SD, Sipo and related matters in Poland and Greece; as well as in a context Amt VI
However, as it deals with organisational Police matters, I have used the possibilities to make enhance my collection of notes.
Jost Heinz Maria Karl
Jost Heinz Maria Karl
Photo taken at Camp 020 in England (AOB,
KV 2/104, page 7
(AOB, my brief comment: Jebsen hardly new anything of Jost, nor of Schellenberg's Amt VI; as this message had been briefed to British Secret Services. I wonder whether the latter weren't better informed)
What is noticed originates from Popov's file series, but clearly had been added on behalf of the British Secret Service.
KV 2/104, page 22
On the flight back to Germany were quite with whom we have dealt with on our website, and some names even within this webpage
Only Kaltenbrunner was considered being a War Criminal, and was sentenced to death at Nürenberg (Nuremberg) in 1946.
On this webpage dealt with: Jost - Kaltenbrunner - Kuebart - Lorenz - Naujocks
Huntemann (England-Spiel / Nordpol) Gambke Peters and Raupach (are part of a common file KV 2/3015) references can be found on our index-page.
Jost claimed in England that he preceded Schellenberg at Amt VI
But, the facts are different.
After Jost had to leave Amt VI, Schellenberg had to rearrange Amt VI from the bottom up again; as to gain a valuable progressing military intelligence apparatus.
KV 2/104-2, page 4
Sturmbannführer (Major) Jebsen, travelling representative
Does Jost realised what he was stating?
(AOB: nonsense, rubbish)
Please consider (B) (for PC users - when you want to return here again, please press then: Ctr+Z)
In our context not of further relevance
On 26 May 2020
Major Obstlt. Ohletz
Always intriguing me; why?
Nationality German Ohletz
pob (place of birth) born 30.08.1910 (not noticed here: born in Essen)
emp (employment) 1932 & 1944: Army
reference PF 602765
1944: member Intelligence Service; Germany
05.10.1989: Current File Status: Red (Why just a few days before opening of the iron curtain?) (all these card are dated about like this on)
AOB: being expected that those ones live still in the communist controlled world? These cards are found within so files; in contrast to most file series.
KV 2/106-1, page 9
Please notice this so-called minute-sheet
The red stamps are encountered quite often within the KV 2/xxx series; informing us that the genuine page retained somewhere.
What it does not inform us, is that some has been made invisible. In my perception, this looks like M.I.6 or S.I.S. or Section V praxis'.
KV 2/106-1, page 10
Apparently is content being considered still to be kept hidden, for historians
KV 2/106-1, page 13
We would appreciate seven additional copies of the Report on information obtained from PW CS/2336 Obstlt. i G.* Ohletz (Tyrol)**, 8 May 45. C.S.D.I.C.*** SIR. 1825 11.Sept. 45. On Notes on Mil Amt C ***** and other Departments of RSHA.
V.48.F.8 (might point at M.I.6 or S.I.S.)
* i.G. meant "im Generalstab" implying that he went through a thorough officers education preparing for High Commands
** Tyrol might have been the area where he had been captured. But it also might have been connected to the "Alpenfestung" endeavour; where selected groups should survive and waiting for future operations. As we known: all in vain.
*** Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre
**** Mil / Amt was established after the Abwehr had to merge with RSHA Amt VI. Mil / Amt was shared between former Abwehr personnel and Amt VI personnel. Section C (Ohletz in command)
In our context Ohletz file does not contain anything on the Jebsen complex.
On 26 May 2020
Double cross name Dictionary
KV 2/964-1, page 4
We spoke about this matter on 26.1.45. It seemed to me that the arrangement (he becoming double-cross agent Dictionary) about Marcus was somewhat outside the normal arrangement by which our accredited agents are allowed into this country without examination at IRC. You agreed with this view and kindly said that is any such cases arose in the future you would see that we were informed. I think actually that in a case if this sort S.I.S. (M.I.6) should write to us stating their full reasons and what they intend to do with the body (downgrading for Mr. Marcus), before the man is despatched. I am now in possession of the full facts and cannot understand why this was not done. I am sending a letter in this sense to Vivian (M.I.6).
D.B. Guy Liddell (M.I.5)
KV 2/964-1, page 17
The matter is one of very great importance, as the forgery of Bank of England notes by the Germans has been on the whole very successful, and it is desirable to know as much as possible about the production of them. In addition to this it will probably be possible for the experts of the Bank of England to tell from Marcus' replies about the production of Bank Notes whether he is telling the truth or not.
What we can learn that there existed an animosity between S.I.S. (M.I.6) and M.I.5 personnel.
Though, some general information is provided but none in respect to our forensic Survey on Jebsen.
The second part (KV 2/965) runs into the 1950s.
It tends to be that the British Secret Services suspected Marcus (Dictionary) being a Russian agent in Western Germany.
On 31 May 2020
This forensic Survey took me nearly two (Corona) months of rather intensive file studies and editing, on a daily basis.
This endeavour resulted in 19 (XIX) Parts, which successively had been published on the web.
Part XX should cover my conclusion.
Though, conclusions should imply, in my perception, that every stone have been turned 'upside down' which would have blown my starting considerations: to take into account - all British Secret Services P.F. xxx files concerned. These serials are obtainable (downloadable) via the British National Archives website. Luckily, 99.9 % of these files have been filmed and provided in good reproduction quality PDF*, for affordable expenses.
We possess now > 101,000 file pages in the HW xx/xx and KV 2/xxx serials. (>98 GB)
* Archiving particular files have been straight from the beginning considered being of historical significance and got on their jacket a red stamp Historical. There, however, are existing also files which weren't protected straight from the beginning. Their reproduction quality most often is in black and white only, and often surviving in a rather limited quality; expressing it mildly. Though, relevant - because these often contain valuable information, essential for completing the understanding - and/or - context of German Secret Services. Of which, some files even originating from before the outbreak of the First World War (<1914).
Why have I initiated this Survey"?
Reason: I was highly upset by what had been encountered on Wikipedia concerning Johannes Jebsen.
(1) The editor who once has contributed this nonsense - forced me to start up a new, rather thoroughly documented, Survey; which I later was forced to rename it:
a "forensic Survey".
My objection, was, and still is, to take every source in consideration to which we have access to - within the British National Archives KV 2/xxx file series (>>4000).
We possess currently > 105.750 accumulated file pages.
I omit to repeat what someone have put on print before, because I highly doubt that their sources being truly genuine.
But, one never know which file actually proves to be fruitful.
As: quite many files have been destroyed over the more than seven decades; but, luckily quite often, some essential detail copies survived in other file series. But you never actually know in which one.
Some of you may have already started reading our forensic Survey;
and may have digested the many details concerned.
My sources were: (...) standing for all file numbers in between:
(C) Johannes Jebsen, wasn't born in Hamburg, as so often had been published, also at the criticised Wikipedia contribution(1); but according to Jebsen's girlfriend/mistress Baroness Marie Luise von Gronau (in Lisbon): he was born in Appenrade; near the Danish border (according Google belonging to Denmark, since 1920).
Jebsen, was born incredible rich, and lived a playboy like life in pre-war Nazi Germany. He, nevertheless, studied Law at the Freiburg i.Br. University, where he graduated. Freiburg University was quite popular among none German residents. He met there also Popov - who already, by then, became a friend of his. Jebsen, albeit, grown-up in a Nazi environment; nevertheless, we may believe that his fellow international student colleagues - have turned his mind and have converted his Nazi perception into an anti-Nazi discernment.
Source (B), originating from Popov's file series, informs us that Jebsen apparently already was in 1940, a member of the German Amt Ausland/Abwehr. The reason for it might have been his aim not to become engaged within the German military machine. An option was - to become engaged within a branch dedicated to military intelligence abroad.
Albeit, that he was married, he possessed in nearly all places where he went to for some time, to become engaged with new girl-friends in casu mistresses.
Another means were his financial engagements, which wasn't necessarily for his living, but more for his - fun or other means (maybe even greediness). Not always smart was his eager to be engaged within currency matters, even when he had to deal with those of the SS, and even betraying them; but also dubious dealing generally.
(C) Baroness Marie Luise von Gronau , a girlfriend / mistress in Portugal: considered him being a most intelligent person, but one, whom neglected is own health care. For instance, his smoking of about 100 cigarettes a day! His teeth were poorly kept, and even his right-hand fingers and nails showed severe brown signs due to his heavy smoking behaviour.
AOB: What is the difference here - between being intelligent and/or being smart? When we compare the very facts between the warnings put forward onto him, by say, T.A. Robertson (TAR) of M.I.5. on Ballhorn (his real name Hans Brandes) and his contrary believes and thus not taking the careful measures put forward to him serious; we must come to the conclusion: that his intelligence did not prevent him from responding rather naive and childish. In other words, he over estimated his personal judgments - being superior to what was forwarded to him on behalf of M.I.5. It has to be noticed though, that they (M.I.5 and M.I.6) had been seriously hampered by the very facts: that Britain's most secret asset the information gathered by deciphering Germany's (most) secret communications, which they gave the cover-name: Most Secret Source, or simply M.S.S. (MSS); which was based upon continuous decrypting German machine generated secret messages, generally known as Enigma machine codes (fore example) (think of Bletchley Park). The failure that it went this way - was the faulty assessments by British Secret Services, that their black spot and menace Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) should be lifted desperately. And Artist (Johann Jebsen) was trustworthy and living about the same area where Ostro lives. But Jebsen was so naive to contact a fellow German countryman Ballhorn (Hans Brandes) who was according Jebsen a trustworthy fellow German. But Ballhorn (alias of Hans Brandes), was a V-Mann engaged to KOP I H in Lisbon. He informed Dr. Aloys Schreiber at KOP in Lisbon, as well as in Berlin (Kuebart); the fact that Jebsen was "fishing" about Mr. Fidrmuc. Please consider reference (D). Albeit, his graduation at the Freiburg University, Jebsen apparently lacked an adult sense for reality; in my perception, his responding proved to be rather naive and childish!
(E) Quoting: The meeting between S.I.S. (Major Foley M.I.6) and Artist (Jebsen) on 28.4.44 (the day before Jebsen's abduction) was referred to in my previous note. A written report has now been received which slightly amplifies the information previously available. The written report states that Moldenhauer was in Lisbon on 28.4.44 staying with Artist. Artist had also reported that there was a chance of Brandes (Ballhorn) being recalled of his failure to produce his agents (rumours only). According to Artist, Brandes was worried that Tricycle should be so good an agent as Brandes was afraid that Tricycle would report the date and place of invasion and this prolong the war. Artist informed S.I.S. that although he was convinced that Brandes was not trying to trap him into any admission. Artist acted as though Brandes was so trying and therefore always reacted to Brandes' suggestions as a good German should. (AOB, Jebsen, apparently, did not grasp where he was talking about!)
(G) Quoting: He (Kuebart*) was also interrogated by an unknown Hauptsturmführer (late July and/or August 44 ). During these interrogations he was asked why he had not arrested Sdf. Wrede (KV 2/560) his failure to reveal Jebsen's attempt to bribe him (KV 2/860-1, page 49). Kuebart replied that he was not in charge of Wrede and considered such arrest to be unnecessary since Wrede's omission ?coined? to be actuated by stupidity rather than malice. He was also asked why he had made difficulties in handing over Jebsen to the S.D. after their demand therefore. He replied that as Jebsen was a soldier he regarded it as a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Abwehr. With regard to Moldenhauer Kuebart admits that Schreiber exceeded his scope in arresting this man, since Moldenhauer was merely concerned with Jebsen's plans to desert, and enjoyed civilian status. (AOB, incorrect: Moldenhauer was already in 1941 engaged in the Abwehr. Administratively he belonged to Nest Cologne (Köln). Both Moldenhauer and Jebsen were keen not get to be caught for service in the Wehrmacht. Madrid was no longer a secure place for Moldenhauer, and therefore he moved next to Lisbon. Both Jebsen and Moldenhauer knew each other already in 1941, maybe even earlier)
* Kuebart succeeded Hansen and shared the same Belinde barracks with Hansen. Both men had been arrested in the early morning of 22 July 1944. Considered as a close contact with Hansen, he was also arrested. And went through all SS interrogations. Though, Hansen who really was heavily engaged in the failed plot against Hitler, on 20 July 1944; Hansen was sentenced to death. Whereas Kuebart, was the first one who got a different censure (5 October 1944), he lost his military rank, pension, and was removed out of the Wehrmacht. But, he survived. Both men appeared for the fearful Volksgerichtshof (People's Court).
Another great nonsense encountered within Wikipedia's contribution on Jebsen: that he had withstand all SS severe interrogation methods - and not telling them about where to expect the future Allied invasion would ground.
This is ridiculous and a great nonsense: Fortitude was Britain's highest endeavour to keep the Germans expecting an eminent invasion everywhere - but not at the actual shores of Normandy.
AOB: Generally speaking: The British Secret Services played their agents to believe: being well informed and their best friend; which actually wasn't the full truth. They were kept convincing them, but factually: when the spell was over, they were regarded as former agents, no more - no less!
(K) and following correspondences: a rather shabby - but true story: Quotation 1: to get her pension (Lore Petersen - Jebsen's widow) I think also that the same considerations apply to any action which might be taken by Ian Wilson, who was in fact the officer who ran the Jebsen case and I believe met him from time to time. Subject to your approval, therefore, I propose to reply to Ian Wilson that there is nothing, that we can do and which in our opinion he should do either. It does not, incidentally, seem to me to be very meritorious (commendable) case you will observe that the lady is proposing to marry again. (AOB, was Jebsen once not a very valuable friend in 1944?)
Quotation 2: B.1.
I am not aware of the details of this case and I do not know therefore whether we should as a department do what we can to assist Mrs. Jebsen in getting a pension from the German Government, but even if the services rendered by Jonny Jebsen to the department were such that we are under some moral obligation to assist his widow, I still agree with the views expressed by you, that we as a department should not give any certificate to Mrs. Jebsen, and Ian Wilson should be so informed.
If we are to assist Mrs. Jebsen in any way, we should I think take the appropriate action through the Foreign Office, who could in turn approach the Bonn Government.
20.8.1951 B.A. Hill
Quotation 3: Minute 1258
Reference minute 1257, I should like you(r) opinion on this point. My own agrees with Courtenay Young's as expressed above. to my mind there is no objection to writing to the Bonn Government on Mrs. Jebsen's behalf, providing we do not thereby invite the retort (reply) that, if Jebsen worked for us (has his mind already deteriorated so much?), we should bear the cost of his widow's maintenance.
D.B. D.G. White
AOB: Mr D.G. White was during Jebsen's wartime engagements already in charge! I would like to consider: this had not been in Jebsen's and related minds, when they offered their services to the Allied's future.
Now our crucial query: remained Jebsen unbroken during the SS interrogations? No he did not! Evidence?
Wrede Summoned to Berlin:
At about the same period in the beginning of middle of May, Sdf. Wrede was summoned to Berlin and interrogated by Sdf Weiss (Kuebart's assistant), who taxed Wrede with his failure to admit Jebsen's attempt to bribe him.
Wrede confessed that he had not revealed this, and after a certain amount of discussion with Obst. Hansen, who whished to avoid any further trouble over this whole question, Wrede was sent back to Paris.
(L) As will seen later, Kuebart's failure to have Wrede arrested, was brought before the People's Court (Volksgerichtshof) with the events of July 20 1944) (notice on Wrede also: Part_I + Ia)
AOB: To what we so far have noticed in my current Reflections - we may at least draw some conclusions: - that Jebsen was not the person who was painted by the editor of the first quoted (1) Wikipedia introduction. Dr. Wrede was also murdered by the SS machinery; though, it was Jebsen who is to blame for it directly. Why? Because Jebsen told Ballhorn (alias of Hans Brandes) naively about his bribing efforts in regard to Dr. Wrede! Jebsen admitted ultimately during his interrogation that he had been a traitor. And: In all countries of the world "High Treason" results during a war inevitably in a capital punishment. Though, of course not, the cruel way the SS controlled Germans commenced it.
A final, critical note, may be necessary.
Dr. Schreiber (KV 2/3568) Jebsen's German handling Abwehr officer, at some time being interrogated, noticed that Jebsen was also an opportunist.
He may, after all, being considered a bit this way.
As his main aims seemingly above all: concerned his financial (dubious) dealings, which were well known to his guiding - and controlling British Secret Service officers in England.
Another, rather embarrassing behaviour particularly in respect to Popov, but also Jebsen, was the way they managed their expenditures.
What to say: Popov when staying in London gave M.I.5 his recent evening-meal bill to his handling M.I.5 officer.
He was staying at the Savoy Hotel (Strand); spending for his (own) evening meal > £9. We must bear in mind - that in those days: British £1 stood for >10 Dutch guilders. Implying that his dinner had cost him: > 90 Dutch guilders in 1944 (we are not on the black market)! People spending so much, in those days, lacked the real understanding of what the value of money constitutes!
Jebsen in other context showed also little understanding what the value of money implies.
My, maybe, downgrading opinion (B) is: that both men - showed that they belonged to the so-called "Nouveaux Riche" category; where playboys quite often belong to.
Those who really would like to gain an opinion concerning Popov's - as well as Jebsen's papers - which are included - please obtain yourself the KV 2/845 .. KV 2/864 file series (ca 4900 pages); but I warn you: you most likely will become upset by Popov's expenditures - and the troubles he caused; even quite a long time after the end of the war.
It is rather disappointing noticing his (Popov's) financial doings, partly paid for on behalf of the British Secret Services; thus the British tax payers.
To express it straight: he behaved also quite childish!
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By Arthur O. Bauer